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In an age of globalised, highly competitive, volatile and financialised markets, the 
question of how to effectively organise workers to win concrete improvements in 
their working lives is increasingly difficult to answer. This thesis builds on four years 
of action-research, which supported eight unions in one company spread across five 
countries, to coordinate some of their actions and to push for a Global Framework 
Agreement to secure workers’ associational freedoms. It highlights the difficulties 
that workers face when trying to collaborate across borders and argues that any 
attempt to effectively study or empower trade unions at the scale of their 
multinational employer must pay attention to the spcific factors which condition 
their agency as well as to the goals, tactics and enactments through which the ideal 
of international solidarity is embodied.  
The company studied produces silicon chips, employing approximately 28,000 
workers across highly capital-intensive processes of research, development and chip 
production in the Global North, alongside 17,000 workers in the Global South to test 
and assemble the circuits. Between 2005 and 2016, the company underwent a 
process of financialisation, distributing ever larger dividends to its shareholders, 
whilst decreasing capital expenditure and implementing several restructuring and 
layoff plans. Faced with what they saw as an existential threat to their company’s 
future, seven unions from four different countries (France, Italy, Morocco and 
Malaysia) organised successful joint actions to secure greater capital investments 
and the replacement of the corporation’s senior management team. Following this 
campaign, these unions, joined by an eighth from Malta, created an international 
network to exchange information and campaigned without success for the company 
to sign a Global Framework Agreement. This attempt to organise across sites, 
languages, cultures, and institutional contexts, I argue, acts as a microcosm of the 
difficulties workers face in their efforts to exert power in a world characterised by 
globalising and centralising production and intensified financialist on.  
This thesis makes two contributions to labour geography and struggles for workers’ 
rights more broadly. First, it argues that any attempt to understand these struggles 
and their chances of success must be attuned to the ac ually-existing conditions of 
building solidarity and that these conditions cross a number of spatialities and 
temporalities. The unions’ international solidarity efforts were balanced on a series 
of contradictory and uneven relationships. Their memb rs were tied to specific 






reverberated across the sites. Each union reflected their members’ experiences and 
socio-spatial positionalities, whose register crossed a number of scales and each 
union was threatened and/or co-opted by corporate tactics and stood by different 
ideological visions. Unless scholars and activists at end to these detailed variations 
and stories, practices and studies of international labour solidarity will remain an 
abstract ideal, rather than placed in the grounded and ‘messy’ attempt by workers’ 
organisations to deal with and work across multiple differences. Second, it argues 
that international efforts which focus on formal processes of rule-making at the 
expense of more grassroots and militant approaches stifl  international collaboration. 
To sustain international collaboration, instead of an institutional and “dialogue”-
based approach, which underplays the conflict opposing workers and their 
employers, trade unions should push for ambitious demands based on shared 
experiences and interests and engage in truly reciprocal forms of solidarity, rather 
than semi-patronising “help” models, whilst recognisi g that these discussions are 
traversed by each unions’ local realities and ideological stances. Ultimately, this 
thesis reminds us that building a sense of collectiv  agency at the international scale 
is an iterative process, necessary but difficult, facing constant threats and changing 
circumstances. In the face of a global economy managed with increasing disregard 
for workers’ dignity and survival, let alone their power, it is vital that geographers 
pay increased attention to the strategies, challenges, and achievements of unions both 




The dream of international solidarity is encoded in the progressive labour movement 
and, given the increasing power of multinational corporations, continues to make 
some workers’, activists’ and militant scholars’ eyes sparkle with hope. This thesis 
presents and analyses one recent attempt to make rel this elusive dream of worker 
empowerment through greater international solidarity. I examine the international 
grassroots campaign and then the trade union network organised by eight unions in 
one semiconductor company. My study sets forth in detail the possibilities, 
complexities and limits of international solidarity today. 
  
Semiconductor chip production encompasses highly capital-intensive processes, 
including research and development and chip production (front-end activities), and 






(back-end activities). This company, in contrast to m st semiconductor companies, 
continues to directly employ workers in both front- and back-end sites, connecting 
diverse workforces and work requirements through its production chain. The large, 
and ever increasing, capital investments required for front-end sites, as well as the 
industry’s central role in the control of the fourth industrial revolution’s deployment, 
have prompted many states to aid their national semiconductor companies through 
financial support, preferential agreements and ongoing versight. The company 
operates within an increasingly financialised landscape, which prompted its senior 
management teams to favour strategies which maximise shareholder value at the 
expense of R&D, updates of means of production or improvements in working 
conditions. In this case study, eight unions launched an international campaign to 
confront the growing financialisation of their company, a campaign which led to the 
construction of a trade union network aiming to improve workers’ rights across the 
company. This thesis analyses how the company’s sectorial chara teristics, which I 
show to be tightly bound with uneven landscapes of regulation and support, workers’ 
socio- spatial positionalities and unions’ own ideologies both enabled and 
constrained international collaboration among eight unions from five countries 
(France, Italy, Malta, Malaysia and Morocco). The unions were brought together 
around common interests, including fighting the threats implicit in financialisation, 
sharing information between sites and campaigning for the company to sign a Global 
Framework Agreement. However, over the course of three years, their differing 
ideologies, the ongoing everyday and local pressure th y faced as well as the 
difficulty of sustaining truly reciprocal forms of solidarity prompted the network to 
suspend its activities.  
  
I adopted an action-research approach and was embedded from 2015 to 2019 in the 
activities of an alt-labour NGO. I followed the unfolding of the campaign through 
the network of unions and complemented my observations with interviews and site 
visits. I claim that international solidarity within a TNC remains a process fraught 
with conflicts and traversed by workers’ contradictions, but one that can succeed. 
While I offer no comprehensive solution on practicing international solidarity, I 
construct a detailed and comprehensive case study which may inform future attempts 
at creating transnational solidarity and contribute to labour geography’s core 
questions regarding workers’ ability to shape the globalised and financialised world 
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In February 2018, six months before my funding was due to run out and the first 
month in a while since my health had stabilised, lecturers, post-graduate students 
and post-doctoral researchers went on strike for 14 days across the UK. At the 
University of Edinburgh, we stood outside of our department in the cold, feeding the 
fire we maintained for warmth, eating too many sweets. We were exhausted and 
excited. As we dug in, I was impressed by the broad support from students and staff. 
There was excitement, notably when students occupied a building and when our 
University and College Union (UCU) branch gathered to refuse the first deal offered 
by the universities and pension scheme bodies. In March, another deal was on the 
table. Our UCU branch voted against it, arguing that e offer did not recognise how 
the main issue lay in the valuation scheme chosen, which was based on ideologically 
loaded hypotheses. National UCU representatives agreed to let the pension issue fall 









This was my first professional experience of what mny of my research participants 
live regularly: the exhilaration of standing by one’s principles and political 
commitments, and the emotional and monetary costs that it requires. I felt 
empowered when escaping the sometimes grinding and alienating pressures of work. 
I felt a suspended and slightly magical quality to this open time of possibilities, 
discussions, hopes and collective resistance. I also felt the tiredness; the sense of 
pushing a rock up a hill to see it fall back again; the schisms which opened amongst 
us as some crossed the picket lines whilst others did not; the tensions across scales 
of organising; the various ways to practice “unionism”; the complexity of reformist 
and radical goals coexisting.  
I start this thesis with reference to our strike because this experience helped me 
understand the complexity of the decisions the workers I studied had to make. 
Reflecting on my experience helped me understand emotionally and personally how 
tensions between people get magnified when wages and time are put on the line and 
when it becomes about more than wages, and touches pon issues of dignity, respect 
and collective power. In our strike, I weighed the impacts on my work, energy and 
research against the moral and political imperative to support my colleagues and my 
rights. As personal pressures increased, it was not easy to stick with the picket line. 
In those moments, I reminded myself of Don Mitchell's (2008a, p.66) 
straightforward argument that “we never have the luxury of not choosing sides […] 
[or] of not working in solidarity.” I chose my side, as one committed to fighting for 
the respect of workers’ rights, dignity and needs, both during the strike and in the 
research presented here.  
 







Most laypeople in France would not recognise the name STMicroelectronics (ST) 
unless they are from l’Isère, a region dubbed the “Fr nch Silicon valley,” or closely 
follow financial markets. And yet, with revenue of $8.42 billion (ST, 2019, p.10), 
ST belongs to the top forty capitalised French companies, is one of the few 
companies left that produces semiconductor chips in Europe,1 and remains one of 
the largest industrial employers in France and Italy, midst a global workforce of 
over 45,500. The company maintains so-called “front-end” manufacturing and 
Research and Development (R&D) sites in Global North countries and “back-end” 
assembly and testing sites mostly across the Global South (see Map 1.1). ST’s 
production thus crosses over a multiplicity of places and connects diverse workforces, 
which are differently organised and have varied sources of power (see Figure 1.1). 
For instance, Italy, Morocco and France have industrial models that encourage and 
enforce collective bargaining agreements regardless of union density and allow 
competing unions within the company. In contrast, workers in Malta and Malaysia 
are permitted to join only one union and no independent union exists in ST sites in 
China and in the Philippines.  
 
Map 1.1: ST front-end and back-end sites throughout the world, map extracted from a 
promotional document put out by ST 
 
                                                          
1 Along with Global Foundries (U.S.A.) and Texas Instruments  (U.S.A.) in Germany; NXP, 
owned by private equity funds in Germany and the Netherlands; Infineon, owned by private 
equity funds, in Germany and Austria; and IBM  (U.S.A.) in Ireland. This non-exhaustive list 






Figure 1.1: Trade unions, sites and trade union membership ST sites in France, 
Morocco, Malta, Malaysia, China, Singapore, the Philippines and China. The 
colour code indicates front-end (blue) or back-end (green) status 
Name Site(s) Number of members 
Confédération Générale 
du Travail (CGT) 
Grenoble, Crolles 
1, Crolles 2, Tours, 




No numbers. According to national 
statistics, approximately 8% of 
French workers in large private 
companies belong to a union 
(Dares, 2018). If true for ST, this 
would correspond to 
approximately 800 people in 
STMicroelectronics across 6 
unions. As the CFDT, CGT and 
CFE-CGC are the most 
'representative' unions, based on 
the triannual site elections, one 
could guestimate that their 
members must be between 200-
400, with fewer members in FO, 
CAD and UNSA. 
Confédération Française 
de l’Encadrement - 
Confédération Générale 
des Cadres (CFE-CGC) 
Confédération Française 
Démocratique du Travail 
(CFDT) 
Force Ouvrière (FO) Tours, Crolles 2, 
Rousset  
Union Nationale des 
Syndicats Autonomes – 
(UNSA) 
Grenoble, Crolles 
1-2, Tours, Rousset  
Collectif Autonome de 
Salarie.es de ST (CAD) 
Grenoble, Crolles1-
2, Sofia, Rousset   
Union Marocaine du 
Travail (UMT)  
Bouskoura 
(Morocco) 
85% membership, approximately 
2200 members 










No data. According to national 
trade union statistics 50% of the 
Maltese workforce belongs to a 
union. In ST, this would represent 
800 workers. However, the factory 
features a high turnover rate and 
new workers often do not join the 
union. 





 35%, approximately 1260 workers 





No data. Closely linked to the 
Communist Party, this is a 
mandatory union in all companies 
 
Calamba (The 
Philippines) No union 
United Workers of 
Electronics & Electrical 
Industries (UWEEI ) 
Ang Mo Kio 
(Singapore) 
This is a democratic union, tightly 
linked to Singapore’s tripartite 
system of industrial relationships 
Confederazione Generale 
Italiana del Lavoro  
(CGIL-FIOM)  
Agrate, Castalletto, 




According to trade unionists, 
approximately 30% of workers are 
unionised (i.e., some 3350 
workers). They did not provide the 




Unione Italiana del 







ST’s latest 2019 Sustainability Report (2019b, p.39) claims a high compliance with 
labour rights requirements and outlines ongoing measures to make sure “all of [its] 
employees are treated with respect and dignity,” whilst boasting of its participation 
in the Responsible Business Alliance. An examinatio of ST unearths no horror 
stories about working conditions; on the contrary, the company provides stable and 
reasonably well-paid jobs to its employees. Yet, it has also laid off over seven 
thousand workers in the last ten years, diverted an increasing share of its profits to 
its shareholders, and like most transnational corporations (TNCs), organises internal 
competition between its sites to “whipsaw”2 states and unions to its advantage, 
illustrating, at its scale, the globalised, competitive, volatile and financialising ways 
in which global markets are operating and the consequences for workers.  
ReAct is a French alt-labour NGO driven by the simple slogan that “since companies 
are global, so must be the resistance against them” (ReAct Manifesto, 2016). Critical 
of existing structures of international trade unionism for being overly bureaucratic 
(notes, June 2015), they have supported grassroots-based union networks since 2010 
to encourage shop-floor union representatives to take part in international labour 
solidarity efforts. In 2014, ReAct members approached leaders of the CGT in ST to 
assess with them how they could support workers to form a union in the ST Calamba 
(Philippines) factory and associations of workers at ST’s factories in Shenzhen and 
Longgang (China).3 These first ambitious goals were quickly abandoned following 
a shift in strategy by ReAct’s Chinese partner and because organising ST Calamba 
workers was no longer the Filipino union’s priority. Instead, ReAct members and I 
contacted unions in Morocco, Italy, Malta and Malaysi  to foster greater 
international exchanges within ST and support an international campaign against 
ST’s financialisation, which was followed by the creation of a trade union network 
(TUN) in September 2016. Unions hoped to use this TUN to share information 
regarding social benefits, working conditions and loca  struggles amongst 
participating unions, and to launch a campaign for a Global Framework Agreement 
(GFA), a negotiated code of conduct between a company and labour represntatives. 
From then until the beginning of 2019, ST unions puhed for ST to sign a GFA. In 
2019, having not succeeded and facing ongoing difficulties, the TUN disbanded, 
though unions still intermittently exchange information.  
                                                          
2 Whipsawing refers to a tactic whereby “one negotiat r plays off at least two other parties 
against each other to gain an advantage” (Greer and H uptmeier, 2016, p.30). 






Drawing on this four-year-long action-research project, during which I analysed the 
rise of the TUN and helped it come into being, thisesis examines how unions can 
build power at the scale of their transnational employers and use TNCs as potential 
“key nodes in the cartography of international employment […] to forge networks 
of solidarity between workers across space” (Wills, 2001, p.487). Given the 
extraordinary development of TNCs following neoliberal globalisation, scholars 
have encouraged trade unions to reconnect with international solidarity practices and 
build international structures able to match the power of TNCs for them to continue 
to defend their members’ interests and workers’ rights and dignity (Amin, 2008; 
Bieler, 2012; Bieler et al., 2010; Brookes and McCallum, 2017; Evans, 2014, 2010; 
Lindberg, 2014; McCallum, 2013; Munck, 2010; Waterman, 2001). Building such 
solidarity, I argue, is both about confronting shocking instances of workers' 
exploitation, and more generally about fighting against the mundane ways in which 
TNCs have built power, whilst commanding a system that has seen workers’ global 
share of rising productivity gains steadily decline over the last thirty years (ITUC, 
2016). Scholars have suggested that greater NGO-labour collaboration and 
grassroots efforts are key to achieving long-term and militant international solidarity 
(Brookes and McCallum, 2017; Cumbers et al., 2016; Evans, 2014; Zajak et al., 
2017). This thesis analyses the difficulties faced by ST unions to enact a grassroots 
internationalism and unions’ constrained ability to overcome these challenges. I do 
so by attending to the spatialities and temporalities in which unions were embedded 
and the multiple loyalties and ideologies which both pulled unions apart and brought 
them together. These formed the actually existing conditions for building and 
grounding solidarity, and, I claim, examining these factors needs to be central to any 
attempt to understand and encourage workers’ interna ional solidarity efforts.  
- - - 
The ideal of global solidarity was most famously proclaimed in Marx and Engels' 
(2004) summons: “Working men [sic] of all countries, unite!”4 Marx and Engels 
based this hopeful call upon a dialectical materialist understanding of history, 
according to which each system of production sows the seeds of its own destruction. 
For capitalism, its demise would result both from internal contradictions in the quest 
to realise profit and from the rise of a new agent of history, the working class. Marx 
and Engels (2004) believed that capitalism, by centralising the means of production 
                                                          
4 Though this sentence is associated with the Communist Manifesto, Flora Tristan, a French 







and relying on a constantly expanding market of production and exchange, would 
bring about greater contact and interdependence among workers throughout the 
world. Further, by transforming individual workers into interchangeable commodity 
producers, by bringing them together in increasingly large production units and by 
changing them into mere appendages of a wider social machine, capitalist relations 
of production would create shared experiences of exploitation and alienation across 
the world. This vision of commonality across difference fuelled the labour 
movement and its rhetoric of class. A unifying identity and shared destiny, 
encapsulated under the term “working class,” would come about for the people who 
had become “the masses of wage earners in these new relations” (Denning, 2007, 
p.128) irrespective of nationality as “modern industry labour, modern subjection to 
capital […] has stripped [the proletarian] of every trace of national character” (Marx 
and Engels, 2004, p.20). United by capitalism, workers across the world would 
promote their long-term common interests and together overhaul this exploitative 
system. Internationalism referred to both the ideal of international solidarity between 
the working class and the means to achieve greater power for workers.  
As a scholar and activist, I am drawn to the prefigurative discourse put forward by 
Marx and Engels, that people can break down imposed spatial belonging,  reimagine 
what they share in common, and fight for an alternative society.5 However, I am also 
aware that this dream, at its core, displays a normative and universalist idealism, 
which claims the global relevance of class as the common experience around which 
workers should organise, when the history of chauvinism, patriotism and war plainly 
debunks this dream. Feminist scholars have further s own internationalism to be a 
metanarrative that glosses over power imbalances between workers and the sexist 
and colonial practices of the industrial working class (Gibson-Graham et al., 2000; 
Katz, 2006; M. Wright, 2006). Both historically and now, there is no “abstract 
worker" but only masses of workers whose lives are geographically, socially, 
politically and economically diverse and crisscrossed with competition. Workers 
often resort to a racist or nationalistic discourse in attempts to protect themselves 
from perceived threats to their jobs and ways of life (Silver, 2003) and their 
organisations have also undermined other workers’ rights. For instance, throughout 
the 20th century, many Global North unions entered into types of national 
                                                          
5 I believe it is important to understand Marx and Engels as both astute scholars nd political 
activists, who produced concepts with the aim of reframing so-called natural laws to change 
reality. Wills (2008a p.308) notes, “it is importan to recognize the role of Marxism in making 






compromises,6 when they agreed to tame industrial action and cooperated with 
representatives of capital and nation-states to increase labour security and reap a 
share of the rewards of colonialism and industrial growth (Bieler et al., 2010; 
Braverman, 1974; Lindberg, 2014; Munck, 2010; Standing, 2009; Waterman, 2001). 
This nationalisation weakened many internationalist practices previously supported 
by trade unions. Van der Linden (2003, p.16) notes, 
As soon as the British trade unions became nationally strong enough 
to rule independently on the admission of individual tr de groups to 
the labour exchange, the necessity for an organisation that regulated 
the labour market internationally [disappeared]. 
Not only did unions’ means of power focus upon the national scale, but so did the 
ideologies that guided them. Waterman (2001) claims that in the 20th century, a type 
of “national internationalism” arose whereby international union institutions and 
practices reflected national divisions, whilst Anderson (2002) adds that the ideal of 
internationalism lost ground to nationalism, which often became the frame through 
which workers imagined their liberation.  
- - - 
Whilst history and theory plainly outline how workes’ multiple and contradictory 
affiliations have challenged international solidarity efforts, reconnecting with this 
ideal feels more urgent than ever given the growing globalisation of production and 
exchange, the growing reach and power of TNCs, the rising nationalist discourses as 
well as race-to-the-bottom measures that seemingly drive most states’ labour policies. 
Several national labour movements and campaigns have re ched similar conclusions, 
re-embracing an internationalist agenda (Bronfenbroner, 2007; Croucher and 
Cotton, 2012; Lerner, 2007a; 2007b). International union campaigns, often 
spearheaded by reinvigorated Global Union Federations (GUFs) have attempted to 
negotiate at the international level to improve workers’ rights and have organised 
successful transnational cooperation (Croucher & Cotton, 2012; Fairbrother & 
Hammer, 2005). Using global support, notably in the home countries of selected 
companies, campaigns have negotiated better national bargaining agreements 
(Anderson, 2009; Banks & Russo, 1999); fought against plant closure (Castree, 
2000a; Herod, 2001a) ; supported workers’ organising efforts in anti-labour climates 
                                                          
6 By the end of the 19th century, van der Linden (2003, p.37) explains that, p rtly to “[suppress] 
social and political unrest and [take] the wind outf he labour movement‘s sails” and partly 
in response to emerging labour movements, many Global North states introduced labour 
regulations, systems of national collective bargaining agreements and types of welfare 
programs. In addition, mandatory education and military service encouraged workers’ and 






(Anner, 2009; Brooks, 2016; Delpech, 2015; McCallum, 2013; Tate, 2006); and 
forced TNCs to reinstate unjustly fired workers (Anderson, 2015; Anner, 2009; 
Birelma, 2018; Brookes, 2017; Cumbers, Nativel, et al., 2008; Juravich & 
Bronfenbronner, 1999; Sadler, 2004a). More recently, GUFs have turned towards 
fighting and lobbying for companies to sign GFAs, which nominally acknowledge 
workers’ basic freedoms (Dufour-Poirier & Levesque, 2013; Fairbrother et al., 2013; 
McCallum & Fichter, 2015). Concurrently, GUFs have created institutions to 
facilitate the exchange of information within TNCs, such as workers councils and 
TUNs (da Costa & Rehfeldt, 2009; Fairbrother & Hammer, 2005). Hennebert (2010, 
p.9) defines a TUN as  
A relatively flexible grouping of unions from differ nt countries 
which represent workers from the same multinational corporation. [Its] 
objectives are usually to facilitate the exchange of inf rmation and the 
sharing of experiences between country members, to improve workers’ 
rights in the countries where they are not guaranteed and to coordinate 
unions’ actions internationally. They might also seek to open new 
arenas for social dialogue and collective bargaining at the international 
scale. 
These international efforts, whilst they demonstrate how workers may use 
globalisation to their advantage, remain fraught with difficulties, and crucially, 
scholars argue, are shaped by unions’ scaled belongings. Lillie and Martinez (in 
Fairbrother et al., 2013, p.4) thus claim that 
Trans- and inter-national strategies can only be understood in the 
context of the interaction between unions’ embeddedness in national 
regulation, and globalizing production, resulting in transnational 
unionism consisting of a set of relationships betwen competing 
national players with competing visions of ‘the global’ within global 
production structures. 
In addition to national embeddedness, Dufour-Poirier and Levesque (2013, p.52) 
argue, “transnational unionism also needs to be located in time and space,” since the 
unions which compose transnational movements face local issues that capture their 
attention and weigh upon their international interaction. Their observation suggests 
that transnational union efforts need to be located in the variegated times and spaces 
that each union belongs to. These reflections reflect labour geography’s project to 
assess the impacts of workers’ scaled belongings and spatial embeddedness upon 
their agency (Herod, 2003a). Adding to the attention o space, Coe and Jordhus Lier 
(2011) stress that the need to examine the temporal dimensions of workers’ agency 
and to “embed” unions’ varied positionalities within specific states and Global 
Production Networks (GPNs). My study uses this notion of “embeddedness” to 






political and technological factors upon unions’ ability to build power at a range of 
scales. To get beyond the understanding of embeddedness as only reflecting workers’ 
positionalities and as “rigid”, I analysed unions’ ideologies and their impact on the 
international process and showed how workers’ experiences of financialisation 
brought them to recognise common interests and fight for it together. Here, I expand 
on how my thesis contributes to these three aspects, namely the semiconductor sector, 
unions’ stances and the experience of, and resistance to, financialisation. 
My thesis examines workers in the semiconductor sector, which, despite having 
fuelled the growth of the world’s GDP and revolutionised our societies (Brown & 
Linden, 2009),7  remains poorly understood from the perspective of unions’ 
international efforts.8 Representing a $30 billion market in 1987, semiconductor 
production and assembly ballooned into a $410 billion industry by 2017 (Statista, 
2017, p.7), establishing itself as one of the world’s most profitable industries, just 
below the internet and software industries (Ezratty, 2014b). Dicken suggests, 
“Microelectronics has replaced the automobile as today’s ‘industry of industries’” 
(in Silver, 2003, p.104). However, Silver (2003, p.104) argues that employment in 
the semiconductor industry “has not had a direct impact of working-class formation 
equivalent to the historical impact of textiles or automobiles.” Rather, the 
semiconductor industry has developed a complex interna ional division of labour, 
reflected in ST’s GPN. Workers in the Global North are strongly divided between 
blue- and white-collar jobs with blue-collar positions steadily declining because of 
the industry’s rising automation, whilst in the Global South, workers have yet to 
enter “the ranks of the relatively well paid working class” (Luthje et al., 2013, p.235) 
and face a range of corporate tactics to prevent their organising (Asia Monitor 
Resource Centre, 2013; Nang & Ngai, 2009).9 There are few studies of international 
union solidarity in this sector (Brookes, 2017), whilst studies such as Luthje et al.'s 
(2013) that analyse the semiconductor industry’s regim s of employment fail to 
analyse workers’ agency. This thesis analyses how te material realities entailed in 
                                                          
7 A report by the consultancy firm McKinsey (Hasenstab, 2013, p.5) ascribes “up to 40 
percent of the global productivity growth achieved during the last two decades to the 
expansion of information and communication technologies made possible by semiconductor 
performance and cost improvements.” 
8 By contrast, Anner et al. (2006) and Carmichael and Herod (2012) have provided this 
analysis for the automobile, maritime and clothing manufacturing sectors. 
9 Workers have more recently been able to articulate their grievances through unions (e.g., in 
Malaysia), informal workers groups (e.g., China) or through NGOs’ pressure on factories’ 






chip production, along with workers’ local context and the corporate tactics they 
faced, hindered the unions’ ability to build power locally and internationally.  
Despite the literature examining workers’ “spatial dilemma,” namely how workers’ 
spatial belongings may complicate their class-based on s (Castree et al., 2004; Herod, 
2003b), few studies examine the importance of subjectivities and ideologies to 
workers’ international organising (Birelma, 2018; Bolsmann, 2010). The dimensions 
presented above to “embed labour” thus fail to encompass unions’ ideologies, 
despite Brookes (2013a) showing that these are crucial to unions’ power and their 
international efforts, and Wills (2008a) arguing that greater attention is needed 
regarding how to politicise class. Rathzel et al. (2014, p.21) add that scholars often 
fail to engage with the subjectivity of workers, noti g that “even when workers speak 
in labour studies, they are only allowed to exist as a figment of the research’s critical 
engagement with capitalist control.” In keeping with these insights and critiques, this 
thesis seeks to make space for workers’ “diverse, fractured, and contradictory 
experiences” (Rathzel et al., 2014, p.69) and demonstrate that workers and unions 
were torn by different loyalties, and ideologies, at the local, national and 
international level.  
My ethnographic approach which combined site visits w h the observation of, and 
participation in, most of the TUN’s spaces enabled me to address these questions 
over a relatively long period and thereby understand the impact of unions’ different 
cultures upon the development of international relationships. Brookes (2013, p.32) 
explains that long-term interactions, as opposed to merely putting out urgent fires, 
are crucial to the rise of international solidarity because solidarity and “reciprocity 
[are not] established overnight [but result] from repeated instances of active support 
among unions over a period of time” (see also Bergene, 2006; Lillie and Lucio, 2004). 
Whilst most studies of international alliances analyse campaigns after they have 
achieved their goals (see Anderson, 2012; Anner et al., 2006; Banks and Russo, 1999; 
Brookes, 2017; Castree, 2000a; Cotton and Royle, 2014; Holland and Pyman, 2011; 
McCallum, 2013; Wad, 2014, exceptions being Anderson, 2015; Cumbers et al., 
2016; Hennebert, 2010; Tate, 2006), my approach allowed me to analyse the impacts 
of each unions’ local contexts and culture upon their international efforts. Beyond 
understanding the role of unions’ varied ideologies,  I also show how the very process 
of international collaboration served to reduce union radicalism, agreeing with 
Savage and Wills' (2004, p.6) argument that “an understanding of the challenges 
from within the labour movement is as important as understanding the challenges 






constrained agency, since the TUN’s efforts stumbled, and ultimately ceased, 
because of unions’ different ideologies and understandings of international solidarity.  
Finally, my thesis examines the importance of understanding workers’ varied 
circumstances, not just because they constrain workers’ agency, but also because 
they may provide the source of common experience between diverse workforces. 
Taking seriously Banks and Russo's (1999, p.565) claim that international campaigns 
“must emanate from local workers’ agendas, because there are no international 
workers, only local workers,” my thesis attended to ST workers’ experiences of 
financialisation. Whilst literature understands financialisation on a macro-level as a 
new regime of accumulation (Krippner, 2005), on a meso-level as the emphasis upon 
maximising shareholder value (Millberg and Winkler, 2005) and on individual-level 
as the rise of the financialised subject (Mazaratti, 2011), there remains little 
understanding of the impacts of financialisation on working conditions and workers’ 
relationship to their labour (Cushen, 2013). Financi lisation is mostly portrayed as 
an unstoppable and abstract force, which workers have to cope with (Aalbers, 2019), 
rather than understanding how, in some circumstances, workers may resist it. I show 
that the focus by ST senior managers on maximising hareholder value prompted 
workers to feel increasingly alienated from their labour and precarious in their 
employment. This situation culminated in 2016 when ST closed its digital division 
and announced the layoff of 1,600 workers, a decision which unions linked to ST’s 
financialised outlook. Unions used their memory of the previous industrial vision 
which had driven ST, their knowledge of the business, their links to public office 
holders and a more or less successful international coll boration, to shift the strategy 
guiding ST. Whilst in itself an important contribution to the understanding of labour 
agency in financialised times, this campaign also demonstrates the importance of 
attending to workers’ workplace experiences to sustain international labour 
solidarity. By answering to “local” workers’ agenda, this campaign was able to 
bridge the divisions between ST’s various unions and workforces. It illustrates how, 
empirically, unions can build common interests, demands and strategies and, 
theoretically, the need for international solidarity efforts to be grounded in workers’ 
varied realities for the ideal to be relevant to workers’ lives. 
- - - 
I chose a research project that allowed me to support an existing organisation and an 
ongoing struggle, rather just to document and analyse its efforts. This stance reflects 
the “pragmatic imaginary” advocated by Harney et al. (2016) whereby researchers 






creation of new publics which can work to remaking the world in a more socially 
just manner. Having heard about ReAct through my activism in France and inspired 
by their attempts to build power at the grassroots level against TNCs, I approached 
them in February 2015, prior to the start of my PhD. In June 2015, we designed 
together an action-research project, which aimed to support ReAct’s attempts to 
facilitate greater transnational links between ST workers and would enable me, as a 
researcher, to explore the questions mentioned above. As part of ReAct, I encouraged 
union leaders to work together by organising conference calls, visiting union leaders 
in each site, supporting leaders to exchange information and facilitating their 
transnational efforts. I committed to take part in ReAct’s experimental attempt to 
support ST unions, and, as a result, I and my reseach were somewhat vulnerable to 
the evolution of this project.  
I am aware of the dilemmas that assuming a triple role ( esearcher, member of ReAct, 
supporter of the TUN) entailed, as I switched betwen acting and analysing. This 
stance caused my supervisors and me to worry about my influence over the processes 
I studied. Whilst I reflect on my normativity in Chapter 3, one of my driving 
methodological beliefs is clearly phrased by Hyndman (2001, p.262), who argues, 
As a researcher, one is always in the field; [by] being in the field one 
changes it and is changed by it; and [field] experience does not 
automatically authorise knowledge, but rather allows us to generate 
analyses and tell specific kinds of stories. 
I believe that whatever we choose to do as researchers changes the object of study, 
and here I choose to be transparent about my goal to support my object of study to 
come into being. I did not prescribe what union leaders should do, however I tried to 
resource their efforts (see Derickson and Routledge, 2015a), providing them with 
knowledge of each others’ realities and with resources, of which the most simple and 
crucial was time. I acknowledge that by having actively supported this effort, I risk 
eschewing the complexity of particular struggles in favour of seeking to connect 
workforces whose differences may, in fact, overshadow their commonalities. 
Importantly, whilst I have spent four years supporting and studying trade union 
internationalism, I do not hold that it is always the best solution to achieve workers’ 
goals or that class is always the identity that brings people together. Rather, and s 
this thesis demonstrates, activities at all geographical scales continue to be important 
for workers’ success as do their range of identities and loyalties. However, I do 
believe that developing reciprocal solidarity, notably through trade unions, is crucial 
to bridging some of the differences that tear the world apart. My work tried to adopt 






and workers. I see the value of romanticism because I believe that we, as academics, 
need to offer alternative narratives of agency by workers in order to imagine how to 
change the current injustices that structure our world. By the same count, we need to 
retain our critical edge in order to temper our hopes with “sober descriptions of the 
reality of intra-class racial warfare, gender violenc , the despotism of many union 
nomenclatura, and the at times appalling tactical decisions made by workers or other 
social movements” (Mitchell, 1995, p.323). My research supported a specific 
struggle without either romanticising workers’ actions, censoring my ethics or 
prescribing what should happen. 
- - - 
To analyse unions’ constrained ability to build transnational labour solidarity in one 
TNC, as both a tool for power and as an ideology, I examine three ancillary questions: 
- (1) How does the embeddedness of workers and by extent, unions, in GPNs, 
states and local dynamics shape their ability to organise at a range of scales? 
- (2) What is the significance of workers’ ideologies to their capacity to 
organise locally and internationally? 
-  (3) How do the internal dynamics between unions and their divergent 
ideologies shape a TUN’s effectiveness? 
My thesis is structured as follows: Chapter 2 introduces the field of labour geography 
and the growing pressures on workers’ organising in the wake of neoliberal 
globalisation. I review the scholarship that specifi s agency and emphasises the 
importance of understanding labour agency as constrai ed spatially, temporally and 
relationally. In Chapter 3, I detail my action-research framework, present my 
methods and reflect on the power dynamics my methods encountered. 
Chapter 4 describes the bare bones of the six-year effort by ST unions to increase 
their international collaboration, simply telling my readers what happened. In the 
next two chapters, I set out to “embed” ST workers and unions, by attending to the 
sectoral specificity of semiconductor production, workers’ various positionalities, 
local union cultures and labour-management relationships, because, as Brookes 
(2013a, p.26) argues, transnational labour alliances ar  “only as effective as the 
individual unions that constitute them.” In Chapter 5, I argue that ST’s global 
organisation has been shaped by states as regulatory contexts and agents seeking to 
protect their national competitiveness. The factors that inform where ST has 
allocated each step of chip production, alongside existing uneven national 
regulations, led to a workforce with unevenly distributed power, and unevenly 






engagement with international collaboration. In Chapter 6, I show how workers’ 
varied socio-spatial positionalities and their unions’ contrasting ideologies, in the 
context of divisive corporate tactics, challenged unions’ ability to build power and 
work together at the local and international level.  
Chapter 7 examines ST’s financialisation, which led workers to feel increasingly 
insecure about their jobs and alienated from their labour, and provided unions with 
a source of common interest. Workers across ST feared that this process threatened 
the company’s future and, as a result, their jobs. Workers resisted these changes, 
arguing that they embodied a short-term logic favouring shareholders’ value at the 
expense of an industrial vision which would secure ST’s future. In Chapter 8, I show 
that workers’ concerns fuelled an international camp ign to curtail ST’s 
financialisation, during which unions developed a powerful narrative contrasting an 
industrial strategy with a financialised one. This narrative discredited the sitting 
senior management team, established the ground for uni ns collaborating across 
their geographical, professional and ideological divisions and created a common 
interest with the French and Italian states in securing ST’s survival. Their campaign’s 
ability to spread across countries demonstrates the need to base international 
solidarity upon the everyday realities which matter o workers. 
In Chapter 9, I argue that the TUN was traversed by conflicts over what the TUN 
should aim for, who should negotiate for the TUN and which tactics it should use. 
The unions’ choice to focus on pursuing a GFA, an aim which was driven by the 
GUF’s agenda rather than by workers’ needs, and the presence of moderate unions 
led the international effort to collapse on itself. Furthermore, the TUN’s discussions 
mobilised a North-South “help” vision which preventd a more radical imagination 
of what reciprocal solidarity could mean. In my conlusion, Chapter 10, I argue that 
unions’ local contexts and cultures conditioned their collaboration and ultimately 
caused the demise of the TUN, but also that unions were able to sustain greater 
international collaboration temporarily and when this was grounded in workers’ 
realities. I argue that attention to workers’ realities and ideologies is empirically 
crucial to building international collaboration and theoretically central to labour 
geography’s core notion of workers’ constrained ability to shape the geography of 
capitalism. Between chapters, I have set interludes, which feature stories of workers 
navigating various threats to their employment. I use these to thread place-based 
accounts into the thesis and offer some ways for my readers to grasp the complex 












Chapter 2:  
Labour geography, 
labour’s geographies  
 
As I mention above, labour internationalism encompasses “how” questions 
regarding the building of workers’ power, the dream of commonality between 
workers, when that dream is as much to be made as it is real, and the question of the 
ability of workers to shape their landscapes (Herod, 1997). This literature review 
attempts to weave throughout an attention to these various aspects of international 
solidarity, showing how international solidarity remains both profoundly elusive 
given workers’ constrained agency, but also ever moe necessary in the face of 
neoliberal globalisation. 
In Section 1, I introduce labour geography as a subdi cipline that emerged alongside 
the changes prompted by neoliberal globalisation. I review the neoliberal 
globalisation literature as one that reproduced a narrative of workers as helpless 
recipients of such changes and highlight how, by contrast, a labour geography 
perspective unearthed possibilities for workers to also use globalisation to further 
their goals. Then, across Section 2 and 3, I review three areas of labour geography 
which Castree (2007) and Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) claim need further analytical 
development: the notion of labour agency, the spatial nd temporal dimensions of 
labour’s agency and the need to understand the multiple relationships that define 
workers’ lives. Mitchell (2011) describes this question as “labour’s geography,” that 
is the political and economic environment which conditions workers’ agency. To 
these questions, I add the importance of understanding workers’ socio-spatial 
positionalities to account for intersectional understandings of workers’ identities 
(McDowell, 2009) and of analysing the ideologies unions uphold, which, Birelma 
(2018) argues, are often ignored in studies of transn tional solidarity. In Section 2, I 
present the literature on labour’s agency, and, in Section 3, the literature regarding 
embedding workers’ struggles. This review of the various dimensions and identities 
which constrain workers’ agency justifies my thesis’ attention to ST workers’ varied 
contexts, positionalities, and stances, as key to understanding how their international 






1. Labour geography and neoliberal globalisation 
 
Herod (1997) coined “labour geography,” an ontological, epistemological and 
political research agenda, to encourage greater attntion to and appreciation of 
workers’ role in the production of capitalism’s spatial organisation. His call 
paralleled the rise of New International Labour Study in sociology and political 
science (Brookes & McCallum, 2017), and followed growing attention by 
geographers to the spatialisation of employment issue  (N. M. Coe & Kelly, 2000; 
Massey, 1995; McDowell, 1997; M. Wright, 1999). These fields of study emerged 
alongside studies of the concrete process of increasing global interdependence across 
places, institutions and systems or “globalisation,” whilst scholars also showed that 
this term represented a political attempt to promote the global coordination of 
activities under a neoliberal agenda (Jessop, 2002). Peck et al. (2010, p.97) thus 
stress that “neoliberalism” was a term precisely coined to “denaturalise globalisation 
processes [and call attention] to their associated ideological and political 
constructions.” Throughout, I thus attend to both the materiality of these changes 
and the ideology underpinning them. This discussion begins with an overview of 
labour geography, which is followed by a review of the literature on neoliberal 
globalisation and of its critique by labour geographers. 
a. Labour geography  
 
Herod (1997) critiqued Marxist geography for producing a “geography of labour,” 
which featured labour only as a factor in the production of the geography of 
capitalism. For instance, Smith's (2008) major work Uneven Development explains 
the world’s uneven development through the lenses of capital’s spatial decisions and 
the internal dynamics of differentiation and equalisation. Labour mobilisations 
figure in the seesaw pattern of development - they encourage crises of profitability 
by pushing wages up and diminishing the profit margin, yet Smith conceptualises 
them as by-products of capitalist development rathe an as its driving force. 
Similarly, Harvey's (2006) seminal work Limits to Capital argues that the growth-
driven nature of capitalism provokes crises of over-accumulation which then shape 
capitalism’s creation of various “fixes” to secure d sirable profit rates. Whilst 
Harvey (2006, p.xxiv) acknowledges that, “if the working class was strong enough 
to constitute a barrier to profitability, then it had to be disciplined, its wages and 
benefits reduced and all signs of its capacity to exert a profit squeeze removed,” his 






in the reproduction of capitalism. However, despite th  lack of theoretical attention 
to workers, both authors’ works are also steeped in a belief in the power of people’s 
mobilisation. Smith (2008, p.203) argues,  
We have seen that given its inherent global tendency toward 
equalization, capital strives to differentiate space below the global 
scale as a means of political control as well as economic survival. The 
working class must attempt the precise opposite; as a class divided it 
must strive toward equalization at the global scale. […] [This] can be 
achieved to the extent that spatial cooperation among the working 
class is developed as a political force.  
Labour geography aimed to bring back the focus on the possibilities, conditions and 
complexities of such efforts. The sub-discipline has sought to make workers’ 
experiences theoretically central to “the very constitution of capitalism, taking to 
heart the significance of efforts like E.P. Thompson’  (1978) that show how 
understanding capitalism as it actually is, is impossible without a direct focus on the 
complexity of the everyday lives of workers” (Mitchell, 2011, p.566). It seeks to 
analyse workers’ concerns and actions, the difference that space and place make to 
workers’ organising efforts,  and how these are central to the development of 
capitalism and its geography (Wills, 2008b). The sub-discipline stresses the crucial 
fact that, to produce value, capitalists must (somewhat and sometimes) compromise 
with workers and make concessions, as workers ultimately own their labour power 
(Offe, 1985). Cumbers et al. (2008a, p.270) describe this need as capitalists 
confronting the “labour problem,” which refers to “the need to successfully 
incorporate labour into the production process, […]the need to exercise control over 
labour time in the production process and […] the imperative to exploit labour as 
part of the process of commodification to realize surplus value.”  
Different disciplinary traditions have suggested different concepts to understand 
capitalists’ responses to the labour problem. From the perspective of corporate 
control, sociologists, drawing on Burawoy's (1979) notion of a “regime of 
production,” analyse the various mechanisms developed at company-level to secure 
workers’ participation in the production process and workers’ range of reactions, 
from resistance to consent, to these regimes (P. Thompson, 2010). This tradition, 
coined as the Labour Process Theory (LPT), offers an important acknowledgement 
of workers’ agency, however it focusses on local rel tionships, somewhat bypassing 
processes happening beyond the shop floor. Broadening the scope of LPT, Jonas 
(1996, p.325) proposes the concept of Local Labour Control Regimes (LLCR), 
defined as a “historically contingent and territorially embedded set of mechanisms 






consumption and labour reproduction.” This concept sets local regimes of control 
within the Marxist understanding of uneven development, claiming that 
[LLCR] are negotiated and contested socio-territorial structures. […] 
[which lead to] an uneven landscape of labour control which, in turn, 
forms the social basis of subsequent rounds of industrialization and 
restructuring. (Jonas, 1996, p.329) 
This concept foregrounds uneven development as, in part, the result of contested 
settlements, and links sociologists’ corporate-level focus to broader landscapes. 
Instead of workers just reacting to regimes of production, Jonas (1996) emphasises 
the negotiated aspect of LLCR. He thus joins with the labour geography perspective 
which stresses workers’ ability to become “active geographical agents, whose 
activities can shape economic landscapes” (Herod, 1997, p.3). 
This notion of workers’ agency is central to labour geography’s epistemology and 
research agendas. Herod (1997; 2003a) argues that workers, similar to capital, may 
desire and struggle to produce specific economic and political landscapes to ensure 
their reproduction and produce their own “labour spatial fix.” Labour spatial fixes 
range from workers’ campaigning for affordable housing and better transportation 
provision to unions making common cause across space, and may be performed by 
a range of labour representatives – from individual workers to unions and political 
parties. For Herod (1997, p.17), recognising workers’ agency enables 
A more deeply political theorization of the contested nature of the 
production of space under capitalism for, ultimately, it is the conflicts 
over whose spatial fix (capitalists’ or workers’) is actually set in the 
landscape that are at the heart of the dynamism of the geography of 
capitalism. This means that understanding processes of class 
formation and inter- and intra-class relations is fundamentally a 
geographical project. 
 
To understand processes of class formation geographically, he encourages 
geographers to examine “how workers’ spatial embeddedness may influence their 
behaviour, how workers must engage with the unevenly developed geography of 
capitalism and how workers seek (or not) to make comm n cause over space” (Herod, 
2003a, p.117). My thesis aims to address these questions by looking at workers’ 
ability to build international solidarity in one company, drawing upon labour 
geography’s key insights, namely the emphasis on workers’ agency, and the 
importance of space in shaping class struggles – and vice versa. 
Following Herod’s call, some geographers regrouped un er the label “labour 
geography.” These scholars analysed different labour representatives such as trade 






(Tattersall, 2009; Tufts, 1998), and different scales of struggles whether at the 
workplace (Castree, 2000a), in a locality (Kelly, 2001) or over legislation (Coe and 
Kelly, 2000). Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) argue that t ese studies mostly focussed 
on workers able to change their geography and ignored the varied ways in which 
people “labour” under capitalism, echoing the broader feminist observation that 
“work” under capitalism is not confined to the formalised workplace (see Gibson-
Graham et al., 2000; McDowell, 2009; Mies, 2014) and that the definition of labour 
is profoundly social and historical (Grint, 2005). Doing so, they claimed, meant that 
early studies sidelined non-labour-related terrains round which workers organise 
and workers who are less able to shape their geographies. More recently, studies 
based on an expanded understanding of labour have examined new methods of 
organising, the various identities workers may organise around, and struggles by 
more vulnerable workers (Aguiar & Ryan, 2009; Alberti, 2014; Alberti et al., 2013; 
Avendano & Fanning, 2014; Binford, 2009; Carswell & De Neve, 2013; Jenkins, 
2013; Johns & Vural, 2000; Kelly, 2012; Lindell, 2010; Lund-Thomsen, 2013; 
Padmanabhan, 2012; Pye, 2017; Simms & Holgate, 2010; Tattersall, 2009; 
Vijayabaska, 2017; Wills, 2008a, 2012).10 I acknowledge that my focus on relatively 
protected, organised and powerful workers replicates this early bias. I pursued this 
focus nonetheless because these workers belonged to a structured and relatively large 
workforce, and hold an interesting potential to disrupt the most powerful companies, 
namely TNCs of the telecommunication sector. 
b. Trade unions facing neoliberal globalisation 
 
Whilst labour geographers have offered a renewed emphasis on analysing and 
understanding workers’ agency, in practice, neoliberalisation, financialisation and 
globalisation, which have come to dominate – unevenly a d in a disparate fashion – 
the production of space, have altered the balance of power between organised labour 
and capital achieved in the Global North post 1945. Here, I briefly review the 
                                                          
10 History also puts into perspective the narrow focus on wage work, showing the multiple 
ways in which people have “worked” under capitalism 
 
The notion of [a working class] was invented in the 19th century to identity a 
group of so called ‘respectable’ workers in contrast to slaves and other unfree 
laborers, the self-employed and poor outcasts. […] Such a classification 
simply does not apply in the Global South. […] We have to recognize that 
the ‘real’ wage-workers with whom Karl Marx was centrally concerned, i.e., 
workers who as free individuals can dispose of their own labour power as 
their own commodity, and have no other commodity for sale, represent only 
one way among others in which capitalism transforms labour power into a 






literature on each phenomenon, understanding them as a set of ideas as well as 
continuous processes of making neoliberalism, financial dominance or global 
integration happen (Aalbers, 2019). I further show how, at the same time, these 
changes have prompted scholars to call for renewing labour internationalism.  
Neoliberal ideology “proposes that human well-being can best be advanced by 
liberated individual entrepreneurial freedoms and skills within an institutional 
framework characterized by strong private property rights, free markets and free 
trade” (Harvey, 2005, p.2). Unions and labour rights are antithetical to this vision, as 
they seemingly constrain individual and market freedom. As a result, states driven 
by a neoliberal outlook have actively targeted “the political and institutional 
collectivities upon which more progressive settlements had been constructed” (Peck 
and Tickell, 2002, p.385). Amongst other things, governments have attacked 
regulations protecting workers and their organisations, limited welfare provisions, 
restricted the scope of solidarity strikes and of bargaining agreements, encouraged 
workers to free ride, and promoted the flexibilisation of labour markets (Cumbers, 
Nativel, et al., 2008; Hennebert, 2010; Hyman, 2008; Luce, 2014). In the Global 
North, following the crisis of Fordism whereby wages became too high – or were 
astutely portrayed as too high – for capitalism to maintain an “adequate” profit rate, 
neoliberal measures have undermined the social compromise of rising productivity 
against rising wages (Harvey, 2006; Streeck, 2014) and sheltered capital from risks, 
which are transferred onto workers instead (Standing, 2009; P. Thompson, 2010). In 
addition, neoliberal measures have fragmented and individualised the workforce, 
undermining the collective identity and shared conditions of work which are core to 
unions’ power (Cumbers et al., 2016; Luce, 2014; Padmanabhan, 2012).  
These trends are exacerbated by financialisation, which Aalbers (2015, p.214) 
suggests represents “the increasing dominance of financ al actors, markets, practices, 
measurements and narratives, at various scales, resulting in a structural 
transformation of economies, firms (including financial institutions), states and 
households.” Sokol (2017) outlines that studies of financialisation have examined 
three interrelated scales of changes. Some scholars argue that financialisation 
represents a new regime of capital accumulation, where profits increasingly stem 
from financial channels and financial engineering rather than from trade, production 
and product markets (Aalbers, 2015; Crotty, 2008; Fine, 2010; Lapavitsas, 2011, and 
debate by Christophers, 2012). For Silver (2003), this shift undermines workers’ 
power because industries increasingly have to offer th  same rate of return that 






given that financial returns now represent a greate share of firms’ total income, 
firms have less incentive to compromise with workers (see also Guschanski and 
Onaran, 2018), and, as a result, the wage share of nati nal income has fallen across 
the board (Aalbers, 2019). At the mid-level of analysis, scholars argue that financial 
standards increasingly set business norms, pressure how companies allocate 
resources, and encourage managers to privilege sharholders’ interests (Bachet & 
Compin, 2013; Froud et al., 2000, 2014; Sauviat, 2003). Lastly, some scholars have 
analysed the everyday life consequences of financialisation pointing to the way in 
which financial risk, metrics and practices have become bound up with and 
normalised through everyday activities, and seep into people’s sense of self 
(Christopherson et al., 2013; Garcia-Lamarca & Kaika, 2016; Marazzi, 2011; Pike 
& Pollard, 2010). Whilst each of these perspectives points to consequences for 
workers, Cushen (2013, p.315) claims that workplace consequences of 
financialisation “remain under-specified,” adding that “[scholarship] is at best 
unaware of what employees experience on a daily basis and is at worst encouraging 
a default view of employees as hapless recipients of deterministic financialized 
outcomes.” My work addresses her observation by analysi g ST workers’ 
experiences of and resistance to financialisation’s workplace consequences. 
 
These two phenomena work hand in glove with the rise of “globalisation.” This term 
refers to the fact that markets, financial exchanges and production processes are 
increasingly integrated and take place at the global scale, changing the relationships 
between places and enabling the faster diffusion of phenomena across the world 
(Herod, 2003a). Globalisation resulted from the breakdown of the Bretton Woods 
system which brought on regulatory shifts that promoted trade and financial 
liberalisation and was lubricated by the technological revolution in communications 
and transport (Dicken, 2004). Geographers emphasise that globalisation entails a 
reshuffling of scalar relationships and has disrupted “entrenched assumptions about 
what kinds of social activities fit properly at whic  scales” (Smith in Jones III et al., 
2016, p.145). Swyngedouw (2004, p.25) explains that“institutional/regulatory 
arrangements [have shifted] from the national scale both upwards to supra-national 
or global scales and downwards to the scale of the individual body or to local, urban 
or regional configurations.” He argues that this shift has strained the power of the 
state to mediate tensions between citizens, workers and corporations. The 
internationalisation of capital following has enabled TNCs “to play an increasingly 






2013, p.179).11  Companies have transformed themselves into “integra d 
transnational production and sales machine[s], increasingly part of an open-ended 
network of cross-border financial and legal contracts and transactions” (O’Neill, 
2012, p.80). The reorganisation of TNCs has often cr ated situations where “legal 
ownership of the forces of production has been divorced from operational control 
[and thus] accountability for labour conditions is generally diffuse” (Lichtenstein, 
2011, p.355). Unions increasingly struggle to exert influence in TNCs’ increasingly 
segmented and dispersed organisation expressed in parallel with a centralisation of 
corporate decision-making (Anner, 2003; Bieler et al., 2010).  
 
The growing power of TNCs alongside the seemingly declining power of states, and 
their growing reluctance to regulate markets, has sustained fears of businesses 
offshoring if workers demand too great a share of the profits or respect for their rights. 
As a result, Wills (2002, p.680) claims that “workers' organization is often viewed 
as an expensive luxury in the cut-throat battle to secure jobs and investments.” 
Nation-states are pushed to use the cost and malleability of their labour force to 
attract capital, leading to a race to the bottom for w rkers’ rights and benefits (Taylor 
& Bain, 2008). This, Aalbers (2019) stresses, results from the interconnectedness of 
processes of financialisation, globalisation and neolib ralisation, outlining that 
Offshoring, […] may be motivated by financialization but its effect is 
economic globalization. Furthermore, both globalization and 
financialization are often promoted and furthered through a neoliberal 
agenda, sometimes through false pretences of levelling the playing 
field while in fact redrawing the field in favor of corporate and 
financial elites, and their shareholders. 
Faced with this triple onslaught, Bieler (2012, p.371) argues that national unions 
“have been surprisingly unable to match the power of capital at the global level in 
ways that are necessary to force the latter into anything close to the compromises and 
concessions won in the immediate post-war era.” Over th  last forty years, wages 
have stagnated despite rising labour productivity and profits have accrued primarily 
to capital (ILO, 2015); union membership has drastic lly, though unevenly, declined 
(van der Linden, 2016, p.202); and painfully acquired labour rights have been 
weakened (ITUC, 2016). Neoliberal globalisation has clearly reinforced TNCs’ 
power at the expense of workers’ rights. The question becomes how can workers and 
their organisations build power to fight against these trends, and at which scales.  
                                                          
11 The ITUC (2018) thus claims that “80% of world trade and 60% of global production is 






c. Nuancing the neoliberal globalisation discourse 
 
The material presented above describes concrete processes that clearly threaten 
workers’ power and share of wealth. Yet, these discourses also portray neoliberal 
globalisation as solely integration for the worse whilst brushing over the matter of 
workers’ agency regarding each process. Workers, “place-trapped” and inadequately 
protected by nation-states, increasingly compete wih one another: any attempt to 
improve working conditions is met with the threat of relocating production, as 
footloose capital roams and scorches the earth seeking the cheapest labour force 
(Anderson, 2002; Bieler & Morton, 2014; Johns, 1998; Johns & Vural, 2000; Wills, 
1998). Yet, scholars have shown that this polarised narrative displays several 
shortcomings. 
First, it fails to understand the dialectical nature of capitalism: each produced space 
or scale acts as a barrier to new rounds of accumulation, calling for, in time, its 
destruction, replacement or reconfiguration in order for capitalism to survive 
(Harvey, 2006; Herod, 2001b). The changing role of ach scale reflects this dynamic 
production of space. Capital is both place-bound and footloose, as a certain measure 
of “regime stability” is necessary to ensure profits (Castree et al., 2004). The very 
switch between fixity and motion provides capitalist development with the 
dynamism needed for its continuous reinvention, and from there, survival (Smith, 
2008). The narrative of footloose capital thus ignores the “geographical correlative 
[of] place and immobility” (Jonas, 1996, p.326). Taylor and Bain (2008, p.149) 
explain that, “notwithstanding labour cost differenc , capital is only relatively 
footloose.” “Capital mobility” also simplifies the situation: productive capital might 
be moving, yet profits in many ways are more concentrated than before (Johns, 1998), 
and different types of capital are more or less moveable. By the same token, workers 
and workers’ movements have always been mobile. From its birth, the trade union 
movement featured internationalist principles and created informal and formal 
structures to support solidarity between workers “over space” (Featherstone, 2012). 
Hobsbawn claims that, “traveling men [sic], emigrants and returned emigrants were 
the essence of early labor movements” (in Wills, 1996, p.357). Itinerant organisers 
and militant unions embodied ideals and translated th m across places to inspire 
activism; used distant examples to unearth organising opportunities (Wills, 1996); 
disseminated union models through colonial geographies (Evans, 2010; van der 







The second limitation of this narrative is that it is placeless and ahistorical, 
exaggerating the contrast between before and now. Rdrik (2011) emphasises that 
capitalism has always sought to enhance processes of xchange and connection, 
whilst Dicken (2004) adds that the brief period of high union density and high wages 
and benefits for workers may be overemphasised. Whilst t e Fordist-Keynesian era 
featured the support of sympathetic states, this wa far from the case everywhere, 
even in the imperial heartlands, and gains resulted from struggle, they were not a 
given (Evans, 2010; Munck, 2010).12 Dicken (2004) argues that it is important to 
analyse the specific shifts which neoliberal globalisation entails, rather than to 
romanticise the past as a foregone Golden Age. He claims that failure to do so would 
represent a disservice to theory as well as to union practices, erasing the fact that 
union rights had to be won (Munck, 2010). 
Third, under neoliberal globalisation, states continue to host circuits of accumulation, 
accountability and contestation (Robinson, 2012). Even as TNCs cut across state 
boundaries, the absence of international regulations means that states still enable the 
presence of TNCs on their territories and regulate the relationship between workers 
and employers (Henderson et al., 2002; Rainnie et al., 2011). Swyngedouw (2004, 
p.32) claims, “without territorially organised political or institutional arrangements 
that regulate markets, money and ownership […], the economic order would 
irrevocable break down.” Whilst criticising the state, neoliberalism has hardly 
accomplished its promised dismantling and thus, “equating neoliberal globalization 
with the loss of the state as ally [to labour] is a dubious proposition” (Evans, 2010, 
p.356). Rather, neoliberalism re-invented the state’s relationship to the private sector 
and ensured that the state would actively engineer the conditions for neoliberalism’s 
expansion (Aalbers, 2013; Peck and Tickell, 2002). This is a “qualitative 
reorganization  of the structural capacities and strategic emphases of the nation state” 
(Dicken et al., 1997, p.162). These critiques expose how the term globalisation is 
“enmeshed with a web of discourses” (Dicken, 2004, p.6) and has become a 
pervasive and self-invocating term, which Harvey (2006, p.xx) claims, 
“conveniently disguises class relations.” Swyngedouw (2004) agrees, holding that 
the term functions as an ideological screen to margin lise the social and spatial 
                                                          
12 In no way was the Fordist model a natural help to uni nisation. Neilson and Rossiter (2008, 
p.56) show that between 1903 and 1941 Ford firms themselves were characterised by, 
“Speed-up, armed security guards, shop floor spies, physical intimidation and external 
propaganda [which] were all part of the method employed by Ford to cut workers’ contact 
with their peers and bind their labour to a pre-ordained tempo set by the factory’s machinery.” 
They argue that it was only working class revolts and organising which brought Ford to 






reshufflings and struggles neoliberalisation prompts and to depict workers as 
powerless, with Walker (1999) adding that workers’ feeling of powerlessness is 
more the result of the political successes and economic failures of capital, rather than 
“globalisation’s” ubiquity. 
Fourth, Bieler et al. (2010) replicate the critique H rod (1997) levelled at Marxist 
geography. They argue that frameworks to analyse globalisation such as Global 
Commodity Chains (GCCs), Global Value Chains (GVCs) and Global Production 
Networks (GPNs) tend to outline the consequences for workers and unions rather 
than portray workers as actors with influence. The GPN framework, which most 
geographers adopted,13  was developed by Henderson et al. (2002, p.445) to bo h 
describe “the nexus of interconnected functions and operations through which goods 
and services are produced, distributed and consumed” an  provide an analytic 
framework capable of “grasping the global, regional and local economic and social 
dimensions of the processes involved in many (thoug by no means all) forms of 
economic globalization.” This approach aimed to describe the social processes 
organised across a range of scales, which bring different actors (states, corporations, 
labour) in multidimensional, multiscalar and embedd relationships to produce 
value, which is understood as goods, services and knowledge (N. Coe et al., 2008; 
N. M. Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 2002). Cumbers et al. (2008a) argue that 
this framework conceptualises labour as a factor within the global production of 
value, and call for a greater understanding of labour agency. Since then, a number of 
scholars have called for incorporating labour into GPN analysis (N. Coe et al., 2008; 
Cumbers, Nativel, et al., 2008; N. Coe & Hess, 2013; Rainnie et al., 2011) (see 
Section 3). 
Informed by and expanding these critiques, labour scholars have examined how, in 
a dialectical manner, globalisation and the concomitant technological revolution 
“may actually facilitate transnational solidarity, by connecting production processes 
across borders and thereby bringing workers into direct connection with each other” 
(Bieler et al., 2015, p.2; see also Evans, 2010; Herod, 2003a, 2001, 1997; Munck, 
2000). Anner et al. (2006, p.10) argue that TNCs “create the space in which new 
contests over forms and structures of globalization occur,” given that their workers 
may be more connected and hold greater strategic power due to the dominance of 
these companies over the global economy. Herod (2001, p.408) adds that a TNC’s 
production process may be more vulnerable to disruptions because the 
                                                          
13 See the evaluation of each approach in Henderson et al. (2002), Taylor (2010) and 






“consequences of any particular event can be transmitted much further and much 
faster than ever before.” The research presented in this thesis contributes to the 
analysis of workers’ contestation of global capital and their attempts to practice 
international solidarity (Bieler, 2012; Bieler et al., 2015, 2010; Brookes and 
McCallum, 2017; Evans, 2014; 2010).  
In this section, I grounded my research within labour geography, and used this 
perspective to analyse how neoliberalisation, globalisation and financialisation have 
challenged trade unions’ power, setting the background to the assaults on their rights 
and power that workers face. Yet, I also showed howrecent scholarship suggested 
that these processes may open up renewed possibilities for labour internationalism, 
as one way to respond to the challenges prompted by neoliberal globalisation. My 
research contributes towards understanding these possibilities, by analysing, in one 
company, how workers’ organisations negotiated the challenges and opportunities 
introduced by greater interconnectedness and the financ alisation of production, and 
whether they were able to use these factors to increase their power and build greater 






2. Understanding labour’s agency  
 
According to Greer and Hauptmeier (2009, p.77), international labour solidarity is 
“the spatial extension of trade unionism through the intensification of cooperation 
between trade unionists across countries using transnational tools and structures.” 
This definition highlights the simple fact that international solidarity  relies on 
individual unions. Brookes (2013a, p.26) similarly emphasises that the presence of 
a transnational union network “has little impact on power relations within firms, 
[rather] what matters is the ability of unions participating in such alliances to tap 
their locally- and nationally-scaled powers.” However, despite the centrality of 
workers’ agency to labour geography, Castree (2007, p.858) claims that labour 
studies often fail to specify this concept which becomes a catchphrase for “any 
instance in which some group of workers undertake any sort of action on behalf of 
themselves of others.” To answer this critique, Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011, p.8) 
draw upon Katz (2004) to argue that workers’ agency reflects “strategies that shift 
the capitalist status quo in favour of workers” through resilience, reworking and 
resistance.14 This classification focuses on the goals or outcomes of agency and, with 
a union’s lenses on, it does not explain what unions’ power is. To answer Castree’s 
(2000) call to define labour agency, my work draws on the Power Resource 
Approach’s (PRA) concepts of associational, institutional and coalitional power.15 I 
review this approach and then discuss Brookes’ (2013a) work, which introduces the 
concepts of inter- and intra-union power. Her attention to workers’ ability to organise 
together brings me to review the literature on class formation, socio-spatial 
positionality and crucially unions’ varied ideologies. I conclude by showing how 
these concepts inform the understanding of internatio l labour solidarity.  
a. Workers’ agency through trade unions 
 
The Oxford Dictionary of Human Geography defines agency as the “potential and 
actual ability of individuals and institutions to affect the circumstances that structure 
their thought and action” (Castree et al., 2013). This definition highlights that agency 
                                                          
14 Resilience refers to strategies to survive, cope and get by; reworking to efforts to improve 
the conditions of their existence; and resistance to direct challenges to capitalist relations. 
These categories account for the range of ways workers have agency beyond unions 
(Carswell & De Neve, 2013), though they fail to encompass the more covert and gradual 
aspects of resistance in situations of repression and r pid change (see Scott, 1985). 
15 Labour studies increasingly draw on these concepts of power to analyse specific unions 
and their strategies (Coe and Hess, 2013; Newsome et al., 2015; Rainnie et al., 2013; Selwyn, 






is a potential available to people rather than just an outcome and that it is about power 
(Brookes, 2013b). Dahl (1957) defines power as the ability of an actor A to make 
another actor B do something B would not otherwise do. For Dahl (1957), this 
capacity varies according to the basis of A’s power, to the means A uses and the 
scope they mobilise, and to their public. However, in addition to power over oneself 
and someone else, power takes indirect forms. It is A’s ability to affect B’s decisions 
in a conflict through defining the very scope of issues considered (Lukes, 2005) and 
protecting them or how they are framed from being questioned (Scott, 1985). This 
face of power is core to the literature on discourse, hegemony and ideology, which 
argues that specific ways of seeing the world may become hegemonic, and in so 
doing, may encourage people to agree to the status quo and limit their capacities to 
challenge it (Lukes, 2005). Yet, if these authors define power, they do not provide a 
typology of power’s basis, i.e., what is the source of this power, a question I examine 
for labour. 
Wad (2013, p. 52) defines labour agency as “more or l ss deliberate attempts by rank 
and file employees and their organisations and networks to influence the outcome of 
the interactions between labour and capital, state or civil society organisation.” 
Again, this definition does not specify the ways to achieve such outcomes. The PRA, 
which was developed in the 1960s to analyse working class struggles and the types 
of power yielded through collective mobilisation, provides such a typology (Schmalz 
et al., 2018). From the 2000s, the PRA embraced Wright's (2000) distinction between 
workers’ structural and associational power. Structural power is comprised of two 
strands: workers’ marketplace and workplace power. Ma ketplace power stems from 
the supply-and-demand relationship in a labour market: workers with desirable skills 
or in a buoyant market may be able to negotiate favourable contracts. This correlates 
with  geographers’ emphasis on the importance of local labour markets in shaping 
workers’ ability and desire to improve particular workplaces (N. M. Coe, 2000; N. 
M. Coe & Kelly, 2000; Jonas, 1996). Workplace power results “from the strategic 
location of a particular group of workers within a key industrial sector” (Wright, 
2000, p.962). These workers may be able to disrupt production to pressure their 
employers to heed to their demands. Lastly, associational power efers to “the 
various forms of power that result from the formation of collective organization of 








Burawoy (2010, p.303) however criticises the PRA for being overly optimistic in 
assuming “that labor is always interested in resisting exploitation and its success 
depends on its capacity” to mobilise, that is upon w rkers’ ability, rather than desire, 
to resist their situation. Birelma (2018, p.217) contends that PRA should be 
“complemented with an analysis of [workers’] subjectivities,” and adds that analysis 
should focus on workers and unionists, who, “just like workers, […] can also have 
a wide range of different intentions and motivations other than merely organising 
and class struggle.” Brookes' (2013a) reworking of Wright’s definition of power 
addresses these critiques. She argues that Wright’s categorisation does not 
distinguish an organisation that merely exists from one able to influence other actors 
and that decides to use this power. She suggests instead that  
[Associational power] is the ability of [union leaders] to compel the 
other members of their organisation to do something they otherwise 
would not do – in this case, to behave as a collective actor. […] 
Associational power is a capacity embodied […] in the workers 
themselves and how they relate to one another. (2013a, p.256) 
 
She outlines how this power is required between workers – “intra-union power” - 
but also, especially in international coordination, between unions – “inter-union 
power” (Brookes, 2013b, 2013a). Her notions of intra- and inter-union power are 
important because they provide ways to account for the importance of workers’ 
belongings and subjectivities which, Smith (2000, p.1019) claims, Marxist 
geography “most glaringly failed to embrace”  and treated “as a virtual black box.” I 
next review the literature on workers’ multiple belongings and loyalties, as well as 
the varied ideologies, which characterise each union’s efforts to unite workers, and 
the impacts of these differences on inter-union power. 
b. Inter-union power: making class possible 
 
Silver (2003) explains that Marx, in his revolutionary dream of international labour 
solidarity, downplayed the reality that whilst for capital, workers are interchangeable 
and abstract components, this is not the case for workers themselves. History simply 
demonstrates that workers may not develop a common class consciousness despite 
experiencing similar processes of exploitation and lienation; that class may not be 
their primary source of identity; and that workers may undermine other workers’ 
rights to protect themselves from the threats they believe they face (Gibson-Graham 
et al., 2000; Munck, 2010; Offe, 1985; Silver, 2003; Wills, 2008a). To explain this 
disjuncture, Bieler (2012), in summarising existing literature and drawing upon an 






itself, and a class-for-itself, as a political process whereby workers articulate their 
experiences and struggle for their interests. Whereas the former mechanically results 
from one’s location in the production system, the latter is not guaranteed. It is 
produced and practiced as people handle their experi nc s of work and contest them, 
a process which “is defined by men [sic] as they live their own history” (Thompson, 
1972, p.11). Braverman (1974) similarly claims that cl ss-consciousness, rather than 
resulting from a specific body of people, stems from a social process whereby people 
struggle together. This distinction stresses that workers are both abstract labour, the 
source of value under capitalism, and sentient beings, whose identity is 
multidimensional and whose commonality is to be made (Rainnie et al., 2011).  
This emphasis on class as a process informs Gibson-Graham's (2006) anti-
essentialist approach to class. 16 They suggest that class is a set of processes and 
relationships involved in the production and distribut on of surplus labour, rather 
than a given location. Their approach forms part of a broader post-structuralist 
feminist critique, which challenged Marxist analysis for neglecting nonworkplace-
related forms of value production and for upholding class as the sole “difference that 
matters” (Katz, 2006; Wills, 2008b). Drawing on theconcept of positionality, which 
Haraway (1988) introduced to recognise and ground the distinct identities and 
experiences that shape people’s perspectives of the world, feminist scholars 
questioned whether an abstract consciousness divorced from people's realities exists 
and if workers share a single and common experience of work (Wright, 2006). They 
suggested that, instead of class acting as the princi al identity for people, workers 
hold multiple sources of identification, such as gender, age, caste, religion or 
ethnicity, and they demonstrated how these shape people’s work experiences, access 
to employment and practice of class politics (Ettlinger, 2002; Jepson, 2005; Leitner 
et al., 2008; Lund-Thomsen, 2013; McDowell, 1999, 2009; Milkman & Voss, 2004; 
B. E. Smith, 2015; Tufts, 1998; Wills, 2008a). Doucette (2010, p.150) adds that 
workers’ positionalities also shape how valuable they are perceived to be, explaining 
that labour’s value “[results from] power relations that strategically value and 
devalue the work of different social subjects.” Importantly, Silver (2003) emphasises 
that states, capital nd workers draw upon, (re)produce and co-construct these varied 
identities. For instance, local labour policies may reinforce workers’ different legal 
status (Elias, 2009; Kelly, 2001) whilst corporations may use social and cultural 
                                                          
16 Gibson-Graham et al. (2000, p.24) draw upon Resnick and Wolff’s definition, according 
to which “essentialism mean(s) a specific presumption […] that any apparent complexity - a 
person, a relationship, an historical occurrence, and so forth - can be analyzed to reveal a 






relationships to co-opt workers (van der Linden, 2008) and/or base their employment 
decision on stereotypical understanding of gender (Jenkins, 2013; McDowell, 2009).  
 
In acknowledging workers’ multiple belongings, scholars have highlighted the 
contradictions which pull workers apart from each ot er, and geographers have 
particularly emphasised the importance of people hoding deep loyalty to specific 
places (Escobar, 2001; Rainnie et al., 2007). Summarising existing scholarship and 
a plain reflection of reality, Lier (2007) notes tha  the need to survive may bring 
workers to collaborate with management and ensure that a company stays profitable 
in a particular place. This consideration nuances th  “assumption that [the interests 
of labour and capital] are irreconcilably and diametrically antagonistic […] [because] 
at the level of the enterprise, the interests of employees and employers may be very 
tightly intertwined” (Grint, 2005, p.93). This attention to workers’ spatial belongings 
further deconstructs the monolithic category of class, allowing for cleavages 
between workers depending upon their location. Herod (2003b, p.519) states this 
allows one to recognise that “it is not just conflicts between capital and labour that 
shape the geography of global capitalism but also those between different groups of 
workers who might have quite different spatial visions for the future.” Herod’s claim 
does not ontologically oppose space and class, rather he outlines the importance of 
understanding class as a “set of place-specific” relationships (Castree et al., 2004, 
p.6) and I review the concept of “spatial dilemma” which accounts for such tensions 
in Section 3. I recognise that, in lumping Herod’s (1997; 2003b) emphasis on the 
spatial aspect of class with a feminist anti-essentialist approach, I smooth over strong 
debates within geography. However, my work demonstrates that these approaches 
overlap in emphasising the importance of workers’ socio-spatial positionalities, a 
term suggested by Leitner et al. (2008) to consider people’s multiple identities and 
stress that these are relational, unequal, context- and place-shaped and open to being 
negotiated. Throughout this thesis, I draw on this concept to show that workers’ 
multiple identities shaped their ability and desire to make class politics possible 
locally and, demonstrating the nested aspect of scale, unions’ ability to develop inter-
union power internationally.  
 
c. Politicising class: the work of ideology 
 
Wills (2008a, p.308) argues that an anti-essentialis  understanding of class further 
brings attention to the importance of politicising class relationships, through 






restates the fact that working-class organising from its origins was based on attempts 
to reframe workers' experiences in order to politicise them, rather than reflecting a 
mechanical reaction to objective conditions. Offe (1985) suggests that the 
politicisation of class relies on the principle that collective action and solidarity can 
prevent or mitigate the exploitation of individual workers, or simply that “the union 
makes us strong.” Lindberg (2014) argues that the creation of this solidarity stems 
from people naming and recognising mutual interests and developing feelings for 
and identification with each other through shared values and experiences. Thus, 
solidarity is both about individual experiences through which workers recognise 
their mutual interests and about articulating these within a broader value system. 
Rosanvallon (1988, p.89) for instance, stresses that French unions built a cohesive 
identity by developing and upholding “a community of values and ideas which aimed 
to promote alternative visions of society.” This echoes Thompson’s (1972) 
discussion of how a communal value system originated from struggles to uphold a 
moral order which sanctioned the blackleg, reframed an injury to one as an injury to 
all and encouraged collective values. Unions thus built a specific ideology, following 
Hall’s (1986, p.26) definition of ideology as 
The mental frameworks - the languages, the concepts, ca egories, 
imagery of thought and the systems of representatio - which different 
classes and social groups deploy in order to make sense of, define, 
figure out, and render intelligible the way society works. 
Thompson (in Scott, 1985, p.1) explains, “every class struggle is at the same time a 
struggle over values,” to define what ought to be, over what exists. Above, I showed 
that the definition and control over what is deemed to be common sense is crucial to 
exercising power. Politicising class is thus about recognising mutual interests and 
contesting the dominant ideology to make space for other ideologies which can 
sustain class politics. This perspective reiterates Brookes’ (2013a) argument that 
associational power needs to be cr ated and it stresses the crucial ideological work 
to make class politics possible. This raises questions about how unions will 
conceptualise building power, and at which scales such identification and solidarity 
arise and who it will encompass. Castree (2007, p.860) argues that these “moral 
geographies,” defined as “sets of values relating to modes of conduct towards other 
people near and far,” deserve analysis in their ownright. They shape the scope of 
workers’ concern or indifference. Wills (2008a) adds that understanding how this 
ideological work of building commonality and narratives of justice is done, not only 
matters regarding workers’ geography of care but is al o crucial to the 






encountered when trying to promote worker solidarity at a range of scales, and how 
they overcame them. 
Just like workers, scholars also show that unions’ values are historically placed and 
varied. Jonas (1996, p.333) explains, “the economic and political strategies of unions 
have been tailored to locally variant class structures, gender and race relations, and 
political institutions” and, as a result, unions have developed “distinctive regional 
and local cultures of unionization.” Some unions believ  that their role is to represent 
their members’ specific interests, others set out t be social partners within 
institutionalised bargaining procedures to secure a “fair” return for workers. Some 
unions focus on ensuring satisfactory employee-employer relationships and some 
aim to act as vehicles for class struggle, aiming for the general emancipation of 
workers (Hyman, 2008; Lillie & Lucio, 2004; Rosanvallon, 1988). This highlights 
the simple fact that unions do not defend all workers and, that in practice, many 
unions have facilitated the reproduction of inequalities (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011). 
Barker notes that, throughout history, unions have represented particular workforces 
and have been “agencies of both struggle for and cotainment of workers’ demands” 
(in Bieler, 2015, p.24). Given Castree’s suggestion hat unions’ values are core to 
the scope of workers’ solidarity, I now show that unions’ ideologies matter because 
they inform international solidarity practices and because international solidarity 
activities may promote some interests above others.  
At the local level, scholars show that some unions have colluded with management 
to secure ongoing production and discourage grassroots involvement which could 
threaten stable labour-management relationships (see Bergene, 2010; Cumbers et al., 
2008a; Giraud, 2013; Lier, 2007; Milkman and Voss, 2004; Moody, 2007; Offe, 
1985; Pernot, 2013). Yon and Béroud (2013) emphasise unions’ duality: they play a 
key role in resisting some aspects of capitalism and are instrumental in domesticating 
workers’ claims, to ensure the reproduction of the factory order. Importantly, the 
choice by unions to collude with management or resist it also reflects the impact of 
corporate strategies and discourses to secure workers’ and unions’ participation in 
the production process (Brookes, 2013b; C. Brooks, 2016; Giraud, 2013; Hauf, 2017; 
Hennebert, 2010; R. C. Rose et al., 2011). Hammer and Riisgaard (2015, p. 85) stress 
that these dynamics transcend the local scale, arguing that the “outcomes of 
management-labour relations have implications for dynamics of cooperation and 
competition between […] different groups of workers.” Hennebert (2010, p.57) 
illustrates the consequences of such multiple scalar belongings, explaining that one 






Trade unionism, behind a unifying discourse which proclaims shared 
common goals, notably the particularly large and vague goal to defend 
workers’ interests, is composed of organisations with different 
structures and very diverse ideological orientations. 
My research builds on these claims, analysing how such ideological differences, 
informed by unions’ local contexts and relationship with management, weakened 
unions’ collaboration.  
In addition to the ranges of stances held by unions l cally, their practices of 
international solidarity are not an unalloyed good. Silver (2003, p.22) argues that 
since workers are pitted one against the other and “precisely because the ongoing 
unmaking and remaking of working classes creates dislocations and competitive 
pressures on workers, [workers may] draw nonclass borders and boundaries as a 
basis for claims for protection from the maelstrom.” This happened and happens 
across scales to protect perceived local and national interests. For instance, Cumbers 
et al. (2008a, p.374) argue that the national social compromises Northern unions 
entered into during the 20th century led unions to privilege white male industrial 
workers “at the expense of nonunionized workers, femal s and ethnic groups both at 
home and abroad.” National unions have also used int rnational labour institutions 
and practices to promote their members’ interests, notably through supporting 
protectionist policies or undermining radical trade unions (Brooks, 2007; Johns & 
Vural, 2000; Scipes, 2016; Wills, 2001). Acknowledging such diverse  practices of 
international solidarity brings Johns (1998, p.256) to distinguish between 
“transformatory” solidarity, defined as altruistic a tions by workers with the sole 
intent of helping other workers, and “accommodationist” practices, where workers 
act in a way “not to transform social relations but to accommodate them while 
reasserting the dominance of a particular group of workers within capitalism’s spatial 
structures.” Greer and Hauptmeier (2009) provide a more nuanced appreciation of 
this dichotomy, arguing that, by bringing people together, accommodationist 
solidarity practices over time might enable greater id ntification between union 
representatives. They recount how, as restructuring of production and deregulation 
hit automobile workers in Europe, at first, national i terests undercut unions’ actions. 
However, they show that, over time, through what the authors name “identity work,” 
unions built a common European identity and confronted GM’s whipsawing strategy. 
Introducing this temporal element to solidarity practices tempers Johns’ suggested 
dichotomy, because “rather than emphasising the simultaneously reciprocal nature 
of solidarity [it] can be more useful to see this mutuality constructed across time” 






vision and shared demands, as well as the reactionary impulses which may fuel 
international solidarity, inform my analysis of ST unions’ international collaboration.  
Further, international solidarity efforts may not be consciously regressive but they 
may undermine union radicalism by promoting specific practices which deny or 
minimise the structural inequality between workers and their employers. 17 Yon and 
Béroud (2013, p.154) articulate the danger of forgetting such structural differences, 
as for instance “social partnership” practices may “lead to, under the guise of 
neutrality, the reproduction of inequalities [between workers and their employers].” 
Hauf (2017) argues that international campaigns which export rules for social 
dialogue may end up favouring unions subservient to companies and gloss over the 
power imbalances which structure national industrial relations. For instance, during 
the Play Fair campaign that targeted football manufct rers in Indonesia, Hauf (2017) 
argues that the integration of left-wing unions “into multi-stakeholder negotiations 
force[d] them to speak the language appropriate to that arena and adopt more 
moderate strategies” (p.996) and this in fact “delegitimiz[ed] more radical strategies 
of industrial action — even though the latter have be n more effective in terms of 
raising wages and improving working conditions” (p.988). Brooks (2007) similarly 
criticises the transnational coalition of NGO and unions against sweatshop 
conditions for garment workers, which, under the goal of supporting women’s and 
children’s rights, made white consumer bodies of the Global North the principal 
actors of the campaign. These authors thus stress th  importance of understanding 
each local context and assessing whose agency is foregrounded within transnational 
campaigns. Whilst Castree (2000), Bolsmann (2010), Birelma (2018), Brooks (2016) 
and Hauf (2017) are amongst the rare studies which analyse how unions’ cultures 
informed international campaigns, they do not study the labour-management 
relationships in each site or the corporate strategies workers faced. As a result, they 
are less able to ground each union’s ideology in its context and assess how such local 
contexts further shaped international efforts. My study addresses this gap, by 
analysing how unions’ ideologies, understood as shaped by national laws and local 
managerial tactics, as well as their representation of the international both supported 
and challenged their capacity to act at the internaio l level. 
 
                                                          
17 For example, Brookes (2013) recounts an encounter between Swedish and Columbian 
union representatives. The former attempted to convince the latter of the value of social 







d. Structural, institutional and coalitional power 
 
Brookes (2013a) claims that associational power forms the prerequisite to exercise 
other forms of power: unless workers are organised collectively and recognise 
common interests, they often will not be able to exercise other forms of power, or 
will do so only passively. She outlines three other forms of power: structural power 
– as defined by Wright (2000), institutional power and coalitional power. 
Institutional power is the capacity by unions to leverage existing institutions and 
laws or to create new ones to influence a company’s behaviour. Institutional power 
is uneven, often reflecting “the contingent outcomes of past battles between capital 
and labour” (Cumbers et al., 2008a, p.375). Coalitional power stems from the 
recognition that workers are also community members, consumers, and citizens. 
Unions exert coalitional power when they coordinate their activities with other 
unions, notably at the international level (Brookes, 2013b; Lier, 2007), or when they 
extend the scope of a struggle to affect the outcome f their dispute, for instance 
drawing on alliances with political representatives or other community groups (e.g.: 
Ellem, 2003; Johns and Vural, 2000; Sadler, 2004b; Tattersall, 2009; Tufts, 1998; 
Wills, 2008a). Unions’ ability to exert coalitional power relies notably upon the work 
of creating common interests with diverse constituencies (Brookes, 2013a), and my 
research analyses how ST unions managed to create common interests with other 
unions and public office holders to leverage greater power over their employer. 
The concepts of power I introduce in this section stress four crucial points. First, 
power is relational. This is key to labour geographers’ reminder to see labour agency 
as embedded in specific places, times and relationships. Second, unions’ power 
depends on workers, but this power relies on building workers’ willingness to act 
together (Brookes, 2013a). This points to the crucial work of what Wills (2008a) 
calls “politicising class,” which relies on workers recognising and building common 
interests and values, for there is potentially a significant gap “between workers’ 
objective potential power and their subjective ability, or willingness to act” (Taylor 
and Bain, 2008, p.150). Third, amidst the uneven and competitive landscape of 
capitalism, workers are torn by different loyalties, they have access to and choose 
different tactics, and may attempt to reach a comparatively better position by 
colluding with capital at a range of scales. Cumbers et al. (2008a, p.373) argue, “the 
antagonism of cooperating and resisting capital accumulation will vary widely 
between subjects […] contingent on their positionality.” They add, “[unions’] 






schizoid relations of domination and resistance as any other capitalist form” (p.374). 
As Herod (1997, p.3) stresses, workers’ collective organisations reproduce workers 
“as workers in a capitalist society” which entails them making hard choices. My 
research analyses how workers’ socio-spatial positional ties shaped their ability to 
create inter- and intra-union power and how local union-management relationships 
and union cultures shaped unions’ international solidarity efforts. My research 
demonstrates the continued “nested” aspects of scalar relationships, but also workers 
ability to work through the differences prompted by their diverse experiences and 
the divisive tactics upheld by management.  
 
Fourth, union power is shaped by temporal and spatial dimensions - whether local 
labour market dynamics regarding structural power, national legislation regarding 
institutional power or scalar relations regarding coalitional power. As a result, unions’ 
powers depend on where and when workers organise. Herod (2003a, p.117) argues 
that a sensitivity to spatial matters “can help to understand workers’ praxis” because 
“workers’ social practices are shaped by their spatial contexts and [in turn], their 
spatial practices play an important role in structuring the evolving social and spatial 
relations of capitalism.” Throughout this section, I showed that workers’ and unions’ 
spatial identity informs their ability to organise with other workers and unions. 
Taking the importance of workers’ spatial and temporal contexts seriously requires 
the category of “labour” to be embedded within its geographies, and it is to this 









3. Embedding labour  
 
Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) and Mitchell (2011) warn that labour geography has 
potentially overemphasised labour’s agency at the exp nse of a realistic analysis of 
the political and economic structures which limit workers’ organising. Workers’ 
agency in Herod’s (1997) account is determined by history and geography, evoking 
Marx (1852): 
Men [sic] make their own history, but they do not make it as they 
please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but 
under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the 
past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on 
the brains of the living. 
“Determined” does not imply that results are already known and can be predicted, 
but rather that situations and struggles have historie  and geographies which set 
limits and exert varying pressures on how struggles d velop (Williams, 1973). 
Mitchell (2011) notes that labour scholars often forget this cautionary reminder, 
driven by the desire to place workers at the centre of analysis. He urges geographers 
to go beyond stating the possibility of workers’ agency and to examine capitalism as 
it actually develops and is, that is, to assess labour’s geography. By this, he means 
to examine the conditions under which workers’ agency is possible and to engage 
with the places and times when labour “is largely incapable of shaping, ‘through its 
actions, the geography of capitalism’” (2011, p.565). In a similar vein, Coe and 
Jordhus-Lier (2011) suggest that studies should analyse the structural and social 
contexts workers are embedded in, notably the GPN and state with which workers 
interact. Understanding labour agency as constrained revives the debate opposing 
structure with agency, which saw structuralist positi ns confront poststructuralist 
ones over how to understand the labour process, who shapes it, and how to represent 
it. Following O’Doherty and Willmott (2001, p.459), I attempt to hold onto both: 
namely, “how relations of capital and labour are practically accomplished and 
challenged at the point of production” and analyse how these relationships are 
shaped by political and economic processes in the context of uneven power relations 
(Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011; Thompson, 2010). Here, to introduce key notions 
regarding “embedding” labour, I review existing literature on the temporal and 
spatial dimension of workers’ agency and on the rol f workers’ belonging to 
specific GPNs and states, both of which, I acknowledge are also distinct spatialities 






a. The temporal dimensions of labour agency  
 
Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) delineate four ways to understand the temporal 
dimensions of labour agency. They outline the significance of history and of business 
fluctuations – or time as context, the timing of actions – or time as means, the 
temporality of gains – or time as an e d, such as decreased hours of work, less 
precarious employment or coordinated bargaining negotiations, and time as enabling 
the build-up of experience – or time as process. Grint (2005, p. 46) asserts for 
instance that “what may appear as irrational today, for example, trade unions 
demarcation disputes, may well reflect a pattern of work that was constructed to fulfil 
a real need at the time of origin.” Yet these inherited boundaries may now impede 
contemporary organisational efforts, as shown by the way the growing 
nationalisation of labour movements often constrained unions’ international efforts. 
However, memory of past experiences may also support w kers’ struggles. 
Traditions of organising, whether family or place-based, stories of resistance, and 
experiences of political repression make up a repository of values and resources 
which can sustain workers’ actions and support cultures of solidarity (Carmichael & 
Herod, 2012; Kelliher, 2017; Mitchell, 2013; Rainnie et al., 2007; Wills, 1996). The 
temporal framing of workers’ struggles matters. Whether a union negotiates 
collective bargaining agreements annually or tri-annually shapes how activists 
organise and might constrain their demands (Holmes, 2004). Drawing on the 
automobile workers strike in Flint in 1998, Herod (2000) show how the smaller 
inventories companies hold under Just-In-Time production mean that the 
consequences of any particular event are transmitted much faster than before, and 
this increases the structural power of “well-situated” workers (see also Banks and 
Russo, 1999; Selwyn, 2009).  
Temporal considerations may also be part of a company’s rsenal to impede workers’ 
organising. For instance, companies’ anti-union strategies may differentiate between 
workers based on their temporal status, whether port aying workers as “impermanent” 
to reduce their wages (Wrights, 1999) or using precarious workers against the more 
permanent workforce (Brooks, 2016). The difficulty of organising seasonal workers, 
workers in the hospitality sector, or migrant workers stems in part from their 
impermanence. It is harder to collect their details; harder to persuade them of the 
value of long-term changes, of complaining about problems, and of unionisation; 
and harder for them to develop long-term ties to a place and to learn from their 






Wills, 2008a). Finally, time is a source of discursive framing. Brookes (2013a) 
argues that whether an issue is one of everyday concerns, of immediate urgency, or 
one that provides more abstract long-term benefits, shapes the possibility of 
organising around it. Such a temporal imagination is crucial in international 
campaigns, because workers often perceive international organising as separate from 
everyday concerns and as instead a long-term goal which does not answer their short-
term needs (Featherstone, 2012). Further, organising international interactions 
requires resources and commitment, both of which may be sapped by quotidian or 
urgent needs (Hennerbert, 2010). Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011, p.220) argue, “There 
is also a lot to be learnt about the temporal aspects of labour agency,” which the 
discussion above sought to illustrate. They add, however, that “this point is often 
understated in the literature.” This thesis enhances th  understanding of the temporal 
dimensions of trade union agency at a number of scale , by examining how ST 
migrant workers’ legal status fragmented the workforce, how workers and unions 
used memories of past practices to challenge current ones and how unions negotiated 
building long-term goals to sustain their collaboration across borders.  
b. The spatiality of labour’s agency 
 
The spatiality18 of Global Justice Networks concerns both “the geographical context 
in which they operate and the strategies they employ” (Routledge and Cumbers, 2009, 
p.76). In a similar fashion, I understand space as what shapes workers’ struggles and 
as a resource they may use to further their agendas. Leitner et al. (2008) identify five 
spatialities to account for the ways that contentious politics within social movements 
are practiced: place, scale, networks, mobility and socio-spatial positionality. Here, 
I focus on the notions of scale, place and network, because labour geographers who 
analysed union internationalism initially focused on scale, and have only recently 
examined the significance of place and networks, whilst I reviewed the importance 
of analysing workers’ socio-spatial positionality above.  
Marston and Smith (2001, p.615-616) define scale as “a produced societal metric 
that differentiates space [which] is not space per se.” By this, they mean that scale is 
a “level of representation” (Marston, 2000, p.220) which is crucial to the 
organisation and production of space but which does not constitute space in itself. 
Swyngedouw (2004, p.33) claims that scales are neither natural nor permanent: they 
                                                          
18 According to Castree et al. (2013), spatiality “denotes socially produced space, […] [it] 
recognizes the roles people play in creating space and the interaction between space and 






are “perpetually redefined, contested and restructued in terms of their extent, 
content, relative importance, and interrelations.” Scalar thinking emphasises that 
each scale interacts with processes happening elsewher , as I suggested above. Ellem 
(2006, p.383) thus explains that one cannot understand “the nature of and prospect 
for local action at the local scale alone” and, conversely, that global phenomena take 
shape in place (Massey, 1991). Whilst the “scales dbate” of the early 2000s 
proposed so-called “flat scalar ontologies” (Johns III et al., 2016), 19 most labour 
geographers hold onto a notion of scale conceived as set of nested and complex 
relationships (Coe and Jordhus Lier, 2011). They argue that workers’ scalar 
embeddedness can provide (or deny) them economic, pol tical and cultural resources 
to support their organising (Carmichael & Herod, 201 ) and emphasise that scalar 
configurations result from continuous struggles (Rainnie et al., 2011).  
Determining which scale is entrusted with legitimacy and power is a contested 
process that may benefit some workers at the expense of others, or companies at the 
expense of workers (Castree, 2000a; Ellem, 2006; Holmes, 2004; Lier, 2007; Merk, 
2009; Mitchell, 1998). Castree et al. (2004, p.213) argue that unions are inherently 
“scale constructing actors” who aim to negotiate at the widest scale possible to level 
working conditions, wages and benefits and curb employers’ power to whipsaw 
workers in different places against each other (seealso Ellem, 2005; Herod, 1998; 
Merk, 2009; Rainnie et al., 2007). Through the changes unleashed by neoliberal 
globalisation, corporations are increasingly able to whipsaw workers and states, 
leveraging the threat of relocation to extract profitable concessions from local unions 
and governments, which tumble over each other to offer the most competitive wages, 
generous subsidy packages or less stringent regulations (Bieler et al., 2010; Holmes, 
2004; Hyman, 2001; Jonas, 1998; Rainnie et al., 2007; Sweeney & Holmes, 2013).20 
This is a reminder that labour agency takes place in an unequal field: multinational 
companies are “better able to coordinate [their] bagaining agenda transnationally 
than unions are, and often use this ability to pressure local worker representatives” 
(Lillie and Lucio, 2004, p.163), whilst workers’ ability to negotiate at favourable 
                                                          
19 I do not get much out of such ontologies and seem to share this sentiment with other labour 
geographers (Coe and Jordhus Lier, 2011). However, I alue critiques to the concept of scale 
which highlight the importance of the spheres of reproduction and consumption and 
demonstrate that the creation of scale is shaped by people’s socio-spatial positionality 
(Marston, 2000; Marston & Smith, 2001). 
20 The rise of areas where national regulations do not apply or are suspended, such as Special 
Economic Zones, and areas managed through special industrial relation departments, often 
at the expense of workers’ right to organise, illustrates in very concrete terms how neoliberal 
globalisation produces scales that are unfavourable to workers’ rights and organising 






scales is undermined by neoliberal measures. This heightened competition fosters 
what Castree et al. (2004) call “spatial dilemmas” whereby what makes sense for 
workers in one place may undercut workers’ interests lsewhere. Scholars suggest 
that this is a dialectical phenomenon: as workers bcome more interdependent, they 
might both become more likely to act together and to compete with one another 
(Castree et al., 2004; Hennebert, 2010; Wills, 2001). Herod (2003a; 2003b) claims 
that research into how unions negotiate these dilemmas is crucial to the 
understanding of the possibilities for and limits of transnational solidarity, with 
Sweeney and Holmes (2013, p.219) adding that “the successful exercise of worker 
agency at one scale can undermine solidarity and foster competition between 
workers and unions at other scales.” My thesis illustrates the reality of these 
dilemmas in one TNC, and argues that finding common interests and having a global 
understanding of the company’s operation were crucial to unions negotiating them. 
Above, I suggested that workers’ ability to bring conflict to another scale of 
engagement is a source of coalitional power. In geography, this capacity is termed 
by Smith (1992, p.60) “jumping scale,” referring to the ability to “organize the 
production and reproduction of daily life [at one scale] and [resist] oppression and 
exploitation at another scale.” As noted by Brookes (2013a) and Lier (2007), 
international solidarity activities reflect an instance of scale-jumping, as these 
practices seek to leverage workers’ power elsewhere to influence the outcome of a 
specific struggle. The idea of scale-jumping is impl cit in the work of several labour 
sociologists, whether via the “boomerang effect” (McCallum, 2013) or “reverse 
whipsawing” (Evans, 2010). In addition to bringing other actors into a struggle and 
thus exerting coalitional power, Mitchell (1998) argues that scalar jumps also dispute 
the very definition of the arenas of struggle. The production of scale thus also results 
from ideological struggles that aim “to locate problems, causes and solutions at 
particular scales and to legitimise the exclusion of certain actors and ideas from 
debate” (Jones III et al., 2016, p.143). 
As Smith (1992, p.62) suggests, “the use of spatial metaphors, far from providing an 
innocent if evocative imagery, actually taps directly into questions of social power.” 
The analysis of scalar jumps should thus attend to bo h the varying scales of struggle, 
and whom they benefit, but also how actors fight to redefine what is appropriate for 
them to have a say on, or the scope of an issue (Brookes, 2013a). For instance, 
Mitchell (1998) and Anderson (2012) show how companies may conjure metaphors 
of distance or proximity to counter unions’ goals and delegitimise union organisers 






corporate interests by disrupting assumptions around where practices are expected 
to take place, by bringing up workers’ rights issues at a company’s Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) (Sadler, 2004a) or in stores, where poduction issues are hidden 
from the consumers’ view (Leitner et al., 2008).  
In trying to formalise these broader scales of engagement over the last 30 years, 
unions have attempted to create new tools to regulate TNCs at the international level 
and undermine TNCs’ whipsawing power. In Europe, unions have deliberately used 
the EWCs set up for European employees representatives o “overcome the 
asymmetry between centralized management and decentralized worker 
representation that was making whipsawing possible” (Greer and Hauptmeier, 2009, 
p.11). These remain weak tools, as the  European Trde Union Institute  (2017, p.5) 
notes, “it is clear that even once EWCs are up and ru ning, practice shows that they 
are still rarely capable of really influencing the d sign or implementation of 
restructuring measures.” In the maritime trade, the GUF has successfully instituted 
an international agreement on wages (Lillie, 2004). In other sectors, some GUFs and 
unions have brought TNCs to sign GFAs, drawing on firms’ increasing attention to 
their image; extensive campaigns; existing industrial relation frameworks in Europe 
(Greer & Hauptmeier, 2009; McCallum & Fichter, 2015); and top-level pressure on 
shareholders (McCallum, 2013).  
By contrast with unilaterally declared codes of conduct, which fall short in terms of 
guaranteeing trade union rights (Fichter et al., 2012), GFAs promise greater union 
involvement and the assurance that basic workers’ rights are respected throughout a 
TNC and its supply chain. McCallum (2013) heralds GFAs as crucial to the securing 
of appropriate rules which allow unions to bargain for greater rights. However, given 
the lack of enforcement power in these agreements, McCallum and Fichter (2015) 
come to suggest that GFAs remain poorly effective and represent public relation 
exercises rather than instruments to enable the rise of independent unions. Whilst the 
literature has highlighted caveats about GFAs themselve , there is little attention to 
possible drawbacks with the process of pursuing a GFA. As my research 
demonstrates, such a process inevitably favours GUFs over grassroots leaders, 
instores a “charity” mindset to solidarity and stifles militant actions which, I claim, 
are crucial to building an effective labour internationalism. In other words, how each 
scale is imagined, who it encompasses and what it is used to achieve, matters. 
Despite these developments, scholars increasingly question the relevance of workers 






internationalising labour’s campaigns (Bronfenbronner, 2007; Munck, 2000; 
Waterman, 2001), Herod (2003b, p.511) warns that “it is not always necessary for 
particular groups of workers to engage in international solidarity campaigns to secure 
their goals.” He cautions against claiming that unless workers’ resistance is global, 
it will fail. Evans (2010) and Castree et al. (2004) agree, citing the fact that the 
international scale lacks the regulatory power of nation-states and that the national 
scale still offers workers the most protection and rights. For instance, Castree (2000) 
argues that the Liverpool dockers’ failure to stop workers from being fired despite a 
vibrant international campaign between 1995 and 1998, was partly due to the lack of 
support from the national transport union, whilst workers’ ability to withstand the 
months-long struggle was due to local organising and support. Similarly, Banks and 
Russo (1999) claim that the UPS strikes of 1997 were successful because each 
mobilisation articulated concerns related to local issues, rather than because all 
fought for the same demand. This work suggests that no one scale is inherently 
progressive or effective, but rather that unions should organise workers locally and 
facilitate strong national and international collaboration (Brookes, 2013a, 2013b). 
Ettlinger (2002, p.836) argues that unions’ ability to organise at a range of scales and 
“achieve geographical flexibility figures prominently in sustained effectiveness” 
(for examples see Anderson, 2015; Castree, 2000a; Evans, 2010; Herod, 2001). As 
Harvey suggests, “the choice of spatial scale is not ‘either/or’ but ‘both/and’ even 
though the latter means confronting serious contradictions” (in Leitner et al., 2008, 
p.160). The questioning of workers’ upscaling strategies brings attention to the 
importance of place – understood as workplace, labour markets and local territory – 
in workers’ struggles (N. M. Coe, 2000; Herod, 2000; Ellem, 2003; Mitchell, 2011).  
Rainnie and Herod (2011, p.163) suggest workers’ relationship to place is dialectical: 
places act as arenas, where local and nonlocal rules, norms, customs and rights 
“interconnect to mould workers’ and employers’ behaviours, with such workers’ and 
employers’ behaviour in turn moulding the character of place.” Several studies have 
analysed workplace dynamics and how these limited th  rise of shared purposes 
between workers. For example, Ellem (2005) highlights how Rio Tinto used spatial 
tactics to create a union-free worksite and fragment workers through the use of fly-
in/fly-out of workers. Kelly (2001) explains how companies physically excluded 
union organisers. McKay (2004) shows how companies strategically fragmented the 
workforce by placing workers across different housing units to prevent organising 
and Pun and Chan (2013) argue that the dormitory system foreclosed opportunities 






Despite this attention to workplace dynamics, most studies of international 
campaigns do not engage with specific site strategies and realities, and whilst Banks 
and Russo (1999), Hennebert (2010) and Anderson (2012) emphasise the importance 
of local dynamics, they do not analyse the impacts of each union's culture and context. 
Ellem (2006) suggests that places are imbued with meaning, which may divide or 
unify workers, and privilege or exclude certain forms of politics. According to Wills 
(1998, p.35), place-based systems of relations may exacerbate unions’ spatial 
dilemma and provide the basis for sustaining international campigns as 
“communities where solidarity is tightly forged in place, on the basis of shared 
memory, traditions and experiences, are often those that are in the forefront of trans-
spatial solidarity.” Anderson (2015) likewise argues that intense single-site struggles 
may energise transnational campaigns, by enabling specific stories to become 
“resonant” globally and enthuse workers to organise in solidarity. Thus, Martin 
suggests that workers may not need to “throw off the ‘s ackles’ of place to realise 
their ‘real’ social interests” (in Castree et al., 2004, p.80) and organise across scale. 
Rather, Cumbers and Routledge (2010, p.49) argue that the “question of local 
ownership is critical to the politics of transnational union solidarity” and that one 
should embed international solidarity within place-based struggles. My research 
shows the ways place-based dynamics both sustained nd undermined international 
collaboration, as well as the difficulties encountered in creating local ownership of 
international efforts. 
The matter of GUFs or international campaigns touches upon the last spatiality I 
mentioned, that is networks as ways for social movements to connect their various 
territorial struggles (Cumbers, Routledge, et al., 2008; Escobar, 2001; Featherstone, 
2003; Juris & Khasnabish, 2012; Leitner et al., 2008; Tarrow, 1996). This spatiality 
is increasingly relevant to trade union studies and efforts: Brookes and McCallum 
(2017) argue that, following the rise of new information technology and the 
increasing ease of travel, network-based and decentralized forms of union activity 
have enabled the rise of a “new” labour internationalism. Their observation reflects 
the fact that, increasingly, unions have created transnational networks to share 
information and develop common strategies in an effort to complement what Evans 
(2010) describes as the “tree-like” bureaucratic structures of international unionism 
(see also Hennebert, 2010; Herod, 2003b; Wad, 2014). Certain GUFs have embraced 
this possibility and promoted the creation of company-based TUNs to add a layer of 
horizontality within unions’ international relationships and build power at the scale 






Yet, despite Cumbers et al.’s (2008a) hope that TUNs may facilitate greater 
solidarity amongst workers, few studies have examined TUNs’ practices and none 
has featured an NGO.21 Zajak et al. (2017, p.902) claim that “internal dynamics in 
[labour] networks and their consequences have not yet been sufficiently explored” 
and, within transnational labour alliances, “it remains puzzling how these very 
different organizational structures, ideological backgrounds, interests and access to 
resources can be integrated and held together for a c mmon cause” (p.905). Despite 
the horizontal imaginary they claim to follow, Zajak et al. (2017) emphasise that 
transnational networks are not egalitarian spaces, due to discrepancies in languages 
spoken, ideologies, resources or the ability to travel (see also Cumbers et al., 2008b; 
Featherstone 2003; Routledge and Cumbers, 2009). In addition, unions’ international 
cooperation efforts are sites of contested relationships that involve power struggles 
between national and international structures. Grassroots workers and national 
unions may criticise the coordination by one GUF of an international campaign, 
whilst unions with greater financial and political resources may dominate a GUF's 
agenda (Brookes, 2013a; Cumbers and Routledge, 2010; Gordon and Turner, 2000; 
Rub, undated). National unions may also be reluctant to transfer power to the GUFs 
on the one hand or to grassroots levels on the other, which further complicates the 
involvement of shopfloor workers in international campaigns (Cumbers & 
Routledge, 2010; Wad, 2014).  
In short, the literature on labour’s geography outlines the importance of 
understanding the spatial and temporal dimensions of workers’ struggles as 
constraining and empowering. Unions and companies materially and discursively 
struggle over these dimensions and each settlement shapes future interactions 
(Carswell & De Neve, 2013; Cumbers, Nativel, et al., 2008; Herod, 2003a). Coe and 
Jordhus Lier (2011) suggest that space and time act as stages which condition what 
is possible to achieve and workers’ identities, as means unions use to advance their 
goals, and as the “things” workers may struggle over. My thesis shows the 
constraining effects of various temporalities and spatialities upon workers’ 
organising efforts and how these unions worked to overcome them. 
 
                                                          
21 Although scholars have shown the importance of NGOs to combat the violation of workers’ 
rights in the apparel industry (Johns, 1998; Anner, 2009; Armbruster-Sandoval, 2003; 
Rodriguez-Garavito, 2005), I have found no study examining the links between NGOs and 






c. Global Production Networks 
 
I now examine another aspect of embedding labour, namely attending to the 
relationships between workers, their company’s GPN and their states. Whilst the 
GPN perspective is mainly applied to understand intrafirm dynamics and the web of 
relationships across a firm (N. Coe & Yeung, 2015), a rising number of studies have 
sought to “bring labour back in” to GPN studies and understand how a GPN 
perspective may inform the understanding of workers' agency (Cumbers et al., 2016; 
Luthje et al., 2013; collection by Newsome et al., 2015; Selwyn, 2012; Carswell and 
De Neve, 2013; Rainnie et al., 2013). Key concerns of this literature have been to 
analyse the broader political and economic canvas in which labour struggles take 
place (Cumbers, 2015); to analyse the uneven levels of workers’ agency across a 
GPN; to reveal workers’ potential spatial dilemma and connections (Coe and 
Jordhus-Lier, 2011); to examine how “social upgrading,” i.e., workers gaining 
greater rights can take place (Barrientos et al., 2011); and the role of “local factors, 
such as gender, age and caste, and regional connections […] in the shaping of GPNs” 
(Carswell and De Neve, 2013, p.62). This literature adopts a macro perspective 
singularly devoid of labour agency, which McCann (2013, p.241) finds has “rather 
little to say about labour management, workers and unions.” For instance, even if 
Luthje et al. (2013, p.31) stress that their explicit goal is “to bring the labor process 
back into political debate,” their study does not analyse workers’ experiences. 
Despite recognising its importance, the issue of labour subjectivity is absent from 
“labour-conscious” GPN literature. My research bridges the descriptive GPN 
analysis of unions’ varied power with Rathzel et al.’s (2014) account of workers’ 
experiences within a TNC. This supports my argument tha  analysing unions’ 
stances is crucial to understand how they work with the conditions they face, notably 
those related to the GPN in which they are embedded. 
 
Whilst GPN analysis stresses the importance of sectorial dynamics in shaping 
territories (N. M. Coe et al., 2004; Henderson et al., 2002), this attention remains at 
an abstract level. Labour studies, by contrast, have shown how sectoral differences 
inform workers’ power and “condition the problems that emerge and the solutions 
cooperating unions find plausible” (Anner et al., 2006, p.11), thus emphasising that 
they shape workers’ local power and their ability to collaborate. Geographers have 
demonstrated that workers’ agency is shaped by featur s such as the organisation of 
production (Herod, 2003); the capital requirements of production (Anner, 2003; 






production is producer-driven (e.g.: automobiles), buyer-driven (e.g.: apparel 
industry) or export-driven (Selwyn, 2009); the type of goods produced (Mitchell, 
2011; Selwyn, 2009); and the health hazards associated with the industry (Nang and 
Ngai, 2009). They add that companies’ capital requirements inform how easily sites 
might be offshored, and workers’ opportunities and desire to build long-lasting 
organisations locally and international collaborations (Anner, 2003; Brookes, 2013b; 
Cumbers, Nativel, et al., 2008; Silver, 2003; Taylor & Bain, 2008). My research 
contributes to the literature which examines how corporate features and firms’ global 
organisation shape workers’ international collaborati n by answering this question 
in the semiconductor sector. I show that the varied capital intensity requirements of 
semiconductor production meant that unions in each “end” related differently to their 
states and to other unions, as their sites were competition with other sites and 
unevenly dependent on their state’s capital support.  
 
d. Embedding labour in the state 
 
Despite Lier (2007, p.818) suggesting that the state “due to its size, its legal powers 
and monopoly of force, [functions] as the main institution for the social regulation 
of the labour market,” Castree (2007) claims that te state’s role is seldom examined 
as a determinant of trade union agency. Whilst my research aims to address this issue, 
both these statements reify the multiplicity and complexity of the state, as to “view 
the state as an actor is to attribute to it a unity of purpose which it lacks empirically” 
(Hutchison, 2016, p.185). I attempt not to reify the state. Following Bieler et al. 
(2008) and Jauch and Bergene (2010), I understand the state as (1) a context or 
spatiality, (2) a field of struggle where various interests and actors collide and which 
is the product of these struggles and (3) an actor with its own agenda. That these 
three aspects are dialectically linked (Fairbrother et al., 2013) reflects the growing 
literature which understands the state as a “potentially malleable dimension of 
political economic processes” (Brenner, 2004, p.71) and thus, as a political process 
in motion, which can be repoliticised. 
As discussed above, states as territories produce and ncompass habits and cultures 
which shape workers’ agency and their organisations (A derson, 2012; Zajak et al., 
2017). States also act as the home bases of companies d as such may serve as 
launch pads for their exports and sites for foreign direct investment and still influence 
a TNC’s internal identity and practices (or lack of thereof) of social dialogue (Bhopal 






notably who is a worker, what it means to work and who can enter the territory to 
work (Coe and Jordhus-Lier, 2011). Unions have fought, often by leveraging the 
democratic process or their structural power in specific companies over the shape of 
labour laws, over labour market and welfare policies and over the state’s role as an 
employer (Chi, 2017; Hyman, 2008). This has produce varieties of labour regimes 
across the world, under which states have awarded unions greater or lesser 
institutional power in the form of bargaining rules, institutional recognition, 
negotiating power, access to information and freedom of association (Hennebert, 
2010; Hyman, 2008; Kelly, 2001; McKay, 2004). But, by the same token, companies 
have also lobbied states which, in the name of attracting development, have adopted 
anti-labour stances which impact workers’ and unions’ agency (Lillie and Lucio, 
2004). For instance in the semiconductor sector across Vietnam, Indonesia, South 
Korea and Taiwan, states have supported anti-labour regimes at the expense of 
workers’ rights, working conditions and, sometimes tragically, lives (Asia Monitor 
Center, 2013). 
Showing the importance of various national regimes stresses, at another scale, the 
importance of understanding workers as place-based actors. Regarding 
internationalism specifically, authors argue that ech national system of industrial 
regulation shapes unions’ international activities, as labour internationalism is based 
on the interaction of national unions (Lillie and Lucio, 2004). National regulations 
may limit unions’ right to strike or to receive foreign funds and may facilitate 
national mechanisms of collusion that inhibit interational cooperation. Brookes 
(2013a, p.29) explains, “institutions of codeterminat on and social partnership 
arrangements give unions in some countries not only more power to negotiate with 
management but also incentives to maintain their positive relationships with 
employers and promote corporate interests over those of foreign workers” (see also 
Anner, 2003). This leads Lillie and Lucio (2004, p.164) to argue that unions’ 
approaches and models “carry the regulatory characteristics of their respective 
national economic and social systems” (see also Bieler et al., 2008; Coe and Hess, 
2013; Evans, 2010; Selwyn, 2009). In terms of the ag nt aspect of the state’s role, 
Glassman (2011) demonstrates that states may favour specific companies and 
strategically develop specific sectors. My study shows how unions’ ability to draw 
upon the state’s interests, and from there, its power, remains crucial to unions’ power 
and, if these efforts are driven by an internationalist outlook, they can also sustain 






Throughout this literature review, I stressed both the idealist impulse of international 
labour solidarity, given labour’s constrained agency across spatialities, and its 
necessity, in the face of these financialised, globalised and neoliberal times. I defined 
the concept of agency for trade unions, demonstrating the importance of 
understanding both workers’ socio-spatial positionalities, but also and crucially, 
unions’ ideologies, as contributing to and limiting their organising. Doing so, I 
returned to the agency/structure debate, emphasising how international solidarity 
was never a given and always had to be dreamed in or er to become real and stressed 
the need to “embed” labour’s ability to accomplish such dreams. Understanding 
labour’s constrained agency, I showed, requires attending to, amongst other things, 
sectorial and national specificities, local labour-management relations, spatial and 
temporal dynamics, states’ roles and workers’ positionalities within a GPN. Cumbers 
(2015, p.148) explains why this matters, arguing that  
A GPN approach allows us to see how labour agency ad ultimately 
success and failure are linked to a broader set of structures, institutions 
and processes. By recognizing the dynamic set of relations that exist 
between local, national and multinational actors, it helps us to 
understand not only the constraints but also the opportunities for 
progressive politics. 
Whilst labour geographers have shown the importance of ngaging with these 
spatialities and temporalities, which are malleable and power-laden, both framing 
workers struggles and potentially being disrupted by them, few studies have 
combined attention to several local-labour management r lationships, with an 
attention to how local unions negotiated their differences and potential conflicts over 
time across one TNC. In this spirit, my study aims to provide a detailed analysis of 
a company, its hosting states and the broader set of structures to contribute to the 
intellectual and political project of understanding unions’ constrained agency, and 
their ability to create greater international solidar ty. As I will show in the chapters 
that follow, the challenge of organising ST workers across their myriad spatialities 
and drawing on their uneven power reveals the extent to which the dream of 
international solidarity has multiple iterations and eeds to be struggled over on an 























Chapter 3:  
Solidarity from  the ground-up 
  
 “[I]nternationalism ought to consist, not only in l stening attentively to an 
internationalist discourse, but in contributing to it n our own account. We 
are not truly present in any conversation if we are only silent auditors … 
Internationalism should […] be a concourse, an exchange.” (Thompson, 
1978, p.iv)   
How does one contribute to the conversation around internationalism as a researcher 
and as an activist? How can one’s research reflect one’s political beliefs? How does 
one balance activist contributions with academic research? Following Olson and 
Sayer (2009), who encourage geographers to share thei  normative beliefs and how 
they shape their research, I begin this chapter by describing my own politics. I then 
review the activist research epistemologies and methodologies from which I draw 
inspiration to explore these questions and which motivated me to conduct research 
which would contribute to greater international solidarity. I then explain my methods: 
participant observation, interviews and archival research which were set within the 
framework of a multi-sited ethnography. Finally, I present the ethical questions that 
I encountered and reflect on the power dynamics which run through each relationship 
with the “publics” of my research – workers, unionists, activists in ReAct – and 
through the representation of my data. I hope to be refl ctive as encouraged by 
feminist geographers (G. Rose, 1997; Sultana, 2007), without the “self-indulgent 
focus on the self” which, as Kobayashi (2003, p.348) bemoans, can plague accounts 
of research and reproduce the power differentials between researcher and researched 








Calling for greater interaction between academia and politics, radical geographers 
urge academics to not only interpret the world, but to change it (Blomley, 1994, 2008; 
Bunge, 1969; Chouinard, 1994; Derickson & Routledge, 2015b Pain, 2003). Before 
examining how academics do this, I first outline why radical scholars connect their 
politics and scholarship and then present my own beliefs, which brought me to 
organise my research to support unions’ efforts. Some geographers articulate their 
commitment to political research through the lenses of morality, spirituality or ethics 
(Cloke, 2002; D. M. Smith, 2000) or, perhaps more di ctly, politics (Bourgois, 2006; 
Kobayashi, 2003). Others emphasise that researchers b ar similar ethical 
responsibilities in “the field” as in their everyday lives and, as a result, need to be 
relevant to the communities they study (Bourgois, 2006; Chari and Donner, 2010; 
Davis, 2006; Katz, 1992; Kindon et al., 2007; Kirsch, 2002; Kobayashi, 2003, 1994; 
Lawson, 2007; McDowell, 1999). My own commitment to action-research stems 
from my feminist and Marxist epistemologies, and, as Wright (2001) says simply, 
because I care about the world.22 
Feminist scholars stress that the very production of kn wledge is political, situated 
and contested (Haraway, 1988) and that scholars cannot escape from politics, but 
need to “[fight] to understand better how we and others can challenge social 
oppression” (Chouinard, 1994, p.5). hooks (1994) brings attention to the importance 
of knowledge as a tool for power and as something which is interpreted from one’s 
body, positionality, and emotions, and grounded in one’s experiences. My research 
grew out of anger. I am revolted by the persistence of inequality and the continued 
economic, environmental, physical, social and political violence inflicted on the 
majority of the world. I take courage from Bourgois (2006, p. x–xi) who argues, 
Denouncing injustice and oppression is not a naïve, old-fashioned 
anti-intellectual concern or a superannuated totalizing vision of 
Marxism. On the contrary, it is a vital historical t sk intellectually, 
because globalization has become synonymous with military 
intervention, market-driven poverty, and ecological destruction.  
I focussed on the situation of workers in a TNC. I do not hold their situations and 
stories to be at the vanguard of the fight against injustice, but rather one place where 
                                                          
22 Cloke (2002, p.594) defines care as a will to “actively work towards reaching for the other, 
and sustain an emotional, connected and committed sense for the other.” Lawson (2007, p.3) 
adds that an ethic of care requires an attention to creating relationships “in ways that enhance 






inequality is reproduced and contested. In the literature review, I introduced many 
of the necessary caveats I hold when approaching workers’ organising, namely the 
fundamental inequalities between workers and companies and the organisations of 
the former and the latter, but also between workers themselves, as people who have 
uneven access to the power needed to unsettle how work is organised and defined. 
My research, at its scale, has tried to be part of the conversation, in practice and in 
theory, regarding how to further greater solidarity between workers in one TNC. 
This research is also shaped by previous academic experi nces. My earlier research 
with Eastern European migrants on the outskirts of Paris left me feeling that, despite 
my best intentions, I reproduced problematic tropes of academia: I dipped in and left, 
there were clear power imbalances between participants nd myself, and the 
knowledge I produced did not aid participants in their struggles to stop the bulldozing 
of their settlements. Following that experience, I wanted to design a research project 
which contributed to a struggle and which took place through a long-term 
collaboration with partners that would support non-academic goals. Looking for 
inspiration, I reviewed the range of ways in which geographers have practiced such 
politics. Some have explored archives and public documents to produce insightful 
analyses of powerful institutions and discourses (Mitchell, 2004). Others have 
researched places and people which bear the brunt of the violence of inequality to 
“‘ferret out’ an understanding of truth that can speak to power” (Bourgois, 2006, 
p.ix), or acted as witnesses to people’s struggles (Routledge & Cumbers, 2009). 
Others have developed research in collaboration with and to support 
participants such as Action-Research (AR) and Participatory Action Research (PAR) 
(Cahill, 2007a, 2007b; Kindon et al., 2007; Klocker, 2012; Pain, 2004), whilst others 
produced research to support progressive policy (Dorling & Shaw, 2002) or partner 
institutions (Murray, 2003).23  Within labour geography, Castree (2007, p.856) 
explains that the discipline has always been more than “simply about working people 
[…], but is in some sense for them too, in all of their diversity.” He adds, 
It is, however, one thing to be ‘for’ workers epistemically: that is, to 
represent their actions and perspectives in print, in the seminar room 
or in the lecture theatre. But it is quite another to mobilize one’s 
professional capacities and outputs as a researcher to enter the rough-
and-tumble of worker politics in activist mode. […]  Herein lies a 
                                                          
23 Efforts have also turned ‘inwards’ as scholars have challenged the neoliberal ideologies 
that sustain universities (Castree, 2000b; Mountz et al., 2015) and developed alternative 
teaching practices (Gill, 2002). I recognise and appreciate the fact that these political stances 
do not always result in research projects but in a style of writing, teaching and caring that has 






difficult choice for labour geographers […]: to be a relatively 
‘objective analyst’ or an activist-scholar? (p.856) 
A gradient of inside/outside runs through the methods f labour geographers. Some 
choose a more outsider perspective, analysing campaigns from produced documents 
and through interviews with the involved union activists (Aguiar and Ryan, 2009; 
Anner et al., 2006; Castree, 2000b; Greer and Hauptmeier, 2009; Kay, 2005; Sadler, 
2004) whilst others choose to get involved in the situations they study (Anderson, 
2012, 2015; Avendano & Fanning, 2014; Banks & Russo, 1999; Smith-Nonini, 
2009). I chose an involved perspective because of my normative beliefs – Pulido 
(2008) recalls that activism also reflect scholars’ personalities and needs - and the 
hope that this perspective can produce valuable findings. I embraced, more or less 
consciously at first, the politics of resourcefulness laid out by Derickson and 
Routledge (2015a, 2015b) which stem from the AR traditions. They argue that a key 
task of scholar-activism is 
To attempt to find, generate and resource potential rather than only 
provide intellectual critique, to contribute to practices that are aimed 
at social transformation rather than merely the production of 
knowledge or the solving of local problems. (2015a, p.6) 
Resourcing activism, they argue, values conceptual contributions “whilst 
emphasising that they are insistently and dialectically rooted in the struggles of 
everyday life” (2015a, p.2). I was inspired by the fact that Derickson and Routledge 
outline practical ways for researchers to contribute to radical practices, notably by 
providing time, facilitation, or money, and by creating knowledge that informs 
struggles. Derickson and Routledge (2015a) further recognise the dilemmas that 
might arise between scholars and the organisations and individuals they attempt to 
support: in their work, they both helped British activist groups to access resources, 
facilitated internal processes, and voiced concerns over the gender issues they 
noticed. My approach followed their framework: I tried to provide critical and 
supportive engagement to ReAct and the trade unions involved, whilst conducting a 
research which would contribute to theoretical debat s.  
I approached ReAct in February 2015, having heard about their work through 
volunteering and because they were key players in introducing organising tactics in 
France. I was inspired by their commitment to organise workers against TNCs. I 
started attending meetings, translating documents and observing their activities. In 
summer 2015, we discussed the possibility of me doing an action-research project 
with them, based on their need for greater understanding of the difficulties of 






collaborative research project. As we discussed how I, as a researcher, could work 
alongside them, we intuitively followed the triangulation process outlined by 
Derickson and Routledge (2015b). They suggest a resea cher interested in a 
resourcing approach should consider: (1) current theoretical debates; (2) which 
publics and projects are served by the knowledge produced; and (3) what non-
academic collaborators want to know. My literature review sketched answers to (1). 
In respect to (2), ReAct wanted to support internatio l collaboration amongst 
grassroots union leaders and to analyse the limits encountered by these efforts. 
Finding out the answer to (3) required my persistent sorting through the layers of 
divergent interests between ReAct participants, as my notes reflected: 
Our discussion goes in every direction: Some want it to help develop 
the identity of ReAct and theorise its relation to social movements, to 
organise greater reflexive internal practices, to create a corporate 
research team, to organise surveys…. I have a hard time sharing what 
I am interested in. My questions feel too abstract.   
Given that I was not interested in a sociological argument around social movements 
and that I believed that ReAct already had impressiv  ways to reflect on its own 
practices (see similar thoughts in Broqua, 2009), and that I knew that strategic 
corporate research would not fit academic demands, we agreed upon me doing an 
ethnographic study of ReAct’s attempt to support ST unions, with my active 
involvement in this “project.” Over the following three-and-a-half years, I took part 
in ReAct’s activities, facilitated meetings between ST union leaders and helped to 
organise actions against the financialisation of their company. Throughout this time, 
I analysed ST unions’ agenda in creating greater int national solidarity. My input 
as a researcher aimed to help ReAct reflect on its international efforts, whilst my 
input of time, attention and funding supported ReAct in achieving its goals.  
Whilst we discussed the design of the research and I shared my reflections with 
ReAct members and unionists, neither participated in the data production and 
analysis. Although I am inspired by PAR’s ethical desire for research to support 
positive change (Cahill, 2007a; 2007b; Klocker, 2012), this research was not a 
collaborative process of knowledge creation.24 As in PAR projects, I tried to support 
people’s awareness of their own skills and adopt a facilitation role rather than a 
                                                          
24 PAR researchers aim to involve and collaborate with research participants in the design, 
performance, analyses or dissemination of research results (Davis, 2006; Kindon et al., 2007; 
Pain, 2004). In doing so, they challenge assumptions about who is deemed legitimate to 
produce knowledge and who owns, distributes and profits from research and hope to bring 
about positive and contextualised change for involved communities (Blake, 2007; Cahill, 






prescribing one (Stoecker, 1999). I also acted simultaneously as a researcher and a 
member of ReAct (Blake, 2007). However, I chose to do AR rather than PAR25 
notably because of ReAct members’ and unionists’ time-pressures and their need to 
achieve their goals, rather than academic ones. Stoecker (1999, p.845) cautiously 
reminds academics that an AR project is a “community organizing and/or 
development project of which the research is only one piece,” and, as such, the 
researcher should be open to other agendas. I felt a split between my academic 
questions and the pragmatic ones which drove union leaders and ReAct members 
(see Calhoun, 2008). Whilst in practice I collected both types of knowledge, this 
PhD mainly accounts for the academic one, which I discussed less with ReAct and 
union leaders. Nor did we discuss the role of space or ideology in their struggle – 
although these questions animate my research. They met one another, exchanged and 
collected information on security, health conditions, wages, benefits and collective 
bargaining agreements. They appreciated my support in enabling these conversations, 
yet, they did not express the desire to participate in the research analysis. This 
reflects Mehan's (2008, p.86) claims that 
Researchers and practitioners come from different backgrounds, and 
in some respect, privilege different things. Practitioners want to learn 
about the strategies that will make the most improvement to their local 
situation. Researchers are more interested in abstracting 
generalizations from local circumstances. (see also Pulido, 2008) 
Aware of these different attitudes towards knowledge production, I suggest that my 
action-research took on the form of a reciprocal exchange of non-equivalent 
resources. Union leaders provided me with access to workers and meetings; I 
provided them with time and an understanding of each structure, which enabled me 
to facilitate their coalition. ReAct provided me with access to a project and contacts, 
whilst I supported ReAct through translation, reflection and everyday work.   
                                                          
25 The dichotomy I posit also depends upon which definition of PAR drives the researcher(s). 
For example Smith-Nonini (2009, p.116) suggests a broader definition of PAR and that 
researchers can become useful in more concrete ways: “accompanying organizers to protect 
them, producing reports or educational materials specifically designed to aid social 






2. Multi-sited ethnography 
 
Where does one start in attempting to grasp the meanings and practices of labour 
internationalism? By definition, labour internationalism extends from but also 
beyond the local scale and includes internationalist sentiments, which are embodied 
in a myriad of ways. Union leaders from five countries and eight unions participated 
in the ST TUN through social media, email and occasional meetings, so where does 
one catch their network?  Studies of labour internatio lism mostly analyse 
international union bodies (Croucher & Cotton, 2012; Cumbers, 2004; Fairbrother 
et al., 2013; Fairbrother & Hammer, 2005; R. Lambert, 2014; R. Lambert & Webster, 
2001; Waterman, 2001) or international campaigns from the perspective of a specific 
site, union, country or sector (Aguiar & Ryan, 2009; Anner, 2009; Banks & Russo, 
1999; Castree, 2000a; Coleman & Kenneth, 1998; Herod, 2003b; Juravich & 
Bronfenbronner, 1999; Sadler, 2004b; Selwyn, 2009, 2011). Few look at 
international campaigns by union leaders across multiple sites. Brookes (2013b) is 
notable for her comparative study of six international campaigns. However, the 
campaigns she analysed sought to solve local issues by drawing on international 
solidarity rather than by developing long-term inter ational exchanges across one 
company. Three publications stood out for their globa  outlook and they informed 
my choice of methods: Rathzel et al.’s (2014) study of four Volvo sites; Hennebert’s 
(2010) study of a TUN in a Canadian company; and McCallum’s (2013) study of the 
global campaign against G4S. Each analysed a TNC across several of its sites, 
focussing on workers’ perspectives and their unions. Rathzel et al. (2014, p.71) 
interviewed workers in India, Mexico, South Africa and Sweden, locating their work 
“at the crossroads between following an organisation (a TNC) and following a 
conflict (the antagonist relationship between workers and capital).” There was no 
transnational action involved. McCallum (2013) intervi wed workers in South 
Africa and India and GUF representatives to analyse a phenomenon (labour 
transnationalism) and the context (the private security industry) of the global 
campaign against G4S. Building on these approaches, I conducted interviews with 
ST workers and unionists, observed union meetings (seeFigure 3.1) and adopted 
more of an ethnographic approach to follow the evoluti n of the TUN.26 Here, I 
present my data production methods and explain how I analysed the data produced. 
                                                          
26 Rathzel et al. (2014) emphasise that their study takes the standpoint of workers, in a similar 
fashion as an ethnographic approach, however their encounters with participants were brief. 
McCallum (2013, p.203) outlines, “though I have notundertaken a strict ethnography, I make 






Field visits Date Duration Data Production 
Rousset Jan-16 2 days observation 
Bouskoura Jan-16 3 days observation 
Agrate-Castelletto Apr-16 2 days observation 
Grenoble-Paris May-July-16 3 months observation 
Agrate-Castelletto Nov-16 2 days observation 
Bouskoura Jan-17 1 week 
observation, 17 
interviews 
Grenoble /Crolles Feb-June-17 4 months 
observation, 24 
interviews 
Tours / Le Mans Apr-17 2 days 
observations, 7 
interviews 
Rousset Apr-17 2 days 7 interviews 
Muar Jun-17 2 weeks 
observation, 11 
interviews 
Calamba Jul-17 1 weeks observation 
Singapore Jul-17 3 days 1 interview 
Kirkop Jun-18 1 week 
observation, 3 
interviews 
Catania Jun-18 1 week 5 interviews 





Meetings Date Duration Data Production 
Geneve Sep-16 2 days observation 
Grenoble Sep-17 2 days observation 
Agrate Feb-19 2 days observation 
Figure 3.1: Data production instances during the research. 
 
a. An ethnographic framework 
 
Ethnography is an approach which attempts to “understand parts of the world as they 
are experienced and understood in the everyday lives of people who actually ‘live 
them out’” (Crang and Cook, 1995, p.4). Ethnographers combine methods such as 
note-taking, interviews, and document analysis with participant observation to 
acquire an in-depth understanding of a place, people r phenomena through time 
(Crang & Cook, 1995; Falzon, 2009; Jackson, 1983). Participant observation is a 
method whereby a researcher spends time gaining access to, observing, interacting 
with and reflecting upon the lives and interactions f a social group or place (Crang 
& Cook, 1995; Herbert, 2000). Here, I explain why I speak of an “ethnographic 
                                                          
targeting interviews and observation within each spere.” This approach, I believe, falls short 






approach” to describe a process during which I visited over ten sites across seven 
countries whilst having ties with participants across five countries and being 
embedded in ReAct. I reflect on how this claim sits with the archetype of 
ethnography, epitomised by Pritchard’s 1950 lecture where he emphasised the 
importance of staying for at least two years in a so-called “primitive” society to 
“truthfully” portray the experience of a community (in Hannertz, 2003; see also 
Gupta and Ferguson, 1997; Tedlock, 1991). I discuss the feminist critiques of this 
posture – that it pursues objectivity and reifies the place of research as a bounded 
“field” separate from one’s life - and outline how the rise of global ethnographies 
further expanded the “field” out of single sites. These two sets of critiques inform 
how I conceptualised my ethnographic approach.  
I adopt the feminist critique that scientific objectivity does not exist and that 
researchers do not have a monopoly on knowledge producti n (Haraway, 1988). 
Although theory abstracts particular events and practices to establish a wider claim 
(Peet, 1991), as it reaches towards generality, theory remains situated, partial and 
contested, since knowledge is produced by people, institutions and processes which 
stand somewhere and hold a specific perspective and agenda (Katz, 1992; Nast, 1994; 
Staeheli & Lawson, 1994). I tried to be transparent about my positionality: my 
emotions, common sense, and experiences colour my resea ch (Delaney, 1988; 
Kobayashi, 1994). Further, a feminist perspective emphasises the importance of 
knowledge as co-produced, as people under study often acutely analyse their 
circumstances and become knowledge producers in their own right (Calhoun, 2008; 
Casas-Cortes et al., 2008; L. T. Smith, 2012). Warren (2006, p.221) thus criticises 
accounts where the research “becomes an individualised process of discovery,” 
because they fail to acknowledge “the scholarly networks and lines of transnational 
solidarity that provide the basis upon which innovative findings and activism are 
constructed.” Although my arguments were not produce  through PAR, this research 
is the product of collective support for which I am i mensely grateful.   
A feminist perspective also informs my understanding of my data. My research 
attempts to present insights into the worlds of my participants, however this thesis is 
only my “most thorough and accurate representations of [my] interpretation of 
research materials” (Mehan, 2008, p.84). Acknowledging that writing is an act of 
representation and thus a source of power, feminist scholars emphasise the need for 
non-innocent accounts, which are transparent concerning where their knowledge 
comes from and how the “self” runs through the research and its writing (Katz, 1992; 






(1994, p.86) emphasises that whilst it “can make us more aware of asymmetrical or 
exploitative relationships […] it cannot remove them. We do not conduct fieldwork 
on the unmediated world of the researched, but on the world between ourselves and 
the researched.” England’s insight reflects the postcolonial and feminist challenge to 
the belief that the research “field” exists “out there” (Gupta & Ferguson, 1997; L. T. 
Smith, 2012). These scholars instead suggest that resea chers are never complete 
insiders or outsiders but rather stand “in-between” as they co-construct the “field” 
with the researched (England, 1994; Katz, 1994; Kobayashi, 1994; Nast, 1994; 
Staeheli and Lawson, 1994; Till, 2001). I refuse to be sheltered by the notion that 
there is a “field” out there, from which I can retreat without consequences and which 
lies undisturbed, to be discovered, and mined. My “field” was not only a place, or a 
“people” (Hyndman, 2001), it was “a set of relations urtured, contested and 
developed during the course of long fieldwork phases often lasting several months” 
(Caretta and Cheptum, 2017, p.415). Some of these relationships continue, even as 
my research process has ended.  
The concept of global ethnography covers two strands of research (Burawoy, 2001; 
Burawoy et al., 2000; Marcus, 1995; Tsing, 2004), with my research stemming more 
from the second one. First, “global ethnography” examines how global processes 
play out in everyday lives and considers the ways in which relationships, languages, 
cultures and places resist and/or accommodate such influences (Crang and Cook, 
1995). Burawoy (2001, p.148) adopted this perspectiv , recognising a key 
geographical insight that the global is “an artefact manufactured and received in the 
local.” In doing so, this global ethnography path follows the tradition of critical 
ethnography, which aims to examine how people “reproduce and challenge 
macrological structures in the everyday of place-bound action” (Herbert, 2000, p.550; 
see Bourgois, 2006; Katz, 1992; Morley, 1991). However, Burawoy et al.’s (2000) 
approach is grounded in single sites which authors c mpare and contrast, and thus 
reflects more an epistemological shift in the understanding of place (see Massey, 
1991) rather than a methodological theorising of an ethnography taking place over 
several sites. 
The second global ethnography perspective expands ethnography out from a single 
site and attempts to study a subject “in the multiple sites that it emerges in” (Davies, 
2009, p.21). It seeks to follow people, connections, associations and relationships 






ethnographies to research translocal communities;27  commodity chains;28  and 
metaphors and transnational discourse.29 Davies (2009) argues that such multi-sited 
ethnographies can account for the practices and politics of spatially extensive 
movements. Multi-sited ethnographers acknowledge limits: compared with 
researchers involved in single-site studies, they cannot claim a “grasp of the entire 
‘fields’ which [their] chosen research topics may hve seemed to suggest” (Hannertz, 
2003, p.207) and where the boundary of a site ends is a tricky question (J. Cook et 
al., 2009).30  Relationships formed through multi-sited research might be less 
informative given their shorter duration; the selection of sites can be the result of 
opportunities as much as design; and language remains a key limit (Hannertz, 2003; 
Hendry, 2003; Marcus, 1995). Whilst my research encou tered language barriers 
and the lack of long-term observation of local contexts, as Falzon (2009, p.9) claims, 
multi-sited-ness provided me with an insight into the complexity of participants’ 
stances, which I show to be crucial to their ability to work at the international level.  
The use of multi-sited ethnographic methods was a practical tactic to answer my 
research questions: I aimed to follow the process of creating greater international 
solidarity through a network which has no physical space itself and understand each 
union’s embeddedness. Each site provided points of comparison between workers 
and allowed me to contextualise what happened in other sites. My research was 
ethnographic because of my long-term engagement with ReAct and union leaders 
and because of the importance of observation to my analysis. However, I did not 
observe unionists’ everyday organising activities or the quotidian pressures of work. 
This begs the question of why I did not embed myself in one site or union. The 
answer is both pragmatic and political. First, “hanging out” and doing “thick 
description” was very hard in practice given my lack of access to worksites, inability 
to speak Italian, Maltese, Malay or Moroccan Arabic, and lack of the necessary 
technical training. Second, being embedded in one site would not have answered 
what I wanted to know, since I was interested in the development of the TUN, which 
has no specific place. In my notes in October 2016, I reflected on this: 
Although I am totally aware of the importance of ‘being’ somewhere 
for a long time and I appreciate the weight of space, I feel this also 
reifies physical space over the fact that I’m already embedded in a 
                                                          
27 See Hannertz's (2003) study of global news correspondents; Kelly and Lusis's (2006) study 
of the experienes of migrants across borders and  Davies's (2009) study of the Tibetan 
lieration movement.  
28 See Cook (2006, 2004); Lepawsky and Mather (2011). 
29 See Featherstone (2005b, 2003); Hendry (2003). 






transnational ‘aspatial’ exchange […] I want to suggest an ethnography 
of a process rather than of a place…  
Third, my in-depth and situated perspective is grounded in ReAct rather than in any 
specific union. This provides another answer to whyI choose not to work in a site or 
with a union. ReAct was introduced to the unions by a senior official from the CGT, 
yet it did not have an allegiance to any union, which provided ReAct with a 
(somewhat) “neutral” status. Introduced to the union leaders as a researcher and a 
member of ReAct, I was granted a double neutrality. Choosing to embed myself in 
one union would have positioned me, in the eyes of other unionists, with specific 
politics and thereby reduced the possibility of me being trusted as a guarantor of the 
international process. As I show in this thesis, relationships between some unionists 
were tense. For instance, I remember interviewing oe unionist, whom others 
despised. Although I had informed other unionists of my plans, I wrote 
I hope that no one sees us together, because I’m always afraid of the 
competition between unions and suspicion by other unionists and [yet] 
each instance of not being transparent can create damage to my 
relationships with other unionists. (notes, May 2017) 
This reflection illustrates how my interaction with each union activist was assessed 
by the others. Wallerstein (2005, p. 49) warns researchers that, “we may imagine we 
are walking into a community representing only our research projects and ourselves; 
yet we may be viewed through the lenses of multiple experiences which we know 
little about or do not expect.” I believe that choosing not to embed myself in a 
specific union preserved my relationships with membrs from other unions. Last, the 
very shallowness of being in multiple sites allowed me to come to embody the space 
of international relations. I became a translator between unions, not just of languages 
but also of values, concerns and practices. During interviews, I was asked how things 
were elsewhere in ST, both regarding mundane things such as whether other workers 
could run on their work breaks (notes, July 2017) or m re serious ones, such as how 
did unions deal with ST’s discrimination against militant unionists (notes, June 
2018). My neutrality and work of translation informed my theoretical insights on the 
frictions that occur as unionists from different backgrounds come together. Multi-
sited participant observation, in this instance, helped to produce knowledge and to 








b. Participant observation 
 
I became a member of ReAct in June 2015 and attended, either physically or through 
Skype, ReAct occasional weekends, called the Commune, where members of ReAct 
discuss and outline the organisation’s strategy; monthly meetings to discuss one of 
the organisation’s pressing issues; and, for two years, weekly staff meetings where 
project coordinators report on and collaboratively analyse ongoing issues. 
Concurrently, for three-and-a-half years, I observed the exchanges of unionists from 
the eight unions that participated in the TUN. I communicated through WhatsApp, 
Imo, phone calls and emails with these union leaders. I visited several ST sites, where 
I observed activities, held interviews and facilitated meetings and I participated in 
international gatherings in Geneva (2016), Grenoble (2017) and Milan (2019). 
Observation, as suggested by Siméant (2012), yielded crucial insights, as these 
events displayed some of the core issues at stake in an international network. I spent 
time with two families in Malaysia, two in Italy, one in Malta and three individuals 
in France, outside of the interviews and meetings. I took notes during and after these 
visits. My fears, doubts and concerns appear in my notes, along with my to-do lists 
and my reflections on negotiating the challenges of being an activist-scholar (see 
Diphoorn, 2012). Some conversations were recorded almost verbatim; others are 
subject to the limitations of my memory (see Cook and Crang, 1995). Site visits gave 
me a greater understanding of the context of each site and allowed me to position the 
discourses of union leaders. My visit to Singapore provided me with an 
understanding of why the Singapore union was not part of the TUN, whilst my visit 
to the Philippines supplied the TUN with information they found difficult to access, 
since ST workers in Calamba had no union. The longer-term relationships with key 
union leaders provided greater insight into the formation of the TUN.  
c. Interviews 
 
As part of these visits, I conducted 80 semi-structured interviews with union leaders, 
union members, rank-and-file workers, consultants, HR managers and political 
representatives (see Figure 3.2 and Appendix 1 for descriptions of the interviewees). 
Interviews provided me with greater insights into unionists’ and workers’ 
experiences and offered interviewees a place to reflect upon differences and 








Place Status No Professional characteristics Gender 
Morocco 
UMT member 10 
 7 operators, 3 technicians, 4 
supervisors,  2 engineers,  1 








1 technician, 2 union 





























Public officials / 
experts 5 















representatives 5  1 organiser, 8 operators, 1 






Figure 3.2: Interviewees’ location, professional status, union affiliation and gender 
of interviewees 
Mischi (2012, p. 123) observed that “interviews [provide] an occasion to review 
what happened during a meeting and to explain position  which are not explicitly 
discussed in the tight-knit activist community.” Similarly, I found it informative to 
organise interviews in parallel with participant observation because I noticed that my 
observations and notes gave me a picture which leaders had less control over, and 
sometimes contrasted with what they said in meetings or interview spaces (notes, 
July 2018). For instance,  
in interviews, Samuel presents himself as in conflict with the union 
federal structure for his left-leaning stance, but at the same time I know 
that in his site, he has driven out many of the representatives [who held 
a working class narrative]. (notes, September 2017) 
This dichotomy was revealing not just of the need to have different methods, but also 
helped me understand the relationships between union leaders, which, notably in 






In interviews, I attempted to develop a safe atmosphere where people could voice 
their reflections (see Pile, 1991). Interviewees were provided with a consent form, 
which outlined my research questions. I offered them the option of being anonymous, 
asked for recording permission and stated that they could withdraw from the study 
(see Appendix 2). When possible, I followed a semi-structured format that used 
specific questions from which I let interviews flow (see Appendix 3). Each interview 
allowed me to refine my questions and to develop my vocabulary, whether about the 
semiconductor industry or the world of each union (see Mikecz, 2012). I found that 
each place where I interviewed workers presented, as noted by Elwood and Martin 
(2000), an opportunity to reflect on the meaning of their variation from one another.  
In Morocco, I had close contact with union leaders prior to my arrival but when I got 
there, they told me the HR manager had told them, off the record, that I would not 
be allowed on the worksite (notes, January 2017). This informal refusal brought them 
to face a dilemma: either confront the HR manager with hom they wanted to 
maintain good relations or admit to me a certain collusion of interest with 
management in their need not to upset them (notes, January 2017). As a compromise, 
I was put in a room off site where UMT leaders introduced me to willing rank-and-
file workers, union members and union leaders through t the day. I interviewed 17 
people over two-and-a-half days with most interviews lasting between 20 and 45 
minutes, and then begged the unionist not to bring anyone else. I found it difficult to 
focus during the entire day and reached a level of saturation. The interviews which 
successfully followed a semi-structured format were mostly with technicians or 
white-collar workers: most of the operators spoke a rudimentary French and were 
quite nervous. Workers spoke with me in a place adjacent to the factory, during their 
break and after being introduced to me by union leaders and I felt they hesitated to 
speak out. Whilst I could have arranged to see workers outside working hours, I 
decided not to, since union leaders had not given m workers’ contact information 
and I did not want to go behind the union’s back. I also arranged phone interviews 
when back in France with union leaders. 
In Malaysia, the EIEUSR organiser and president introduced me to operators, 
technicians and managers. I met with migrant workers, women from Indonesia and 
men from Nepal by hanging out in front of their hostel between shifts. Operators’ 
daily 12-hour shifts left them little time and energy for external interactions and my 
interviews suffered from this. I noted, “shift work frames all possibilities for me to 
interact with them and means that I find it easier to access some categories of workers, 






lack of control over events and this led to a few makeshift situations. I followed the 
union president and organiser from meeting to meeting hroughout Malaysia’s 
southern region for three weeks. This provided me with more in-depth knowledge of 
the industrial relations system in Malaysia and the situation in ST. As with the 
operators in Morocco, I struggled to get interviewes to go off script. My notes show 
my concern: 
It’s hard to dig deeper for answers: I just feel like people are telling 
me: this is a production chain job, so what? […] Interviews contrast 
with some of the quite detailed and free-flowing discussions with 
engineers in France, who speak about production, perspectives and 
development. (notes, July 2017) 
The apparent lack of depth of interviews with operators in both Malaysia and 
Morocco may result from these workers being less involved in the union, since 
discussions with operators who were union leaders were more informative. They 
may result from my lack of local knowledge and/or reflect the different expectations 
that white-collar workers in Europe held compared to blue-collar workforces in the 
Global South, concerning their jobs and what an interview with a social researcher 
entails. I do not see these interviews as “failed.” As Anthony and Danaher (2015) 
suggest, understanding the differences between operators and engineers, the 
obstacles to discussion, and how much knowledge about international processes 
trickled down from union leaders to workers was also informative. 
In France, I snowballed contacts, notably through union leaders, who provided me 
with members’ email addresses and phone numbers. In each site, I interviewed at 
least one representative from the CGT, CFT and CFE-GC. However, by January 
2017, I was denied entry in ST sites because ReAct was deemed an outside 
organisation and because the company recognised that it aimed to support union 
activities. Even so, workers from the CFDT and the CFE-CGC were able to invite 
me into the worksite, often without asking for the company’s permission whereas I 
met CGT members exclusively outside the worksite. I r flected that this difference 
in treatment and denial of entry both “limits my access but also brings me closer to 
some union leaders [who see me now on their side]. As some union leaders are more 
or less able to invite me inside, I also understand he different possibilities and rights 
that exist among French unions” (notes, January 2017). This experience shed light 
on the company’s uneven treatment of union members, since the company only 
denied my access when it was requested by members of the CGT. For me to be able 






granting me an official mandate.31  To grant this endorsement, Industri’ALL 
demanded that each major French union in ST sign an i vitation letter. When the 
CGC-CFE did not respond,32 Industri’All refused to grant me the mandate. This 
tactic potentially wielded to slow me down, reveals why unions’ varied postures 
towards management matter. Moreover, relationships between unionists in certain 
sites were acrimonious, and this weighed on my interac ions: I felt stressed when 
speaking with some union members feeling that I wasbreaking the trust of others 
(notes, March 2016). Having these varied experiences hammered home the 
reflections I introduce in Chapter 5 regarding the problematic consequences of union 
division and mistrust. 
In Italy, I visited Catania, where I was not able to enter the worksite, and met 
members from the CGIL. This visit was not very well prepared for by the union 
leaders because of existing local tensions between unions and I felt I had imposed 
myself on them, in contrast to other visits where I had an explicit invitation. I visited 
Milan three times, for meetings and interviews. In Malta and Italy, I interviewed 
union leaders rather than workers because of the language barrier and because of my 
experience with rank-and-file workers in Bouskoura and Muar. In Malta, I spent a 
lot of time with one union leader, who introduced me to other union members.  
In Singapore, I interviewed a union official from the federation; he did not provide 
me with contact details to reach ST union leaders. This refusal suggested a certain 
insularity of the union in Singapore, which was confirmed over time. Given this, my 
knowledge about Singapore remains little more than informed hypotheses. In the 
Philippines, I spent a week visiting workers’ groups organised by a local union and 
shadowed an organiser. Between 2014 and 2016, this union had considered initiating 
an organising drive at the ST plant in Calamba. They d cided not to in 2016. My 
visit in July 2017 attempted to understand why and to etermine whether further 
support from existing ST unions would help them initiate such a drive. Workers, 
following logistical issues, cancelled three planned interviews and, as a result, my 
analysis relies on only one organiser’s perceptions. A member of ReAct did three 
                                                          
31 According to French law, union members can invite union-related people to their worksite 
without the company being able to object. 
32 The lack of an answer is of course an answer. It was a practical reminder that not all unions 
welcomed my presence with the same enthusiasm. For the CFE-CGC, which has adopted 
positions closer to management in ST, I was positioned as ReAct and seen with 
suspicion.  Further, their unionists did not have trouble inviting me inside, and thus did not 






weeks of research in Shenzhen, and ReAct commissioned WE to do a survey of 
workers from ST. I rely on these two reports to understand ST’s Shenzhen site. 
Interviewees’ contributions in Malaysia, Malta, Italy nd Morocco were framed by 
my inability to speak in their mother tongue: intervi ws took place in English or 
French. My cultural proximity to and greater time in France, given my 
embeddedness in ReAct, means that I developed a greater understanding of what 
happened there. Given my dependence on unionists to pursue the TUN’s goals and 
have access to workers, my perspective relies on those of union leaders and members 
rather than rank-and-file workers, and these perspectives were sometimes laced with 
different interests and internal mistrust. Indeed, I was sometimes warned by one 
leader against another: “[leader] asks me to take off a member from the collective 
WhatsApp chat, because, [he claims that] she reports t  management what the chat 
is about, yet can I trust him?” (notes, May 2017). In practice, this meant that I had to 
be careful with how and with whom I shared information, whilst in terms of 
academic output, I attempt to be mindful of these int rnal power struggles, by 
describing each unions’ stance to ground their comments and reactions to one 
another.  
d. Archival research 
 
Wherever possible, I complemented interviews and observations with secondary 
documentation. In Bouskoura, I found no archives and my attempts to contact town 
hall officials went unanswered; I met with a planning officer in Muar. In Italy and 
Malta, the language barrier prevented me from accessing archives. In Grenoble and 
Crolles, I accessed three boxes of files regarding the funding that ST received in 
1992 and in 1998-2003 to develop Crolles. In Marseilles, archives were not available. 
I used unions’ blogs to access unions’ public communications and ST’s website to 
access corporate filings. I read a thesis on the dev lopment of Crolles (Balas, 2009), 
a history project commissioned by Crolles’ worksite committee (Moreau, 2006), and 
reports ordered by French worksite committees. Such documents reproduce the 
French bias of my thesis and illustrate the regulatory differences between countries, 
as French workers have greater access to information than workers elsewhere do.  
e. Survey  
 
Union leaders and I collected and exchanged detailed information on each site, 
pertaining to basic pay, bonuses, health benefits, working conditions, working 






proved hard, not just because of issues associated wi h collecting the data but also 
because of issues around the data itself. My notes reflected that, “the problem is that 
the ‘facts’ are not just out there to be easily picked. Union activists don’t have every 
answer on hard facts or ‘statistics’” (notes, January 2016). This was exacerbated by 
each site’s different rules and outlook: for instance how does one compare the fact 
that ST Malaysia provides workers with a cash allowance to account for their 
exposure to chemicals with the fact that elsewhere workers are fighting to ban 
chemical risk entirely? Each site was ruled by a delicate infrastructure that is hard to 
compare through Excel spreadsheets. Unionists were aware of this and asked 
detailed questions; each data point was often the result of tedious explanations (notes, 
September 2016). What’s more, the lack of reliable data made some claims hard to 
substantiate. For example, how does one know if the incidence of cancer or suicides 
is higher than the norm (notes, January 2016), or how does one prove Malaysian 
workers’ suspicion that the rate of miscarriages walinked to working in the factory 
(notes, July 2017)? The prevalence of gender or union discrimination was also hard 
to evaluate, notably because of the individualisation of workers’ wages in France 
and Italy and management’s refusal to share data regarding pay differences (notes, 
November 2016). The survey was thus helpful in both the data it generated and in 
demonstrating the issues workers face when sharing information across sites. 
f. Analysis 
 
I ended up with 14 notebooks of observations and reflections on meetings, emails, 
WhatsApp and phone conversations, 90 interviews and one survey – of which there 
were multiple iterations. I transcribed all the interviews and analysed them and my 
notes by developing categories as “code,” informed by theoretical debates. When 
necessary, I translated interviews. These practices both strengthened my control over 
the representation of data and diluted some of the colour and cultural context of each 
interview and observation. When analysing workers’ xperiences, I found it easier 
to assert my claims concerning unionists’ opinions, given that I interacted with key 
leaders over a long period, and that they are relativ y aware of their words needing 
to reflect a public position and not just their indivi ual opinions. I found it harder to 
build claims regarding ST workers more broadly. I shared my struggle with 
“representative-ness” with my PhD supervisors following my visit to Morocco: 
I do not know at all how to draw generality from [the interviews], it’s 
such a drop in the bucket. [I interviewed] 15 peopl, from the [2600 
workers], [interviews are] quite repetitive (which at least is good 






struggling with the [small number of interviews] bycomparison with 
the scale of the company. I know I shouldn't look fr representative-
ness, but I also need to be able to justify why I will claim what I will 
claim. (notes, January 2017) 
Rathzel et al. (2014, p.72) who interviewed a slim section of Volvo’s workforce, 
dealt with the issue of generalisation by claiming, 
[Workers] are individuals and thus their perspectives are subjective. 
But the language in which they speak, the images and symbols they 
use, are shared. In that sense, our workers are repsentative because 
they express shared meanings in a shared language […] [they] 
represent the horizon of possibilities in terms of h w work could be 
experienced by all workers. 
Likewise, I apprehend the stories, through which ST informants constructed, 
understood and acted upon the world, as partial, honest and valid versions of their 
experiences (see Crang and Cook, 1995; Staeheli and Lawson, 1994). The interviews 
provide me an account of ST from a subsection of workers, in a situation shaped by 
the social relations of capitalist production and contribute towards understanding 
some of the realities of work and organising in this industry.  
Whilst analysing workers’ experiences, I questioned why I wanted to include 
workers’ voices, given my recognition that there is no “abstract labourer” and my 
suspicion of literature that let workers speak only to claim that class was paramount 
to whom they were. Haider and Mohandesi (2013) reflect upon the Marxist tradition 
of workers’ inquiry, asserting that, although these accounts recognised the 
importance of workers speaking for themselves, theyoften intended to show workers 
“the universality of their seemingly particular expriences” (p.4) to raise workers’ 
consciousness and encourage revolutionary action. I reviewed above the feminist 
critiques to this universalist impulse, and I see it popping up throughout my work. I 
also do not feel comfortable with the posturing of unbridgeable difference between 
people, which certain ethnographies invoke when attemp ing to “[represent] at least 
partly in its own terms, the irreducibility of human experience” (Willis and 
Trondman, 2000, p.5). I’m stuck between feeling that this is another form of 
essentialism and disbelieving in the possibility of unearthing universal experiences. 
I know that individualising narratives are powerful corporate strategies to undermine 
organising efforts and that union work relies on the creation of common interests. In 
this text, I draw on the words offered by ST workers to further the understanding of 
labour agency in a multinational corporation, and, as suggested by Rathzel et al. 
(2014), to expose symbols, trends, and situations, which may speak to other workers 






3. Thinking through power 
 
When supporting union leaders, participating in ReAct’s activities, interviewing 
workers, or now, writing this thesis, ethical issue have cropped up. Askins (2007, 
p.351) considers “ethics as emergent through social rel tions in place” and thus as 
an exercise in communication, negotiation and reflection rather than box-ticking (see 
also Elwood, 2007; Ferdinand et al., 2007). Likewis, I understand ethics as a 
process of self-regulation, reflexivity and questioning of the research process and the 
power relationships it entails rather than a standard code of conduct to follow (Pile, 
1991). As I wrote earlier, power is also the capacity to define the very field of 
engagement between people (Lukes, 2005). Examining power issues thus also entails 
analysing who sets the agenda. For instance, did I compromise ReAct’s organising 
goals by bringing them a research-driven agenda? By upholding the axiom that faced 
with multinational corporate power, transnational mobilisation is crucial, did ReAct 
– and I, as a member of ReAct – impose a strategy upon the unions? Did I ignore 
participants’ knowledge systems as I worked with them to make the coalition real? 
Who am I to impose an agenda on union leaders who have been organising in the 
company, sometimes for decades? Having already explained why I did not involve 
participants in the production and analysis of data, I here consider issues related to 
the research process itself, its definition and its implementation and issues related to 
my activist stance (Klocker, 2012). The power relations between myself and 
participants shifted as I performed different roles (see Cloke et al., 2000; Smith, 2006) 
and became accountable to audiences with different languages, goals, and time 
frames (Burawoy, 2014). I reflect on the ethical issues I encountered with each 
audience as an activist and researcher and the blurr d in-between I came to embody.   
a. ReAct 
 
Since I proposed the research project to ReAct, my supervisors and I considered the 
legitimate question of whether I imposed research goals on them. There is a two-fold 
answer to this. First, I attempted to design the research questions in collaboration 
with ReAct members (see above). Second, as a member of ReAct, I had limited 
control over its structure: like any member, I could influence ReAct’s governance 
and decisions but not impose them. ReAct took respon ibility for what the “ST 
project” was and did. ReAct’s attempt to bring ST trade unions together dated from 
June 2014: ReAct had thus defined its role, identifi d contacts and secured external 






contact for ST unionists for a year. Over the course of 2016, they took a back seat, 
due to a lack of time. However, monthly meetings betwe n volunteers in ReAct and 
my weekly check-ins with ReAct’s director ensured that ReAct had control over the 
“project.” Importantly, for me and reflecting ReAct’s goals, ReAct’s direction faded 
as unions took control of their coalition. 
In regards to the balance of power between ReAct and me, as an activist, I was under 
the director’s management. As a researcher, Adrien and I considered how my roles 
as a researcher and ReAct member could conflict with/or support one another. We 
drafted and signed an agreement outlining the responsibilities we held towards one 
another and negotiated issues as they came up. On a few occasions, I felt uneasy with 
the director’s prescriptions, in particular his decisions not to work with the Filipino 
union and how he pushed me to present my work to uni n leaders (notes: January 
2016; March 2016; September 2016). I raised these issues, the director and I debated 
the appropriate course of action, and, ultimately, he retained the final word. In a 
partnership where I feared imposing my agenda, I obeyed his direction, and 
sometimes, I did not voice what I believe was valuab e criticism. Diphoorn (2012) 
recounts becoming a “passive participant” in situatons where she was uncertain and 
overwhelmed. I sometimes disagreed with the directo and yet, lacking experience 
and authority, “froze” and followed his lead. For instance, in the early stages of the 
research, the director had arranged a meeting with representatives from the CGT 
federation. I asked him whether I should present myself as a member of ReAct or a 
researcher. He pushed me to present myself only as a member of ReAct in order “not 
to complicate matters” (notes, November 2015). He went on to prepare and facilitate 
the meeting without me and I observed the meeting, acting more as a researcher than 
as a member of ReAct. In this situation, he used his power as ReAct’s director to 
impose his views; I reacted as a member of the organisation and obeyed. Yet, without 
being given the means to participate, I fell back into a researcher role. I felt 
uncomfortable with this arrangement, believing he had not respected my need for 
transparency towards union leaders (notes, November 2015). After this, I followed 
my own “research ethics,” clearly informing all unio  members of my position as a 









b. Core group of unionists 
 
I developed relationships of mutual respect with 12 union leaders. In our initial 
meetings, I outlined my role as a researcher. I repeated this when I asked them to 
sign interview agreement forms, yet the relationship we developed, I believe, meant 
that this was not always the role they associated m with. Whilst literature points to 
the danger of researchers imposing their agenda on participants (Kvale, 2006), I 
believe that union leaders are practiced activists, and that they weighed the risks and 
advantages of working with me. As Martin (2007, p.324) claims, participants are 
“individuals with understandings, agencies and competences in their own lives […] 
who can identify potential risks of research to thems lves [and restrict or reject] 
interactions with researchers.” Stoecker (1999, p.852) adds, “if we have real respect 
for the communities we work with, we will understand that they will tell us when we 
screw up, and they will not let us lead them astray.” I believe that union leaders 
decided whether or not to work with me and this choi e somewhat mitigated the risk 
of my imposing an agenda on them.  
Regarding power imbalances, whilst I controlled the research process, union leaders 
sometimes had greater resources, access to political representatives and social capital 
than I (see Smith, 2006). I mention this not to abdicate responsibility over ensuring 
that their needs were respected, but to underline their ability to talk back and that I 
was not always in the position of authority (see Blake, 2007). Tedlock (1991) argues 
that research projects often depend upon a community accepting it as meaningful 
and making it possible. I felt that the core group f union leaders willingly supported 
my research. They helped me gain access to workers and provided me with transport, 
housing, meals and updates. I was welcomed and housed in Italy, Malta and 
Malaysia and I spent long evenings in unionists’ homes. I do not know if such 
generosity was granted due to my gender, foreign statu , activism, or other factors. I 
think this reflects a more general principle that we, as researchers, develop 
relationships with participants whose generosity and ki dness is humbling. Still our 
camaraderie brought another harvest of complications as I became privy to 
comments which I could not identify as on or off the record. Murray (2003) outlines 
how her multiple identities – field researcher, union organiser and friend – meant she 
sometimes privileged one identity over the other and, when acting as a friend, 
stopped taking notes. In a similar way, I have developed friendships with participants 






As the facilitator of the TUN, I had the power to frame the TUN’s discussions 
although I attempted to involve unionists in setting agendas. I did not have the power 
to make decisions, which rested ultimately in the (more-or-less) democratic union 
structures. Union leaders held the final say over whether to work with ReAct: some 
decided not to for a while (notes, February 2016) and one tried to thwart ReAct’s 
participation altogether (see Chapter 9). Over time, unions gained control over the 
TUN – to the point where it has now almost disappeared. This is an outcome that 
neither ReAct nor I interfered with. 
A last consideration that I examined was that the risks of this project failing or 
successfully taking place were unevenly distributed. The company received my 
research with hostility; they denied me access to sites in France and in Morocco; no 
French or Swiss manager answered my requests for interviews; and, in Malaysia, I 
met with managers only informally. ST has considerable power over workers and, 
as I show, discriminates against union leaders. I feared that the union leaders helping 
me would encounter greater difficulty at their workplace. I am concerned that 
publishing my findings may result in unintended consequences for participants. As 
a result, I used a pseudonym for each interviewee; however, given that I provide  site, 
profession and union affiliation for them, anonymity s relative. I considered 
anonymising ST, but I decided against because only one semiconductor company is 
Franco-Italian, save for precluding any mention of France and Italy, this was 
impossible. I have to trust that my participants, well-aware of ST’s tactics, are better 
judges than I of the risks involved in participating i  my research. 
c. Interviewed workers  
 
Kvale (2006) argues that interviews entail hierarchical relationships where the 
researcher controls the situation, imposes a one-way di logue and holds the 
monopoly of interpretation. Here, I reflect on which power imbalances played out 
between interviewees and me, assessing how my positional y and activist posture 
shaped how I presented myself to participants and how I was perceived. Depending 
upon the country, my skin colour, relative wealth, and ease of travel positioned me 
as a person with more power and opportunities than interviewees. The fact that my 
contacts with workers came about via union leaders’ introductions might have 
limited what my informants felt able to say. In France, some workers eyed me with 
suspicion, as they had previously been interviewed by a researcher and they had 
disliked how the researcher had correlated workers’ life stories with certain postures. 






which reassured them. In France and Italy, workers had higher salaries, greater 
technical knowledge and often greater power than me, eaning that the power 
imbalance was not always in my favour (see Valentin, 2002). My offer of retraction 
and anonymity helped establish trust, as some unionists have had experiences of their 
words being distorted by other unions, or the company. Some comments were 
deliberately made off-the-record and I do not relay them in this work.  
I performed, similarly to Murray (2003) and Smith (2006), some impression 
management to gain the confidence of participants ad emphasised different roles 
depending on the public. My being positioned inside ReAct meant that ST managers 
received me critically, which precluded me from accessing what could have been 
fascinating insights for my research (see Smith-Nonini, 2009). Although this 
position limited the data I was able to access, I felt transparent in giving an honest 
presentation of myself to corporate participants and u ionists who were hostile to 
ReAct. With public officials, I emphasised my role as a researcher over my role in 
ReAct. With unionists, I found my position as a fellow activist provided common 
ground (see Diphoorn, 2012; Petray, 2012): I emphasised the tenants’ union I built, 
or the picket lines I took part in and, I feel, my actions also spoke for themselves. 
My long-term commitment to the TUN often positioned me either as a comrade or 
as a sympathetic researcher. I attempted not to leak the criticism I became privy to 
about other unions, since rumours are tactically used by the company to foster 
divisions among unions. Instead, I tried to contextualise each union to my 
interviewees to support greater understanding. My activist posture thus brought 
many participants to have greater trust in me and presented me honestly to those who 
disliked ReAct’s approach.  
With most workers, impression management mainly consisted of creating common 
ground to facilitate an open discussion and a supportive situation for each to express 
their views  (Anthony & Danaher, 2015). It was easir with some workers than others, 
and I wondered if I “took up the cause for the CGT and its members with whom we 
agree on politics, the Left etc” (notes, June 2017). With others, I found the political 
dissonance difficult to manage. Blix and Wettergren (2015) argue that qualitative 
research entails emotional labour to protect access to the so-called field and to cope 
with the researcher feeling resistance to some of the participants’ behaviour. During 
some interviews, my activist self silently boiled over as participants misrepresented 
a situation, expressed blatant contradictions, or wilfully ignored sensitive topics. 






My breathing is blocked. I have a weight on my chest, I can’t 
concentrate. [...] I don’t know where this pressure, which takes all my 
space and air, stems from… From [the interviewee’s] vague responses? 
The sense that [they] are just producing hot air? [Their] individualistic 
vision of the union? My desire to scream at [them]?  
I had a good relationship with the interviewee and s a result, their elusiveness felt 
disturbing. With a unionist I felt less close to, I was more confrontational: “several 
times, [they] answer deliberately off topic or without answering and I outline such 
inconsistencies” (notes, May 2017). During these situations, whilst probing, I did not 
express criticism for fear that it would jeopardise th  interview (see Rathzel et al., 
2014), further who am I to say what they should think? Blix and Wettergren (2016, 
p.695) add that emotional disconnection may happen because researchers feel “guilt 
is associated with the potential of delivering critique against trusting participants” 
and I recognise my own difficulties in this description. After one interview, I wrote  
I think that, were we in the same company, [we] would be in conflict, 
because he really protects the interests of ST and justifies their 
decisions. [...] But I don’t see the day-to-day interactions, the 
quotidian dilemmas, I don’t have the pressure to be ‘responsible’ for 
jobs and I cannot say if greater militancy would bring about positive 
results. […] By sharing more time with [him] and being grateful for 
[his] generosity, I fear I’m less critical. (notes, June 2018) 
Whilst I hold reservations about several of my interviewees’ opinions, I attempt to 
represent their views fairly and to follow Murray’s (2003, p.386) reminder that, “my 
job is not to judge which side is ‘correct’ or ‘morally wanting’; instead my job is to 
understand, contextualize and re-construct the definitions that each side holds to be 
true.” My empirical chapters, by analysing the contexts in which unionists make their 
decisions, attempt to downplay such individualistic narratives in favour of 
understanding the pressures each interviewee faced. 
Given that I interacted with managers and unionists who other unionists identified 
as close to management, I weighed the risks of sharing information with some 
participants. As I show, information about other site ’ productivity rates or salaries 
is crucial information, which unionists are interested in accessing and not always in 
sharing. For instance, an HR manager drove me back to Kuala Lumpur and asked 
me questions during the ride. I wrote: “One makes m jerk. He asked me if I had met 
unions when I was in the Philippines. I lie. […] I fear that revealing the [Filipino 
union]’s strategy would inhibit the very possibility to organise. […] I skirt around 
the question. This isn’t just curiosity, power plays and crucial information are also 
in the background” (notes, July 2017). I sometimes acted in a non-transparent way, 






Whilst this might seem like an old story now to my readers, it was a guiding thought 
when making decisions: assessing power imbalances between interviewees, I believe, 
should also be part of a researcher’s ethical considerations. 
Above, I described how ReAct members, unionists, workers, and I negotiated our 
various power imbalances related to the research process and to the campaign, as 
honestly as I could and driven by an analysis of what power is. In the chapter, I 
described my normative beliefs, presented my “resourcing activism” approach and 
reflected on the different data production methods I used. This research relied on my 
being embedded in ReAct, participant observation in a umber of union settings, 
interviews, archival research and long-term relationships with key participants. 
These methods enabled me to have an understanding of the process of creating 
greater international solidarity in ST and of ST workers’ range of realities. I crossed 
worlds: from that of well-paid engineers putting ontheir running shoes under 
spectacular mountain ranges, to the hustle and bustle of aking three jeepneys – or 
collective taxis – in Calamba to attend a course named “Marx-Lenin-Mao” run by a 
militant Filipino union, where, during the break, workers shared stories of unionists’ 
“disappearances.” I’m immensely grateful for the range of landscapes, actors and 
stories this process has exposed me to and painfully aware of the limits to conducting 
this research. I picked a case study based on my relationship with ReAct, rather than 
for pre-existing analytical reasons. I mentioned the bias that cultural and linguistic 
proximity created. I tried not to reproduce the trope of the western academic going 
to a Global South context, yet, as a result, I give greater attention to France. This 
research occasioned environmental costs; pragmatic challenges in developing 
contacts and itineraries; and personal costs from being often on the move, having to 
sustain and build trust with a range of people and develop an understanding of such 
diverse contexts. I often doubted the reliability of the data produced and dreamed of 
more insights, yet I hope this thesis allows my readers to grasp one attempt at 
building greater international solidarity. I learned by doing and I made mistakes. I 
hope that participants have learned or benefitted from this project. Some days, this 













September 2016: First meeting of ST trade unionists from Morocco, Malaysia, 
Malta, France and Italy 
Chapter 4:  
The ST Trade Union Network 
 
My research focussed on the attempt to set up a network hat would effectively unite 
the different unions in ST. The ST Trade Union Network (TUN) came about after 
six years of discussions, encounters, mishaps, persistence, false starts and successful 
coordination between ReAct, some unions in ST and one global union federation. 
This is not a neat story, and with hindsight certain events make me cringe: I wish we 
– ReAct and I - had acted differently at times, hadknown better, had persisted. When 
I got involved, this effort was already underway: whilst ReAct started speaking to 
French union leaders in 2014, the history of international links between ST unions 
begins earlier. An attempt at pan-European union coordination (the EWC) was set 
up in the mid-2000s, and the French and Italian unions in ST have exchanged 
information regarding strategy since the 1990s. This history reaffirms one of the 
central themes of my research: establishing common gr und among unions is slow 
work with many challenges along the way. Here, I lay the groundwork for the 
empirical chapters that follow by recounting, in some detail, the story of the ST TUN, 
spanning 2013-2019. I argue in the following chapters hat these details exemplify 







In August 2013, Adrien met with activists from a Chinese alt-labour NGO, called 
Worker Empowerment (WE). This was a time of relative openness in Shenzhen and 
Hong Kong, where many alt-labour NGOs were springing up as workers organised 
for minimum social benefits, better working conditions, or to claim unpaid wages. 
WE members were interested in organising Chinese workers in a European TNC, 
supported by European unions. Following this meeting, Adrien met with the CGT 
metalwork’s federal representative for international activities. He suggested that ST 
would be a “good company to run a pilot test” (ReAct document, November 2013) 
and initiated discussion between ReAct and CGT union leaders in ST. By the end of 
2013, they agreed on a project to support ST workers in China and to foster greater 
collaboration between the multiple ST unions. At the same time, ReAct contacted 
the union in ST’s site of Bouskoura (Morocco), whose leaders were keen to initiate 
a transnational alliance in ST. 
At that point, WE emailed ReAct that their preliminary study of ST showed that, 
despite the layoffs in in Longgang (China), the company followed standard practices 
and that workers “seemed happy with the arrangement [provided]” (ReAct document, 
June 2014). They outlined the difficulties they faced getting access to workers 
because of ST’s control over workers’ dormitories, and the apparent lack of strongly 
felt issues within the workforce. The email concluded by stating that WE no longer 
wished to organise ST. Summer holidays slowed the pac  of meetings between the 
CGT and ReAct. By contrast, UMT union leaders in Bouskoura by then had 
enthusiastically elaborated a plan of action to build greater international links, 
though the lack of response from France somewhat discouraged their efforts. To re-
initiate proceedings, in October, they sent a letter to the CGT. A week later, one 
UMT member called a CGT representative. The phone connection was poor; the 
French participant observed, “apart from saying hello and exchanging information, 
we need to think about what we can bring to each other. We need to build 
[something]”; they did not plan next steps (ReAct document, October 2014). Around 
this time, ST initiated a restructuring plan, offering voluntary redundancies 
worldwide, and in Crolles, short-time working, whereby workers receive 75% of 
their salary without work and keep their contracts. A year thus went by without many 
practical steps taken to support greater collaboration among ST unions. 
In January 2015, WE reiterated its interest in organising ST workers, this time in 
Shenzhen. By then, ReAct had contacted the Malaysian union in ST, EIEUSR, which 
showed interest in greater transnational coordinatio , and one Filipino union, PMA, 






workers in Calamba. In France, Crolles CGT members’ time was consumed with 
addressing the restructuring plans. In March, independent of union plans, workers 
from the weekend shift in Crolles spontaneously walked out. The CGT quickly 
supported them. Through links established by ReAct, EIEUSR published a statement 
in support; after promising to do the same, the UMT failed to do so. Pickets 
continued. The CGT Rousset team disagreed about the s rik  and CGT activists had 
no time for the international alliance, highlighting discrepancies between branches 
even within the same national union. After two weeks of mobilisation, the company 
and the CFDT, another large French union, agreed on a settlement, giving a one-time 
bonus of €300 to operators, but not engineers. Grassroots leaders felt betrayed. Otto 
(CGT) explained,  
Workers had been on strike […] for a month, and the [CFDT leaders] 
came in on the last days, sticking their flags on the roundabout. People 
told them, ‘What are you doing with your flags? If you want to come, 
come but stay discreet, because we have been here for a month night 
and day [and you haven’t].’ So yeah, workers called them out […] 
because [the CFDT] came […] because TV crews were coming. […] 
I’ll tell you frankly, in Crolles, there is no inter-union work, and it’ll 
take time for it to emerge. 
In May 2015, ST’s CEO hinted at another restructuring plan, a message which, 
workers felt, was aimed at pleasing financial markets. In the meantime, the UMT 
suggested a campaign to protect freedom of association rights throughout ST but 
conditioned the campaign on the participation of at least two French unions, a 
condition that collided with the tensions between the CGT and CFDT.  
This is the point at which I enter the story. In June 2015, I joined ReAct. We 
elaborated an action-research project aimed at investigating working conditions and 
social issues within ST, a plan which we shared with involved unions and with the 
CFDT, which had previously been kept out of the loop because of its conflict with 
the CGT. After the Filipino union ReAct was in touch with backed out, another 
Filipino union contacted ReAct in October 2015.33 They appeared to be interested in 
organising ST workers and in the offer of international support.34 On the 15th of 
                                                          
33 This, ReAct came to understand was because Filipino u ions fight over how turf is 
distributed. Whilst PMA had a claim to the Calamba factory, they and the other union agreed 
locally over whose turf it would become, leading PMA to step down. 
34 This second union was interested in Calamba becaus they had organised workers in a 
nearby factory at Cabuyao owned by the Dutch semiconductor company NXP since the 1980s. 
NXP and ST entered into a joint venture in 2008, which was dissolved in 2010. This brought 
NXP to transfer its Calamba factory to ST. ST managers made sure to provide appropriate 
working conditions in Calamba and that all the unionists were concentrated in Cabuyao to 






October, the CGT organised a rally in Grenoble against the restructuring plan 
attended by over two hundred and fifty people including some Italian unionists 
whilst in Rousset and Tours no walkouts occurred.  
By December 2015, ReAct’s proposal of an international research project hit a wall: 
in Malaysia, EIEUSR reported that there were no problems to research; in Morocco, 
progress depended on the response of a federal representative who failed to reply 
until February 2016; in the Philippines, the union asked for monetary support to 
circulate a questionnaire that ReAct had written. ReAct’s director refused, claiming 
he did not want to reproduce the traditional North/South developmental relationship 
in which Northern NGOs “help” Southern social movements and dictate their 
agendas. I disagreed but did not feel able to push against his view. By contrast, in 
the same period, ReAct funded WE to write a report on he working conditions of 
ST workers in Shenzhen which was distributed amongst the French and Italian 
unions. 
In lieu of supporting ReAct’s survey, French and Italian federal union officials 
pushed unions to contact Industri’ALL, the GUF to which union federations pay 
dues and hold responsible for initiating international processes. In December, the 
CGT and CGIL drafted a letter to Industri’ALL asking for support for the project. 
The CGIL asked the other Italian unions (CISL and UILM) to jointly sign the letter. 
ReAct contacted the CFDT, which agreed to sign. On the 26th of January, ST’s CEO 
confirmed unionists’ fears by announcing the closure of the digital division and the 
layoff of 1,600 workers, mainly in France, the U.S. and India. This both energised 
international exchanges between unions and further stalled ReAct’s survey. Between 
February and March, French trade unions organised metings throughout the 
company and increased the pressure on local MPs to lobby government to force ST 
to change its strategy. I attempted to find contacts wi h Indian workers to learn about 
their fate, finally coming across a French worker in close contact with Indian teams. 
He told me that most workers, because they needed positive references from ST, 
chose not to protest. Concurrently, most French unions (but not the CFDT) mobilised 
against the French government’s labour reform, which absorbed the branches’ 
energy and attention. 
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By March 2016, seven unions agreed on a letter to Industri’ALL, which stated: 
STMicroelectronics is a company with approximately 45,000 workers 
[…]. Its semiconductor activity is the industrial base of the 
contemporary world and experiences fast growth. However, our 
company follows the opposite path with a workforce and a gross 
income which have declined over the last years. This is mainly due to 
the purely financial strategy chosen by the managers, characterised by 
the distribution of large dividends regardless of the financial situation 
of the company, the decline in investment, the lack of long term 
strategic vision. […] 
This negative strategy was confirmed by […] the closure of the 
advanced digital branch [which entails] redundancies, r structuring 
and voluntary departure plans. Whilst the measures touch particularly 
France, India and the United States […] the negative consequences of 
the financial strategy of the company affect all the countries in which 
ST is implanted [having an impact on] wages and social returns as well 
as the deterioration of industrial relations, [ and workers’] freedom of 
association. Today, there are organised unions […] in several 
countries. There are also workers who want to create unions but who 
encounter repression by the company.35 
We thus call upon Industri’ALL to examine the possibility to organise 
a first international meeting with the different rep sentative unions of 
the company. This meeting could aim to: 
- Analyse the strategy of the company and its consequences in 
the different countries, notably around employment 
- Survey of the major issues addressed by the unions of the 
different countries 
- Address the question of freedom of association and the means 
to progress towards a common organisation of workers 
For six months thereafter, I organised conference calls between four to ten different 
unionists across three to five sites and visited union branches in Rousset, Grenoble 
and Agrate, first to support the mobilisation to change ST’s strategic plans, and 
second to prepare a first international meeting in September 2016. In response to the 
French unions’ campaign against the restructuring plans, unions in Morocco, Italy 
and Malaysia organised diverse actions, including rallies and solidarity photos, under 
the slogan “all together for a change of strategy.” B  May 2017, ST announced a 40% 
reduction in dividends and prepared plans to replac the CEO. Thanks to ReAct’s 
contacts, European unions learned of Chinese engineers’ demand for better layoff 
benefits, which prompted the EWC to send a letter asking ST’s global HR head to 
answer these demands. The request was dismissed in a curt statement: the HR head 
                                                          
35 The first draft ended with: “There are also, f r example in the Philippines, workers who 
want to create unions.” After discussion with the Filipino union, participating unions agreed 
not to mention the Philippines because the local union feared that if ST knew they were trying 
to organise Filipino workers, they would either increase surveillance and repression or 






cited the EWC’s Europe-only jurisdiction and said that, whilst European unions are 
entitled to their opinions on all matters, this issue was already “covered.” In June, 
the CGT learned through its members’ contact with Sngaporean technicians of the 
death of a worker in Singapore following exposure to a chemical at work. The 
Singaporean union, UWEI, stayed silent on this incident, asking for no support from 
other unions. 
In the summer, union leaders enthusiastically organised for their first gathering, 
sorting through an agenda, getting visas, funding, facilitating and translation. In 
September, leaders from seven unions gathered in Geneva, buoyed by the success of 
recent actions taken together, eager to learn from each other’s stories and experiences, 
excited to build something new. Jiro, Industri’ALL’s Electronics director, set the 
agenda, suggesting that the unions should create a TUN, which could then campaign 
for a GFA. In the meeting, unions mentioned wanting o support Filipino workers, 
since they had heard from me that there was no union i  Calamba. Filipino contacts 
had indicated their need for their organising to remain covert, and, as a result, in the 
absence of a Filipino organisation, I sought to tame the enthusiasm of attendees 
whose efforts could expose and threaten the organising drive’s very start. Without 
other more concrete proposals, and with, I felt, a push from more institutional unions, 
representatives agreed to pursue the GFA.  
In the autumn of 2016, the unions drafted a GFA proposal and sent it to their local 
branches. I tried to identify specific aspects of the GFA which branches could use to 
make it relevant to their workforces, such as attention to gender-based pay gaps, 
limits on maximum weekly hours, and the matter of migrant workers’ working 
conditions. In November, a UMT member and I gave prsentations in Agrate and 
Castalletto to promote direct exchanges between unionists. Two hundred and fifty 
workers attended in Agrate, thirty in Castalletto. The Moroccan representative came 
with a list of technical questions to compare working conditions, canteen provisions 
and technical equipment in Agrate versus Bouskoura. In December 2016, EWC 
delegates invited Jiro to their meeting for him to present the demand for the GFA, in 
a space where, significantly, the Malaysian and Moroccan unions had no voice. ST’s 
HR representative answered that signing the GFA wasnot on the cards, and 
wondered, when national movements were on the rise, why ST would swim against 
the current and favour transnational processes. In December, Industri’ALL sent a 
letter to ST’s CEO asking him to launch a process to formalise the relationship 






In January 2017, ST declared that a GFA was not necessary since ST had already 
adopted the EICC’s Code of Conduct and regularly imple ented human rights audits. 
The communication cited the EWC and argued that it relied on “local structures [in 
non-European countries] to implement adequate rules,” dismissing demands for an 
integrated global forum. Faced with this refusal, unions considered organising 
coordinated actions. Meanwhile, I met with CFE-CGC representatives, angry that 
they had not been invited to the September meeting because the CGT and CFDT 
regarded them as no different from management. When w  met, CFE-CGC 
representatives expressed interest in NGOs, like ReAct, for their “expertise in 
corporate social responsibility” rather than for organising or campaign support (notes, 
January 2017). To present my PhD and rekindle French a d Italian members’ interest 
in the GFA, which leaders admitted was quite abstract for them, I visited branches 
from January to May 2017. However, ST denied me entry to their sites and a 
convoluted process to meet the workforce ensued, whilst t e meeting in Rousset was 
cancelled following conflict between the CGT and CFDT over union elections. In 
the meantime, the TUN debated who could negotiate the GFA and, faced with ST’s 
rejection, which strategy to adopt. 
ReAct’s director pushed for direct actions, suggesting union members could attend 
ST’s AGM, target shareholders or go public with ST’s refusal (notes, April 2017). 
Whilst the CGT, CGIL and UMT met the proposals enthusiastically, enactment was 
hampered by Industri’ALL, CFE-CGC, GWU and CISL lead rs who opposed 
hurting the company’s image, whilst the CFDT focussed on finding a scandal, 
unsuccessfully. The EIEUSR declared itself to be too far from corporate 
headquarters to take part. By April 2017, activities had stalled. At that time, another 
wave of strikes in France absorbed all unionists’ time. In Italy, divergence between 
unions in the north and south stymied plans to negotiate a new collective bargaining 
agreement whilst French federal union structures tri d o push ReAct out of the GFA 
process. In June, after the UMT publicised the death of a subcontracted worker who 
was maintaining Bouskoura’s generators, outrage arose on the WhatsApp group. 
Although the UMT did not ask for support, other TUN members debated ST’s 
responsibility. 
The next TUN meeting, still partially funded by Industri’ALL, took place in 
Grenoble in September 2017. Union leaders decided against advertising it to workers 
in Grenoble and Crolles, sensing a lack of interest, and because most branch 
members were focussed on the last national strike against the labour reforms. GWU 






had prompted ST to set up sharp fences around the site to stop “union trucks” from 
barging in. UMT leaders could not get visas in time, and I set up a precarious 
conference call and chat to ensure their minimal participation. Jiro’s welcoming 
presentation described the goals of a TUN, automation’s growing impact on workers, 
and the sectoral challenge of labour organising given the large number of white-
collar workers and the concentration of semiconductor ompanies in Asia and the 
U.S., where there is either a poor record of labour rights or limited social dialogue. 
At my suggestion, union leaders exchanged information in working groups on safety 
conditions and gender inequality. A CGIL representative described each union as a 
finger, and the TUN as the hand. There was a desire to fight against nationalist waves. 
The network decided to collect information on health nd safety, social benefits and 
gender-related inequality to build a convincing argument for ST signing the GFA. 
Italian and Maltese unions denounced the inability of French unions to speak in one 
voice at the international level, bringing union lead rs to postpone the drafting of 
demands until after data was collected. 
The decentralised data collection failed. Jiro took ver, to my frustration. I felt his 
focus on targets meant he failed to ask questions regarding sites’ realities. I 
facilitated bilateral conversations between union leaders, to bring back the focus to 
these realities and maintained a relationship with each union leader. By February 
2019, whilst care for and interest in one another endured, the failure of the data 
collection exercise, the lack of a need for the GFA and absence of other goals, meant 
the TUN had nothing to sustain it and, by default, it faded away. We left the meeting 
without follow-up plans. The WhatsApp group goes on with intermittent exchanges 
and news, mostly posted by the CGT and UMT. And there the story ended, for now. 
In the chapters that follow, I analyse the grounds upon which this effort took place, 
seeking to unpack some of the spatial and temporal dimensions and narratives that 
sustained and strained its implementation, to reflect on, and hopefully contribute to, 


















Chapter 5:  
Circuits of capital 
 
The environment in which we found ourselves, condition[ed] the 
success of the company, of people who work and of territories in 
which workers worked. (Damien, former chief economist of ST) 
In a succinct manner, Damien introduces one of the chi f points of this chapter, 
namely the importance of people and territories to the functioning of a company, and 
to the creation of international solidarity. In this chapter, I follow Mitchell’s (2011) 
call to assess labour’s geography, attending to the political and economic 
environments which condition semiconductor production, and to the factors which 
explain the geographical organisation of ST’s back- and front-end production sites. 
These factors, allied with business considerations a d informed by public office 
holders’ interests, led workers to have uneven power, or what Coe and Jordhus-Lier 
(2011) call “variegated agency,” which framed their ability to work together.  
In the first section, I describe key characteristics of semiconductor production. I 
demonstrate that because semiconductor production entails large amounts of fixed 
capital and because semiconductor technology is crucial to military and industrial 
sovereignty, some states have protected and supported their national semiconductor 
industries. By way of illustration, I outline how the French and Italian states shaped 
the birth of ST and continue to have controlling stakes in the company. This sets the 
context for the political leverage that some ST unions have access to. In the second 
section, I examine ST’s global organisation and identify key factors that inform ST’s 
location choices, returning notably to the power of states, and analyse how these 
factors shape workers’ ability to organise, locally nd globally. I show that workers 
face different experiences of work depending on their location in back- or front-end 
production and the level of national protections, and to the degree they are put in 
competition with one another for investments and orers. The accumulation of 
differences and competing interests framed their ability and willingness to work with 
one another, demonstrating why attention to the specific factors which inform a 
company’s development are crucial to understanding the structural constraints that 
shape labour’s agency across one company. This chapter is based on close reading 
of business texts (Brown & Linden, 2009; Luthje et al., 2013; Peters, 2006), industry 






1. The political economy of semiconductor 
production 
 
Drawing on his study of high-tech ventures in the United States and the development 
of the “Asian Tiger” economies, Lerner (2009, p.42) claims, “Virtually every hub of 
cutting-edge entrepreneurial activity in the world to ay has its origin in proactive 
government intervention.” This section substantiates his claim. I highlight how 
semiconductor technology entails high start-up costs, both in terms of R&D and 
manufacturing equipment. I show that the combinatio of this capital intensity with 
the strategic importance of the semiconductor industry has prompted states to 
support semiconductor firms, though not all states can afford to do so. I then show 
that the history of ST came about as a direct result of the French and Italian states’ 
efforts to develop their national semiconductor industry. The description of these 
sectoral specificities along with ST’s specific history sets the scene for understanding 
ST workers’ uneven power across the company. 
a. Semiconductors and the state: a love affair 
 
“Semiconductor” is a generic term to describe any material that conducts electricity 
imperfectly (Brown and Linden, 2009). To create a semiconductor chip, different 
photolithography processes layer and/or erode metal oxides on a silicon substrate - 
the most widely used semiconductor material. These patterns create a series of 
connected electronic components (transistors) which enable the storage of 
information, the reading of signals, the organisation and supply of power, and 
calculating functions. Three innovations gave birth to the microelectronics industry: 
(1) the invention of the transistor in 1947, which allowed the storing of information 
through electronic currents; (2) the Integrated Circuit (IC) in 1958, which aligned 
several transistors together on a silicon chip; and (3) the microprocessor in 1971, 
which integrated several ICs on a single chip (Morgan & Sayer, 1988).  Each 
breakthrough took place in the U.S. Two points are important to note. First, whilst 
these were idiosyncratic inventions, they took place in a scientific ecosystem, which 
was supported by the U.S. in the context of the Cold War (J. Lerner, 2009; Peters, 
2006). By the 1960s, the U.S. Department of Defence was the prime consumer of 
semiconductor products (Peters, 2006). Public grants for semiconductor R&D 






p.12).36  As I show, semiconductor technology’s political significance, notably 
because of its key input to military technology, has continued to justify the industry 
receiving state support and attention.  
Second, as indicated by the continued success of U.S.-based technology giants and 
their technological advantages in subsectors of the industry (Peters, 2006), the 
semiconductor industry features an aspect of “path dependency,” defined by Castree 
et al. (2013) as “a situation arising when a system or organization follows one 
possible path such that others become progressively more difficult to adopt.” This 
feature stems from the regular trajectory of innovati n under capitalism and from the 
specific capital-intensity required to produce semiconductors, which meant that as 
companies developed specific technologies and becam fixed in specific territories, 
developing alternative paths and territories became progressively more difficult and 
costly. Regarding the first aspect, technological innovations flow from gradual and 
continuous improvements of existing technologies rather than from discrete 
breakthroughs (Morgan and Sayer, 1988). This advantages existing companies, 
though this is a double-edged feature: the development of technologies in specific 
places both offers a competitive advantage to pioneer firms and may limit their 
opportunities for growth (Peters, 2006).37 This illustrates an observation by Harvey 
(2006 [1982], p.123) who notes, “fixed capital, which s itself one of the chief means 
employed to increase the productivity of social labour, becomes, once it is installed, 
a barrier to further innovation.” Below I add nuance to this statement, showing that 
the rising importance of Intellectual Property (IP) rights increasingly thwarts 
latecomer strategies. 
In addition to technological features, semiconductor’s path dependency also results 
from the sector’s capital intensity, which rises with each new technological 
development. Indeed, the semiconductor industry has progressed along a steep 
productivity rate, which the industry refers to as “Moore’s law” (The Economist, 
2015). Gordon Moore, Intel’s cofounder, forecast that the number of transistors 
which could be manufactured on an IC would double every year – a prediction later 
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Rothwell, 1986, p.12). 
37 For instance, between the 1950s and the 1990s, companies were able to break into the 
semiconductor market by adopting latecomer strategies, mitating and then improving 
existing technologies (Mathews and Cho, 2000; Peters, 2006). Existing companies 
sometimes missed technological breakthroughs. For example, American firms focussed on 
the NMOS technology due in part to their mostly institutional customer base. As a result, 
they missed the CMOS technology, which Japanese firms, more adapted to and geared 







revised to every two years – whilst the price of ICs would be halved (Brown and 
Linden, 2009). This law has been synonymous with continuous improvement in 
performance and reduction in the size and unit costof an IC (Hasenstab, 2013). 
These achievements result from three main developments. First, semiconductor 
companies have consistently improved chip designs. Innovations are increasingly 
combined through re-usable technological “blocks” (protected by IP rights) which 
engineers can assemble puzzle-like on a chip instead of re-inventing each block anew. 
Second, companies have continuously increased their ability to diminish the width 
of the layer of metal deposited to integrate more transistors and more complex 
functions on the IC, increase the speed of transmission and decrease the chip’s power 
consumption (Brown and Linden, 2009). The industry has relentlessly miniaturised 
the IC through technological jumps: whilst the linewidth of the first transistors was 
in the scale of tens of microns (10-6 m), the most advanced lithography machines now 
aim to print 7nm (10-9 m) circuits  (Sperling, 2017). To illustrate this extraordinary 
feat, whilst there were 2,000 transistors on an IC in 1970, there are 20 billion 
transistors in the latest chips, a 107-fold increase (Roser & Ritchie, 2018). Third, 
companies have increased the efficiency of the fabric tion process (Brown and 
Linden, 2009). They have controlled manufacturing defects and increased the size 
of the wafer, which is the silicon disk upon which ICs are built. Competitive wafer 
diameters were 150-mm in the 1980-90s, 200-mm in the 1990s-2000s and since the 
2000s, 300-mm wide. Each increase in wafer diameter size greatly improves the 
productivity of a fab, the increasingly automated large factories producing 
semiconductor chips. The larger the wafer, the more ICs are produced on each one.  
These three sources of innovation entail economic constraints. The rising importance 
of IPs – which takes place in a broader context of a shift towards a rentier economy 
(Standing, 2016) and financialisation – means that small companies increasingly 
struggle to pay the royalties to access the needed designs, and that already 
established companies receive large streams of rent, which further their R&D 
dominance.38  Each technological jump exacerbates the capital costs required, 
notably in terms of lithography equipment and R&D efforts to design and 
industrialise smaller linewidth. For instance, the jump from 32nm to 22nm linewidth 
on 300-mm wafers “causes typical fabrication costs to grow by roughly 40%, costs 
associated with process development by about 45% and with chip design by up to 
50%” (Hasenstab, 2013, p.6). This becomes worse with smaller linewidth: 
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developing a 7nm chip design was estimated to have cost $271 million, or nine times 
the cost to design a 28nm device (Lapedus, 2016). The drive to follow Moore’s law 
and continuously increase computing power along with decreasing devices’ size to 
remain competitive puts intense pressure on the industry.  The R&D costs add to 
rising fixed investments required for each diameter inc ease: lithography machines 
have become astonishingly expensive - some of the latest machines are worth $110 
million each and fabs have hundreds of machines (Castellano, 2017). Charles, an 
industry expert, estimates that manufacturing plants based on 300-mm wafers cost a 
minimum of one billion dollars per fab whilst Intel’s lates fab is said to have cost 
about $7 billion (Bradshaw, 2017a). This represents a staggering jump from the 
1970s’ $3 million price tag (Peters 2006, p.80). As a Texas Instruments executive 
remarked, “the cost of semiconductor manufacturing is rising at such a tremendous 
rate that the big challenge will lie not in the ability to make better chips, but in having 
enough money to do so” (in Brown and Linden, 2009, p.39). As a result, ever fewer 
companies can contemplate investing in new fabs (Any Silicon, 2016; Brown and 
Linden, 2011; Hasenstab, 2013). These three interrelated pressures mean that 
companies which successfully introduce smaller linewidth and wider wafer 
diameters acquire considerable competitive advantage, offering advanced ICs at 
cheaper cost, adding to existing pressures of scale.  
The race towards smaller ICs along with larger wafer diameters that characterises 
the semiconductor industry in parallel with how these technical features entail rising 
economic constraints, encapsulates quite remarkably one of Marx’s (1990) key 
claims regarding the interplay between forces of equalisation and centralisation in a 
capitalist system. Drawing heavily on Marx, Harvey (2006, p.133) notes that 
innovations fuel capitalist competition, as they provide “the prime lever for 
furthering the accumulation of capital through perpetual increases in the value 
productivity of labour power.” Assuming similar labour conditions and following a 
process that Harvey calls “leapfrogging,” companies must equal or improve 
techniques adopted by other companies or face irrelvance, given the “coercive laws 
of competition” that reign over capitalism. However, underlining the spatial 
consequences of such leapfrogging, Smith (2006) argues that technological 
innovations also act as a key levelling or equalising force in the production of uneven 
development, whereby over time companies attain a type of equilibrium whereby 
they achieve similar returns and productivity until an innovation ruptures the 
equilibrium. The development of the Asian Tiger Economy, notably based on 






(Mathews & Cho, 2000). However, Marx (1990) also notes that this equalisation is 
always contradictory, for competitive economies also create the conditions for ever 
greater centralisation of capital: monopoly positions arise, whereby smaller 
companies are destroyed or appropriated by larger on s.  
In the semiconductor sector, the process of equalisation, whereby companies can 
copy and further develop existing technology and thus fend off the monopoly 
situation, is frustrated by the interlocking links between technological development, 
capital requirements and patent laws which curtail the spread of innovation in favour 
of increasingly large semiconductor companies (Brown and Linden, 2009). The 
industry’s development thus remarkably illustrates how technological development 
holds within it both equalising and centralising forces and the salience of Marx’ 
analysis almost 150 years on. The whirling spiral ceated by the interplay between 
such equalisation and centralisation, within a competitive system, is illustrated in the 
ongoing pressure of business cycles (see Section 2.b below) but also in the growing 
financialisation of the sector which turbo-charges monopoly situations (see Chapter 
7). These interlocking tendencies stress that one cmpany’s development rests on 
ongoing contradictions and instability. Significantly, workers are caught in these 
contradictions and, whilst I show in Chapter 8, that t ey may be able to mitigate the 
worst impacts of these pressures on their individual companies, the churning process 
of capitalism means that not all workers can, and when they do, it is only ever a 
temporary “fix.”  
In addition to pointing to the fundamental contradictions that workers face, the 
interlocking loop of technology, capital and path-dependency also matters because 
of the political nature of semiconductor technology. Indeed, technological 
considerations are key to a semiconductor company’s success but also to that of 
entire national industrial sectors and, as a result, to states’ geopolitical, military, and 
industrial dominance (Sayer, 1986). Semiconductor technologies are central to what 
has been deemed the third industrial revolution, which refers to the growing 
automation and digitalisation of manufacturing, andthe fourth industrial revolution, 
which will be “characterized by [a] much more ubiquito s and mobile internet, by 
smaller and more powerful sensors and by artificial intelligence and machine 
learning” (Schwab, 2016, p.7). Connected devices, biomedical inventions, advanced 
military equipment, and the “Internet of Things” all depend on the capacity to 
produce and improve the ICs they rely on. Morgan and Sayer (1986, p.51) argue that 
such interdependence leads to a situation where “any country which lacks a 






electronics industry as a whole.” Damien explained, “Chips are an infrastructure of 
sovereignty. Without it, there is no internet, drive less cars, connected objects, 
health-related applications.” He added that this dependency has an impact on 
companies in other sectors, leading to types of economic and geopolitical war 
between states over control of such innovations: 
You are not going to build the smart car by buying your chips from 
the Americans. You can’t believe such fantasies, the economic war is 
still here, and it has never been elsewhere. […] I hope you don’t 
imagine that Qualcomm [U.S.-based] will sell its best chips for 
intelligent cars to Peugeot before Ford? That’s just p re heresy! 
Indeed, the presence and control of semiconductor industries may enable profitable 
exports, advanced military technology and positive externalities in the form of a 
dynamic job market or a head start in related industries. The path dependency of 
semiconductor production, its capital intensity allied with the strategic significance 
of chips to future industrial growth and military prowess has meant that some states 
have systematically intervened to secure a thriving semiconductor industry and 
“develop their competitive advantage” (Brown and Linden, 2009, p.164). Amongst 
other things, states have introduced protectionist policies, imposed specific standards 
for the benefit of their favoured company, upheld preferential purchasing policies, 
offered training programs, supported laboratories and technology transfer 
agreements, incubated semiconductor firms (e.g., Taiwan) (Mathews and Cho, 2000), 
manipulated their currencies, and provided easy access to capital (e.g., Japan) or 
bailed out companies (e.g., South Korea bailed out Hynix in 2001 with $64 billon, 
Peters, 2006, p.61) (Brown and Linden, 2009; Jowett and Rothwell, 1986). These 
policies continue to this day, with even higher stakes. States still perceive foreign 
companies as threats to their national companies and economies, as illustrated by 
recent American orders prohibiting mergers and acquisition activities between 
American and Chinese firms, citing potential leakages of IPs and “threats to 
semiconductor innovation and U.S. national security” (Dye, 2017; Lucas, 2017). 
Countries which want to create a semiconductor industry ex nihilo face the need for 
huge investments. China has promised $160 billion in the next ten years to ensure its 
semiconductor companies’ competitiveness (McGrath, 2018). 
This discussion highlighted the key technological, economic and political features 
of semiconductor production and showed how their interrelations have prompted 
some states to actively support the development of their national semiconductor 
sector, but also encourage tendencies towards monopolisation. This knowledge is 






appreciating the significance of capital investments, the erosion of which was core 
to workers’ fear of financialisation. Furthermore, this discussion sets the scene for 
understanding why workers were able to draw on state representatives’ support to 
further their demands, since, as I show next, ST is no exception to the trend towards 
state intervention and support.  
b. The history of STMicroelectronics 
 
STMicroelectronics was created in 1987, combining “the non-military business of 
Thomson Semiconducteurs, the microelectronics busines  of the French state-
controlled defence electronics company, Thomson-CSF, and SGS Microelettronica, 
the microelectronics business owned by […] the Italian state-controlled telephone 
company” (ST, Annual Report, 1996, p.5). The Thompson emiconductor division 
resulted from the French state’s 40-year strategy to develop a French semiconductor 
industry, based on merging different companies and start-ups (Moreau, 2006). One 
of its precursor companies was the Compagnie de telegraphie Sans Fil (CSF), which 
produced tubes starting in 1955, then diodes and germanium transistors in St Egreve, 
a stone’s throw from Grenoble. As germanium became obsolete, the CSF lab 
attempted to develop transistors based on silicon (Balas, 2009). Yet, following the 
launch of Sputnik, the previously relatively open sharing of technologies between 
France and the U.S. stopped in the name of “defence se rets” (Moreau, 2006). Emile 
recounted that,  
We needed electronics which worked with nuclear [rays]. […] This 
forced [the government] to think about the components […] but the 
U.S. didn’t want France to develop its [atomic] bomb, so there were 
restrictions on technological transfer. 
Narratives like these reiterate the political nature of semiconductors. Concurrently, 
engineers from the Nuclear Study Centre in Grenoble understood the revolutionary 
potential of semiconductors and in 1967 successfully lobbied for the creation of a 
publicly-owned electronics and information technology lab, the LETI. However, by 
1972, the lack of state support and an industrial vision within the LETI pushed its 
researchers to create a private company, EFCIS, to industrialise the technologies they 
had developed (Balas, 2009). Following a number of tumultuous years of 
competition between EFCIS and CSF – which in 1968 merged with Thomson under 
pressure from the state in 1976, Thomson-CSF acquired shares of EFCIS and 
gradually increased its control over its rival (Balas, 2009; Daviet 2000). Thereafter, 
Thomson-CSF benefited from the state-backed Plan Composant which allocated 600 






semiconductor industry (Balas, 2009). This plan failed because of the French 
market’s insufficient size; the competitive advantage of American and Japanese 
companies; and the significantly larger public subsidie  in the U.S. and in Japan – 
500 and 300 million francs per year respectively (Balas, 2009, p.245). In 1982, 
Thomson was partly nationalised and then pushed into a merger with an American-
French joint venture, Eurotechnique, based in Rousset. The government tried again 
from 1982 to 1985 to breathe profitability into the company by subsidising it to the 
tune of $820 million (Peters, 2006, p.12). This partially failed. In 1986-87, Thomson 
fired a thousand workers in Grenoble (Reverdy, 2014, p.7). 
SGS-Microelettronica shared a similar fate in Italy. Founded by Adriano Olivetti and 
Virgilio Floriani in Milan in 1957, it later internationalised its activities, creating a 
joint venture with Fairchild – an American company – and a site in Singapore in 
1969 (Daviet, 2000). Following financial difficulties, it went under public ownership 
in 1971 and then merged with ATES, which produced tubes in Catania, Sicily. In 
1979, when the Italian state shifted its strategy rega ding publicly owned 
corporations, the company became privately managed under the direction of 
Pasquale Pistorio – who would later become ST’s CEO – whilst supported by the 
national plan for microelectronics (1982-1992). Thus, both Thomson-CSF and SGS-
Microelettronica were more or less inspired by, andin competition with, American 
companies, had state support, and pursued struggling business models within a 
disadvantaged Europe. Pistorio wrote that in the 1980s 
The United States and Japan combined financial resou ces and a big 
internal market […] with a large pool of qualified labour, in an 
industrial environment, which enabled companies a better use of 
human and capital resources. […] They also had access to financial 
support for research, thanks to existing national pl ns in this sector. 
Lastly, they benefited from the knowledge and the industrial synergy 
between the customers and producers of semiconductors. In other 
words, they seem to have it all. (in Balas, 2009, p.244)  
In 1987, there “was a French-Italian [i.e., French and Italian state] desire to merge” 
(Louis) the two companies which were “dwarfs, we were too small, we didn’t have 
a critical size so we had every chance to disappear, lots of debt, no growth” (Damien). 
They thrived as one company: ST. In 1996, ST was introduced onto the stock market 
with the French and Italian states each owning a controlling minority share of 13.5% 
(ST, Annual Reports 1996). ST, in a remarkable turn, became successful through the 
mid-2000s, when it employed some 52,180 employees, and in 2007, reached $10 
billion in revenue (ST, Annual Reports 2007). According to Louis, this was notably 






energised the sector with the help of the state and of the regions [and] brought ST to 
the third global ranking.” However since then, ST has undergone several 
restructuring plans and closed many R&D divisions ad back-end sites (ST Annual 
Reports, 2009; 2013; 2017), a shift I analyse in Chapter 7.  
In explaining this industry’s high capital intensity and geopolitical significance, I 
have introduced the matrix of considerations which frame ST’s development. I 
stressed the reinforcing links between semiconductor technology and their spatial 
development, showing how the development of technology in a certain place shapes 
the broader dynamics of uneven development between cou tries and I return to the 
significance of this for trade unions’ power next. Harvey (2006, p.122) argues that, 
often “technological change appears to assume an autonomous dynamic, entirely 
divorced from its origin in capitalist competition a d class relations,” a process akin 
to the fetishism of the commodity. As I have shown, the technical characteristics of 
chip production and their economic constraints reinforce the path-dependency 
feature of semiconductor industrial development and i tersects with political 
considerations, given this technology’s geopolitical significance. By claiming an 
agency of technology, I am not embracing a concept of “things” as agents in and of 
themselves (see Arboleda, 2017; Swanton, 2013), devoi  of a dialectical process 
whereby they shape people’s lives and are constituted by people, within specific 
political and economic systems. Rather, I demonstrated that chip technology’s 
“power” to shape the development of the industry stems from political and economic 
considerations, which have prompted some states to intervene to support their 
national industry, ST being no exception. Morgan and Sayer (1988, p.20-21) argue 
that, “there is no contradiction in acknowledging both that the technical properties 
of material […] have an irreducible quality, and that their use and manipulation is 
always influenced by social characteristics.” This politicised understanding of chip 
technology’s “agency” aims to contribute to “more nua ced concepts for 
understanding the relations among people, knowledge and things” (Kirsch and 






2. ST’s geographies of production 
 
In September 2015, a union leader told ReAct’s director that he  
seemed to underestimate the difference [emphasis added] between 
back-end and front-end [sites]. The activities have nothing to do with 
each other. The comparison potentially doesn’t make much sense. 
[Back-end] activity has been totally offshored for more than thirty 
years. Back-end [sites] live their lives. No one really thinks about them 
in terms of global corporate strategies. [Our union] would suggest 
[regarding international solidarity] that Morocco, Malaysia and others 
suggest what their claims are, and we support [them].  
Three-and-a-half years later, as we walked back from the third international 
gathering of ST unions in February 2019, the lead officer of electronics for 
Industri’ALL turned towards me. Soon we were talking about the difficulties of 
creating the network. He noted that this sector is more complex than automobile 
production, which entails a standardised production process and often shared 
experiences across the workforce. He stated, “Everyone is totally different [emphasis 
added], they do different jobs, it isn’t easy to see what they have in common. It makes 
it difficult to organise” (notes, February, 2019). In the following discussion, I analyse 
what the difference mentioned by interviewees entails and argue that these varied 
landscapes challenge inter-union collaboration by decreasing the commonality 
between workers and putting in place complex patterns of internal competition 
between sites and workforces. Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011, p.221-222) claim a GPN 
analysis may reveal 
The variegated landscape for agency potential across different sectors. 
While some workers occupy privileged positions within the broader 
system – associated, for example, with high levels of value-adding 
activity and low levels of potential substitutability – others find 
themselves in far more marginal, transitory and competitive working 
environments. 
By attending to the differences mentioned by interviewees, I explore Coe and 
Jordhus-Lier’s claim in one company rather than an entire GPN. I argue that 
variegatedness is about workers facing varying conditions, which shape their power 
and vulnerability locally but also their interest in international collaboration.  
Semiconductor production is divided into three main processes which are scattered 
around the world: (1) R&D; (2) manufacturing; and (3) assembly and testing.39 
Within ST’s business, the three processes cohabit: (1) and (2) make up front-end 
                                                          







activities and (3) back-end sites. Here, I examine how ST workforces’ varied 
environments shaped ST workers’ power, vulnerability and inter-site relationships. 
Exploring these geographies, I found myself revisiting theories around industrial 
location and wondered what I could add to this body f research, which gradually 
merged into the GCC, GVC and GPN literature. I cannot encompass the variety of 
national industrial relations frameworks and local conditions that workers in ST’s 11 
major plants and three R&D centres face. To go beyond stating that “geography 
matters,” I analyse some of the factors which determine each site’s continued 
existence as a semiconductor site, recognising that they exist alongside elements of 
serendipity and mere history (Rathzel et al., 2014).40 Here, I first describe the 
organisation of production in ST, displaying simply the varied contexts it 
encompasses, and then show how ST’s business environment and corporate 
relationships were also crucial frames for understanding workers’ ability to exert 
power. Last, I analyse the factors which conditioned back-end and front-end sites’ 
survival. I argue that understanding the matrix of these factors, which represent a 
combination of business considerations, labour and capital costs, as well as ST’s 
territorial embeddedness, is key for evaluating the varied material conditions of 
inter-union collaboration in the semiconductor sector. 
a. Embedding ST in space and time 
 
In R&D sites, engineers determine a chip’s function and design the physical layout 
of the metal oxide for each one. Most workers are white-collar workers: engineers, 
managers and administrative staff. As of 2018, 16.3% of ST’s workforce or 
approximately 7,400 people work in R&D (Ferro, 2018, p.5). This is a “skill 
intensive” part of the production process, which features a rising number of hours to 
design ever-more complex chips and provide a software p ckage for each (Brown 
and Linden, 2009). As a result, and although firms’ R&D costs as a propo tion of 
sales have increased from 10% in the 1990s to 17% in 2006 (Brown and Linden, 
2009, p.144), there remains a “productivity gap” whereby design engineers’ capacity 
to design new chips cannot match the pace of technological development. This has 
                                                          
40 For instance, one manager explained that ST developed in Muar in 1967 because a 
representative from ST on their way to Malacca from Singapore had to stop there for the 
night. He met a representative from the state who offered ST land and attractive energy prices. 
ST then located in Muar (notes, July 2017). According to Damien, “Catania […] well it was 
[Pistorio’s] ‘pet project’. […] because it is his country, and he is an eternal immigrant, so he 
dreams of Sicily,” whilst Malta was chosen because “it is an ex-Italian colony and it isn’t far 
[from Italy].” These anecdotes emphasise some aspect of hance in locating sites and 
illustrate Schoenberger’s (2001) argument that companies’ trajectories are shaped, at least in 






led companies to standardise some components of design, to outsource part of their 
design needs and to open R&D sites in countries with a cheap engineer labour pool, 
such as India (Brown and Linden, 2009). These trends are reflected in ST, which, in 
the 1990s, opened R&D sites in Noida and Bangalore (India) with 900 to 1,500 
workers.41  However, most of ST’s R&D work continues to be performed in France 
(approximately 2,950 workers), Italy (approximately 2,000 workers) and Singapore 
(approximately 1,000 workers) (see Appendix 4 for the full figures of ST’s global 
workforce). Not only is R&D highly skilled, it tends to pay well: French engineers’ 
wages start at €2,500/month and can go up to €6,500/month and Italian ones at 
€2,000/month up to €5,000/month. I was not able to find equivalent data for 
Singapore or India. 
After the design of a chip comes the fabrication stage, which takes place in 
increasingly automated factories called fabs. Workers in fabs are mostly operators 
and technicians, who are supported by industrial engineers. ST employs 
approximately 19,300 workers in fabs in France, Italy and Singapore (including 
engineers, there are approximately 9,170 fabs workers in France, 8,450 in Italy, and 
4,600 in Singapore). These workers are unevenly distributed, just like the R&D 
teams. Whilst the two largest fabs of Crolles and Agrate each encompass 
approximately 5,000 workers, there are only 1,500 workers in Tours (See Appendix 
4). Fabs provide strictly controlled internal environments to avoid any contamination 
of the chip (Ezratty, 2014a). There, each silicon wafer goes through hundreds of 
different processes which build and erode successiv layers of resins, film materials, 
and metal oxide over the silicon (ST Microcontroller division, 2000). Fabs are 
qualified according to the diameter of the wafers they produce. Entry-level wages 
for operators are lower than they are for engineers, approximately €1,500/month in 
France and €1,300/month in Italy, in line with statu ory minimum wages and reliant 
on complex bonus structures. 
The last production stage takes place in back-end sites where the chips are cut out of 
the wafer, placed on a frame, connected with copper wir s, assembled in a protective 
package, and tested (ST Microcontroller division, 2000). Apart from Rennes (France, 
100 workers), Toa Payoh (Singapore, 1,300) and Kirkop (Malta; 1,600), ST operates 
most back-end sites in the Global South: Bouskoura (Morocco; 3,450), Muar 
(Malaysia; 3,900), Shenzhen (China; 4,800) and Calamba (the Philippines, 1,600). 
In total, there are approximately 16,850 workers in back-end sites, most of whom 
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are operators and technicians, with fewer engineers and managers (ST, 2017).42 
Back-end operators’ entry wages in the Global South are much lower than those of 
fab operators, ranging from approximately €250/month i  Morocco and Malaysia 
(excluding bonuses) to €840/month in Malta in 2017.  
In short, ST’s employs a highly diverse workforce in terms of expertise, pay and 
location that is roughly split between front-end site  (26,700 workers) and back-end 
sites (16,840); between Global North and Global South locations; and, in front-end 
sites, between operators and engineers. Of course, thi  distribution is not random: 
the spread of ST’s activities relates directly to labour and capital costs, as well as to 
active state intervention, as I show below. Furthermore, the organisation of work is 
not just set in space, it is also set in time and business relationships. Morgan and 
Sayer (1988, p.17) thus state that workers are vulnerable because “the firms that they 
work for have to conduct their business in [a] turbulent and uncertain environment.” 
By examining the cycles of the semiconductor market, th  resulting vulnerability of 
sites within ST, and the role of business clients in shaping workers’ varied 
experiences and uneven structural power, I argue that it is not possible to decouple 
internal corporate changes from global cycles and business relationships, as I show 
when examining, in Chapter 7, the sector’s and ST’s growing financialisation.  
The semiconductor industry exhibits extremely volatile economic cycles (Brown and 
Linden, 2009; Chery, 2017). Boom years are followed by sharp dips in demand: 
Between 2001 and 2002, the sector dropped from a 40% revenue growth rate to a   -
40% rate of contraction (Figure 5.1). For Luthje et al. (2013, p.40), these bubbles 
follow from the “structural overcapacity […] due toextremely short cycles of 
innovation and capital valorization” in the semiconductor industry. Each company 
seeks to be ahead of competitors by committing large resources to R&D and 
production, which can induce periodic crises of overproduction whilst clients 
overstock, artificially driving up demand (Brown & Linden, 2009). Tendencies 
towards overproduction and crisis, as engines of growth and destruction, are endemic 
to capitalism (Harvey, 2006). Authors argue that they are specifically potent in the 
semiconductor industry, given the increasing sunken capital costs associated with 
chip production and the volatility of market cycles (Brown and Linden, 2009; Ezratty, 
2014b). A minority of firms may thrive during a low-growth period, however 
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19,300 fab workers and 16,840 back-end workers, equalling 43,540 workers, which is short 
of the 45,500 figure quoted. The difference reflects the fact that I did not include the 






Morgan and Sayer (1988, p.269) grimly stress, “not all [companies] can keep up […] 
simultaneously.” This restates why business cycles matter: industrial development 
does not progress “in smooth and evolutionary ways but rather in cycles interrupted 
by plant closures, layoffs, and massive restructuring during periods of economic 
crisis” (Luthje et al., 2013, p.225) and any attentio  to workers’ power must also 
attend to these broader business cycles. 
 
Figure 5.1: Global semiconductor revenue growth from 1988 to 2018 (Statista, 
2018) 
ST’s French workers clearly correlated different restructuring plans they lived 
through with market cycles. For instance, in 1990 in Rousset, “there were job 
dismissals,” said Alban, who explained, “it was a cycle of the market, [and] we were 
at the bottom.” Claire recalled the mobilisation in 1995 of three hundred white-collar 
workers in Rousset who feared a redundancy plan (notes, February 2017). Rene 
remembered that “in 2000, there were significant pay rises […] and after, there was 
a crisis that arrived in 2001 […] [ST] said we’re going back to ground zero for all 
the job grades, the things, the benefits. And workers exploded.” A mobilisation 
followed, which Emmanuelle remembered, “was really conflictual, following the 
recession [in semiconductors]. […] [It was] the last time we burned tires around here 
on the roundabout, with the barbecues and the sausages.” In 2004, six hundred 
workers in Rennes lost their jobs; in 2016, there wre four-hundred-and-fifty 
voluntary redundancies in France. Each of these events followed a dip in the market, 






have negative effects on workers’ jobs: unions alsou ed positive market cycles to 
push for greater pay. For example, in 2018, three Fnch unions signed a declaration 
in common proclaiming “despite two exceptional years [of growth in the sector and 
the company], your pay rise just doesn’t add up!”(CFDT, 2018). These examples 
demonstrate that French unions were well aware of the importance of the economic 
environment in terms of their structural power to bargain with ST. Raphael simply 
explained, “there is no miracle, economic activity is leverage” (notes, October 2018). 
This acts as a reminder that unions’ power is only effective if they threaten their 
employers’ interests (Brookes, 2013a) and that the eff ctiveness of this threat is 
mediated by dynamics beyond a single firm. 
Not only did business considerations inform workers’ structural power, but the 
organisation of the company means that workers wereunevenly exposed to the dips 
of the market. Workers explained that both within and across countries, some 
workers could be doing well whilst others experienced difficulties. Jules from 
Crolles remembered, “[Once, in Rousset] they were totally overloaded with work, 
[whereas] we had weeks of partial unemployment.” Until 2016, R&D and production 
efforts in ST were segmented between analogue and digital divisions, the former 
mostly in Italy and the latter in France. Peppe explained that “you [had] to consider 
that from a technological point of view, you could divide the company into two […] 
[Almost like] two different companies” and this meant that “[experiences] can be 
uneven.” This mapping of ST’s operational divisions across France and Italy 
encouraged workers to hold nationalist readings of ST’s difficulties. For instance, 
when no investments were planned in Italy, Lucas from the CISL read this as a 
consequence of the digital division’s large losses, complaining that the Italians – and 
not the analogic segment per se – had to shoulder the burden of the “French losses” 
(notes, November 2016). French unionists recognised this resentment: 
The Italians were scared that […] to continue losing money [by 
protecting the digital division] was to make the Italian side also 
shoulder the losses, whilst it wasn’t their fault. […] Why should 
investments in Italy be threatened by the [budget] hole on the French 
side? (Baptiste) 
Thus, workers suggested that national loyalties and fears flared up over the question 
of who should pay for the losses of the French digital division. This illustrates that, 
within the same company, workers are exposed to different market forces and that 
the division of work across the production chain may exacerbate anxieties about one 
national workforce benefitting at the expense of another. These tensions also 






contexts, to understand how these may bring together or divide workers based on 
their business’s organisation. 
In addition to market cycles, workers also referred to differing exposure to ST's 
clients. The semiconductor industry, which was first dominated by institutional 
clients, has become an industry which caters to the needs, desires and whims of 
price-sensitive consumers (Brown and Linden, 2009). This gives enormous power 
to the final client (e.g., Bradshaw, 2017b and Brookes, 2017). ST’s growth in the 
1990s and 2000s was propelled by its strong relationship with Nokia (Balas, 2009; 
Brown and Linden, 2009). However, this relationship backfired. When Nokia failed 
to embrace the smartphone turn, ST lost a large percentage of its digital market share 
and implemented several layoff plans along divisional lines. As a result, Peppe 
explained, “In France they suffered a decline in production that was higher than [in 
Catania].” As noted by Brookes (2017) and Sadler (2004a), ST’s exposure to clients 
was not only about vulnerability but also, sometimes, about workers’ power. In Le 
Mans, workers were saved several times from layoffs because of their valuable 
business relationships with Samsung. Arnault explained, “We can thank the 
management from Samsung, because without them we would have rapidly been fired 
[…] Once you were attached to a guy [sic], a [Samsung] manager, he held onto you 
tight and we held tight onto him.” Laura recounted how after the 2016 restructuring 
plan, “ST kept some [Indian workers] because at one point the clients heard [about 
the closure]. They said [to ST], ‘You have committed [to this product] so you are 
finishing it.’ So [ST] kept [Indian workers] for two months in Noida” (see also CGT, 
2016b). This wasn’t just about protection, but also, in the spirit of Wright’s notion 
of structural power, about leverage. For instance, in spring 2018, workers in Crolles 
leveraged the fact that the fab was fully loaded for a powerful client to threaten a 
partial strike, securing an additional bonus (notes April, 2018).43  
As the preceding discussion suggests, business considerations are central to the study 
of GPNs and of workers’ agency (Coe and Yeung, 2015). ST is clearly vulnerable to 
market cycles, whilst workers were unevenly to use their structural power, depending 
on their sites’ relationships with clients and the load of each fab. In addition to 
workers’ geographical fragmentation, it is also clear that workers’ ability to 
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off the very branch where they are sitting, by creating bad publicity for the company” (notes, 
April 2017). Olivier explained that “[the client inCrolles] can’t be used as leverage, we can’t 
lose our biggest client” (notes, April 2017). Union representatives thus held different 






recognise common interests with other workers, whether between two countries – 
pace the digital/analogue division – or in the same country – pace the diverging 
experiences of Crolles versus Rousset – was framed by their being placed unevenly 
in relationship to market cycles, clients and product loads. This simple point bears 
repeating, because these temporal and geographical ositions lead workers to having 
varied experiences, senses of power, vulnerability and interests, which all add to the 
complexity of building the common interests crucial to sustaining international 
collaboration.  
b. Locating back-end sites 
 
These temporal and spatial dimensions were further framed by specific 
considerations, which informed the profitability and viability of back- and front-end 
production and, as a result, the internal competition between sites in ST: labour costs 
and rights, state support, technological secrets and c pital costs. As I show, these 
factors differed between front and back-end production and conditioned the potential 
cooperation between unions across each “end.”  
Assembly and testing equipment costs are not nearly as high as those required to set 
up a fab. Raphael explained “the stakes for back-end investment are totally different, 
it costs nothing. The global organisation of back-ends spends its time playing with 
adding or subtracting pennies.” In 2016, packaging and assembly equipment 
spending for the semiconductor industry was $1.83 billion (Statista, 2017, p.50). By 
contrast, spending on equipment for wafer production was $37 billion (Statista, 2017, 
p.49) and expenditure for R&D $36 billion (Statista, 2017, p.35) or forty times 
greater. As a result, labour costs are a significant v riable in back-end production 
costs. Historically, this has led to the transfer of back-end production to countries 
with cheaper labour – ST’s annual report (2009, p.26) notes that “more labor-
intensive back-end facilities are located in Malaysi , China, Philippines, Singapore, 
Morocco and Malta, enabling us to take advantage of more favourable production 
cost structures, particularly lower labor costs.” 
Taking advantage of “lower labour costs” meant employing a majority female 
workforce (see Chapter 5); situating in locations with fewer labour rights (e.g., 
Malaysia and China); and fighting workers’ attempts to create unions. In Morocco, 
ST fired unionists twice prior to 2010, when workers’ collective organising finally 
stopped company repression. In Malaysia, Todd and Peetz (2001, p.135) explain that, 






control guaranteeing a high level of managerial prerogative within the workplace, 
minimal overt conflict and very little bargaining power for labour.” For 30 years, the 
microelectronics industry was exempted from national labour laws to attract 
transnational corporations and investments (Aminuddin, 2009; Wad, 1997). Only in 
2010, after years of international pressure, did this change. However, the 
implemented law only allows regional unions, not a national one, and strikes remain 
forbidden in practice, as they require authorisation fr m the Malaysian industrial 
relations department (Bhopal & Todd, 2000; Luthje et al., 2013; Wad, 2012). No 
independent union exists in ST Calamba and Shenzhen.44  
In ST, back-end workers followed standardised processes which enabled ST to set 
sites in competition with one another. Etienne from Tours explained, “[ST] double-
sources back-end products. It is a client demand. […] at the same time that serves as 
leverage to lower costs and prices.” Effectively, back-end sites “bid” for product 
lines, competing with each other and with other assembly companies. Bilal, a 
Moroccan engineer, noted that, every three months, ST organises a corporate 
conference call to rate sites “according to accidents, worked hours, sickness leave, 
and productivity.” In Muar, workers said that they competed with Calamba based on 
productivity, quality and yield (notes, July, 2017). This created what Greer and 
Hauptmeier (2016) name rule-based whipsawing, that is, ST introduced formal 
bidding rules between sites for production loads and this weighed upon the 
interactions between back-end union representatives. In Malta, Liam explained that 
“management often uses the threat of competition between plants to detract from 
[the] union’s claims,” in other words, to imply that if GWU asks for too much, ST 
could relocate. If securing a product line is the carrot, the stick is offshoring, or 
coercive whipsawing, and this threat is not empty words. For instance, in 2005, the 
Ain Sebaa and Rabat (Morocco) sites were threatened with closure. Massoud 
recounted, “Managers said, ‘We are going to leave for Shenzhen.’ […] They closed 
Ain Sebaa, because they said the site was no longer profitable and all the [chip frames] 
from Ain Sebaa were transferred to Shenzhen.” To fight against this plan, workers 
created a union. ST promptly fired its representatives (Bureau regional de l’UMT, 
2005; Ghannam, 2005). The sites were closed and the Moroccan workforce was 
downsized from 4,800 workers in 2006 to 2,600 in 2012.45  
                                                          
44 See story of Calamba and report by Worker Empowerment regarding high turnover and 
working conditions in Shenzhen and Longguang in Chapter 4.  
45 Numbers are hard to come by, as the sites in Morocc  and Malta are recorded as one unit 
in ST’s annual account. These accounts report 7,330 employees in Morocco and Malta in 






Unionists also cited geopolitical considerations and the influence of states in 
facilitating ST back-end sites’ survival in each country. For Bilal, the size of the 
company in Morocco meant, “it isn’t just 2,300 [sic] workers, there are people 
behind us […] children, suppliers […] it’s not in the national interest to close [ST].” 
According to Aaron, a Maltese union representative, ST set up in Morocco because 
“the Moroccan government subsidised the plant, the utilities, the training of the 
employees and the pay for the technical grades.” In Malta, Aaron explained, ST first 
“got the site for free, the infrastructure, they just paid the rent and they had a tax 
exemption for ten years,” and then, following the 2010 turmoil, the Maltese state 
provided ST with €48 million worth of subsidies to preserve the Kirkop site (see 
Interlude 2 Malta). Citing broader geopolitical considerations, Charles argued that, 
between 2009 and 2013, ST transferred back-end activities from Singapore to 
Longguang (China) and reduced activities in Malta and Morocco because “for ST, it 
is politically useful to be in China, because they have loads of clients in China.” 
However, such geopolitical considerations were mediat  by changing labour costs. 
Just a few years later, ST started recruiting in Malta nd Morocco, whilst it closed 
Longguang and transferred its activities to Shenzhe and Muar (notes, June 2018). 
Workers in Muar believe that the Longguang site might have been closed because of 
the fear of Chinese companies copying chips (notes, July 2017), whilst Nour in 
Morocco explained “before, the Chinese workforce was cheaper, now it’s the 
contrary so [ST] wants to transfer the means of production because labour costs have 
doubled” (cf. Johnson, 2017). 
Here, I showed that according to back-end workers their sites’ vulnerability was 
shaped by the fluctuation of labour costs and that t ese criteria were mediated by 
technical knowhow, productivity and geopolitical considerations. Given the 
relatively greater reliance of back-end activities on labour costs, the company was 
able to draw upon rule-based and coercive whipsawing to extract concessions from 
unions (see also Interlude 2: Malta) and in Chapter 9, I show how this shaped union 
leaders’ trust in one another.  
c. Locating front-end sites 
 
Currently, ST’s R&D sites and fabs are concentrated in France, Italy and Singapore. 
In addition to the path-dependency characteristics outlined above, I suggest that the 
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1,600 in 2017, a loss of 900 workers. From this, I nfer a rough estimate of 4,830 workers in 






continued presence of front-end sites in these countries is explained by (1) the need 
to preserve industrial secrets; (2) the importance of “scientific ecosystems”; (3) the 
capital intensity of semiconductor production; and (4) the importance of states as 
both regulators and funders. I examine these four factors in turn, demonstrating that 
they framed each site’s vulnerability and shaped front-end unions’ ability to 
recognise common interests. 
First, given that IP blocks are crucial to the success of a company, only the least 
sensitive parts of design are offshored, whilst patentable R&D remains centred in a 
chip company’s home region to protect key designs containing proprietary 
algorithms (Brown and Linden, 2009). In Singapore, Chris, a union representative 
from UWEEI, explained that “it is still a challenge to get some of these big MNCs 
to transfer R&D function [here] because in the semiconductor industry there is this 
huge patent problem.” A state’s desire to retain cotrol over certain IP rights, 
regarding both manufacturing techniques and chip design, may reinforce the force 
of path-dependency features of the location of companies’ front-end sites and tie in 
with a fourth factor, states’ intervention to protect their national technological 
competitiveness. 
Second, Global North countries provide attractive settings where companies can 
access public research laboratories and workforces with technical knowledge, whilst 
the cost savings of offshoring engineering tasks are often offset by the managerial 
challenges which they prompt, such as the lack of face-to-face interactions, the cost 
of monitoring and the need for greater control procedures to avoid IP theft (Brown 
and Linden, 2009). Charles explained, 
There was a time when […] Pistorio said, ‘Recruit in India as much as 
you want. Now we recruit engineers in low labour cost countries.’ This 
increased the pressure on the Franco-Italian teams. [But] they 
rescinded [this decision]. As regards the creative and innovative 
process, it isn’t always about having teams everywhere, and, in fact, 
the [CEO] who does the best in ST […] never recruits in India.  
To explain the reasoning behind choices made about fabs’ locations, he added,  
You need to be careful. You need subcontractors of a very, very good 
quality, the men [sic] who do the maintenance of equipment, training, 
cleaning, technical support. […] You need skills, and schools that train 
good engineers and technicians. 
The need for technical knowhow thus somewhat limits the mobility of 
semiconductor capital, in favour of regions with technical education institutes and 
scientific facilities (Lerner, 2009). Given the fabs’ large consumption of water and 






reliable local planning systems. As noted by Coe et al (2004, p.47), regions may 
therefore be able to support the fixing of a fab in a place if they “are prepared to 
invest in developing the infrastructure and human resources required for value 
enhancement.” For instance, according to Reverdy (2014), Mr. Pistorio, chose l’Isere 
in 1992 for the expansion of ST’s R&D workforce in part because of the existing 
regional scientific ecosystem, which resulted from decades of public support and 
which, according to Emile, a former mayor, meant tha l’Isere “[was] an exceptional 
site for microelectronics.”  
Third, in contrast to back-end production, in fabs “labor typically accounts for 16% 
of costs, including depreciation in fabs producing 200mm wafers and less than 10% 
in the newer 300-mm fabs” (Brown and Linden, 2009, p.7). Indeed, with wider 
diameters, “the cost of the workforce is less and less significant” Charles explained 
“because automation becomes key to quality.” In the 300-mm fab, Louis from 
Crolles noted, 
Robots load the machines, it isn’t people anymore. […] It’s quite 
impressive, the robots are on the ceiling to avoid accidents, one just 
hears the movement of the robots, which go down, move, stop to let 
the other robot pass… It’s really like the ‘Fifth Element’! 
Automation and associated high capital costs mean th t the geographical variation 
in labour costs had become less significant. Chris noted, “whether you put the robot 
in France or in China, that robot is probably going to cost you the same amount of 
money.” What becomes important to locational decision  under these circumstances 
is whether the state will subsidise some of these capital costs.  
Indeed, the last factor that contributes to the locati n of front-end sites concerns the 
uneven regulation by states and crucially, their levels of support. For instance, 
whenever ST dismissed workers, their uneven legal protection was exposed. Claire 
recalled, “we have closed a lot of sites, I guess all the sites that weren’t in a protected 
environment: England, the U.S…” In 2016, the closure of the digital division 
affected R&D sites in France, India, the U.S. and sales offices across Asia. In China, 
workers were dismissed without knowing when they would be required to leave and 
with minimal compensation, something which, quite exceptionally, they mobilised 
against.46 Elsewhere, “for the Americans it was over in ten days, and for the Indians 
in one week” (Laura). By contrast, when reports of the plan were leaked, French 
unions succeeded in turning the layoffs into a generous voluntary redundancy plan. 
                                                          
46 They circulated a picture in which they stood behind a banner, their heads hidden, and 







According to Maurice, the French state intervened and “probably blocked the layoff 
plan in France, but let it go ahead elsewhere.” This intervention demonstrates that, 
for French ST workers, more than state regulation is at play: direct support and state 
control also matter.  
The Italian, French and Singaporean states have provided ongoing and uneven 
support to ST, ranging from direct subsidies to tax breaks and development subsidies. 
In the 1980s, Eurotechnique – a precursor to ST – was offered 100 million francs to 
settle in Rousset following plans to revitalise this de-industrialising region (Lambert, 
2013, p.91). In the 1990s, according to Daniele, ST drew on the available funds to 
industrialise the South of Italy in order to develop the fab in Catania (notes, June 
2018, see also Daviet, 2000). In Singapore, Julie said, “[The rumour] was that, in 
comparison with France, there were huge subsidies from the government […] and 
that’s why they went [to Singapore].” Damien corroborated Julie’s assessment, 
stating, “We had a design site in Singapore […] because the state helped a lot.” Chris 
similarly claimed, “The Singapore government is very progressive in terms of trying 
to secure investments […] [though] I don’t know what the goodies have been for 
ST.” I was not able to substantiate these claims; however, ST’s 1996 annual report 
(p.108) indicates that Singapore provided ST with poneer status, which exempted 
its profits from taxes. I do not know if this practice continues. In Europe, funding 
came in the form of access to loans at low interest ates from the European 
Investment Bank (ST, Annual Report 2017), and, mostly, in allowing individual 
states to create national support programs, without infringing on the EU rules 
preventing member states from providing unfair advantages to companies. An 
employee from the Ministry of Industry explained, 
[The French state cannot] finance production equipment because there 
is a European rule of non-competition between member states […] so 
[we] only help companies through R&D [costs]. […] We don’t finance 
jobs or the development of the company. 
These rules have not stopped the French state from supporting ST. When needed, 
French public officials have come up with innovative ways to bypass European rules 
of noncompetition. Compiling all the subsidies received by ST reveals an astonishing 
level of financial support. Between 1994 and 2017, ST received €4.588 billion in 
subsidies in the form of tax credits, capital expenditures and R&D subsidies, with 
France providing the lion’s share: €3.4 billion (see Appendix 5).47 These numbers 
                                                          
47 Since ST’s Annual Accounts report public subsidies without linking them to distinct 






demonstrate the extent to which the French government took an interest in this 
(semi)-private company, and re-emphasise how this industry’s development is 
inseparable from geopolitical interests and state support. As I now show, these 
subsidies also reflect the successful ways in which unions and other local actors 
organised to secure ST’s development in certain places.  
For instance, in the 1990s, the continued existence of ST’s Grenoble site came into 
question by SGS-Thomson managers as its characteristi s (location, size, vibration 
levels) were deemed unsuitable to host the next generation of machines (Balas, 2009). 
Afraid that chip production would leave l’Isere, unio  leaders, the site’s senior 
manager and local research institute directors lobbied local councillors and MPs to 
support the creation of a new production site in Isere. According to a union 
representative, unions gained the support of public representatives because the latter 
“understood that this industry, which they saw as cutting-edge, high-tech, could 
significantly develop the labour market” (in Balas, 2009, p.300). Guillaume 
explained that local politicians recognised the regional benefits that hosting ST 
provided: “ST has an impact on the local social-economic fabric. […] One doesn’t 
do semiconductors alone, there are loads of indirect jobs […] and that, of course, 
interests politicians.” The coalition successfully lobbied the French government to 
commit one billion francs to the creation of a fab in Crolles, just next to Grenoble, 
which would meet SGS-Thomson’s technical requirements. 
When the next investment phase was needed in Crolles, between 1998 and 2001, 
ST’s Crolles director and trade unions lobbied MPs and regional representatives to 
secure the support for a new 300-mm fab in Crolles without having to “rely on the 
public subsidies which must be reported to the European commission” (C. Morel, 
personal communication, 19 September 2001; Prefecture Isere, 1999). Emile 
recounted, “We didn’t give subsidies – well, we dida type of buy-to-let… It was a 
fabrication, a trick. […] This took a long time and was under the control of the 
industry ministry, with direct links with Europe. It was really sophisticated!” Mayors 
created an administrative structure which enabled th m to contribute €80 million to 
the building of Crolles2.48 In exchange, ST promised to create six hundred jobs and 
invest €700 million (SMG2 and ST, 2001). The French state added €65 million worth 
of investment (Prefecture Isere, 2000) and, by 2002, announced a five-year R&D 
support plan worth €453 million. In addition, Crolles’ director approached Philips 
and Motorola to create an industrial and R&D cluster combining the companies’ 
                                                          
48 Their investment evaded European rules because a public laboratory would use 20% of the 






investment capacities (Balas, 2009). They agreed – notably thanks to the speedy 
public subsidies offered. “Crolles2,” a 300-mm fab, was created. Following this, 
every five years, Mme Fioraso, a former MP, explained that “there was a strategy to 
develop this company regarding its technology” and public subsidies were funnelled 
into l’Isere to nurture a “French Silicon Valley” (Balas, 2009). In Isere, ST now 
employs approximately six thousand workers and supports some twenty thousand 
jobs indirectly (Reverdy, 2014). This story demonstrates the ability of workers as 
part of wider coalitions to fix capital in certain places. It also displays the French 
unions’ relatively high coalitional power, showing that whilst similar factors shape 
ST’s development, how they materialise, reflects the interplay between different 
actors and historical circumstances.  
State support also came in the form of tax relief and, more commonly but no less 
valuable, tax leniency. In Italy, state support included greater access to credit (ST 
Annual Report, 2009, p.237), European plans for the development of the Southern 
region (ST Annual Report, 2007, p.40) and "the reduction of various governmental 
liabilities, including income taxes, value-added tax and employee-related social 
charges" (ST Annual Report 2013, p.157). In France, Charles noted that the French 
state had adopted a similar leniency regarding ST’s taxes, which “is a slightly 
disguised way for the French state to provide […] hidden support [to ST].” Such tax 
leniency is supported by the internal cost-pricing system, whereby ST’s 74 
subsidiaries (ST Annual Reports, 2017, p.86-87) can bill one another and relocate 
profits to where corporate taxes are low. Charles described the system, 
All the costs of R&D engineers in Grenoble are invoced to the 
financial hubs in Geneva or Holland, […] so ST does really what they 
want, it is quite arbitrary, to organise tax evasion. […] During all the 
years when ST made a big profit, they assigned their profits to 
Singapore […] and ‘luckily’ they were in tax holidays there. 
There is nothing particular about ST in this: most TNCs use transfer prices “to 
determine the distribution of reported income across different segments (divisions) 
of the firm” in order to “minimize [their] worldwide tax liability” (Hiemann and 
Reichelstein, 2012, p.3). Given how TNCs increasingly whipsaw states to provide 
favourable tax structures, it shows that the power of states to enhance regional v ue 
capture, as emphasised by Coe et al. (2004), is mainly bout capturing value as jobs 
and their supposed externalities rather than value s paid corporate taxes.  
These factors and their interrelation came alive for me when I tried to understand 






and testing centre to Singapore. Workers emphasised diff rent pressures to explain 
this shift. For instance, David (CGT)49 believed “these were products with a low 
margin, so if you save on salaries you save on everything.” Similarly, Rene (CGT) 
believed the offshoring of the testing facility was a result of labour cost because 150-
mm plants were less automated than wider diameter plants. By contrast, Claire (CFE-
CGC) emphasised that they,  
had a period of site blockades that were tough. […] That was radical, 
we had big clients [who said], ‘No, now this is too risky, you have to 
transfer the production elsewhere.’ And so we transferred all of the 
testing facilities because of that to Singapore. 
Balthazar (CFDT), echoed her feeling, contrasting mineworkers with ST workers, 
Miners when they blocked the mines, the mine couldn’t be exported 
elsewhere. The coal was under their feet and they blocked access. 
Discussion over. Here, once they [the CGT] did thatin Rousset, […] 
they chained the test centre. Result? It shocked management and for 
one-and-a-half years there were no longer any test [machines]. […] 
The machine is on wheels and can move. 
Both Claire and Balthazar stressed that it was militant union activity by the CGT 
which caused these facilities to close. Samuel (CFDT) introduced another 
consideration: “We can’t be competitive as compared to places such as Singapore 
[…] because Singapore is twice as likely as Europe t  offer subsidies.” He agreed 
that, “Labour costs are not the problem. New fabs will be more and more automatic, 
as a result the labour costs to produce chips is negligible as compared to the cost of 
a fab.” Thus, workers offered three competing narratives to explain offshoring: one 
emphasised labour costs, another labour militancy ad the last state support. The 
truth is probably a combination of the three, though there was an overarching 
acknowledgement that labour costs would factor lessand less given increasing 
automation. These competing narratives demonstrate he complex interrelations 
between each factor that frames front-end production and that unions held different 
views regarding militant action. It also demonstrates how, despite high sunken 
capital investments, sites remained vulnerable to offsh ring. 
Given that each investment often took place at the expense of other fabs, tensions 
arose between unions about protecting sites. For instance, workers explained that the 
absence of investment for fifteen years in a 300-mm fab in Italy when Crolles2 was 
finished in 2003, strained union relationships (notes, November 2016). Similar 
competition was also present between R&D sites as activities were transferred from 
                                                          
49 If I add unionists’ affiliations prior to their comments, it is because these comments also 






one site to another. Maurice observed, “[When that happens], there is a ‘country’ 
which will feel dispossessed. […] I don’t think tha it creates a deep nationalist 
resentment, but it leads to hesitations [towards greater collaboration].” When I 
prompted Thibault around collaboration with other sites, he answered, 
The difficulty between Tunisia and Grenoble is that on one side 
they’re firing workers and on the other, they’re hiring. […] Go 
collaborate on a matter like that [between] the union representatives 
from Tunisia and Grenoble! Everyone will be looking out for their site. 
As such, front-end sites also faced competition for investments and activities and 
union representatives argued that this made collaboration on these issues 
complicated. Competition was not just between countries. In Italy, a long-planned 
investment in Catania worth €542 million was cancelled in 2007 (ST Annual Reports, 
2007, p.40), something which union leaders there linked to efforts in Milan (notes, 
June 2018). In France, workers perceived that the Isere sites were protected at the 
expense of other sites. Rene felt that Crolles had become the “display site, so they’re 
protected” from layoffs despite sometimes reporting low productivity. Emmanuelle 
agreed that “in France, Rousset doesn’t come first.[…] if there are investment or 
state subsidies, it will fall more to Isere than to R usset, Le Mans or Tours.” Workers 
believed that the historical links between union lead rs and MPs in l’Isere continued 
to protect the Isere sites (notes, May 2017). Thibault insisted, “The Isere MPs defend 
l’Isere, especially since [union leader] has good relations with them.” For instance, 
in 2012 when ST announced a redundancy plan, Thibault s id that, 
Everywhere, it was like don’t touch l’Isere. So, in reality the perimeter 
of the plan was [Le Mans]. For two years, we took the voluntary 
redundancy plans. […] Because, simply put, the state invested in 
Crolles […] and because ST is a company with the public participation 
of the state, the Ministry of the Economy needs to approve 
restructuring plans in France. […] [The Minister] can’t politically say, 
‘We give money [to ST], if at the same time [ST] ends jobs.’ […] So 
you can’t touch Grenoble. 
Arnault confirmed, “Grenoble is the French Silicon Valley. […]Hollande [former 
French president] went to Crolles, ministers go to Grenoble.” By 2016, Le Mans’ 
union leaders decided that Le Mans “wouldn’t get caught twice” (Thibault) and be 
forced to bear the burden of all layoffs. The union worked with the site manager to 
lobby their local politicians to influence the governmental unit overseeing ST’s 
potential restructuring. As a result of their efforts, the 2016 voluntary redundancies 
mainly hit Paris and Grenoble (notes, May 2017). Whilst French unions represent all 
ST French workers, union leaders are workers located in specific sites. Their place-






challenge and just needed to endure. Workers thus acknowledged that they faced 
“spatial dilemmas” on the issues of investments, technological projects and IP rights, 
which secured the lasting employment of workers, and explained that these dilemma 
framed the potential for solidarity both within and between countries.  
In summary, it is clear that ST back-end sites’ locations are conditioned by 
geopolitical considerations but mostly by labour costs, whilst front-end sites’ 
locations are determined by considerations around industrial secrets, the need for 
technical knowhow and, given the capital intensity of semiconductor production, 
state support. Whether enabling the presence of a scientific ecosystem, or providing 
subsidies and tax breaks, this support has successfully embedded “particular parts of 
the GPN” (Henderson et al., 2002, p.452) in specific regions, at least for the time 
being. These conclusions temper the stereotypical narrative of footloose capital 
scorching the earth for the cheapest labour, even in the labour intensive back-ends, 
and stress instead the ongoing role of the state in facilitating the chip industry’s 
development. The state’s interest, I argue, remains a crucial element to 
understanding the current geography of ST’s production and ST workers’ uneven 
power. I emphasise this point because it introduces  another obstacle to international 
solidarity: if a great part of ST’s support comes from nation-states, the national scale 
will remain crucial for unions to exert power. Finally, I showed how ST had 
successfully introduced competition both between fro t- and back-end activities for 
production loads and investment, which led unionists to be suspicious of other sites, 
and to try to protect their sites’ survival, at theexpense of other fabs. This discussion 
demonstrated how and why the varied economic, labour-related and political factors 
which inform the companies’ locational decisions alo frame unions’ ability to 
organise together across borders and why these sectoral and GPN considerations 








In this chapter, I offered some of the vocabulary and the spatial and temporal 
contexts through which to understand ST, that is, some aspects of workers’ 
geography. This description demonstrates the sheer variety and differences that are 
encompassed across ST’s workforce. I drew upon these to expose the varied sources 
of power workers have access to, their varied vulnerabilities and the geographical 
dilemmas they faced. This vocabulary, I showed, is relational. It reflects the 
intersection of technological constraints, economic pressures, historical 
developments and geopolitical considerations, along with considerations around 
labour costs, capital investment needs, technical requi ements, business cycles, 
relationships with clients and state interests at a range of scales. Yet how these 
factors intersect in the semiconductor industry varies: labour costs and territorial 
interests fluctuate in significance depending upon the stage of production, and, I 
showed, shape how sites compete for survival.  
In attending to these factors, I highlighted how some states have actively intervened 
to alleviate the large capital costs faced by semiconductor production companies and 
thereby secure their domestic industries. Coe and Jor hus-Lier (2011) argue that 
geographers should embed labour’s agency by considering states’ roles as contexts 
of GPN activities. However, Glassman (2011) contends that this approach fails to 
consider that, because of specific geopolitical factors, states may play a greater role 
than just regulator (see also Horner, 2017). I demonstrated his argument for the 
semiconductor sector, and showed why it mattered to trade union power. I argued 
that the reinforcing links between semiconductor technology, capital and place, and 
the importance of semiconductors in national competitiv ness and technological 
sovereignty have prompted some states to become activ political agents and commit 
significant resources to enable the rise of semiconductor companies. To do so, they 
have embraced the roles of facilitators, buyers, regulators, shareholders, creators and 
funders. Whilst states always mediate the development and geographical 
organisation of capitalism, the semiconductor industrie  powerfully reminds one of 
the ongoing role of nation-state in enabling technological development, and as a 
result, in the functioning and growth of specific companies. Morgan and Sayer (1988, 
p.116) thus argue that “the conventional juxtapositi n of ‘state versus market’ or 
‘government versus industry’ miserably fails to capture the manifold ways in which 
the state shapes [the semiconductor] industry and co stitutes its markets.” Whilst 






global economy is as much a political formation as an economic one” (Coe, 2011, 
p.392), this interest of the state is not inert: it deeply influenced unions’ local realities, 
vulnerability and sources of power.  Indeed, I show in Chapter 8 that French unions 
were able to protect their jobs by leveraging the state’s concern, in contrast to 
Malaysian workers, for whom the state’s attention has meant a restricted scope of 
union rights, and to the GWU which faced pressures from their state to accept ST’s 
deal (See Prelude 2).  
Mitchell (2011) urges geographers to attend to the conditions of agency, embodied 
in the organisation and relations of production. In their comparison of transnational 
union activities across the maritime, car-making and textile sectors, Anner et al. 
(2006) claim that sectoral specificities conditioned both international competition 
between workers and their ability to collaborate across borders. They argue that “the 
different production and regulatory structures produce different sets of challenges 
and opportunities for unions and consequently result in different types of union 
strategy” (p.22). For instance, whilst maritime employers may hire workers from any 
country to work anywhere, motor manufacturing remains structured around 
industrial centres, prompting unions to maintain strong allegiance to their states and 
to “seek to structure rather than attenuate inter-plant competition” (p.8), in contrast 
to the global flexibility of clothing manufacturing which leads to “sporadic 
[transnational] campaigning rather than ongoing organization” (p.8) (see also 
Carmichael and Herod, 2012 and Lillie, 2004).  
I suggest that, in the semiconductor sector, similar considerations condition unions’ 
ability to build inter-union power at the international scale. In the case of ST, I 
showed that back-end and front-end sites relate unevenly to capital costs and 
territorial actors: whilst back-end sites are more vulnerable to changing labour costs 
and thus to relocation whilst front-end sites rely more heavily on their nation-state’s 
support. In keeping with Anner et al.’s (2006) suggestions, I argue that ST’s global 
organisation, by encompassing different stages of pr duction, conditioned the 
interaction between unions at the international level. Intra-union cooperation 
between each “end” is hampered by the state of direct competition for production 
loads or investments, whilst collaboration across each “end,” is limited by the fact 
that workers face substantially different tasks, wages and experiences of work. These 
differences, allied with the obvious inequalities between Global North and South 
locations, made it hard to imagine the drafting of c mmon demands. As Olivier 
summarised the situation, “[working together] on wages or health benefits, I can’t 






end activities meant that the national scale remained a key source of power, not just 
as a source of institutional power but also because it was where unions were able to 
leverage the state’s interest. This importance of the national scale acted as another 
condition regarding workers’ ability, interest in and, crucially, willingness to 
internationalise their activities. 
Hennebert (2010, p.55), in the context of the international campaign in a Canadian 
paper TNC, reflected that “workers in the different units of the multinational 
corporation perceive themselves more like competitors fighting to save their jobs 
than as an interest group which shares common goals, whose pursuit necessitates a 
concerted internal action” (see also Wills, 2001). I showed that this reflection 
remains true in the case of ST, and outlined the specific factors which conditioned 
this competition, showing how they varied across each end. Throughout the chapter, 
I provided a first attempt to embed labour within its GPN, trying to move beyond the 
description of difference to the explanation of why it matters locally for each site, 
but also for unions’ efforts to collaborate across sites. Yet, this attempt is somewhat 
devoid of workers’ experiences, opinions and contradictions and, more simply, 
choices. As I noted earlier, a company is a network of embodied labour (Cumbers et 
al., 2008). The world is not a static description: it is reworked and transformed, 
struggled over and accepted by people in general and workers in particular. The next 
chapter analyses how, in the face of corporate strategies to divide the workforce, 


















Opened in 1967, ST operated a 150-mm manufacturing plant in Rennes, which 
employed 600 workers until 2004 (Debontride, 2004). Damien remembered, 
Pistorio really loved Rennes, because he had been fina ced by the 
French government there […] [The French location of the fab] largely 
contributed to the fact that Pistorio took the management of ST [when 
Thompson and SGS were merged] so Rennes was a little darling […] 
but Rennes sadly was this tiny factory […] now in the middle of the 
city with two primary school on each side. […] But a semiconductor 
company is dangerous, there is arsenic, rare metals, g s…[…]So we 
said, ‘this fab we can’t leave it there, and it hasbecome too small so 
we are going to close it.’ […] It exploded [socially]. It was a terrible 
divorce. 
After 37 years of continuous production, workers were told in August 2003 that the 
company was “’studying’ the end of production on the site” (Debontride, 2004). The 
company planned to develop a new fab in Singapore, which would host both the 
production of 150-mm wafers then produced in Rennes and a new 200-mm line 
(Debontride, 2004). When I asked Nathan from Rennes whether they had foreseen 
the closure, he said, “No, not at all […] because we had very good yield, costs were 
quite good. But we had to increase the number [of wafers] and everything [the 
machines and products] was sent to Singapore.” The Rennes fab was fully loaded 
prior to 2003, which worried Raphael from Grenoble, since profitability was often a 
criterion that prompted alarms about a fab’s future (notes, March 2017). 50  Yet local 
union leaders ignored Raphael’s warnings, blinded by the profitability of the site. 
                                                          
50 Raphael explained that high productivity yields may mean that machines have been fully 
depreciated and fabs generate clear cash since they no longer have to pay off previous 
investments, but that if this cash is not invested in new machines, the entire production line 
soon becomes obsolete. As a side note, the Rennes story demonstrates, in almost painful ways, 








A ten-month long struggle ensued. Unions pointed to ST’s reported revenue of €9 
billion, €1billion of profit and €3 billion of disposable cash, to pressure the French 
government into protecting their plant. The senior manager regurgitated the usual 
offshoring discourse: 
To be able to continue to invest in the most-advanced technologies, be 
that in Grenoble, Aix-en-Provence [France] or elsewh re in the world, 
ST needs to rationalise its production. Sometimes, there are decisions 
to be made. The responsibility of the company is its responsibility as 
regards the 43,000 workers of the company not just the 400 people in 
Rennes. (interview on  France 3 Rennes, 2004) 
His answer is interesting in that it counterposes th  decision to offshore production 
to Singapore with that of future investment in France and draws upon the issue of 
other jobs at stake across ST to justify this move. Whilst this might be merely a 
discursive strategy to present the company as still committed to French sites, it also 
offers an interesting thought experiment suggesting hat French workers’ higher 
wages are subsidised by workers‘ production elsewhere, which Harvey (2019) 
clearly argued in the case of the transfer of value in the software industries.  
Workers held demonstrations in Rennes, Paris and Crolles. Some occupied the 
factory, three started a hunger strike. Anger built up. Workers felt betrayed: ST now 
stood for ‘Salaries Trahis’ - Betrayed Workers and ‘Salaries Sans Travail’ - Workers 
Without Work. An employee declared on TV, “I gave 31 years of my life to this 
company. I believe that they shouldn’t kick me out like this, like a dog” (France 3 
Rennes, 2004). Her words remind us that work is more than employment and a wage; 







Caption: The placard reads: “600 layoffs”, ST subsidised, State shareholder and 
accomplice??? 
The state did not react. Rather, the Finance and Economy Ministry declared that the 
layoff was part of the free play of global competition and that the state couldn’t 
interfere (Debontride, 2004). In April 2004, 450 peo le lost their jobs, 50 were 
moved elsewhere within the company and 50 stayed to continue a back-end role for 
high security military and space components, since, a cording to Philippe, “We were 
qualified by European Agencies, we often made components for satellites and 
[European Agencies] didn’t want to cancel that.” The combination of the location of 
the Rennes plant (in a city centre with little room for expansion); the size of the 
wafers produced in Rennes (150-mm wafer production requires cheaper machines 
and thus labour costs form a greater part of total costs); and the acceptance by the 
French state of the “forces of globalisation,” sealed the future of the site, despite 
workers’ vibrant struggle. The fab was closed, leaving enduring rancour between 
unions. Thomas remembered that on the day of the vote for the redundancy plan, 
“[the representatives from one union] went to drink champagne with management, 
we saw them. That leaves traces.” This symbolic exchange felt bitter.  
The relocation of Rennes’ production mirrors traditional accounts of globalisation. 
As the fab became obsolete, the race towards cheaper labour drove capital (and jobs) 
out of its Global North location, potentially guaranteeing the company’s overall 
survival and profitability. Thus, as much as I emphasised above the fixity of capital 
given semiconductors’ capital costs and geostrategic importance, in some instances 














Chapter 6:  
Unpacking ‘labour,’ workers, 
unions, and power 
 
 
Encouraged by Cumbers et al. (2008) to understand the varieties of labour positions, 
this chapter turns towards the relations of production between workers, unions and 
management. Since inter-union power relies on unions creating mutual interests and 
since these interests are informed by unions’ local re lities (Brookes, 2013b; Kay, 
2005), I consider the range of identities which overlapped and informed unions’ local 
organising efforts, and analyse the local labour-management relationships, to embed 
unions’ ability to collaborate across borders.  
In Section 1, I examine the situation of front-end sites, where I show that the division 
of labour into operator and engineer categories, along with corporate tactics, 
challenged unions’ ability to create mutual interests amongst workers. I then 
examine some aspects of the positionalities of back-end site workers, with a focus 
on gender, religion and, in Muar, the use of migrant workers. I argue that these 
characteristics informed workers’ ability to organise through their union at the local 
level, either by further sustaining a collective idntity beyond just a class identity, or 
fragmenting the workforce. In Section 2, I analyse th  different stances that unions 
chose – I use this term to refer to how unions conceptualise their role and relationship 
with management – and understand these choices as ones made in a context of the 
undermining of militant unionism by corporate tactics. These various stances 
towards management matter, because they shaped unions’ ability to collaborate 
locally and their appetite for international collaboration. I argue that attending to 
local contexts requires both understanding workers’ socio-spatial positionalities and 
unions’ stances, amidst ongoing corporate tactics to hift workers’ and unions’ 






1. A fragmented workforce 
 
Here, I show that workers’ varied socio-spatial positi nalities challenged the unions’ 
ability to build intra-union power. I focus on the operator/engineer division in front-
end French sites, because unions stressed that it was the main factor which 
challenged their organising, given the even split in the workforce between operators 
and engineers. I focus on the significance of workers’ gender, religion and migrant 
status in Muar and Bouskoura. I do not look at other back-end sites because I do not 
have detailed data for the Philippines and China,51 nd because in Malta the 
predominantly male workforce negates analysing gender disparities.52 Rathzel et al. 
(2014, p.241) argue that “for there to be groups of w rkers who can be used against 
others, there needs to be processes of excluding groups of workers which makes 
them vulnerable to management strategies.” Consequently, I also discuss how ST’s 
strategies drew upon specific aspects of workers’ positionalities to undermine 
workers’ ability to recognise common interests.  
a. Workers in front-end sites 
The division of labour between blue- and white-collar jobs, whilst being somewhat 
arbitrary, administration-based and ambiguous (Scott, 2014), still reflects persistent 
inequalities between workers (e.g.: in France, Amossee, 2011; Bouffartigue and 
Roux, 2011; in Britain, McDowell, 2009). White-collar workers, defined as such by 
their so-called intellectual tasks or their management responsibilities, have been 
symbolically recognised as a successful and upwardly mobile workforce, and 
encouraged to think of themselves as of “higher value” than blue-collar workers 
(Boltanski, 1979a, 1979b; Denis, 2005). Socially, politically and economically, 
white-collar workers have been, and still are, pushed to organise in separate unions; 
to side with corporate management; 53 and to privilege negotiation over direct action 
                                                          
51 The ST Shenzhen site report showed that the workforce was mainly composed of migrant 
workers. The organisers and workers I met suggested that Calamba’s workers were 
predominantly women, but given my limited data, I cannot provide greater analysis (see 
Kelly, 2001; McKay, 2004). 
52 To explain this pattern, one may look at Maltese natio al statistics, which indicate a low 
female workplace participation of 27% in 1990 (World Bank, 2019) whilst in industrial work, 
where night shifts were prevalent, the figure might have been even lower. Further, given that, 
until recently ST was the largest private employer in Malta and associated with strong 
symbolic recognition, historically men have been encouraged to work there. This pattern may 
have continued through informal mechanisms. 
53  For instance, Boltanski (1979b, p.100) quotes a pamphlet destined for white-collar 
employees, which argued, “The engineer is a boss: he [sic] must serve and command, both 
terms constitute the force and stature of a boss.” He adds that white-collar unions in France 






in order to show their openness to reasonable proposals (Boltanski, 1979a; Denis, 
2005; Thoemmes & Escarboutel, 2009). I argue that ST workers’ experiences, in the 
context of various corporate tactics, led them to reproduce and uphold the division 
between operators and engineers. This meant that org nising workers locally was 
already fraught with difficulty, let alone organising internationally.  
In front-end sites, interviewees emphasised that operators’ and engineers’ different 
experiences of work conditioned their interests. David, an engineer, contended that, 
“The preoccupations aren’t the same, the working conditions aren’t the same.” 
Operators followed a shift-rotation schedule to ensure that fabs are producing around 
the clock. They had regimented lives in a tightly controlled environment where they 
were covered head to toe by protective gear. By contrast, engineers worked in open 
offices and had longer but more flexible hours, higher wages and more autonomy. 54 
Interviewees argued that, beyond entailing difference, workers’ various working 
conditions challenged camaraderie: 
An engineer will be able to go to the ‘social centr’55 at lunch time, to 
take time to eat, go running… An operator, if he [sic] is one minute 
late, he is called in. […] [In the morning], operators come down for 
breakfast at 8:30am, they see [engineers] coming in to start the day, 
it’s a friendly moment but if [operators] ever take a minute more for 
the break [they get reprimanded]. (Louis, operator) 
Operators, when they leave the clean room, all at the same time, en 
masse, they see engineers who are putting on their running shorts, 
when they [operators] are timed to the minute and that they have 30 
minutes for the lunch break and every bonus is taken way or ‘offered.’ 
[Operators see engineers] and say: ‘They’re the well-to-do’ […]  
[Office workers] have a lot of latitude in [their] work, [whereas, in the 
clean room] […] your rate of work is measured almost by the second. 
(Otto, operator) 
The differences challenged workers’ ability to see th mselves as sharing similar 
interests and experiences. A comment by Thomas, who had experienced both sides 
as a technician, showed how strongly this “class war” s felt: 
The comment of the standard operator is, ‘Ah, those white-collar 
fuckers […], they take their smoking break whenever, they’re paid 
better…’ It’s already a class war. Really! It’s spontaneous, everyone 
says it. […] The engineer, he [sic] doesn’t even understand… 
                                                          
54 In France, wages for OATAM range between 18,168 and 33,523 euros/annum, whilst 
engineer wages range from 29,229 to 77,568/annum (CFE- GC Crolles, 2018). Each 
category had a different bonus structure which increasingly relied on individualised bonuses. 







[mimicking]: ‘What does [an operator] want?!’ It’s just a different 
world. 
This division was important because it undermined workers’ ability to act together. 
Etienne, an engineer, explained that during a strike in the 2000s, operators had 
walked out, but  
Workers in the offices didn’t walk out […] We could feel the division. 
[…] That’s when I started to get interested, ‘Who are these people, 
what do they do?’ […] I knew we had a fab, but (laugh) we don’t see 
each other. Their hours don’t correspond to ours, they go eating before 
us. We cross[ed] over, but until then, I had never asked myself what 
they did! 
Differences between workers’ mundane rights and workplace routines thus served 
to separate operators from engineers, and this sense of distinction was cemented by 
workers’ practices of standing in solidarity with one another or not, illustrating the 
interplay between the conditions workers face, here a given technical division of 
labour, and their choices. 
Workers suggested that their varying experiences brought them to focus on different 
issues, and these differences often came with a sense of superiority from engineers. 
Sophie, an operator, claimed, “We just don’t have the same issues,” to which Daniele, 
an engineer, added, “Operators mostly have physically-related stresses, when for 
engineers it will be more the mental stress.”56 Claire, another engineer, argued that 
engineers are “a professional category where […] there is a need to recognise work 
beyond the money, knowing where we are going, why I’m working.” She contrasted 
this with operators, for whom “the [work] risks will be physical, […] [and the 
demands around] working conditions […] and loads of financially-based demands: 
‘Pay me [for] my break time, my thingamajiggy bonus, etc.’” Claire’s distinction 
suggests that operators focussed on “lowly” monetary bonuses whereas white-collar 
workers sought non-monetary recognition and a purpose. Importantly, this prejudice 
took place within a social narrative regarding engineers’ superiority and within a 
company that worked to dent working-class traditions a d encourage workers to 
internalise corporate goals. 
Indeed, Louis criticised some engineers who “will have a bit of a haughty attitude,” 
whilst Edern, an engineer, suggested that, in some engineers’ minds, “We’re still the 
                                                          
56 To put this comment into a broader context, Delmas (2011) assesses whether white-collar 
work is more stressful than blue-collar work and argues that this discourse stems more from 






1950s-60s, [with] the engineer who manages, directs, commands. […] So in the 
offices, there is this belief that people in the rooms [operators] are plebs.” Engineers’ 
sense of superiority was packaged with an emphasis on careerism that was sold to 
them throughout their education. Martin recounted, “As white collars, during our 
training, our brains are stuffed with this discourse that ‘We’re the best […] you need 
to be the best, to crush others.’” Yet, Guy, another engineer, objected to the dream 
he was sold that promised that, “in ten years, you’ll have a team of fifty people, 
you’ll be the leader, you’ll be on the other side.” Instead, he emphasised how it 
prompted engineers to forget “that he [sic] is a working-class person, well-paid, but 
with all the risks that confront all workers in a company, to be fired, to have a boss 
who tells you to do this, or to shut up or get out!” These quotes suggest that engineers’ 
sense of entitlement is reinforced by social and corporate discourses, which 
encouraged engineers to think of themselves as on management’s side, and, if not in 
the upper echelons yet, on the road there.  
This discourse forms part of a corporate int rpellation technique, by which I mean a 
discourse that encourages workers to conform to and perform an idealised work 
identity. This identity benefits the company and undermines workers’ ability to 
acknowledge their difference from and conflict with management, since they see 
themselves belonging to that class or at least do not see themselves and management 
holding different goals (McDowell, 2009). Management’s interpellation techniques 
are effective, in part, because work is more than a me ns of making a living. People 
want to do their jobs well (McDowell, 2009). Rathzel et al. (2014, p.199) call this 
relationship towards work “producer’s pride” and found that management was “able 
to use the workers’ interest in their work as a means of identifying with the company.” 
Similarly, in ST, managers used workers’ concern for their work to undermine the 
case for organising. For instance, an engineer recalled how “we lived an exciting 
adventure [in the EFCIS and CSF labs]. All these people were driven by something 
other than their strict personal interest” (in Balas, 2009, p.209). The lab director drew 
on this sense of technological significance and workers’ concern for the work to 
discourage workers from organising, proclaiming:  
As regards your union activities, you are free outside but here, there are no 
strikes, we work like in a family. What we are doing against foreign 
competition is really hard. We don’t have enough money. If you want an 
independent semiconductor industry to exist in France, we are probably the 
only hope […] You can’t have trade unions activities [here] […], because 






Emphasising their work’s technological significance, the messaging here suggested 
that union activities undermine work, and presented unions as outsiders at odds with 
workers’ interests (see similar story in Mitchell, 1996). Management’s interpellation 
technique works by stressing workers’ producer pride and suggesting that union 
activities will threaten workers’ ability to do their job well, pushing workers away 
from their class interests and towards internalising managerial ones. I show in 
Chapter 7 that this feeling cuts both ways, since workers’ pride and concern for work 
became crucial to their resistance to ST’s financialisation. 
At the same time, corporate discourses and practices also aimed to delegitimise blue-
collar traditions, notably by controlling the imagined properties of their factories’ 
landscapes and suggesting that ST differed from traditional industries. For instance, 
in Rousset, Lambert (2013, p.86) explained that Eurotechnique’s director 
emphasised the need “to get away, at any cost, fromthe spaces marked by the 
stigmata of industrialisation […] and avoid the presence of working-class traditions.” 
Rousset is close to but separate from Gardannes, a mining town whose industrial 
fabric collapsed and where the CGT retains a militant base. Similarly, when ST 
transferred its fab from Grenoble to Crolles, it chose the opposite shore of the river 
from traditional paper, glove and electro-chemical ndustries (Reverdy, 2014). Not 
only did ST apparently attempt to avoid industrially marked landscapes, it also 
attempted to stop the transmission of militant tradi ions within ST. At first, when 
Crolles was created, ST halted the transfer of known union leaders to Crolles to 
create, according to a union leader, “a site free fom [Grenoble’s] history, [because] 
the operators [in Grenoble] had led strikes and [ST] did not want to import a culture 
of conflicts into the heart of Crolles” (in Balas, 2009, p.288). Workers waged a fierce 
battle for their unionised colleagues to access position  in Crolles (Balas, 2009). 
Workers also embraced ST’s portrayal of itself as different from other industries. For 
instance, Yvan, when walking into Crolles, felt, “this is incredible, we are in a high-
tech company, it’s not like basic metalworking industry.” Damien’s utter surprise at 
the emergence of the militant resistance in Rennes also encapsulates this sense of 
distinction that proclaims ST belongs to a different type of industry, one that is 
foreign to working-class militancy. He claimed: “I nearly got hit by a train bolt in 
the head. [Workers] were throwing them everywhere, th y broke windows. … It was 
like we were in a CGT of the 1950s steelwork industry or the mineworkers under 
Mrs. Thatcher. It was just unbelievable!” These accounts expose the ways in which 
ST senior managers sought to portray the semiconductor industry as distinct from 






which some workers internalised. This demonstrates how the control of space is 
inseparable from that of memory and that both memory and the imagined properties 
of a landscape are a source of power in companies’ attempts to stifle workers’ 
organising efforts.  
Not only did the technical division between workers decrease their sense of a shared 
community, it also led them to have a divergent sense of power, a divergence which 
further constrained their ability to fight together. Operators felt that they could stop 
production, provoking immediate delivery issues. By contrast, engineers often felt 
that any strike would only lead to greater pressures later on. Martin, an engineer, 
observed, “We’re far from the client, very far from production where it ‘hurts’ in a 
way. […] We don’t have a direct impact on the numbers […] or in six to nine months 
[…] [so] if we take three weeks off, [it doesn’t really matter].” Daniele agreed, “An 
operator can strike and it harms the company, but if an engineer [goes on] strike, 
you’re going to do [the work] tomorrow.” Gauthier explained that this led operators 
and engineers to favour different tactics, and challenged unions’ ability to suggest 
common modes of action: 
[White-collar workers] believe it’s useless to organise partial strikes 
[and that] we should use other means and then operat rs […] say, 
‘This is our only leverage point, the only way that the company will 
hear us.’ And for [operators] not going on strike is mbarrassing!57 […] 
[The CFDT] will have to reconcile demands, maybe it’ll be a partial 
strike, not for a month but for two hours. 
Daniele added that each workforce held different approaches regarding how to 
achieve greater rights, “[Engineers will also have] an individual vision, because the 
bonuses are individually set. For operators, collectiv  action is more evident, because 
you can win stuff for everyone…” Workers’ job status thus framed how easy it was 
for them to collectivise issues and to imagine collective action to achieve their 
demands. Engineers’ attitude towards striking reinforced operators’ impression that 
engineers would not support their actions, and this increased their resentment, since 
engineers faced fewer restrictions. Etienne said, 
[When operators] go to an [union] assembly, they do a partial strike 
for two hours, that’s two hours off their salary. […] Engineers, they 
don’t even clock in their lunch break and then you see that very few 
stop to listen [to the assembly]. 
                                                          






Otto explained that when they, operators, had organised a strike, “engineers didn’t 
show up and rather complained about having to cross a picket line…” Another time, 
Rene remembered how engineers had even undermined a strike by operators.  
Engineers said, ‘Why are you doing this [striking], you will kill the 
site!’ […] We [operators] blocked the entrance together. […] The 
other operators weren’t the issue, it was more the engineers and low-
level managers who attempted to force through. I remember, we were 
all together, our backs turned, and my manager was hitting my back! 
This incident illustrates the effectiveness of ST’s interpellation techniques and its 
portrayal of union activities as menacing to a site’  future, as well as the real 
divisions of interests and organising cultures betwe n the two workforces.  
Unions had to negotiate these clashing cultures. In the CGT, Baptiste explained that 
before he joined, “Comrades made a number of politica  mistakes, saying that ‘if you 
[engineers] aren’t with us, you’re against us’ which created a lot of cleavages and 
made it hard [for engineers] to become members.” Laura claimed that the 
operator/engineer division also challenged local brnches’ efforts to collaborate. She 
recalled a discussion with CGT representatives from Rousset,58 “They told me that 
when you [engineers from Grenoble] write flyers, [the flyers] are incomprehensible 
for operators.” Despite telling them that they, in Grenoble, could help them to write 
flyers that spoke to engineers, the Rousset branch had not “seized these offers, when 
we’re on the same team” (Laura). The CFDT faced similar tensions. When union 
representatives met in Rousset to ratify which union w uld control the social centre, 
one blue-collar CFDT representative voted for a CGT operator rather than for a 
CFDT engineer, favouring their blue-collar belonging over their union membership 
(notes, March 2017). In Italy, CGIL representatives described their difficulty in 
recruiting engineers (notes, May 2016) and, during my last visit to Agrate, workers 
explained that a new union had splintered from the CGIL to specifically represent 
operators (notes, February 2019). 
There were, of course, other distinctions between workers. Excerpts show that many 
interviewees had a gendered perception of semiconductor workers, which is reflected 
in the lower proportion of women in the workforce, the continued gender pay gap 
and the glass ceiling women face (CGT, 2019c).59 Interviewees mentioned a rising 
                                                          
58 Rousset’s workforce is roughly evenly split between engineers and operators. The CGT 
mostly represents operators, whilst Grenoble predominantly employs engineers.  
59 In the TUN February 2019 meeting, French representatives reported that 5% of workers 






proportion of workers with temporary contracts, who were more wary of organising 
(notes, March 2017). Workers recounted that ST increasingly promoted individual 
approaches to work, dividing workers. Jules explained, “They manage to oppose the 
workforces, to divide them,” by emphasising “indiviual recognition, by merit, 
rather than the team’s performance.” In production, Otto described how each team 
had activity monitors, which managers used to set teams in competition with one 
another, a competition which “detract[ed] from organising.” Alessandro added that 
ST had introduced hierarchies within teams “to fool people that if you act well and 
work hard, you can have a nice career. […] There is no production need [for these 
categories], it’s just to keep people [aiming for a] c reer,” and, when doing so, not 
to organise. Individualisation also happened through privileging the variable 
component of workers’ wages, such as bonuses and increments, rather than general 
salary increases (CGT, 2018a, 2018c, 2018d). Louis explained the consequences 
these discretionary increases, determined by managers, h ld for mobilisation: “We 
have a workforce which bit by bit, with the individualisation and everything being 
based on merit, feels like it’s better not to stick your head out, ‘I’ll try to scramble [a 
promotion] by seducing my manager.’” Giraud (2013) argues that the introduction 
of performance-based bonuses is a deliberate corporate tactic to undermine union 
action, as it individualises the waged relationship, whose general application to 
workers was a crucial victory of the labour movement.60 Bourdieu (1996, p.89) adds 
that merit- and productivity-based bonuses “may be eff ctive as much for [their] 
ability to distinguish between people as for [their] conomic value.” The unions 
posited similar impacts of ST’s focus on individual bonus, which they claimed, 
encouraged workers to think about individual gains rather than collective ones and 
divided workers by setting them in competition with one another and undermining 
their sense of common interests.  
The discussion above illustrates that specific aspect  of front-end workers’ socio-
spatial positionalities, most notably the operator/engineer division, challenged their 
ability to see shared interests and divided their power. Operators and engineers had 
different experiences of work, needs, and ways to organise, and were sometimes 
prejudiced against each other because of ongoing experi nces and corporate 
discourses. These differences were not intractable: most unions – except the CFE-
CGC – organised both workforces. Nevertheless, this divi ion meant that, prior to 
                                                          
60 Didry (2016) demonstrates how this relationship was an achievement of workers’ struggle. 
He claims that workers’ gained standard contracts as a result of legal battles, which gradually 
led the way to workers sharing a contractual status, rights and protections and to face (and 






thinking about shared interests with other sites, unions confronted the question of 
how to create shared interests across the workforces. Donald described his 
bewilderment at imagining workers, joining actions i  solidarity with other sites  
Honestly, it’s already hard to get [employees] to join [the union] on 
issues that concern them directly […] They have a hard time reacting 
at the local level, at the national as well, so at the international level… 
you’re swimming in sci-fi. 
His reaction stresses why workers’ positionalities matter: not only are unions 
unevenly positioned in ST’s network of production, they also confront different 
challenges in terms of building intra-union power locally and these difficulties 
challenged the workforce’s ability to support interational solidarity actions. Laura 
thus stated she had low expectations for internatiol collaboration because inter-
union collaboration at the national level was already so hard to achieve (notes, May 
2015). Importantly, such fragmentation was encouraged by managerial tactics which 
aimed to shift workers’ loyalties, whether through interpellation, denigration or 
individualisation and which, I show in Section 2, management combined with 
discrimination and favouritism. 
b. Workers in back-end sites 
 
Workers’ gender, religion and, in Malaysia, legal status,61  shaped workers’ 
organising, because of the wider social contexts and corporate strategies at each site. 
ST’s employment policies in Muar and Bouskoura reflect the broader trend of 
microelectronics production. In Muar, they hired a isproportionately large number 
of women and migrant workers, a pattern which workers and HR managers explained 
by pointing to gendered stereotypes around women’s so-called natural dexterity. 
Harith, an HR manager explained, “semiconductors are small parts and require 
patience to handle things carefully.” Afiq, a union leader added, women “have 
nimble fingers,” whilst Imran claimed “this is the nature of the job, it isn’t too 
physical or demanding because it’s automated so it d esn’t require much strength 
                                                          
61 Whilst back-end sites feature a technical division of labour, the lower number of white-
collar workers and the fact that EIEUSR only represent operators and technicians made this 
division less significant to unions’ organising efforts and thus to my discussion. In Morocco, 
the UMT does represent white-collar workers. The few engineers I interviewed held views 
that resembled those of front-end engineers. They criticised strikes and emphasised the need 
to privilege communication. For instance, Daoud, a supervisor, said: 
“[Some union members] stopped two-three days, organised strikes, which I 
didn’t like. […] When there was an issue during Ramadan, we stopped [work] 
for one hour. […] [Because] I felt confident that we could get the production 






and women are more patient.” 62 One sees workers and HR representatives mapping 
specific “natural” characteristics onto gendered boies, which then positions some 
workers as more suitable to specific tasks (McDowell, 2009). Scholars argue that 
although companies put forward this gendered argument, they favour hiring high 
school graduates and single mothers who are “family bread winners,” because these 
workers are seen as more dependent on the income they arn and less able or willing 
to organise for higher wages (Elias, 2009; Kelly, 2001; Luthje et al., 2013; McKay, 
2004). Jenkins (2015, p.209) argues these employment patterns are 
Designed from the outset o take advantage of the socio-economic 
deprivation of young women in their society. Disempowerment is 
perceived as a desirable feature of the ideal worker, being associated 
not only with women’s low cost and supposed compliance at the 
workplace but also their greater distance from access to representation 
or employment rights. 
ST women workers saw their relative disadvantages as linked to their lesser 
professional mobility and relationship to their husbands. In Morocco, Aya explained, 
as women, “We stay until retirement […] [finding another job] is hard, you have to 
start training from zero, with kids and all that’” and added, “[women] work for a 
lower salary […] [and] stay, whereas men move, they g t experience and go 
elsewhere.” Imran, from Muar, claimed that women accepted lower paid jobs to 
complement their husbands’ income and were somewhat harder to organise because 
“they need to ask for the permission of their husband or father” before getting 
involved (notes, July 2017). Thus, ST’s gendered pattern of employment drew upon 
broad social patterns embedded in the society in which the factories operated, to 
employ a seemingly more malleable workforce which would accept the minimum 
provision offered by ST. Workers’ creation of unions illustrates that these women 
did not conform to the docile bodies dreamed by a corporate vision (see Appendix 6 
describing the rise of the UMT and EIEUSR). 
In both countries, workers’ religion informed their organising. Imran explained that 
one issue that motivated workers to vote for EIEUSR in 2010 was the demand for an 
on-site prayer room and access to the mosque for the Friday prayer (notes, July 2017), 
a point which Syahmi, a technician, emphasised when praising EIEUSR: “The union 
allowed us to go to the mosque.” In a similar fashion, in Morocco, religious issues 
                                                          
62 This was also the case for early front-end fabs. Moreau (2006) outlines how senior 
managers justified the choice of St-Egreve (France) for the original ST facility because they 
argued that women from the local glove industry would have the appropriate dexterity to 
handle the small components. Daviet (2000, p.138) similarly argues that the semiconductor 
industry developed in Milan notably because the mostly female textile workforce was “used 






also brought workers to support unionising efforts: when workers first occupied the 
factory, they also demanded that management provide them with a break to attend 
the nearby mosque for Friday prayer (notes, January 2016). In spring 2017, workers 
organised three weeks of partial strikes to prevent management from changing the 
agreed custom of stopping work an hour early during Ramadan, which brought 
“management to backtrack” (Massoud).  
Religion therefore energised union activities by providing workers with shared 
demands, and, as Wills, (2008a) notes, sustained class politics. In Bouskoura, many 
workers further articulated a caring community through Islamic values (notes, 
January 2016; February 2017). Hosni stressed, “It’s our culture, union makes one 
strong, even in Islamic proverbs, union is strength.” In Muar, religion played a more 
problematic role in creating a common identity, as it interacted with workers’ ethnic 
identities and prompted resentment from non-Muslim and non-Malay workers. 
Diyana, a former union representative who was a Catholic Indian claimed that “many 
Chinese, Indians, and Sarawak Malays63 don’t join the union because they think it 
only favours Malays.” She was angered by an instance when, “the union asked HR 
to cancel the bonus [workers received if they worked on] Hari Raya [Malay Muslim 
festival] and implement a bonus across the entire month, […] because Malay people 
who took the normal Hari Raya holidays of one week did not get the bonus.” 
Managers cancelled the bonus without offering a replacement and non-Muslim 
workers lost this significant increment. Such tensio  exist in the context of 
Malaysia’s history where first during British rule, and then, as a feature of the 
development strategy of the state, authorities provided Malays with special access to 
education, employment and land (Bhopal and Todd, 2000) and unions principally 
developed amongst Malay people (Ganesan, 2016). Workers’ religious identity thus 
both sustained, and in the case of Muar, challenged, workers’ ability to rally behind 
shared demands, illustrating the ways in which workers’ values and contexts shape 
the deployment and effectiveness of unionisation. 
In Muar, EIEUSR leaders reported that workers were divided based on their legal 
status. Malaysia has developed a migratory regime which eases the ability of 
migrants to work in Malaysia and binds them to a lega  status with fewer rights than 
Malaysian nationals (Luthje et al. 2013; Pye, 2017).64 In ST, a sixth of the workforce 
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64 As regards this phenomenon, I was only able to analyse Malaysia because: (1) there was 
no migratory regime  in Morocco, (2) whilst there were a number of (European) migrant 
workers in Malta, they had the same rights as local workers, (3) I lacked data on the 






are migrant workers, mainly from Indonesia (400 workers), Nepal (50) and Sri Lanka 
(150). Migrant workers and a union organiser agreed that ST provided relatively 
decent terms of work for migrants. The company offered training, housing and set 
holidays, paid workers’ visa costs and even provided compensation for an injured 
migrant workers’ family (notes, July 2017). Manish, a Nepali migrant said, “ST takes 
good care of us, they pay for everything: evening meals, housing…” He, however, 
felt isolated, remarking, “as a Hindu, I feel victimised. There are mostly Muslim and 
I’m scared of starting relationships with women.”65  Some Malaysian workers 
criticised this treatment as preferential. Afiq explained, “I’m jealous that migrant 
workers receive the same pay, but no bills, no housing [costs], just food costs, so it’s 
much better for them.” Migrant workers, whilst well treated, were relatively isolated 
from other workers, and, as indicated by Afiq’s comment, potentially seen as 
privileged, which challenged workers’ ability to create intra-union power. 
ST, I argue, employed migrant workers, not because it was cheaper, but rather 
because it was relatively easier to control them, and whether this was deliberate or 
not, employing migrant workers drove a wedge between th  workforce. Given that 
migrant workers cannot switch employers (Pye, 2017) and, unlike Malaysian 
workers, are contractually bound not to marry or have children, they are less able 
than Malaysian workers to leave ST. Imran explained, “All migrant workers are 
bachelors [sic], if they are pregnant, they’re sent back.” Akmal, an HR manager, said, 
“Migrant workers are more reliable, will work on holidays and are less likely to shift 
from company to company. […] We would like to employ more local workers, 
however many don’t stay, they continue for further studies or get married.” ST 
managers thus used the migrant workforce to reduce their vulnerability to Malaysian 
workers’ turnover, and, whether wilfully or not, to undermine Malaysian workers’ 
marketplace power, since, if migrant workers were not available, to reduce turnover 
management would have to consider increasing wages or improving working 
conditions. Further, migrant workers’ contracts extend to a maximum of ten years. 
This temporality meant that their aspirations often diverged from those of the more 
permanent local workforce. Whilst the former start young (maximum recruitment 
age is 25) and use their limited time in Malaysia to support their families and save 
up to create a business at home (notes, July 2017), permanent workers will 
potentially age within ST. Speaking of Indonesian migrants in Malaysian plantations, 
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Pye (2017) argues that their temporary position leads to a “temporal fragmentation” 
which decreases workers’ incentives and their means to make workplace changes. In 
ST, union activists explained that they faced similar difficulties when trying to 
convince migrant workers to join the union (notes, July 2017), and added that 
migrant workers’ youth undermined older workers’ demands. Whilst many older 
workers complained about the gruelling 12-hour shift alternating each week between 
day and night, younger workers appreciated the resulting higher wages (notes, July 
2017). Najah explained,  
I don’t like the 12-hour shift because it means that people have little 
time with their family. Only young people like it because of the 
overtime. Basic salary is 1,100 ringgit [250 euro] per month, but with 
overtime it can get to 1,600 to 1,800 ringgit. 
EIEUSR had decided not to campaign for a return to 8-hour shifts, because, 
according to unionists, most workers wanted the extra income which overtime hours 
provided (notes, July, 2017). Ashraf, a union representative, explained, “People are 
OK, because they want to work more to earn more.” His response underlines the 
impact of younger and/or migrant workers whose demands contradict those of older 
workers, and the importance of a union’s ideology, since another answer to this issue 
could be to campaign to raise hourly wages instead of accepting overtime to have 
adequate wages.  
This discussion shows that ST’s workforce is highly fragmented in terms of 
composition, identities, and rights, reflecting corp rate strategies and the broader 
social dynamics in which the company was embedded. This diversity both supported 
and challenged workers’ ability to recognise common interests, articulate shared 
demands, and agree on tactics to pursue through their unions. I demonstrated that 
ST’s management drew upon and interacted with these various sources of identity to 
secure production and encourage workers to side with management instead of with 
their class or just to divide the workforces. In front-end sites, management strategies 
denigrated blue-collar traditions, modified wage patterns, and introduced greater 
competition between teams, to encourage individual approaches to work. In 
Malaysia, ST relied on migrant workers who had fewer rights than citizens – to the 
extent that ST governed female migrant workers’ reproductive freedom – to secure 
stable production. This fragmentation and its impacts expose the importance of 
widening the analysis of class politics to encompass workers’ socio-spatial 
positionalities, since, as noted by Wills (2008a), these positionalities informed the 
unions’ ability to create intra-union power locally, which I will show, shapes the 






Importantly, whilst I show that workers’ positionalities conditioned unions’ 
associational power, such conditioning is not intractable. Leitner et al. (2008, p.163) 
argue that socio-spatial positionality is “re-enacted on a daily basis, in ways that 
simultaneously reproduce and challenge positionalities.” This opens the possibility 
for workers’ to accept or transform such positionalities. Positions and identiti s are 
relational. They change through practice, negotiatins and the exchange of ideas 
(Kelliher, 2017; Leitner et al., 2008). Williams (in Castree et al., 2004, p.235) 
explains, “[unions made] real what at first sight is the extraordinary claim that the 
defence and advancement of certain particular interes s, properly brought together 
[emphasis added], are in fact the general interest.” The very existence of a union is 
based on creating common interests, rather than assuming that they naturally emerge. 
The fact that French and Italian unions organised both lue- and white-collar workers 
or that women operators created unions in Malaysia and Morocco demonstrates 
unions’ ability to challenge fragmentation and social assignation.  
Workers, moreover, as we all do, change, and reassess th ir beliefs. Whilst he 
complained that engineers had undermined their strike in 2007, Rene said that after 
2010 “there was a change.” Then, during their strike “white-collars would 
congratulate us [saying], ‘you’re doing a good thing, you’re defending your job.’ […] 
When at the start, I remember that I would distribute flyers to engineers and they 
wouldn’t take them, they would diss me.” Daoud, despit  criticising more radical 
union activities, joined the sit-in to contest the scrapping of the Ramadan break. 
When I visited, EIEUSR leaders were developing strategies to encourage migrant 
workers to join and to develop female workers’ leadership (notes, July 2017) and 
throughout the thesis, I show that workers reworked some of these divisions to 
promote common demands. It is thus both crucial to understand that workers’ 
positionalities condition workers’ organising at a range of scale and that these 






2. A fragmented labour movement 
 
Above, I have shown that the unions choose different stances when it comes to 
organising operators and engineers or to supporting migrant workers. Here, I 
examine these differences in more depth to argue that differing ideologies underpin 
unions’ cultures, which prompted unions to offer different answers to what ST 
workers’ interests are; the tactics needed to further ose interests; and whether 
unions should have a role in deciding corporate strategy. I analyse in more depth the 
differences between French unions, 66 which members of the TUN came to nickname 
the “French problem” and, more briefly, the three back-end unions’ postures. Second, 
I show that each union’s stance was shaped by its members’ experiences of ST’s 
strategies to undermine confrontational leaders. I argue that unions’ varied stances, 
within the context of corporate tactics to harass and co-opt union leaders, challenged 
their ability and willingness to act together against management at a range of scale, 
creating a fragmented labour movement locally, and internationally. 
a. Unions’ ideology: values, roles and tactics 
Several unions represent French ST workers. This situation stems from the history 
of the French labour movement and from national laws, which allow several unions 
to represent the same workforce. In France, seven labour confederations emerged 
during the twentieth century, each embracing a different ideology and organised 
differently at the local, sectorial and national level.67 They have agreed and disagreed 
over countless national negotiations regarding pensions, labour laws and social 
security benefits. These stances act as a backdrop to workers’ understanding of each 
union. For instance, in 2016 and 2017, when French confederations disagreed over 
whether to accept two waves of labour law reforms, the ability of ST unionists to 
work together locally was compromised. Whilst some workers attended the regular 
strikes to protect what they saw as all workers’ rights, others did not take a public 
stance because their confederation supported the reforms or because, as individuals, 
they disagreed with striking (notes, January – May 2017). Workers noticed who 
stood on which side of the line. These tensions serve as a reminder that workers’ and 
                                                          
66 I do not look at the Italian unions, because the divisions they faced resembled the divisions 
between French unions, and because I have less in-depth ata for them. 
67 Industry federations and local worker centres merged to form the CGT at the end of the 
19th century, which was powered by a Marxist and syndicalist understanding of organising. 
By the 20th century, the CFTC, a Christian confederation emerged; the CFE-CGC, focussed 
on white-collar workers, formed in the 1930-40s. Post-1945, splinters within the CGT led to 
the creation of FO, and divisions within the CFTC, alongside the Mai 68 movement, to the 






unions’ local relationships are shaped by processes happening at other scales and by 
layers of history, relationships and politics.  
National stances overlapped with decades of local nitty-gritty conflicts within ST. 
Interviewees suggested that the first disagreement was over tactics – discussion or 
direct action – to create leverage. Pierre, from the CFE-CGC68 explained that 
although all unions shared the same goal “to defend workers as best as possible,” 
they “don’t have the same way to achieve this. […] Often, the CGT enters more into 
conflicts, and we are seen to avoid conflicts. We have more of a 
discussion/negotiation [stance], aiming to strengthen [managements’ propositions] 
with our ideas.” Guillaume (CFDT) agreed, “the CFE functions a lot through back-
door meetings [with management].  And, it maybe isn’t a conscious intention [to 
favour closed meetings], but just a consequence of an intention not to rock the boat. 
[…] The CGT represents more of an oppositional unionism, with traditional actions, 
such as petitions, rallies, strikes, walkouts.” Thibaut (CFE-CGC) concurred, noting, 
“the question is whether [one] helps management to implement [their propositions] 
or whether one stays in a place of criticism.” Samuel (CFDT) conveyed that their 
mode of action “is more negotiation. […]  We mobilise people, but we don’t organise 
actions. […] The CFDT is more oriented towards no confrontation.” This measured 
stance was visible in the CFDT’s relationship to the media. For instance, Gauthier 
(CFDT) criticised actions which created too much media attention, fearing the loss 
of control this represented and preferring to be in “decision-making places”: 
It’s hard to measure the consequences [of media actions]. Because we 
are in the same boat [as the company], so if you pierce the hull […] 
whether the boat will sink or not, no one knows… […] What is at stake 
is not to sink the boat, but to raise consciousness, to bring things 
forward. […] The best leverage is to be in the places where decisions 
are made and to have a voice. 
Unions’ tactical choices reflected each union’s understanding of leverage. Whilst the 
CGT, which represents mostly operators, emphasised the need for direct action to 
pressure management, the CFDT and CFE-CGC, with a larger membership of 
engineers, conceptualised their role as helping management implement its measures 
and, as Gauthier said, “moving things forward.” The expressions CFDT and CFE-
CGC members used are loaded, implying by contrast that the CGT moves things 
backwards and voices idealistic criticisms.  
                                                          






Second, unionists disagreed on the definition of workers’ best interests. When 
workers’ jobs are threatened, the decision about whether to resist or smooth the way 
for corporate plans does not just reflect tactical onsiderations, but also beliefs 
around whose interests the unions should defend. For instance, Rene (CGT) 
denounced the CFDT in Rousset for agreeing to a layoff plan, saying, “That’s the 
difference between the CGT [and other unions]. We’ll fight to keep the jobs, not to 
have better compensation [when made redundant].” Maurice (CGT) claimed, 
There are some unions who concede much more, who accept layoffs 
and the closure of a site and they basically will accompany [workers 
to train for another job] and the closure. And others, which, by 
principle, will not accept that, like ours. 
Unions disagreed, as well, about the meaning of equality, whether it meant levelling 
everyone’s benefits down or bringing them up. For instance, Otto (CGT) criticised 
the CFDT, because they had “argued in favour of cancelli g a break bonus for the 
night shift […] in the name of uniformity [with other teams].” In interviews, I 
mentioned that the UMT had won the annual productivity bonus to equalised for all 
workers, whether operators or engineers. Unionists from the CGT expressed their 
envy towards this victory, which they had never managed to achieve in France (notes, 
March 2017). Claire (CFE-CGC) reacted, 
We [CFE-CGC] defend equitable outcomes when they [CGT] defend 
egalitarian ones. […] Equality for them is everyone receives the same 
annual bonus. If you do this everyone will have the same sum […] for 
an operator who makes two times less than an engineer [that’s a lot] 
[…]. But we don’t do the same hours, [operators] work 32 hours per 
week, and I’m at least on 42 hours, if not more. You see, if you are 
paid more, it’s because you are supposed to provide a service that’s of 
greater value. 
In distinguishing between equality and equity – andin noting that in other instances, 
for example concerning workers’ contribution to insurance plans, the CGT defends 
equity and the CFE-CGC equality – Claire’s remark shows the unions’ disagreement 
over who deserves what. She claims that engineers cr ate greater value, and thus that 
their larger bonuses are fair, in contrast with the CGT which claims that all workers 
create value and should be equally recognised. Whilst t e values that emerged from 
these interviews reflect unions’ efforts to speak to their membership, they also 
symbolise the different political visions that unios hold regarding the very question 
of what constitutes a union’s role. These differences illustrate the varied ways of 
doing union work and the importance of politics to understand these differences. 
Third, the unions choose various stances within the spectrum of promoting workers’ 






CGT argued for “ambitious” demands regarding pay rises, job retention or bonuses, 
Claire exposed the CFE-CGC’s position: “We see the results of the company, the 
difficulties that there may be, we aren’t going to ask for a wage increase of 10%. The 
important thing is that the company does well, thatit can invest.” By contrast, the 
CGT and the CFDT reframed and politicised this trade-off, suggesting that it was 
rather between workers’ wages and capital investment on the one hand, and financial 
returns to shareholders and senior managers on the other (CFDT, 2015b; CGT, 2018e, 
2019a). This was quite an informed critique, where unions suggest that they care 
about the business. Damien remembered, from his corporate post, that all French ST 
unions were attuned to ST’s business needs, 
[French] unions [including the CGT] weren’t Martinez-style.69 I’m not 
going to say collusion, but they had this incredible intelligence to 
understand the stakes. […] There was a really deep understanding of 
the business. […] When ST played well [made money], [unions] 
would annoy us [for greater compensation] and when [ST] played 
poorly, [unions] would still tell us [to protect the company]. 
This attunement came about in part, according to Damien, because when he worked 
for ST, he showed union leaders what he showed senior managers, because he 
“thought it was perfectly logical to give them data. […] When you give people a 
minimum of information on the environment and you tell them you have issues, they 
understand why!” I hold that this forms another type of interpellation technique: by 
giving them information, management encourages unions t  internalise a managerial 
outlook. This interpellation is effective, I argue, because, in sharing such information, 
the former management team recognised union members as actors who can 
understand strategic considerations. Having been recognised as such, union leaders 
might be more understanding of corporate needs but also believe themselves able to 
evaluate ST’s strategies. Rathzel et al. (2014, p.214) note that “trade union work 
requires an imaginary position of company manager, albeit managing the company 
from the standpoint of workers.” Several union leaders I spoke to embraced this 
alternative manager position, emphasising that they had joined the union to improve 
ST’s functioning (notes, May 2017). I return to this stance in Chapter 8, showing 
that it enabled French unions to find common ground. The divergences in unions’ 
tactics, the types of demands they promoted, and their stance towards management, 
illustrate the different politics held across the CGT, CFDT and CFE-CGC. Such 
disagreements strained collaboration between union members locally. 
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Whilst relations in Tours and Grenoble were sometims collaborative, in Crolles and 
Rousset, relationships between the three unions were riven by accusations of 
collusion and betrayal (notes, January-May 2017). In Crolles, Alban (CFDT) 
explained, “We have a very difficult past with the CGT, so we are quite divided,” 
and CGT leaders echoed this feeling. One point of contention was a strike in 2015, 
when the CGT members felt that the CFDT used their mobilisation to negotiate, 
without them, and only turned up for the cameras (see Chapter 4). In Rousset, 
amongst many grievances, David remembered, “[in 2010], the CFE-CGC had 
organised a counter-rally against workers who were striking!” Given these 
antagonisms, Jules argued that the “peak of collaboration” was in May 2016, when 
representatives from the three unions gathered together in front of the Ministry of 
the Economy, because ordinarily, Otto claimed, “in some sites, it’s almost physically 
that union conflicts resolve themselves” (notes, October 2016). Whilst unionists 
rationalised their division, they also acknowledged that it undermined their power, 
recognising that speaking in one voice, by contrast, strengthened their position. 
Maurice (CGT) explained, “We say that we should try, each time we can, to act 
together […] when in terms of workers, it’s worth it […] and we try not to just 
account for the past [conflicts].” In 2017, all three unions agreed on a common 
national declaration, and this had constituted a real challenge to management. 
Guillaume recalled, 
The declaration had barely started. [I was] just saying the first sentence, 
just saying that this was a declaration of all the unions around the table 
and there, straight away, management interrupted, ‘Excuse me, you 
said, all the unions?’ [I said yes]. And they changed colour. They 
weren’t happy. 
For this reason, leaders across the CFE-CGC, CFDT and CGT tried to agree on some 
issues. Nevertheless, they recognised that this appro ch created difficult 
conversations within their branches, as activists’ re entment towards one another 
sometimes overshadowed the national picture (notes, March 2017).  
Regarding back-end unions, my limited interactions with unionists suggest that 
GWU in ST focussed on putting forward reasonable requests and cooperation. For 
instance, Liam exclaimed they were effectively allied with management: “I don’t 
understand why unions and managers are opposite, we’re on the same side. If 
workers’ aren’t happy, the production will not be good.” The labour-management 
relationship in Malta is based on the triannual negotiation of the CBA, which mainly 
feature sit-down meetings and argument-by-argument discussion. Christopher, 






because when you are doing things like that you are losing money.” The last strike 
was in 2015: workers walked out for two hours in a dispute for a pay increase of 5% 
– they accepted 1%. Despite this success, Liam argued that strikes were not the 
solution to labour conflicts but that workers should focus on upskilling instead. This 
“reasonableness” was also apparent in their privileging of the national scale for 
negotiations. When considering whether to join the first TUN meeting, Liam insisted, 
“I don’t want to talk about salaries at the international level. Those are questions 
which we deal with on the local level. I agree to talk about working conditions but 
not salaries” (notes, July 2016). After an EWC gathering in Paris when French and 
Italian unionists broached the subject of asking for better wages at the international 
level, he sent me comments on WhatsApp outlining his worries. He reminded me 
that they went through a large restructuring plan in Malta not long before and felt 
that his union knew how to negotiate with local management and feared that external 
interference would destabilise the equilibrium which enables the Maltese plant to 
survive (notes, November 2017). GWU leaders’ interests in international 
collaboration was thus seemingly caught between their n ed to protect their 
relationship with local management in the wake of ST’s offshoring threats – 
demonstrating why each site’s relationship to ST’s GPN matters – and the fact that 
the GWU had also gained from learning about what happened elsewhere in Europe 
through the EWC (notes, July 2018). This duality persisted during the TUN: GWU 
never pushed for common demands or taking action, hwever they also steadily 
participated in the TUN’s conversations. 
EIEUSR’s tactics were limited by the lack of labour protections and the current 
labour context.70  Their leverage seemed to rely on management’s interest in 
industrial peace. For instance, when the worksite committee prepared the CBA 
negotiation, I asked Imran, “What do you do if management refuse your point?” He 
replied, “If we are faced with management and there is a point of disagreement, I 
advise we move on and then come back to it later.” In my notes, I reflected, “they 
have very limited means of pressure, they’re not legal y entitled to strike… It seems 
like they feel that workers’ problems will resolve themselves based on the 
company’s goodwill” (July 2017). Akmal, explained tha  they conceded to 
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EIEUSR’s demands to a certain extent, to shore up the union’s credibility with 
workers, finding that having EIEUSR as workers’ sole representative was helpful: 
The company treats the union as a partner, as part of the family. 
Because the union knows how much the company can give, it doesn’t 
ask for too much. [Their] demands are reasonable and the company 
knows that [engaging with the union] is part of the process [of 
managing the workforce]. 
EIEUSR limited itself to reasonable requests, whether acquiescing on the issue of 
migrant workers’ rights or once closing down a petition that workers had self-
organised, on the basis that its demands were not feasible (notes, July 2017). The 
union’s president, Afiq, explained, “The relations with management aren’t bad, the 
only thing is that we received pressure to [not] participate in the TUN’s activity. We 
don’t have the same culture here, we don’t function [like unions in other ST sites].” 
Afiq’s answer highlights the risk that unionists took when participating in the TUN’s 
activities, but similarly to Liam above, stressed the value of a localised remit for 
labour-management relations. Unions’ acceptance of this remit, whether in Malaysia 
or Malta, undermines the case for international solidarity, since they suggest that 
they do not need (or want) other unions to get involved in matters which the unions 
held only concerned local labour-management relationships.  
By contrast, the Moroccan union leaders were more militant, though they articulated 
their role as “protecting the company and protecting workers and their dignity” 
(Mehdi, emphasis added).71 When activists created UMT, Mehdi explained,  
Worldwide managers were surprised by our flyers, [because] there 
were pictures and names of people who had responsibilities. They 
wondered why people who don’t have issues with their jobs [or] salary 
or people who have links with HR  [are forming a union]. We outlined 
a lot of problems with management, organisation, production and 
quality, thefts or underhanded deals. […] The [worldwide manager] 
confirmed everything we said, […] and we continued to speak. 
His quote indicates that UMT, whilst increasing workers’ rights, also acted as a 
conduit to express workers’ suggestions for improving the company. Leaders 
explained that they pushed workers to increase the company’s profitability and 
evaluated the costs and benefits of each suggestion in respect to its benefit for both 
workers and the company (notes, February 2019). Azzaddine noted,  
The message that the union gives the workers is that we are going to 
improve our rights but also [business] indicators and quality. You have 
                                                          






to work more, we can’t ask for more and have low [performance] 
indicators. […] You ask and you work! 
Belaid added, “There are our rights and those of the company” and the union defends 
both because, “We’re a developing country, we always need to maintain a good 
image and reputation so that investors continue to invest in Morocco. The union can’t 
create problems that will make investors run away.” This responsible position shaped 
the union’s militancy. For example, once, the UMT had organised a strike in the 
factory which they finished at 4 pm so the production lines would be ready for the 
visit of an important client the next day, demonstrating that the UMT understood 
ST’s needs (notes, January 2017).  
Yet, when UMT leaders embodied this position during the TUN meeting in February 
2019, one Italian leader remarked, “UMT representatives aren’t workers, but 
supervisors” and later that day, smirked, “Do you think this [pushing workers to 
improve local productivity] is union work?” (notes, February 2019). He questioned 
whether his union stood on the same side as the Moroccan one. I found this reaction 
somewhat hypocritical since all unions performed – with more or less emphasis – a 
discourse presenting unions as attentive to the company’s needs. In addition, despite 
their loyalty to their site, Moroccan union leaders were also proactively 
internationalist. Mehdi explained, “[Managers], in negotiations, would speak of 
changes, closures, transfer of the site, but becaus [they saw] it didn’t have an 
influence on us, they stopped.” They believed in the possibility of learning from 
other unions to improve local conditions. Azzeddine argued, “One could take 
competition in a positive way, that we have to improve. For example, Shenzhen have 
no accidents and we have four, that’s not normal.” Workers saw increased 
international collaboration as a source of greater n gotiating strength with ST. 
Massoud believed, “It’s beneficial to have communication between sites and support 
each other when there is a problem,” whilst Hosni argued, “already local solidarity 
is strength, so an international union, that would be a strong organisation.” and 
because “if [troubles] threaten Malaysia today, tomorrow they’re here…!”  
The UMT’s strong interest in international exchanges contrasts with the Maltese and 
Malaysian unions’ stance. This difference, I believe, stemmed from their sense of 
being less vulnerable, and their politicised understanding of solidarity, based on their 
experience of gaining rights and dignity at work following the creation of the UMT. 
This was a considered solidarity, as the UMT also worked to protect Bouskoura’s 
business by engaging in labour productivity bargains. Unlike the Italian 






increasing workers’ productivity, the GWU’s suspicion of external propositions and 
the EIEUSR’s moderation. The UMT represents 85% of Bouskoura’s workers and 
all interviewees were genuinely proud of and grateful for the union; ST Kirkop 
workers voted for GWU and Muar workers for EIEUSR. I do not have to negotiate 
for thousands of workers and weigh their demands against a site’s survival, in a 
situation where back-end sites are more vulnerable than front-end sites to relocation. 
As Wills (2001, p.485) simply put it, “workplace trade unionism is dependent upon 
the viability of any plant or operation.” As such, when unions mandated to represent 
specific workers consent to whipsawing, they may be making a sensible decision to 
keep specifically located jobs in the long run. Signif cantly, the Italian leader’s 
questioning reveals how precarious the trust between the unions was, and how unions’ 
values shaped how they fought for workers’ rights and how they collaborated locally 
and internationally. 
In this section, I highlighted unions’ differing stances towards management and 
analysed some of TUN participants’ values and their local labour-management 
relationships. Such differences mattered locally in France, as they weakened unions’ 
negotiating power, since workers joined different uions, believed in different goals 
and tactics, and were seldom able to agree. In the three back-end sites, unions 
adopted mostly measured stances towards management and, in Morocco, 
emphasised labour productivity bargains, which surprised European union leaders 
and somewhat challenged their trust in each other (s e also Chapter 9). This 
illustrates why attending to unions’ stances and ideologies matters for understanding 
their ability to build trust at the international level, and from there, collaboration. 
Ellem (2004) outlines how it is often the global player, the TNC, which pushes for a 
local-centred outlook, since it enables it to fragment workers’ power and whipsaw 
one site against the other. My observations and interviews suggest that the 
interviewees had, to varying degrees, internalised this limited remit and resulting 
loyalty to their sites and management, a stance which informed unions’ desire for 
and fear of increased international collaboration. Fi ally, I showed that these unions, 
whilst they disagreed on tactics and what extent to push management, all cared about 
ST’s business. In Chapter 8, I show how this alternative management stance 
provided the basis for unions to recognise a shared interest in fighting for an 







b. Varied treatment 
 
Whilst union stances were shaped by their values, they were also informed by the 
unequal treatment of each union a d their members. In France, unions’ authority to 
negotiate collective agreements is based on triannual workplace election results: only 
unions which receive over 30% of workers’ vote72 can sign binding collective 
agreements with the employer. In ST, no single union h lds an absolute majority. As 
a result, management holds an interest in undermining more confrontational unions 
and in strengthening more moderate ones so they can sign agreements in their favour. 
Interviewees mentioned a number of ways in which ST tried to achieve this: 
engineering the transfer of unionists from one site to another to jump-start a specific 
union; granting access to production rooms to some activists during election; and 
creating unions from scratch. One worker said, “Here, [a union] was practically 
created by management.” Workers recognised that these practices had the ulterior 
motive of undermining militant unions. Moreover, in some places management held 
close relationships with federal representatives, who ould curb members that they 
(and management) viewed as too radical. Rene remember d, once, 
[When] we entered into a conflict [with ST], [the fderal union 
structure] came and said, ‘Stop everything. We don’t do such 
mobilisations.’ […] They took away the mandate from all the shop-
floor representatives! 
The HR representatives also introduced alternative channels of negotiation, whether 
negotiating behind closed doors with specific unions or encouraging alternative 
discussion spaces, where each opinion was treated the same whether a worker 
represented anyone or not. One interviewee mentioned se ing representatives from 
another union walking into the negotiating room with HR representatives, because 
both had met in advance to prepare the negotiation together. Another recounted 
having found a script left next to a photocopier, which outlined point by point what 
another union should say during a negotiation and which points the HR would 
concede (notes, May 2017). Workers also noticed, 
At the moment, the tendency is not to negotiate with the unions, but to 
create ‘working groups.’ […] They explain to people afterwards, no 
need for work councils.73 […] They create groups where they select 
participants on a voluntary basis […] mixing representatives, workers, 
a bit of everything. […] Stuff like that kills unionism. (Leo) 
                                                          
72 Further, an agreement cannot be opposed by unions representing over 50% of workers. 
73 Legal instances at the company level where company and union representatives meet to 






Participants in these working groups discuss workplace issues; however, they are not 
accountable to other workers, holding no mandate. Maurice stressed the pro-
management approach that the self-selection of participants enabled, as “[in the 
groups], you have people in front of you who were chosen by management, […] 
when you [as a union] are trying to bring forward ideas that are really collective 
positions because you worked on them.” These situations, under the pretence of 
everyone having a voice, create a false sense of equality and sense of workers’ being 
heard, but they deny the imbalance of power that exists between workers and their 
employer and, as such, deny the need for workers to create leverage through unions 
for their demands to be heard, negotiated and impleented.  
Not only were union structures treated differently, but also, according to 
interviewees, so were their members. Prior to getting involved in his (less 
confrontational) union, Gauthier asked management, “What would happen to me if 
I presented myself on a union list […] [Management] gave me permission, saying it 
was O.K. [i.e., it wouldn’t impact his career].” Presumably, a worker joining a more 
militant union would get a different message. The differences could also be more 
subtle, and yet, highly symbolic. Louis explained that he felt as if representatives 
from other unions “speak with the HR, like you and me are speaking. They [use the 
informal you], they see each other regularly… They just have totally different 
relationships. […] [and this is followed] by promotions and pay raises.” Informality 
illustrates HR managers’ attempt to focus on inter-p rsonal links and deny the 
structural imbalances between workers and themselve, as representatives of the 
corporation. I saw similar tactics at play elsewhere. For instance, in Muar, 
throughout my stay, I witnessed several moments when EIEUSR representatives 
shared social spaces with senior HR managers. This cosiness was confirmed by 
Harith, who explained,  
We have more than a professional relationship with the worksite 
committee. We invite each other to [religious] functions and to each 
other’s homes. Now, we also highlight the fact that ere is a union to 
potential clients, and offer space during the initial training days to [the 
union] to tell workers [about their work]. 
During my first weekend in Muar, a union leader took me to the HR’s son’s wedding. 
Later that evening, we attended the Hari Raya open house – a traditional Malay 
Muslim feast celebrating the end of Ramadan – organised by another HR manager 
(notes, July 2017). When I pressed about the evident closeness, the union president 
retorted, “I don’t understand this hierarchy [between workers and bosses], it is not 






company pays me, how can I fight them?” (notes, July 2017). In his contradictory 
reaction, he reveals a refusal to see an imbalance of power between himself and 
company representatives, and at the same time, his dependence on ST. Several union 
members reproached him for his closeness with management, and in February 2019, 
suspicions along these lines led the worksite committee to send another 
representative to the TUN meeting (notes, February 2019). Whilst not in itself a 
major incident, their choice to switch representatives reflects the ways in which trust 
amongst union leaders was fragile, as well as managers’ power to bend union leaders 
towards holding greater loyalty to them rather than to their union colleagues.  
Besides favouritism, personal relationships, or alternative channels for workers’ 
expression, discrimination has a sharper edge. Alban argued, “Once, we did an 
assembly, and [those who came out] were directly caled in for an individual 
interview. [Managers] had watched the security camer s.” Leaders, who were seen 
as too confrontational, faced repression, and, according to workers, were sometimes 
bought off. Laura once emailed other workers to assess possible gender-based pay 
and promotion imbalances. Despite having bcc-ed workers, she “got an email from 
HR saying she had used a company tool [email] for personal reasons and […] that 
they could fire her for this.” She called their bluff but also noted that it symbolised 
the pressures that CGT union leaders faced, and the legitimate fears workers might 
have when speaking with them. Louis faced intense pressure after standing for the 
CGT. In his words, 
They made sure I understood I had made the wrong choice and that I 
was going to suffer for it. […] I didn’t have any promotion or training 
at all. […] My colleagues were told not to speak to me, […] I had a 
manager monitor my daily movements, hour by hour, minute by 
minute, to try to show that I didn’t do a good job. […] There was a 
false accusation that I had torn down a poster.  
Elsewhere, Jo, a CGT leader, explained, “[I had] a pay rise of 0% for five years, I 
had to do an individual development plan for two years. […] Another [union leader] 
faced pressure, a story of a [work]badge that had turned up in a secure zone. He faced 
cops knocking on his door one morning.” Many unionists reported career freezes, 
which were lifted only after they threatened to bring ST to court. When they did, ST 
gave in prior to the trial: they compensated the claimants, avoiding any legal 
judgement, and thus no proof of discrimination was made public.  
The matter of public-ness, I argue, was crucial. The quotes I present are somewhat 






leaders were not able to prove their suspicions to workers. As a result, interviewees 
reported stories which circulated as rumours and as he rsay, these rumours worked 
to decrease trust between workers, to delegitimise unions and to increase division 
between union activists. They were stories on the one hand, of management bribing 
some union leaders or militant workers, and one the ot r hand, of more militant 
activists facing ongoing discrimination at work. Onthe former issue, namely bribery, 
Maurice observed that other unionists “are favoured with loads of rights we don’t 
have. And worse things which I won’t mention, because I need to be careful with 
what I say.” This speaks to his fear of his words being reported, and without proof 
to back him up, potentially getting him into trouble. In another interview, Rene said,  
I was witness to a discussion with [the HR assistant], who offered a 
post in [union name] to a worker. [The worker] said, ‘No, […] I don’t 
really want to.’ [The HR] answered, ‘But don’t you want to have a 
career?’ And that says it all… 
In this instance, management promised a worker career dvancements if they joined 
a union which would support management’s goals. He added that, “in exchange” for 
receiving favours, when management needed them, workers would do what 
management asked, and, “That’s how you get some people who sue other workers…” 
The cryptic last sentence referred to a story, mentioned by several workers, involving 
one union leader who was accused by a worker of pushing a pregnant worker and 
causing a miscarriage. He faced two years of trials and was only cleared when he 
proved that he was not there when the incident was said to have taken place (notes, 
January 2016). In burnout, he left the company, activists suspected, also with a 
comfortable sum (notes, January 2016). In Crolles, Otto said that, following a strike, 
ST bought off leaders and separated them,  
All the leaders in the night team […] were divided [between teams] 
and at some point [managers] negotiated [a ‘leaving gift’ for strike 
leaders]… then after [such ‘gifts’] it’s hard to mobilise people, because 
they see how it goes. […] Since [ST] isn’t condemned, they continue. 
In addition to decreasing workers’ trust in union leaders, he explained that stories of 
corruption and corporate reprisals were hard to share, because these stories could 
discourage workers from joining unions if they suspected the level of reprisal from 
ST that union membership – in the wrong union – entailed (notes, March 2017). Otto 
added that if they spoke about how ST bought off workers – and rumours already 
circulated about this, other workers would come to feel unionists organised actions 
just to increase the “leaving gift” they would receive from ST and this would tarnish 






Management’s harassment of some union leaders did not stop in France. In Italy, all 
interviewees reported seeing their career advancements stop once they joined a union. 
In Morocco, Mehdi explained,  
Each year I make an official demand to have a career progression […] 
but they still don’t want to give it to me. […] A few years ago, they 
also tried to get rid of me by spreading rumours, according to which I 
had stolen money, created issues. […] During the Arab spring, [I took 
part in the protests]. They sent my picture to globa  management 
saying I was dangerous. 
Management throughout the world uses tactics that encourage workers to take part 
in so-called good unions, which gain company favours in exchange for acting to cool 
off workers’ frustrations (Giraud, 2013; Hauf, 2017). Beyond the ongoing difficulty 
of facing harassment on an individual level, what is particularly powerful here is that 
this repression was uneven across and within sites and, as a result, it divided unions, 
since not all unions and not all union leaders were discriminated against. 
Furthermore, there was no proof of favouristism or its opposite, to provide workers 
and unionists with a recognised set of fact. This uncertainty manufactured mistrust 
and, I argue, undermined unions’ associational power, both regarding workers’ trust 
in the union and unionists’ trust in each other.  
Across this section, I showed the variety of union cultures throughout ST and the 
difficulty this created in terms of building trust, and from there inter-union power at 
the local and international level. I could have written this section only emphasising 
unions’ differences that come as the result of corporate tactics, such as discrimination, 
favouritism, whipsawing, rumours and interpellation. Yet, such a focus somewhat 
negates unionists’ own considered choices. Maurice not d, “To be honest [intra-
union division] isn’t just organised by the company. There is an influence of the 
company, but also, of certain unions that don’t share the same vision.” Whilst it is 
easy to criticise management’s attempts to undermine ilitant unions, it is important 
to recognise unions’ decisions to uphold measured stances. Rathzel et al. (2014, p.72) 
argue that attention to workers’ subjectivity might “allow us to see where resistance 
to subordination might be subdued and diverted, not o ly by authorities but also 
through the ideas and practices of the subordinated th mselves” (see also Jenkins, 
2013). How union leaders conceptualised their roles exposes their constrained 
“stances,” as based on their position in ST’s GPN, the corporate tactics they faced 
and their chosen ideologies, which, whilst not always nswering “class” hopes, 
remain important to acknowledge, for they are examples of choice and because, 








In contrast with site-based stories of workers (Birelma, 2018; Rathzel et al., 2014; 
Wills, 2008a) and despite labour geographers’ call for understanding labour as a 
social category with multiple internal divisions (Cumbers et al, 2008; Herod 2003a), 
studies of international labour campaigns often fail to tell their readers who the 
workers are, what are the various corporate tactics they face, and what they believe 
in and fight for (Brookes, 2013a; Castree, 2000a; Hennebert, 2010; McCallum, 2013). 
Newsome et al. (2015, p.10) further critique Coe and Jordhus-Lier’s (2011) for 
failing to analyse “important contexts and factors including the type, nature and 
structure of union(s) involved, […] the degree of managerial acceptance and 
opposition, [and] employer’s strategies and orientations.” Here, I answered these 
remarks, by analysing workers’ socio-spatial positinalities. I showed that workers’ 
capacity to act in solidarity within one another crossed over a multiplicity of registers 
and how their positionalities shaped their experiences and organising cultures, 
sustaining and challenging unions’ intra-union power. I claim that these local 
challenges are crucial to understand unions’ broader ability to work at the 
international level: if unions cannot motivate workers locally, moving them for 
international goals will be even more difficult. 
I also provided this more in-depth analysis concerning unions’ stances. I showed that 
some unions in ST held closer relationships than others with local management, 
whilst others were more confrontational in their demands and tactics. Cumbers et al. 
(2008, p.373) proclaim that “internally, too, unions are not monolithic entities but 
instead are themselves the site of class struggle, composed of multiple positionalities 
in relation to capital.“ These varied stances challenged unions’ ability to build inter-
union power at the local, national and international level. In France, unions disagreed 
over tactics, values and demands. This divided their power locally and meant that 
inter-union collaboration was difficult to achieve locally and nationally, and, I show 
in Chapter 9, internationally. At other sites, unions were wary of broadening the 
scope of their discussion to include unions located elsewhere because of ST’s 
offshoring threats and because of their close relationships to management. Varied 
cultures challenged the trust leaders held in each other but also their willingness to 
collaborate with other union leaders. Lastly, I argued that an alternative management 
posture ran through all unions, a stance I return to i  Chapter 7, showing that this 






Beyond describing these differences, I showed that workers themselves reproduced 
workplace divisions, whether regarding professional category or legal status and 
emphasised that these choices are framed by corporate manoeuvres. I argued that ST 
unions were divided, not just because they represent different categories of workers 
in different places and by corporate tactics, but also, and crucially, by how they 
choose to represent workers and what they deem a union’s rle to be. I claimed that 
unions’ values reflect their constrained agency, in that each stance is shaped by 
management’s coercion, discrimination and favouritism, but also by unions’ own 
choice to see conflict (or not) between themselves and management.  
Acknowledging workers’ complex if not “messy” affiliations (Katz, 2006; Wills, 
2008), whether in terms of experiences, tactics or values, means I often felt trapped 
in description. I dealt with people, and I railed against the “human factor” and my 
inability to theorise beyond it. I took comfort in Katz‘s (1998; 2006) claim that the 
very desire to abstract from experiences is the issue, as the recognition of complexity 
is key to fighting against the multiple strains of what makes our world unequal. Yet, 
I found myself sometimes banging my head against the platitude of understanding 
the world as suffused only with difference, since it has always been, and yet workers 
have often, with all their complexities, struggled to make it less unequal. I share 
Mitchell's (2016) critique of the counter-revolutionary tendency of acknowledging 
the world only as it is, rather than as one constantly transformed by churning 
dynamics and conflicts. Here, I have argued that first, these differences and divisions 
should be understood as powerful in how they divide workers and challenge their 
ability to create inter- and intra-union power at a range of scales. Second, some of 
these differences should be understood as reproduced on an everyday basis and 
through different scaled systems of power, be they political systems (such as 
migratory labour regimes), social discourses (for example regarding white-collar 
workers’ interests), and corporate practices of division, repression and spreading 
rumours. This dynamic aspect, I believe, opens possibilities for change and 
resistance. Third, the emphasis on workers’ varied socio-spatial positionality should 
be complemented with an attention to unions’ varied id ologies to better understand 
“who” each union is, and, from there, evaluate how unions can negotiate the 
challenge of collaboration, even as these negotiatins are riddled with people’s 
complex affiliations. To avoid this analysis would be to understand class as a 
reaction to workers’ contexts rather than as a process, and erase workers’ and unions’ 



















‘ST used to be Malta’s best company,’ sighs John, a technician. Another technician 
next to me adds: ‘We were third globally, we invented Nintendo, the Wii. 
 Now … no one knows us.’ (notes, June 2018).  
 
 
ST Kirkop Fab (source Xuereb, 2012) 
 
Malta is a small arid island, whose white buildings in the old (and tourist-filled) 
Valetta quarter sparkle over the blue of the Mediterranean sea. It is congested and 
sprawling. There is a lot of tourism and increasingly, I learn, income from online 
gambling – workers walk in and out of buildings groomed for online broadcasting. 
The economy boasts of growth rates that would make its European neighbours 
salivate – 5.2% was projected for 2019 and 6.4% for 2020 (Times of Malta, 2019), 








ST Malta was established in 1981 with an initial workf rce of 25. By 1982, there 
were 400 workers, Christopher tells me. By 2005, ST employed 2,300 people and 
had three plants (Zammit, 2005, p.259). It was the largest private employer in Malta, 
and the largest exporter, representing 55% of the country’s total domestic exports 
(ST, 2004). In 2014, ST still represented 47% of Malta’s exports (excluding fuels) 
(MacDonald, 2015). The company now barely employs 1,600 workers, has closed 
down two of its sites, struggles to keep new workers, and no longer offers the 
recognition that workers feel they deserve, neither in terms of prestige nor wages 
(notes, June 2018). For Christopher, a former union representative, the turning point 
came between 2008 and 2010, when 
[There were] three major issues. One was [that] unemployment was 
going up very high, [second], electricity and water tariffs were going 
sky high, [because] there was the oil crisis, and electricity bills almost 
tripled.  […] [And third] the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) 
had just lapsed and we had to negotiate the new agreement. […] [ST] 
were threatening that they would leave the island, [and put] a lot of 
pressure on the authorities, [saying] ‘Don't increase the wages, the 
utilities or we leave.’ 
ST reported facing a 60% increase in expenses due to higher water and electricity 
costs74 and threatened to offshore its activities (Stagno-Navarra, 2010). According 
to Liam, “The HR manager seemed genuinely scared that the site was going to close.” 
This menace loomed over the negotiation of the new CBA and over state 
representatives who considered offering “concession” to ST “to keep its operations 
in Malta” (Stagno-Navarra, 2010). A Maltese academic explained, “ST is the main 
exporter for Malta […] with many small subcontractors being dependent on ST, so 
they have a lot of leverage over Malta.” The coordinated pressure was successful. 
According to Aaron, the Maltese government “fork[ed] out 48 million euros” as a 
subsidy to develop advanced packaging processes to nsure that ST stayed.75  In 
addition, ST pressured the union to change the CBA. At first, workers resisted and 
organised strikes: there was two years of turmoil, strike, action, whatever” (Aaron). 
Liam explained, 
We told the men [sic] not to say yes to the changes [of the CBA], […]  
[however] there was a lot of pressure. […]  We had internal meetings 
at work [and], at town hall meetings [ST and politicians told us], ‘If 
                                                          
74 Malta relies on fuel imports, and is thus highly vulnerable to energy price fluctuations. 
ST’s factory consumes as much as the island of Gozo, home to 37,000 people (Xuereb, 2012). 
75 The Maltese government budget in 2010 was projected a  2.9 billion euros; 48 million 






you are not going to accept [the agreement], the company is going to 
leave.’ […]  There were news articles that ST was goin  to leave Malta 
if workers didn’t accept the new agreement. 
Because of the town hall meetings, media pressure which portrayed the country as 
“on the verge of losing the biggest employer” because of GWU (Aaron), individual 
meetings with unionists and government pressure, the union signed the new CBA, 
renouncing one wage rise, and introducing a lower wage for newcomers. According 
to Liam, this “was the worst thing.” It established a two-tier wage system for existing 
workers and newcomers. Since signing this CBA, the sit  has lost 1000 workers 
through “natural wastage […] people [left] on their own and were not replaced” 
(Aaron).  
 
Yet, when I visited in 2017, prospects seemed brighter, if not at ST, but in the rest 
of Malta. Increasingly, workers realise, “effectively, they can leave their jobs and 
start another job the following day, especially if they have a technical background” 
(Aaron). Christopher explained, “Now all employers want to sign [new] CBAs 
because they want to increase workers’ entry wages,” to attract the workers they 
need but cannot find. In ST, there was a gap in the pyramid of workers’ ages, because 
entry-level operators, moved to different companies once they had received training, 
whilst older workers stayed, having reached peak levels of pay. The HR 
representative was now eager to revisit the CBA to correct entry-level wages 
whereas they had implemented an entry-level wage fre ze for the previous eight 
years despite the union’s warning of this leading to a recruitment problem (notes, 
June 2018). The situation shows the importance of local labour-market dynamics in 
shaping unions’ ability to negotiate (Coe, 2000; Coe and Kelly, 2000),  and illustrates 
the cordial labour-management relations in Malta. When Christopher explained that 
they were addressing the entry wage issue now that HR were wanting to negotiate 
around it, I thought, ‘Why haven’t you been pushing for this before?’ At the same 
time, I recognised that the story of the Kirkop site features an instance of a coercive 
whipsaw strategy in which the company used “explicit or specific threats” (Greer 
and Haupmeir, 2016, p.30) to its advantage, asking unions (and the state) to help 
secure the site’s profitability. The union decided to heed the pressure, and perhaps 



















Chapter 7:  




Financialisation has led to a new regime of production, which, in a feedback loop 
with increasing international outsourcing and integration, as well as neoliberal 
measures, has prompted a significant reduction in workers’ power and income 
(Crotty, 2008; Krippner, 2005; Silver, 2003). Whilst this much is well documented, 
the impacts of financialisation on workers’ everyda experiences “remain under-
specified” (Cushen, 2013, p.315). In this Chapter, I first present the literature on 
financialisation at the corporate level and outline workplace-level changes which 
scholars associate with a focus on maximising sharehold r value. I then show that 
financial pressures have gained increased precedenc in the semiconductor sector 
and argue that this situation exacerbates the pressures of scale faced by ST.  
I then analyse whether ST’s corporate choices themselve  reflect a growing emphasis 
on delivering shareholder value, considering ST’s alloc tion of income, the 
messaging from the senior management team, and workers’ changing workplace 
experiences. I argue that ST’s allocation of income and its internal strategies, 
especially between 2006 and 2016, reveal a focus on cost cutting in order to report 
desired financial ratios, and on extracting value to provide attractive dividends. 
Workers faced increased insecurity and stress along with increased alienation from 
their labour. I conclude by arguing that workers recognised all of the changes 
mentioned above as consequences of financialisation, and powerfully discredited 
these shifts as harmful to ST’s future, suggesting, at the same time, an alternative 
vision of what ST’s future could be. Doing so, I aim to further the understanding of 
how workers experience and resist financialisation, but also to set the basis of what 






1. Corporate financialisation 
 
Here, I summarise the literature, which has tracked th  meso-level impacts of the 
shift towards maximising shareholder value and review the workplace changes 
which authors associate with corporate-level financi lisation. I then argue that the 
financialisation of the semiconductor industry increases pressures of scale on mid-
size companies, such as ST. This has led some companies to choose a fabless strategy 
whilst others have decided to comply with the demands of Moore’s Law and upgrade 
their industrial capacity, a context which, I show, further increases the pressures of 
competition faced by ST. 
a. ‘What the market wants?’ 
 
Milberg and Winkler (2010, p.276) argue that in the1980s,  
corporate strategies began to shift, focusing more on the maximisation 
of shareholder value and less on long-term growth. The transformation 
involved […] an increased offering of financial services, an increase in 
the purchase of financial assets and [stock buy-backs]. 
 The competitive nature of capitalist development has ensured that the focus on 
maximising shareholder value outlined by Milberg and Winkler (2010) has seeped 
progressively from financial firms to most firms followed by analysts, which are thus 
in turn “financialising” (Chambost, 2013; Fligstein a d Shin, 2007; Aalbers, 2019). 
Maximising shareholder value, expressed as profit and share price, is both a set of 
ideas and a set of strategies favoured by financial markets to put these ideas in 
practice. These strategies have led, across sectors, to firms’ economic performances 
being increasingly benchmarked against their competitors’, based on standardised 
ratios which compare costs, revenue and investments rather than productive 
measures, such as market share, operational investments or long-term growth 
(Bachet and Compin, 2013; Baud and Durand, 2012; Fligstein and Shin, 2007; Froud 
et al., 2014; Levesque and Murray, 2010; Sauviat, 2003). Other strategies include 
mergers and acquisitions because these often lead to l rge windfalls for investors; 
cost-cutting measures which secure expected ratios; decreasing capital investment; 
restructuring and downsizing the labour force; outsrcing activities to suggest that 
the company is focussing on “core business”; share buybacks; and distributing 
dividends (Aalbers, 2015; Fligstein and Shin, 2007; Froud et al., 2000; Sauviat, 2003) 






Froud et al. (2000) argue that these strategies lead companies to change how they 
allocate value but also are geared to performing “ what the market wants.” Aalbers 
(2015, p.217) observes that “many senior managers [have] become busier with 
communicating positive stories to appease credit rating agencies, market watchers, 
and stockholders than with innovation or production gains.” Financialisation, these 
authors thus suggest, is about implementing specific strategies, but also narrating 
them. Senior management needs to construct optimistic narratives to convince the 
financial market – whether this public is real or imagined through the dull 
compulsion of the market matters not – that the chosen strategies will raise 
shareholders’ profits (Cushen, 2013). Yet, according to Fligstein and Shin (2007), 
the preferred, often formulaic, strategies which may raise short-term profits may also 
threaten companies’ long-term profits by decreasing R&D and long-term investment 
and nonfinancial innovation (see also Aalbers, 2015; Christopherson et al., 2013; 
Stockhammer, 2004). As I will show, workers throughout their interviews criticised 
financialisation based on these long-term considerations. 
 
Strategy Justification Practices 
Restructuring 
To focus on “core competence” and 







To ensure that companies provide 
good financial ratios, which secure 
shareholders' investments and 
revenues 
Increasing dividends 
and share buybacks at 




Figure 7.1: Strategies, justification and practices of firms following shareholder 
value pressure. 
 
Whilst a number of studies outline macro-level consequences, including the 
pressures on wages, rising income inequality nd increased job losses (Aalbers, 2015; 
Sauviat, 2003), the literature examining how workers xperience financialised 
pressures is sparse. To understand workplace consequences of financialisation, I 
draw mostly on Cushen (2013) and Chambost (2013).76  
                                                          
76  There are other studies, notably Chan (2013) who ident fies the consequences of 
financialisation for autonomous workers and McCann (2013) who examines the everyday 
consequences of offshoring. However, Chan (2013) focusses on a sector rather than a 
corporation, and McCann (2013) on offshoring rather than the whole framework of 






Chambost (2013) studied firms subjected to Leveraged Buy-Out (LBO). 77 In her 
study, workers reported that the companies’ central objective became the 
achievement of financial performance targets over securing long-term development, 
and that management horizons all became focussed on sh rt-term goals. This 
translated into greater pressures to cut costs, which took the form of decreasing job 
security, increasingly individualising wages and increasing the proportion of 
variable income in workers’ total earnings. Workers reported added stress because 
of chronic staff shortages, the dominance of quantitative performance indicators, 
greater competition between employees and a decreasd sense of power. They felt 
that managerial decisions were increasingly driven by financial considerations not 
based on their expertise.  
Cushen’s study (2013) analysed high-tech workers’ experiences in a TNC subsidiary. 
There, workers reported increasing stress because of understaffing and what they 
considered unrealistic performance targets. They expressed exasperation with 
managers who would hype projects, then abandon themwith the flick of a wrist. 
They felt that money was wasted without management ever intervening to stop these 
repeated missteps because corporate strategies were pr ponderantly geared to 
financial imperatives, resulting in a waste of resources. Cushen (2013, p.327) argues 
that the company’s performance of an “excessive optimism was considered a 
hypocritical affront to [these workers’] understanding of themselves as intelligent, 
educated professionals.” This gap between workers’ xpectations and their 
experiences led to employees distancing themselves from the company: work 
became just work, and they curtailed their expectations and personal investment in 
their jobs. These studies thus emphasise white-collar workers’ deteriorating working 
conditions and loss of benefits, decreased sense of respect and increased detachment 
from corporate strategies. Based on these two studies and Cushen and Thompson 
(2016), I summarised the changes prompted by financalisation in Figure 7.2, and in 
Section 2, draw on these four main changes and their associated consequences to 
assess whether ST itself is being financialised.      
  
                                                          
the increasing insecurity and commodification of academic work, though this literature is not 
often connected to the financialisation literature. 
77 A LBO is a practice whereby investors and pension funds, drawing on equity and debt and 
using the company’s assets as collateral, acquire companies seen as undervalued. Once the 
investors are in control, they often impose a program for the company to “deliver its potential,” 
pay its debts and provide over five percent of return on investment (Chambost, 2013). 
Chambost (2013) argues that companies under LBO, given that they are directly managed 
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Flexibilisation of the 
workforce 




Increases in team-based 
production and changing 
project teams 
Employment insecurity and role 
uncertainty 
Frustration and loss of trust  
Waste 




 Focus on numbers, financial 
performance and short-term 
“revenue-generation” targets 
Evaluation by numbers 
Shortage of staff 






Hyping of projects: 
performance of the narratives 
financial markets and senior 
managers wanted to hear 
Cynicism, frustration 
Detachment, personal 
disinvestment, loss of voice 
Feeling of being undervalued 
and/or stupid 
Figure 7.2:  Summary of workplace changes and their consequences for workers, 
based on Bouffartigue et al. (2011), Chambost (2013), Crowley et al. (2010), 
Cushen (2013) and Cushen and Thompson (2016). 
 
Crowley et al. (2010, p.422) argue that these changes reflect the “revitalization of 
scientific management,” i.e., the refinement of techniques to increase value 
extraction from workers. Crowley et al. (2010, p.422) link the rise of this 
phenomenon, which they ascribe as Neo-Taylorism, to what the literature above 
defines as indicators of financialisation. Indeed, Crowley et al. (2010) argue that 
“increases in deregulation, international competition, buyouts/acquisitions, and 
rising shareholder expectations,” i.e., consequences of financialisation, are 
“prompting firms to pursue flexible arrangements with their professional and 
managerial employees.” I mention Crowley et al.’s (2010) work because it connects 
the particular experiences outlined by Cushen (2013) and Chambost (2013) to the 
more systematic ways in which companies have implemented measures to heighten 
value extraction, but also because they claim that is phenomenon particularly 






add, particularly resent the increased stress to perf rm and lack of dialogue because 
corporate discourse had previously told them they had autonomy and contributed 
valued work. Whilst they fail to explicitly mention it, these studies beg the question 
of whether white-collar workers will, as blue-collar workers did, organise to resist 
the rising alienation that such techniques entail. In Section 2, I show that whilst 
financialisation78 did not lead to the collective mobilisation of white-collar workers, 
it did lead them, along with blue-collar workers, to build a discourse that 
delegitimised the changes they faced and clearly expressed the competing interests 
between themselves and senior management.  
b. Financialisation in and of the semiconductor sector 
 
In addition to favouring specific workplace changes, I now argue that the rising 
significance of financial pressures has exacerbated th  pressures of scale faced by 
semiconductor companies, notably because of low capital investment and the 
emphasis on M&A activities. Brown and Linden (2009) claim that in the 2000s, 
private equity firms, awash with cash thanks to the real estate bubble, stimulated a 
ferocious cycle of spinoffs and M&As in the semiconductor industry (see also 
Hasenstab, 2013). With time, the cycle has only accelerated: in 2015, mergers and 
acquisition expenditures for semiconductor companies r ached $107.5 billion 
compared to $16.9 billion in 2014 (Design and Reuse, 2019). Figure 7.3 ranks the 
top companies by sales in 2004 and Figure 7.4 in 2018. Figure 7.4, in displaying 
the merger and acquisition activities of these top c mpanies also shows two threads 
that run through the sector, namely the large sums involved and states’ oversight of 
semiconductor companies’ fates. Despite ST being relatively protected,79 these 
figures demonstrate that ST now functions within an environment dominated by 
increasingly large and concentrated companies. Comparing the two figures, one sees 
that in 2004, ST was ranked 6th in the world (Lapedus & Clarke, 2003), and the top 
company (Intel) declared an annual revenue of $27 billion. By 2018, ST reached 
$9.6 billion worth of sales, whereas some of its competitors achieved revenues of 
between $30 billion and $78 billion. It had fallen to 11th on the list. 
                                                          
78 I understand the changes through the frame of financialisation rather than Neo-Taylorism, 
because Clark and Macey (2015) argue that changes i the management of labour should be 
considered within the framework of broader economic and political change. 
79 ST has remained outside of this consolidation frenzy after the merger of Thomson and 
SGS-Electronica. Explaining this, the CGT (2017d) claimed, “the joint control [by France 
and Italy] [stopped] the dismantling of ST,” whilst CFDT unionists claimed that the states’ 







Rank Company Headquarters 
2004 Sales 
($M) 
1 Intel U.S. 30,900 
2 Samsung South Korea 15,830 
3 Texas Instruments U.S. 10,700 
4 Infineon Europe 9,180 
5 Renesas Japan 9,000 
6 ST Europe 8,760 
7 Toshiba Japan 8,531 
8 TSMC Taiwan 7,648 
9 NEC Japan 6,469 
10 Philips Europe 5,692 
11 Freescale U.S. 5,519 
12 Sony Japan 5,070 
13 AMD/Spansion U.S. 5,001 
14 Micron U.S. 4,635 
15 Hynix South Korea 4,420 
Figure 7.3: Ranking of the top 15 semiconductor companies in 2004. 
Source: IC insights strategy Reviews Database (Lapedus, 2005) 
2018 
Rank Company Model 
2018 Sales 
($M) 
1 Samsung integrated 78,541 
2 Intel integrated 69,880 
3 SK Hynix integrated 36,767 
4 TSMC foundry 34,208 
5 Micron integrated 30,930 
6 
Broadcom 
Acquired by Avago (2015) for $37bn, failed 
to acquire Qualcomm for $121bn because of 
the veto from the U.S. President fabless 18,189 
7 
Qualcomm 
Failed to acquire NXP for $44 bn because 
China did not clear the transaction fabless 16,385 
8 
Texas Instruments 
Acquired Burr Brown in 2000 for $7.6bn integrated 14,854 
9 
Toshiba 
Acquired by Bain Capital-Led Consortium 
(2017) for £18bn  integrated 13,801 
10 Nvidia fabless 11,951 
11 ST integrated 9,619 
12 
NXP, 
Acquired Freescale in 2015 for $11.8bn integrated 9,407 
13 Infineon integrated 9,210 
14 MediaTek fabless 7,891 
15 Sony fabless 7,715 
Figure 7.4: Sales result for the top 15 semiconductor companies i  2018, and  






The contrast between the two figures demonstrates that the semiconductor sector, 
lubricated by financialisation, quite clearly displays the tendency towards 
centralisation outlined by Marx (1990), whereby companies grow larger by way of 
economies of scale and takeovers. In Chapter 5, I established that the capital required 
to remain technologically competitive enhances such dynamics. Over the last decade, 
these pressures have combined with mergers and acquisitions to further bolster the 
tendency towards increasingly large semiconductor companies. These pressures also 
interact with another two measures encouraged by financialisation, namely the 
emphasis on distributing dividends and the rise of specialisation. These 
developments further squeeze and pressure mid-size actors such as ST. 
Brown and Linden (2009, p.146) note that “despite th  rising R&D burden […], 
leading chip companies have been spending at least as much on stock buybacks” as 
they do on R&D. This is where company size matters. Whilst large companies may 
consider both increasing dividends and large capital investment, mid-size actors may 
become too overstretched to do both. A fab’s competitiv  edge stems from its ability 
to capture innovation and continuously upgrade to install machines able to deliver 
the latest bandwidth on the largest wafers. This entails increasingly large capital and 
R&D costs, which large companies and foundries (semiconductor companies 
focussed on the production of chips) can consider more easily than smaller ones, 
whilst integrated corporations face the growingly prohibitive costs of both capital 
and R&D investments. The rise of foundries reflects the trend towards horizontal 
organisation which has appeared over the last twenty years (Luthje et al, 2013), 
whereby some companies have specialised: either only producing chips (foundries) 
or only designing chips and the software for them (fabless firms). Specialisation is 
one way for companies to respond to the increasing capital and R&D costs needed 
to develop semiconductor technology, alongside the rising need – or perceived need 
– to distribute dividends. Segmentation also performs the focus on "core 
competence," so prized by investors, and decreases the level of investment needed, 
freeing up the means to distribute dividends. The ris of specialisation increases 
pressures on integrated firms, such as ST, which combine both. Charles stressed, 
“Whilst ST has ten thousand people in the front end, TSMC has fifty or sixty 
thousand people. […] They are able to produce for much cheaper because they are 
much bigger.”  
Growing specialisation also crowds out alternatives. Indeed, for mid-size integrated 
firms, one solution to the rising cost of production was collaboration. For example, 






mm R&D centre and fab in Crolles. However, by 2006, investment funds acquired 
Philips and Motorola, and imposed a fabless and outsourcing strategy on both 
companies. By 2007, the alliance in Crolles crumbled, l aving ST to bear the burden 
of all investments alone (Balas, 2009). The trajectory of this alliance illustrates how 
the financialised context both decreases survival options for mid-size actors and 
pressures them towards specific strategies, namely a fabless one (Luthje et al., 2013). 
As Charles claimed, the market may want ST, as a mid-size integrated company, to 
adopt a fabless strategy. He said, “financial analysts have been quite critical of ST 
for years for investing too much industrially in France and Italy…” I emphasise “may” 
because Froud et al. (2014, p.48) argue that “what ‘t e market wants’ is as much a 
moveable discursive construct as a set of fixed financial targets.” As I show, ST’s 
management for a while considered the fabless scenario, to workers’ dismay. 
As I have shown, financialisation at the corporate level entails a shift of workplace 
practices to extract the level of returns and present the ratios expected by financial 
actors. This relies notably on the renewal of Taylorist practices and their extension 
to white-collar work, the individualisation of the workforce, and the growing 
instability of work institutions and structures (Bouffartigue et al., 2011; Crowley et 
al., 2010). In addition, I showed how the logic of financialisation diverts capital away 
from the large investments needed to stay in the rac  of semiconductor development, 
magnifying the pressures of scale and tendencies towards monopolies in this sector. 
This has led a number of mid-size companies to choose the fabless option favoured 
by financial investors, and increased the pressure on the few integrated and mid-size 
companies that remain, notably ST. ST thus faces increasing pressures to shift to a 
fabless model, and to outsource its chip production to foundries and its testing and 
assembly to back-end specialists, only focussing on developing patents and designs. 
These changes are important to understand ST’s external nvironment and the 
increased competition it faces, and, as I show next, the changes in ST that workers 






2. Working through financialisation 
 
ST, since the mid-2000s, has laid off a sizeable number of its workers, closed several 
of its R&D divisions and manufacturing facilities (ST Annual Reports, 2009; 2013; 
2017) and, since 2006, seen its revenues level off and decline (ST Annual Reports, 
2009; 2013; 2017). I acknowledge that the fate of a company cannot be fully 
explained by shifts associated with financialisation.80 Yet, workers in ST strongly 
believed that financialisation, understood as prefer d corporate strategies to 
increase shareholder value, had seeped into ST’s practices and explained its decline. 
Blue- and white-collar workers resented the consequences this entailed, in particular 
their sense of greater insecurity, increasing stres and growing alienation at work, 
but also the threat to the company’s industrial competitiveness more generally. Here, 
I first examine ST’s allocation of income, demonstrating that it has shown an 
increased focus on value extraction within a broader strategy towards ST becoming 
fablight. I then show that workers faced ramped up cost-cutting measures and 
increasing bureaucratic constraints, along with growing dominance of financial 
discipline over their work, leading to heightened subjective precariousness, stress 
and fear for the company’s survival. My analysis shows that workers created a 
coherent narrative according to which financialisation undermined their sense of self 
and their business’ industrial future. This discourse, I argue, was a key element in 
workers resisting the imposition of a financialised outlook. 
 
a. Value extraction 
 
Figures 7.5 and 7.6 (below) describe the amount ST has allocated to R&D efforts 
and CapEx (capital expenditure), since 1996, in absolute terms and as a percentage 
of net sales. Overall, the data displays a sharp contrast between the 1997-2006 period 
and the 2006-2015 period. R&D expenditures increased until 2012 when they 
represented 28% of net sales; they declined to approximately 15% in 2017. After an 
ambitious jump between 1997 and 2001, CapEx fluctuated, displaying a general 
decline until 2017. The decline was particularly sharp between 2007 and 2016, which 
reflected a conscious corporate strategy.  
                                                          
80 Reverdy (2014) claims that ST also lost the prominence it held in 2003 following bad 
choices, the increasingly unfavourable euro/dollar exchange rate, the 2008 financial crisis, 



































Figure 7.5 and 7.6: ST’s R&D and Capital Expenditure between 1996 and 2018 as absolute value and as percentage of Net Sales.  


































Figure 7.7: Value of ST’s dividends and share buy-backs between 1996 and 2018 





















1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Sharebuy backs 0 0 0 0 0 269 151 0 0 0 0 0 313 92 0 0 0 0 156 0 0 0 62.5
Dividends 0 0 0 23 27 35 36 71 107 107 107 275 329 110 247 354 355 356 353 351 212 214 216
Net Income 0 406 411 547 1452 257 429 253 601 266 782 -477 -786 -1131 542 155 -2188 -629 129 110 170 810 1296
Mean 27.4327.4327.4327.4327.4327.4327.43183.1183.1183.1183.1183.1183.1183.1353.8353.8353.8353.8353.8 214 214 214







In 2006, ST Annual Report announced, “our goal is to reduce our capital investment 
spending to sales ratio from above 20% in the past several years to a target of 12%” 
(p.39). The report alludes to a fabless future, affirming that the management team 
had “pursued various initiatives to reshape [the] company […] [notably by] 
establishing a less capital-intensive business model” (p.22). Mr. Bozotti, CEO of ST, 
confirmed this strategy in 2007 (ST, Annual report 2007, p.22). He reiterated it in 
2008, by declaring, “we moved further on to an asset lighter configuration” (ST, 
Annual report 2008, p.5) and celebrated it in 2009, announcing that in 2009 CapEx 
represented “a 50% reduction in comparison to 2008” (ST, Annual Report 2009, p.6). 
Along with decreasing investment, ST increased the value of dividends and stock 
buybacks (see Figure 7.7). These increases took place in absolute terms and as a 
percentage of net sales. Dividends increased from representing 0% of sales in 1996 
to an average of 3% between 2007 and 2011 and more than 4% between 2012 and 
2015. Even when ST sustained losses, as it did during the 2007-09 period and in 
2012-13, dividend levels were maintained or increased. However, in 2017, ST 
increased CapEx to $1.3 billion (>15% of ST’s net sale ) and committed $1.3 billion 
to R&D. This level of investment was sustained in 2018 (ST, 2018). The change 
followed a two-year-long mobilisation by unions (see Chapter 7) and it contrasts 
sharply with the company’s strategy between 2007 and 2016, when CapEx averaged 
8% of net sales.  
The three figures show that increasing dividends and decreasing investments often 
overlap. This makes intuitive sense: money not invested is available to redistribute 
to shareholders. If one discounts exceptional years of share buybacks, three phases 
in ST’s value distribution emerge:  
- between 1996 and 2006, with low dividends and considerable investments;  
- between 2007 and 2015, with higher dividends and lower investments;  
- since 2016, with more moderate dividends and renewed investments. 
The beginnings of these periods roughly correspond t  the entry of ST into the stock 
market under Mr. Pistorio in 1996; the rise of Mr. Bozotti as CEO in 2004; and the 
period that followed the unions’ campaign. Whilst I how in Section 3 that workers 
believed the correlation between ST’s strategy and who made up its senior 
management team was significant, importantly here one sees how ST’s allocation of 
income pursued a financialising logic, privileging dividends and a fabless or fablight 








Not only did financialised trends translate to the allocation of money in certain ways 
but the senior executives’ discourse during this time also reflected an emphasis on 
protecting shareholders’ interests. For instance, during a quarterly conference call 
after Mr. Bozotti announced an ambitious capital investment plan in 2017, one could 
hear the investors’ subtle pressure, and the immediat  reassurance by Mr. Bozotti 
that the plan would not harm the dividend payment: 
BNP investor: And the CapEx increase for this year, where is it going 
exactly? […] 
Mr. Bozotti: So, the cash flow, let's say, anticipation that we had given 
would not change, no? We would certainly cover the distribution of 
dividends, despite the increase in CapEx. (transcript by Seeking 
Alpha, Confcall2017Q2) 
 
This interaction, though anecdotal, demonstrates an instance of ST’s chief executive 
attempting to reassure “the market” after the introduction of a large capital 
investment plan. Scholars stress that financialisation is based on self-sustaining 
performances: senior management teams need to be seen to raise financial value and 
convey “what the market wants” (Cushen, 2013; Froud et al., 2000). Whether or not 
investors believe in such performances is a different matter. Charles claimed “in a 
society that is losing money to distribute dividends…. well everyone, financial 
investors included, would have preferred growth - no o e is tricked.” The analysis 
of ST’s allocation of income and senior management’s public interventions 
demonstrates that, between 2006 and 2015, ST’s senior xecutives embraced and 
executed a strategy which allocated a significant portion of ST’s reserves to securing 
shareholder value, whilst investments declined. This data offers a first step to 
substantiate the claim that ST, until 2015, was “financialising.” As I show in Chapter 
8, unions drew upon these clear material changes to denounce ST’s senior 
management team and request that it be replaced. 
b. Cost cutting, centralisation and outsourcing 
 
According to Cushen and Thompson (2016), financial presentations are based on 
ratios, not values. They explain that firms often reduce “the denominator [costs] 
through cost reduction” (p.356) rather than increase the numerator [profits], since 
cost reductions and outsourcing can improve the ratios in a short time frame, whilst 
investments are more risky. Cost cutting and outsourcing measures thus help 






towards cost cutting and outsourcing in lieu of a revenue growth strategy, and 
criticised it for leading to self-defeating consequnces. ST’s annual reports from this 
period do not say which percentage of ST’s production is outsourced to foundries. 
Senior management’s public announcements however spoke of a growing emphasis 
on outsourcing. For instance, in 2018, Mr Chery, then CEO, explained ST’s decision 
to increase the outsourcing of cutting-edge technology81 because it would “support 
ST’s medium-term growth in order to mitigate our capit l expenditure” 
(Confcall2018Q2). What’s interesting here, is that e presented outsourcing as a 
strategy to offset capital expenditure, illustrating that he believed ST needed to 
achieve certain ratios, and, if these were threatend by more ambitious investments, 
they should be counter-balanced with outsourcing.  
Workers believed that these changes threatened ST’s industrial competitiveness. 
They claimed that the foundries, as a result of ST’s orders, would develop the 
industrial knowledge to put the newest chip design into production, whilst ST would 
become dependent on them, allowing them to set prices. Peppe maintained that “[our] 
added value is to know the technical aspect. If you lose [this], you will depend on 
anybody.” Balthazar remembered that, “once, [ST] wanted to renegotiate the 
contracts […] [The foundry] told them, ‘No, it isn’t this price, it’s this one’.” 
Workers moreover believed that subcontracting exposed ST to the risk of IP theft. 
Charles explained, “There is a risk that [the foundry] copies the technology for other 
clients... [The foundry] is far from stupid.” Luthje et al. (2013, p.222) call this 
behaviour the “modularity trap” and correlate it with financialisation. They claim 
companies lose “innovative capability because of excessive outsourcing of strategic 
knowledge […] in the name of shareholder value.” When I probed Charles about 
why ST had outsourced production of a key technology despite the risks, he 
suggested a similar correlation, noting that 
ST potentially deemed that the five hundred or eight hundred million 
dollars needed to build the fab, well those [sums] ight be criticised 
by financial analysts or even by the states. […] [Both] would criticise 
[ST] for investing too much and taking too much risk around industrial 
production. 
Asked why ST has not acted as a foundry for other companies, given that some of 
its production lines were idle, Charles speculated that “this may be because the 
                                                          
81 As a bittersweet anecdote, the technology he mentioned then was core to the justification 
for the public funding ST received under Nano2017. Rene and David explained, “the 
government gave 500 million euros [and then realised] that ST sold them a vision that 
[technology] was the future and […] [ST] gave everything to [another company]. […] 






margins are not good enough […] ST could do [foundry work] to load the fabs, to 
sustain the means of production, but they don’t want to because it wouldn’t look 
good for the financial presentations.” The quotes from Charles and the CEO suggest 
that the desire to present attractive financial figures overshadowed considerations 
around profit or industrial secrets. In this aspect and the next ones I examine, workers 
criticised the gulf between management’s strategy and need to develop the company. 
In addition to outsourcing, Damien argued that ST had switched its strategy towards 
cost cutting on account of a vision which he assessed a  self-defeating,  
[The financial director] is conscious of the [importance] of critical 
size,82 so [he] cut costs and jobs! […] But […] [Pistorio] always said 
that one should drive a semiconductor company like an automobile 
driver […] when one arrives in a turn one must brake strongly with 
the left foot and accelerate really fast with the right foot to get out of 
the turn quickly. So one must take orders, make loads of technologies. 
We should never be overcome by the fact that we are looking for a 
balance[d] [budget] […] We spend money today because there will be 
tomorrow and tomorrow there will still be tomorrow. […] When one 
cuts, one cuts people, investments, even bits of factories and then to 
start again, good luck!”  
This drive to cut costs resulted in increasing burea cratic constraints around 
spending money, limits which workers saw as absurd. Jean complained, ”each cent, 
you need to justify it three or four times, [when] you ask for something to be bought, 
it takes two months […] so you don’t want to ask […] when that can block the fixing 
of a machine or the qualification of a product!” Etienne described the ludicrous 
ramifications of this policy in Tours, 
[For an order] above €1,000 we need to ask for permission, so we have 
people who will call suppliers asking for an invoice at €999.99 or 
divide the order in two. […] [This leads to] ridiculo s situations where 
engineers and project leaders spend half of their time o try to reduce 
costs to avoid asking for permission.  
Workers thus complained that the cost-cutting logic suffocated their work logic. 
Similarly, Arnault lamented that these constraints delayed expenditures and hindered 
production, citing one incident, 
The ramp-up [increasing production load] was planned for January-
April, [but] machines arrived in December. […] [As a result], we were 
qualifying the machines as we were delivering [chips] to the client. 
[…] Why? Because they didn’t want to unlock the budgets. […] The 
financial strategy is there, and it threatens production. 
                                                          
82 This term refers to the need for semiconductor companies to achieve a certain “critical size” 
in order to achieve expected financial ratios, either as a fabless company or as an integrated 






Workers emphasised the consequences these constraints h d on ST’s industrial 
capacity and their ability to do their work well. Edern confirmed, “[I hope] that we 
find this autonomy again, because this really slows down work,” whilst Donald said, 
“[the €1,000 limit] slows down all the qualification […] [I feel that] we don’t totally 
respond to the clients […] [because] finance stops us.” Workers’ comments illustrate 
that they resented the budgetary constraints for the increased workload they entail 
but also because they believed that they threatened ST’s production capacity and its 
ability to respond to clients, i.e. its business.  
These impacts were particularly highlighted by workers in Tours, who claimed that 
increasing bureaucracy led to “a loss of industrial autonomy” (Arnault), whereas the 
very survival of Tours depended on this autonomy. Charles stressed that the Tours 
site “is suffocating […] everything is controlled to he cent, they can’t take a risk 
and launch new projects.” Previously, the Tours director “sometimes, didn’t tell 
Pistorio at all what he was up to, […] and suddenly delivered a new product! […] 
He had the knowhow and Pistorio gave him room for initiative” (Charles). Damien 
confirmed, 
Each time the [CEO in Tours] talked with Pasquale [Pistorio], 
Pasquale said, ‘When are you going to start losing money so I can 
close your site, because it would be better placed in Singapore.’ [And 
the Tours CEO answered,] ‘Never, because I will always make more 
money than Singapore!’ ‘Well, that’s good’ [Pistorio would say]. And 
Tours was never closed. And they have become global eaders in their 
field. […] What is really important is that [Pistori ] let these different 
local sites run loose, to a certain extent, and these sites created 
capillary roots with the region, the universities, the companies, and the 
schools. […] Against all odds, each time Pasquale sid, ‘I’m going to 
close Tours,’ he would discover that Tours had invested in really 
modern technology, when no one had told them to do so. So [Pasquale] 
would yell a bit, and then go see and say ‘Well, hmm that’s good.’ 
And then say: ‘Do it like Tours!’ 
By these accounts, creativity and autonomy on the part of workers and the site 
director saved the Tours site from offshoring. Workers’ recollections introduce some 
agency into the story of offshoring, and criticise cost-cutting measures for 
suffocating the autonomy Tours needed to develop technology, a narrative, which I 
return to throughout the chapter, according to which f nancialisation threatened 
industrial, or production-focussed, work. 
Blue-collar workers agreed with this critique from white-collar workers, citing 
greater pressure to cut costs and an aging industrial infrastructure as symbolising a 
shift away from an industrial vision. In Crolles, Louis explained, “Now, you need 






Rachid complained, “We have machines that are twenty-three, twenty-four years old.” 
Not only were machines not upgraded, but existing machines were also neglected. 
Otto said: 
The previous site director said that we’re in an industry, we run the 
machines, whether there are pieces to produce or not, you run them! 
[…] Because we know very well that industrial machines, when you 
stop them, the liquids stagnate, and when you startthem again, you 
have problems of contamination. 
Workers were asked to unplug machines “and then, we use them to mine spare parts 
for other machines, which means that there is no chan e of re-using these machines” 
(Otto). When I asked him why, Otto argued that thiswa  “because [running them] is 
a cost. […] We have gotten to such a level of budget restriction that they analyse 
[costs] even to this point [the energy and water costs f running a machine].” Liam 
outlined a similar practice in Malta. He said, “We cannibalise machines,83 […] to 
reduce the costs, […] because of the depreciation, hi gs like that. […] I don’t 
understand either, but the cost of the product will diminish if you take [the machines] 
off of the line.” Just like the white-collar workers above, Otto and Liam expressed 
their irritation as workers who deal with and care for machines. They protested that 
machines were damaged – either for spare parts or thr ugh inactivity - just to cut 
costs in the short term and suggested that these practices did not make industrial 
sense, in light of the previous ambition driving ST when machines were run because 
their functioning was seen as core to what ST does. Blue- and white-collar 
interviewees thus agreed on the issue of financialisation threatening ST’s core 
competences.  
The push towards cost cutting was matched with demands for increasing productivity. 
In Morocco, workers reported increasing machine-to-worker ratios (notes, February 
2017). In Malaysia, Afiq explained, “Operators now handle eight to nine machines 
and they can’t sit down,” to which Nayla added, “Befor , we only had two or three 
machine per workers but now with increased automation, workers easily have eight 
to twenty machines with increased production quotas.” Front-end operators reported 
similar pressures to increase productivity. Louis noted that “since Bozotti arrived, 
[…] work has become a cost, so we have to focus on bei g profitable. […] Every 
person needs to be 150% productive. […]  There is not time for breaks, [the person] 
must always be producing, producing, producing!” Louis added, “People have more 
and more machines to look after, so they have less time to think about their work, 
how to improve it, use techniques to restart the machines, have a bit of time for 
                                                          






themselves.” Whilst they couldn’t prove the changes since estimating only the 
increasing number of machines supervised by each operator ignores the machines’ 
increasing productivity, workers clearly felt the impacts of increasing pressure. 
David in Rousset explained, “It’s not totally false when [managers] say that 
machines have improved, however that doesn’t justify [everything]. The work pace 
has increased. Operators can’t breathe. […] [And, as a result], there has been an 
increase in work-related injuries.” Carla likewise noticed, “Before there was 
somewhat the time to do things, now you need to be fast, […]  so it’s more stressful 
and there is no time to speak.” Workers felt that tey were pushed to their limits and 
that this had a dehumanising impact on their work, highlighting the personal 
consequences of cost-cutting measures along with their industrial ones. ST’s 
allocation of income, cost-cutting measures and workers’ experiences thus reveal a 
growing emphasis in ST on value extraction. The pressures percolated into 
operators’, technicians’ and engineers’ working lives, increasing stress and, 
according to workers, undermining ST’s competitiveness, capacity to innovate and 
its means of production.  
c. Ongoing pressures, restructuring, and increased stress and sense 
of precariousness for the remaining workers 
 
The third shift workers noticed and criticised, again both for its consequences on 
their working conditions and on ST’s competitiveness, was the company’s growing 
emphasis on restructuring its divisions, plans which often lead to hundreds of layoffs 
and for the remaining workers, increased stress and se se of precariousness. ST’s 
annual accounts reveal at least six restructuring exercises since 2005 whereby 
divisions were created, merged, spunoff, outsourced and merged again. Figure 7.8 
(below) summarises the plans’ consequences for workers and illustrates the 
financialised logic behind them. Froud et al. (2000) argue that reshuffling exercises 
aim to conform to investors’ expectations. Workers also made this link. For instance, 
in 2005 an engineer in an interview already complained, “[ST] isn’t an industry 
anymore. […] Financial imperatives dominate. [ST] will open posts, two weeks later 
will close them. […] All that for shareholding bosses who only think of money” ('Les 
impactes,' 2005). Communications from the CFDT (2014) likewise correlated ST’s 
2014 plan with financial pressures premised on a short-term logic,  
[The plan] reproduces the logic to continuously cut osts and reduce 
spending. [The] ultimate goals [of this logic] focus on managing 
mostly the short term and are underwritten by an income logic (under 







The union’s choice of the word “commodity” is meaningful: a commodity is prised 
for its exchange value rather than its use value. Claiming that ST’s logic 
commodifies ST, stresses, by contrast, that the company shouldn’t be treated as a 
mere item to extract value from, but rather as an organisation able to sustain 
livelihoods and develop technologies. This critique, as I show, fed in the wider 
discourse produced by workers to fight for an industrial vision for ST and illustrates 
the ongoing contradictory nature of the in/for/against/with nature of the relationship 
between a worker and their company. 
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Figure 7.8: ST’s restructuring plans since 2005 and their report d aims and results.  





Furthermore, these restructuring plans, workers held, made no business sense and 
neglected workers’ expertise. Otto reported that, “people just tell us ST’s strategic 
choices are bonkers!” For instance, in 2012, ST decided to outsource a design unit, 
despite workers warning that this would be more expensive and less effective than 
the status quo, given the imbrication of this unit with other R&D activities (CGT, 
2012b). The plan was halted in 2013 after significant mobilisation. The CGT argued 
that ST’s obstinacy in carrying out the plan as far as it did led to “hurt colleagues, 
whose trust in the company and management has been tarnished” and that the plan 
dismissed “[our] colleagues’ skills and desire to defend the collective interest of the 
company” (CGT, 2013a). They added, “This is a typical example of what shouldn’t 
be done and what ST does more and more under the pressure of financial criteria.” 
Another time, Richard criticised “baffling strategic choices” when workers in France 
“were given tasks because ST needed to cancel jobs in England, but there was no 
transfer of skills!” Despite receiving warnings from the unions about the likely 
consequences of closing the R&D security unit in question, a year later management 
had to hire new workers, having by then, lost needed expertise (CGT, 2015a).  
In addition, workers complained that the unremitting i ternal changes contributed to 
a sense of increased stress and job insecurity. Restructuring exercises that merged, 
renamed and unmerged divisions haphazardly, led to the ngoing churn of projects. 
This, according to Linhart (2015), encourages the ris  of subjective precariousness, 
as workers do not feel confident in performing their new tasks, having little time to 
adjust to them. Workers spoke of such feelings of subjective precariousness. 
Madeleine explained, “We stop projects and then we start them again. There are 
teams that spend their time stopping project[s].” Martin, an engineer, argued, “we 
have totally fantasy-based schedules. […] For a project where a team of say twenty 
would need eighteen months, we’re asked to do it in six. […] At the end, [I feel] that 
the only interest of this company is to make cash.” T is instability had an impact on 
workplace relationships. Julie said, 
From one day to another, you are in another team, or you come back 
to your team and your manager has gone. […] As managers are thrown 
back and forth between teams, they don’t have the tim  to get to know 
us and, for all intents and purposes, our work. As a result, there is a 
loss of trust. They police us [and] set indicators.  
Along with stress came job insecurity. This, for instance, was particularly acute for 
workers who fell under Statement Of Work (SOW) provisions, when the Grenoble 
digital division was closed in 2016. Then, workers could either accept the voluntary 





of these posts were under SOW provisions (CGT, 2016e). SOW workers would join 
different project teams, but were not attached to any team. Julie explained, SOW 
workers “don’t have a fixed post […] some are made permanent [in the teams] others 
not [and] we don’t know why.” SOW workers have a permanent contract with the 
company, but they need to have a post in a team to be secure (CGT, 2017a). Whilst 
SOW status ensured that no worker was fired, it also introduced a normalised 
insecurity, which according to Pierre, “gnawed at peo le.” Pierre explained that 
“[SOW workers] still have a job and salary, but it isn’t easy for them to see their 
future. […] They just have an ultimatum over their heads, […] maybe ST will do a 
redundancy plan afterwards.” Pierre’s description of SOW workers’ sense of living 
with an ultimatum illustrates Linhard’s claim, and the threat that underscores such 
precariousness, since, as shown in Figure 7.8, many of these restructuring plans led 
to layoffs. This uncertainty also plagued operators. Otto said,  
There were three or four years when we had partial unemployment84  
and you think it smells of pine trees […] which is what you make 
coffins with… […] That’s also why the voluntary redundancy plans 
work, because workers tell themselves that sooner or later [ST will 
close] and potentially think, ‘the earlier I negotiate, the better deal I’ll 
get.’ 
Thus, as Cushen and Thomson’s (2016) note, continuous organisational upheaval 
led to employees experiencing heightened employment and role insecurity, and 
created a deleterious climate of anxiety. Precariousness came as somewhat of a shock 
for white-collar workers, who have been encouraged to think of themselves as more 
valuable and protected than their blue-collar counterparts. On the radio, the engineer 
quoted above realised, incredulously, that offshoring and financialisation also 
threatened his work ('Les impactes,' 2005). These statements demonstrate again 
workers’ dual critique: workers criticised ST’s restructuring plans for the 
financialising strategy they embodied and for leading to a ramped-up emphasis on 
targets, surveillance, stress and precariousness, across the workforce. 
d. Market discipline and the rise of a punitive performance regime 
 
Having illustrated the regular restructuring efforts that took place within ST, I last 
show that the rising preponderance of financial metrics in ST led to an increasing 
feeling of alienation amongst workers. Cushen and Thompson (2016, p.357) argue 
that firms’ accounting techniques “position financial targets central and dominant in 
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decision making.” ST workers similarly saw an accounting logic come to dominate 
their work. For Pierre, the use of SOW workers in Grenoble epitomised this logic’s 
dominance. He noted the incoherence of keeping workers in SOW when, “at the 
moment we are in a growth phase. […] We need people!” Several workers suspected 
that the answer stemmed from accounting procedures and the desire to improve 
financial reporting targets.85 In budgetary terms, the costs of SOW workers are 
reported in the impairment costs of closing the digital division, rather than in the 
labour costs of their teams, thus boosting the company’s performance ratios. There 
were other areas where workers noticed that the goal of achieving attractive ratios 
overshadowed other considerations, and crucially for workers, their sense of being 
valuable. 
For instance, workers noticed that management increasingly fiddled with workers’ 
holidays or paydays to improve their financial presentations. Emmanuelle explained 
the logic: “There are consolidated numbers for each trimester, and [their value] 
makes the value of the share go up or down.” 86 Workers pointed out that this focus 
on ratio was upheld regardless of the impacts on workers or clients and directly 
linked these practices with a financialised outlook. A union leader claimed,  
[Every three months, ST presents its financial results and] it never fails, 
two weeks [before] [ST] will freeze investments and new hires, or 
even force us to take holidays to […] present better balance sheets, 
which is absurd from an industrial perspective. […] In the name of 
presenting [better] reports, they explain to people it is better for them 
at one point not to be there. […] That’s not a saving from an economic 
perspective, where one could say ‘money is a bit tight, let’s see where 
to save.’ No, these are financial fluxes that they optimise because they 
need to present reports. (in Balas, 2009, p.405) 
Pascal explained, “When you take holidays, it fictitiously changes the quarterly 
numbers” by decreasing the labour costs, as holiday pay is itemised separately. He 
added, “At the end of the year, it amounts to exactly the same thing, so that’s purely 
financial. […] It’s a short term financial logic.” Although workers were routinely 
paid at the end of the month, Alain remembered when, “one year, to avoid too great 
a cost ratio, they delayed payday to the fifth. […] After, [workers] suffer the 
                                                          
85 These workers asked for these comments to be anonymous. 
86 On a corporate side, one sees such considerations bei g presented as well. In the investors’ 
conference call of Q2 2018, Mr. Chery explained that “on Q3, we will have the positive 
impact of the seasonality. You know that in Europe th re are a lot of – number of days of 
vacation.” Thus here, “seasonality” is seen as positive, because greater holidays lead to lower 





consequences […] That’s the reality, just to make some savings, the guys [sic] totally 
disregard others!” 
Whilst these remarks concerned everyday working conditi s, some of the 
consequences were more serious. Emmanuelle contended, “An extreme example 
was when Bozotti announced in May 2015 that they ‘had to do something’ [about 
the digital division]. It was purely a financial declaration to reassure investors.” The 
declaration was followed by the layoff of 1,600 workers (see Chapter 8). Workers’ 
reactions show that they were conscious of the financial logic driving these measures, 
a logic which, they added in a unified voice, symbolised how ST disregarded their 
value to the business. In Malta, Aaron explained,  
[ST] started looking at everybody as a number. [Before] if somebody 
left, they wanted to know why: ‘Why are you leaving the biggest 
company in Malta?’ […] especially [engineers] and technicians. Then, 
within 6 months: ‘You want to leave? Yes, you can leave now; you 
don't even need to work your notice period.’ 
In Morocco, Dahlia complained that ST had once been a company that technicians 
and engineers had sought out for its quality training, but more recently, workers no 
longer wanted to stay because they felt ST treated th m as numbers, rather than as 
valuable resources (notes, February 2017). In Catania, Peppe said that Mr. Bozotti 
told them when they were complaining, that they could just leave (notes, June 2018). 
In France, Yann argued that the 2016 redundancy plan created an attitude of “‘if you 
want to go, just leave!’ […] Even PhD students [who] are at the cutting-edge, [ST] 
doesn’t encourage them to stay!” Madeleine argued, “ST no longer has a vision for 
the workforce, which they now call ‘the people’ [in English]. They’re 
interchangeable, you can take them, release them, all [management] wants is to get 
the cash and then leave.”  
Fligstein and Shin (2003, p.5) argue that financialisation shifts how management 
values workers, viewing them no longer as partners but “as costs to be minimized.”  
Likewise, Bachet and Compin (2013, p.5) contend that companies under a 
financialised perspective apprehend work “not as a skill generating value but as a 
burden generating costs which limit the possibility to create value for the owners.” 
Workers’ experiences of corporate practices left them feeling that they were no more 
than pawns in a game of financial reporting in which they had no value. They 
resented the lack of recognition of their worth and the fact that their value was 
disdained not based on ST’s growth needs, but on financial goals. This feeling, 
interestingly, was shared across sites, as quotes from union leaders above show. 





do meaningful and, crucially, productive work. Workers underscored this desire as 
they expressed frustration with financial goals overshadowing discussions on 
developing technology. For instance, Arnault saw the invitation of the financial 
controller to a meeting between union and management representatives as an 
illustration of this financial vision impinging on a production-focussed one. He said: 
I think that we are an industry: You should separate the finance side 
from the industrial side. Because the industrial side, that’s a job where 
you work on a product. I would say that that costs don’t hold a major 
importance for us. […] The job [of the financial director] should be to 
find the funding to finance the production of the product. […] But now 
we are getting to a situation where you almost have no means of 
production, but the guy [sic], he is happy because he sees his 
expenditure go down. […] But we don’t produce anything! ‘That’s 
fine, my costs are going down!’ 
Etienne similarly explained, that when he arrived in 2000, “we still had R&D goals,” 
but by 2017 goals had “slipped into reducing costs. Work was to reduce costs. Do as 
you wish, you can develop a new product, but the goal is to reduce costs. It is not to 
innovate, innovation is in [cost reduction].” Pascal vented against the dominance of 
financial goals: “Total revenue is not a goal! For sales teams maybe but not for 
developers like us! No, what we care about is to develop product!” One hears blue 
and white-collar workers’ nervous irritation: the financial focus undermines what 
they deem important to their job - creating innovation, securing clients’ satisfaction, 
maintaining machines and producing chips. Whilst they acknowledge the importance 
of costs, they insist this hould not be how their work’s value and goals are set. 
Lazonick (2010, p.24) argues, that, in financialised corporations, business executives 
come “to view the corporation as a financial asset from which value can be extracted 
rather than as a productive asset through which value can be created.” Workers’ 
reactions show that they resisted this conception of their company. They wanted to 
create products, not achieve financial targets and felt that the financial logic 
contradicted and undermined their professional logic. Agency as conceived by Scott 
(1985) and Katz (2006) can also be asserted as passive refusal, and this is what 
happened. The dominance of financial targets decreased workers’ willingness to 
invest their energy in their work. Madeleine explained, “You don’t want to give like 
you used to, and we used to give! […] now, [workers] ju t don’t want to […] because 
they get nothing in exchange” (echoing Cushen’s 2013 findings). 
As much as it was about the business, there was also something personal in workers’ 
resentment. Workers lamented the fact that their jobs were no longer technically 





Charles said, “[They’re] not in the latest technology.” In Grenoble, following the 
closure of advanced R&D units, Madeleine complained, “when there are interesting 
things, we stop [them], [such as] the set-top boxes etc.” Edern agreed, observing that 
“workers complain that their job doesn’t have much s ope. […] There is a loss of 
responsibility, the job of the engineer becomes the job of the technician [and so on].” 
Jean, a technician, described the consequences of thi  shift on morale, 
This contributes to a sense of frustration. […] We had a job that was 
relatively interesting; we always worked in collaboration with an 
engineer on [a] project. […] Now we have a more operational job. […] 
We have to think less, but [thinking] is so important to feeling good! 
Front-end operators as well regretted that their tasks required less thinking and felt 
increasingly mechanical. Louis said,  
[ST] had done [previously] a campaign, […] to enrich the operator job, 
so that [the job] was interesting. This has totally disappeared. […] 
Now, you just tell the person to load the machine, not to break the 
disks, to correctly position the basket and that’s it. 
When Alessandro started he could decide 
How [long to] leave a product in acid, [or] calculate how fast the acid 
works on the product. Instead, nowadays, you have specific [guidance] 
that you have to read […] and do it exactly as is written. […] What 
you basically do is, you serve the equipment like a walking smart 
monkey. 
Angelo echoed these words, saying he felt “like a monkey. It is more mechanical, 
[…] there is no space for the human.” Workers’ quotes suggest that, on both sides 
the collar line, workers continue to desire a job, which stimulates and confirms their 
inventiveness and which provides them with meaning. Christophe lamented that, “at 
the moment, a lot of workers come to work, but they don’t know why… well, just 
for the wage at the end of the month.” Marx argued that, under capitalism, workers 
become alienated from their labour, losing the sense of being able to express and see 
themselves in their work. Yet workers have always tried to make work a process 
where they can “invest their knowledge and skills to produce something meaningful” 
(Rathzel et al., 2014, p.258). One sees this desire in workers’ yearning for productive 
work. If authors have focussed on consumption as the locus of identity formation 
(Bauman, 1998), workers’ disheartenment when their work’s meaning is threatened, 
demonstrates that work remains part of people’s sene of self (McDowell, 2009; 








e. Financialisation as a scorched earth policy 
 
Above, I showed that workers held that the strategy implemented by ST’s senior 
management threatened their sites’ autonomy and ST’s industrial secrets and 
decreased their desire to “give” to the company. These critiques fed into workers 
creating a broader discourse which portrayed ST’s financialisation as not just 
harming their working conditions in the present, but also threatening ST’s future 
existence. They shifted the scale and temporal scope of the issue from their 
individual experiences to their company’s future. In narrating the past, workers 
contrasted the vision of ST as an industry versus ST as a financially driven company, 
and argued that the latter threatened the former. In a context where narratives are key 
to a company’s ability to maximise shareholder value, workers produced a 
competing story, which stressed the conflicting interests between workers and senior 
management and created space for an industrial altern tive to the fablight strategy 
embraced by ST’s management team. The creation of this discourse by workers, I 
argue, demonstrates an instance of agency. 
Interviewees argued that all the changes in ST’s policies and practices mentioned 
above represented a shift towards a short-term outlo k. Baptiste explained that 
starting in the 2000s, “[We felt that] the long-term strategy was weakened and [that] 
we were increasingly [operating] in the short term.” Otto echoed this critique: “We 
felt that […] we had to encourage activities with short-term profits rather than a long- 
term vision.” Workers held that declining investment signified management’s 
embrace of a fablight strategy (notes, January 2016; September 2017). Madeleine 
complained, “[ST] isn’t an industry [anymore]. We have fewer and fewer fabs, I’m 
sure if they could get rid of fabs they would do it!” The strategy, crucially, was 
followed by industrial consequences. Charles explained, 
ST, which previously had large investments, has slowed down. This 
means that in [terms of] its ‘cash’ levels, the company continues to sell 
[products] and [thus] to produce ‘cash.’ That’s [the result of] the 
depreciation of past investments, but, they aren’t using the profits from 
this depreciation to reinvest, or less so. As a result, ST is de-
industrialising in a way. This isn’t visible yet interms of jobs, but it 
might become a risk in the future […] but cash is there. So [ST] can 





Charles’ comment posits that the “current”87  decrease in investment is not 
threatening because, given the depreciation of invested fixed capital, fabs are 
profitable. Yet, since in the semiconductor industry, “you can’t have technological 
delays, otherwise [you’re] dead!” (CGT, 2017b), thequestion is whether fabs will 
continue to be profitable. By diverting its income towards ividends and not 
investing now, ST might foreclose its industrial future later, or so workers feared, 
and this anxiety fed into a powerful narrative of finance versus industry, along with 
the personal and everyday consequences I analysed above. 
When I visited engineers in Grenoble, they joked that ST was an “entreprise pré-
siderurgique” (notes March, 2017). This means a pre-ste l company and is a pun on 
“pré-historique” or pre-historical. Through this pun, they indicate their anxiety that 
ST will follow the fate of the steel industry, whic shut down most of their 
production sites in Europe. In Italy, Giuseppe remarked, “the investments now [in 
2018-19] are good, but what’s crazy is that they didn’t invest for 10 years before…” 
(notes, February 2019). This temporal threat interac s with spatial characteristics. 
Not all sites can secure the investments needed to remain profitable. The fear that 
sites did not have a future came up in Rousset, Tours, and Catania, where 200-mm 
fabs have not been upgraded to 300-mm fabs. For instance, in Tours, Etienne 
wondered, “whether or not [ST] France wants to let Tours die slowly. As long as we 
bring them money, they are happy and in ten years’ time, [Tours] will stop by itself.”  
In Catania, Peppe argued, “Bozotti didn't do any real important investment in the 
production capabilities, [and] now we have a very big problem in the capacity. […] 
We’re behind with [customers]. Even basic investments weren’t done. And now we 
are paying the price.” Laura questioned whether: 
The [Rousset] factory is condemned in the medium ter , because [ST] 
doesn’t want to invest and that there will come a moment when there 
won’t be any products to manufacture there. Because technology 
moves forward and forward and if we don’t have the machines or we 
don’t become bigger, or don’t change the factory to make it capable to 
produce new technologies, well … one day there will be no jobs left. 
Rene in Rousset similarly feared for their future:  
We [in Rousset] perform really well but there are no future products 
for the long run. […] Our long-term future? We see that through a 12-
inch fab. [ST] told us that that was insane, that ws a huge investment. 
[…] In the long run, we fear that Singapore will become really 
competitive.  
                                                          






Workers dreaded that the Singapore 8-inch fab would tcompete them and that 
Rousset would be squeezed between the rising costs of manufacturing equipment, 
the growing pressure to subcontract or offshore production, and lack of 
investments.88 Union leaders responded differently to this threat depending upon 
their union affiliation. Some emphasised the importance of fabs to ST’s ability to 
manufacture chips. CGT operators described the professional division regarding this 
issue: 
Jo: We have spoken of the industrial future, but for the operators and 
technicians. Because white-collars, they know they will always be 
there. […] 
Rene: The [white-collar] workers tell themselves, ‘We don’t care, we 
won’t lose our jobs even if the fab closes.’ 
In contrast, Claire, an engineer from the CFE-CGC rationalised the lack of a future 
for the fab in Rousset: 
We’re an 8-inch fab. […] It is still going to produce for ten years. Ok 
so for 12-inch, that’s six billion euros of investment, that’s good guys 
[sic] [describing the CGT], but the products you will make will never 
finance [the investment]. So one must also accept […] that in Rousset, 
one day, there will not be a fab. 
For Alessandro, this was one of the key differences among the CGIL’s, CGT’s and 
CFE-CGC’s visions. Whilst the former two unions believe that “ST without [blue-
collar workers] is nothing,” the CFE-CGC members accepted a potential fabless 
future. That union leaders hold conflicting opinions hammers home the importance 
of their ideologies, with clear links to the makeup of their members. Different unions 
imagine space for different workers. These divergences regarding workers’ sense of 
the future also show the precarious nature of the above mentioned common interest. 
Declining investment was threatening for back-end production and R&D sites as 
well, or so some union leaders claimed. In Malta, Christopher explained, “basically, 
if you don't have new production lines, new techniques, you will dry up and be 
overrun by competition.” In Morocco, Choukri said,  
We’re conscious that there is a problem of investmen  […] [We work] 
with some products from the 1960s-70s, but one day or another we 
will lose them. They will be replaced by new technology, and then we 
                                                          
88 Mr. Chery (2017), ST’s CEO, explained that the Rousset site is now “saturated at 100% in 
terms of its capacity [focussing] on micro-controllers.” What this means for its future is not 
clear: as the Rennes story showed, a depreciated fab is very profitable in the short-term, but 





don’t have a share of the market. […] We have to create new products 
to replace the old ones. 
Choukri thus recognised that a lack of investment rsulted in a lack of new products, 
and given that current products would soon become obsolete, the future was 
uncertain. When I saw them in 2017, after ST’s investment profile had changed, 
Malaysian union representatives believed that the company was good for another 30 
years and were reassured by current expansion plans(notes, July 2017). In France 
and Italy, CGT and CGIL union leaders criticised the successive closures of several 
R&D departments and the resulting decreased capacity to design chips. Even in 
Crolles2 – ST’s most advanced site – workers complained that “no advanced 
technology is produced, [because] most teams from advanced products were fired” 
(notes, September 2017). Alessandro believed that ST was losing its cutting edge 
and relied on old technology, explaining they had “ fantastic 2017” because they 
had found a new application for an old technology, but given the simplicity of this 
technology, they would “not have a fantastic 2018 because we’re still working on 
old-fashioned technologies.” Etienne expressed similar regrets: “[In Tours] we stay 
on old products.” He added, “Maybe this is going to change, but there was a long 
period where the only products we produced were copied from competitors […] 
when before, we were number one on quite a few products.” As such, workers 
suggested that ST’s financialisation led to a scorched earth policy: the enabling of 
fast returns and extraction of value now, they argued, harmed ST’s industrial and 
R&D capacities and by extension, its back-end activities, and threatened ST’s future 
existence. Workers stressed that this threat was both uneven and globally menacing, 
though not all were equally vocal in their assessment of this threat, since on a 
medium-term basis, it was the future viability of some sites and jobs which was at 
stake.  
The workers’ words demonstrate that they politicised their experiences. Not only did 
they correlate ST’s changing practices with the dominance of financial interests, but 
also they reframed the processes they went through, as symbolic of a systemic issue 
which harmed their company’s ability to remain competitive. In doing so, blue- and 
white-collar workers suggested they shared an interes  in fighting for an industrial 
vision, and identified points of antagonism between themselves and ST’s senior 
managers. Notably, for white-collar workers, this meant resisting the corporate 
messaging that encouraged them to identify with management’s vision. As Cushen 
(2013) notes, workers are baffled by changes that do not even seek to secure their 
company’s growth. Scott (1985), in his study of peasants’ resistance to the changes 





hegemony to voice their complaints. He argues, “The ideology formulated by the 
ruling class to justify its own rule provided much of the symbolic raw material from 
which the most demeaning critique could be devised and sustained” (p.339). Cousin 
and Mispelblom Beyer (2011) similarly argue that white-collar workers’ belief in 
work may lead them to contest corporate choices, on the basis that they do not follow 
strategic principles. The frustration workers expressed suggest this posture: workers 
condemned ST’s financialised strategy “in the name of the work they need to do and 
of what they believe it entails” (Cousin and Mispelblom Beyer, 2011, p.49). This 
frustration is interesting because it shows white-collar workers criticising ST’s 
strategy for its poor management. They also spoke of “we,” claiming their 
company’s trajectory as their own. In Chapter 6, I described how ST sought to 
encourage workers to embrace its goals. Here, the double-edged consequences of 
this request becomes apparent, as workers felt emboldened to have a say regarding 
ST’s strategy, and used corporate values to criticise Mr. Bozotti’s choices on their 
own terms.  
f. Scripting the past 
 
Lastly, throughout their criticisms, workers spoke about selected memories of their 
time in ST, which served as a foundation to criticise ST’s financialisation and 
personalised the changes they noticed as reflecting the change i ST’s senior 
management team. These strategies strengthened their critiques of financialisation 
and suggested that alternatives existed. Laura said,  
It’s interesting to correlate [Bozotti’s arrival] with [a graph examining 
investment]. It’s huge. From 2007-08 there is a drop in investment… 
And this [graph examining total workforce] as well […] Bozotti 
arrives and pooomm it goes down. […] In a company like ST, it isn’t 
because the CEO changes that the Gross Revenue will change. […] 
There is a lag of 3-4 years, which corresponds to the development of 
new products. So the impact is there. Bozotti arrives, we stop 
[investments], we live on [past] developments. 
Interviewees unabashedly contrasted Mr Pistorio with Mr Bozotti. In their accounts, 
Mr. Pistorio was a colourful character who cared for the work and workers, “He was 
a Sicilian with a moustache who smoked a cigar […] who had an exceptional aura 
in all the sites. […] He would go see the receptionist and ask, ‘How are you?’ He 
was someone who knew the machines.” (Damien) Massoud recalled, “Pistorio, we 
saw him every year, […] he spoke to people, met with them, listened to them. He 
asked to meet with operators, technicians, etc., to understand.” Aya remembered, 





talked to us, he knew us.” In their recollections, Pistorio not only listened to them, 
but also was driven by an exciting vision. “He was a visionary” (Balthazard), who 
“had an industrial vision, that is, to prepare for the future, new products, to invest in 
fabs and in people” (Louis). He had an “ambition to bring ST to a certain level […] 
[rather than] looking at how much gross income we are going to do next quarter” 
(Jean). By contrast, Massoud complained, “Bozotti, we’ve never seen him, just once 
when Bouskoura started.” Alexandre claimed, “Bozotti barely comes to Grenoble, 
and when he does, he only speaks with managers… His specialty is the conference 
call lathered with technical words.” Workers’ positive recollections of Mr. Pistorio 
stress their desire for an industrial vision and for a management style that values and 
recognises their contributions. 
These reflections matter for two reasons. First, in a more structural sense, they 
illustrate the importance of managers to the shape, strategy and vision of a company 
(Schoenberger, 2001) and confirm Froud et al.’s (2000) and Cushen’s (2013) 
argument that senior executives have some autonomy regarding a company’s 
adaptation to financialisation’s pressures. Why Mr. Bozotti’s team chose to privilege 
shareholders’ interest is unclear, since I showed that, according to workers, strategies 
to maximise shareholder value endangered the long-term interests of the principal 
shareholders. This points to the contradictory interests that arise from the French and 
Italian states’ different roles. These states are shareholders, wanting to maximise 
profits. As Laura noted, they “share a third of thedividends…So for them maybe 
they think, ‘Oh let’s get returns this year and we ill see next year’.” However, they 
are also nation-states, with enduring (albeit irregularly enacted) strategic interests in 
safeguarding their semiconductor champion, as demonstrated by the regular 
subsidies provided to ST. In this contradiction, I show in Chapter 8, lay a source of 
coalitional power for unions.  
Second, on a strategic level, interviewees focussed on management’s self-interested 
stance rather than on broader pressures. Scholars suggest that managers choose to 
perform practices which please investors and raise stock prices because, increasingly, 
their income takes the form of stock options and, therefore, is tied to firms’ financial 
value (Boyer, 2005; Chambost, 2013; Fligstein and Shin, 2007; Thompson, 2013). 
ST introduced a stock option program in the 2000s (Balas, 2009, p.209), which led 
workers to suspect such a collusion of interest. Madeleine observed, “Today we have 
a CEO who cares more about the shares than the company, because he is a 
shareholder. […] If they sabotage the company, theydon’t care, they still have cash 





dividends, what they will make, Bozotti’s golden parachute. The guys [sic] kill the 
company and they don’t care.”  
Workers narrated that the shift from an industrial strategy to a financialised one was 
correlated to specific people, a rhetorical decision which was strategic, whether or 
not workers realised it. A discourse that stresses th  compulsion of competition and 
pressures from intangible financial markets does not all w for reachable alternatives. 
Instead, workers suggested that ST’s financialisation resulted from the choices of 
specific and self-interested managers, and thus could be changed. Scott (1985, p.178) 
emphasises the power of memory, showing that people may create a remembered 
past, that “can serve as an effective ideological backdrop against which to deplore 
the present.” One sees a similar discourse happening i  workers' recollections: they 
script a past which they use to criticise the present and suggest how they wish ST 
would be managed as n industry driven by a vision. Workers distinguished between 
Mr. Pistorio as an industry captain with an eye on the future and Mr. Bozotti as 
someone who holds to a business accountant’s view focussed on short-term financial 
targets. Rene complained, “[with Bozotti], we don’t really have a true industry 
captain who shows us a direction.” Thomas argued, “t n years ago, we were still in 
the race and [then] there was a will to financialise the company, that is, to go from 
an industrial model with R&D to a model where we generate cash every three 
months.” When I asked him to define this industrial model, he explained, “It’s to not 
hesitate to put [in] money, […] to take risks on some technologies, […] to want to 
develop the company for itself and not for [shareholders] [and] to have a strategic 
vision and not just the vision to make + 1% each quarter.” Workers collectively 
remember Mr Pistorio’s industrial ambition, as noted by Rathzel et al. (2014, p.147), 
“as a way of remembering what is possible to achieve.” Doing so, workers challenge 
the financialised outlook’s domination of thinking about what is possible and show 
that alternatives exist. 
Workers’ recollections convey nostalgia for the past  they saw that Pistorio’s 
management paid off: ST invested in new fabs; the workforce increased from 25,983 
workers in 1996 (ST Annual Report, 1996, p.37) to 52,180 workers in 2007 (ST 
Annual Report, 2007, p.14); and ST’s revenue grew from $4.12 billion in 1996 to 
over $10 billion in 2007 (ST Annual Report 2007). Alessandro explained, “[Pistorio] 
said. ‘I’m going to work you harder and longer and i  a more stressful way but I 
promise you that […] in five years we will [increase employment].’ The union 
trusted him and we got this.” By contrast, under Mr. Bozotti’s management, sales, 





Mr Pistorio whose direction entailed layoffs, restruc urings and closures (ST Annual 
Report, 2003). Rathzel et al. (2014, p.36) emphasise that “work is multi-layered and 
almost always includes elements of self-development, l arning collectively as well 
as exploitation and domination.” One sees this complexity in workers’ recollections: 
they decry the demise of previous practices, recognising that while they were 
exploitative, they enabled increased employment and provided stimulating jobs.  
Throughout this section, drawing on ST senior executives’ presentations, ST’s 
annual accounts and workers’ experiences, I demonstrated that the story of ST 
reveals a growing emphasis on value extraction above all else, which takes place 
through limiting investments, increasing constraints around spending, and increasing 
dividends. The company has also undergone numerous restructuring exercises and 
its decisions were increasingly driven by the desire to achieve attractive financial 
ratios. Scholars note that financialisation decreases workers’ share of overall profits 
and undermines workers’ power (Crotty, 2008; Guschanski & Onaran, 2018; 
Krippner, 2005). However, they do not describe how this works and the 
consequences to workers’ sense of self (Cushen and Thompson, 2016). Drawing on 
workers’ experiences, I showed that the pressure to s cure shareholder value in ST 
destabilised white- and blue-collar workers’ fulfilment through work and increased 
their alienation from work, as they faced heightened p rformance pressure, lack of 
consideration by ST, decreased autonomy, and increased stress and precariousness. 
In his classic study, Scott (1985) notes that the introduction of new relations of 
production broke down the interpersonal dependencies that had characterised the 
earlier class system: as agricultural workers becam less needed following the 
introduction of large-scale harvesting machinery, wealthier families no longer felt 
obligated to take part in the previously required social rituals that ensured workers’ 
loyalty when labour was tight. One sees a similar phenomenon at play. As ST 
focussed on pleasing shareholders, the previous workplace reciprocities which ST 
would grant workers to ensure that they would “give,” such as recognition, security, 
or exciting projects, were no longer needed. Authors suggest that financialisation 
undermines the conditions necessary for workplace compromises (e.g.:  training for 
workers or a share of the profits resulting from rising productivity), since it diverts 
profits towards shareholders (Clark & Macey, 2015; Cushen & Thompson, 2016; P. 
Thompson, 2013). ST workers suggested that a financal logic undermines 
companies’ very interest in engaging in such compromises and that this led to 
workers’ feeling devalued and alienated from their wo k. This feeling is important 





workers, and specifically, white-collar workers that, t the end of the day, they 
remain employed by a corporation, and thus vulnerabl  to its whims.  
Indeed, I also showed that ST workers politicised their experiences. Scott (1985, 
p.317) argues that “a hegemonic ideology must, by definition, represent an 
idealization, which therefore inevitably creates the contradictions that permit it to be 
criticized in its own terms.” Whilst literature emphasises the narrative elements in 
the performance of financialisation, there is little analysis of how workers esist this 
ideology. Though Cushen (2013) or Chambost (2013) show resentful workers, these 
studies portray them as powerless in the face of a financialised ideology. Here, I 
show that workers clearly articulated the contradictions produced by a financialised 
outlook and the likely long-term consequences for ST. They used these 
contradictions along with corporate values, such as growth or development, to create 
a politicising discourse contrasting an industrial strategy with a financialised one, 
with consequences for individuals’ work and the company’s future. Interviewees 
argued that their individual and collective interests were under threat; outlined the 
issue, namely that the short-term financialised strategy threatened front-end and 
back-end activities; and defined its cause, a self-seeking management team. Workers 
refused to accept the company’s future as seen by management, and acknowledged 
their vulnerability and their interest in changing the situation. Further, they debunked 
the narrative which maintained that management heldST’s best interest at heart, 
asserting in contrast, that it aimed to squeeze value out of all workers. Their 
discourse defined an “us” – workers who care about their work and the company 
across professions and sites – versus a “them” – managers who care about their 
income above all. Lastly, workers evoked a feeling of righteousness, narrating ST’s 
raison d’être to be an industry, which produces chips not just cash. Throughout this 
reframing work, workers drafted the normative vision by which workers could 
recognise a common interest deriving from their positive identity as producers and 
their shared antagonism towards management. Whilst workers’ frustration cut across 
blue- and white-collar categories, it was spatially uneven: Moroccan unionists 
recognised the dangers caused by ST’s financialisation, but Malaysian and Maltese 
ones mainly spoke about growing pressure to be productive and did not link this to 
a financialised strategy. I show next that this discourse fuelled a campaign against 
ST’s financialisation where unions were able to bypass some of their divisions and 







In analysing the workplace impacts of financialisation, I intended to connect the 
broad phenomenon of financialisation with its concrete corporate consequences (see 
Aalbers, 2015) and provide a sense of h w financialisation is diffused in companies 
(see Cushen and Thompson, 2016). I showed how financialisation seeped into many 
aspects of ST’s day-to-day business practices, instilli g a sense of there-is-no-
alternative and continuing apace, despite undermining the (complex) interests of 
shareholders. Whilst Christophers (2015) argues that scholars need to use the 
concept of financialisation carefully because of its numerous meanings and limits, I 
suggest that this concept is precisely the term needed to describe ST’s transformation 
towards heightened value extraction and the rising ense of precariousness, stress 
and alienation, which workers described. This term matters, I argue, because it 
connects broader economic processes with specific workplace changes, which whilst 
they resemble previous trends towards heightened productivity pressures are geared 
towards specific goals, namely achieving attractive financial ratios, rather than 
earlier “productive” goals, and impact both blue- and white-collar workers. 
Furthermore, the term matters because it provided a powerful concept for workers to 
delegitimise and contest the changes they witnessed, and resist the financialised 
perspective, which sees enterprises as “bundles of a sets to be reconfigured with the 
goal of maximizing financial returns – whether or nt they create jobs, sustainable 
organizations, innovation or long-term growth” (Batt, 2012, p.69). Workers built a 
powerful critique of financialisation, arguing that the focus on generating 
shareholder value had two distinct but interrelated impacts. First, it impaired the 
means of production, threatened ST’s industrial secrets and its ability to respond to 
clients and, according to workers, made no strategic sense. Second, it compromised 
workers’ creativity and the meaning of their work, whilst increasing their sense of 
precariousness and stress. Workers drew on corporate goals – competitiveness, 
creativity, adequate means of production – to dismis  the fabless scenario envisioned 
as ultimately leading to ST’s demise and they strategically narrated the past to put 
forward an industrial vision for ST’s future. This shows how workers’ positionalities, 
identities, here their producer pride, and their temporal contexts, here their memories 
but also their fears for the future, can act as tools to create a political narrative, which 
can then act as the basis of unions’ building intra-union power, that is common 





ST workers described a sense of vulnerability shared by blue and white-collar 
workers, though this was mediated by their unions’ stance, as well as rising 
alienation from their work. This experience and this narrative are important because 
they both suggest common experiences across sites and workforces and a common 
interest, i.e. to stop ST’s financialised strategy. In suggesting common feelings 
across interviewees, I am not endorsing another meta-narrative according to which 
financialisation will herald the recognition of a universal experience of alienation 
from work and from there worldwide resistance. However, the story of ST workers 
suggests that, whilst the “self-actualising fiction” of financialised strategies may 
convince investors, it also holds dialectical consequences. Whilst it works to 
disempower workers – both in their working conditions given rising precarity and 
alienation and through believing value production stems from streams of rent and 
ownership of IP rights rather than through ongoing work – it may also sow the seeds 
of a backlash from workers. If fiction is the reality of finance, then interviewed 
workers offer another fiction reframing the processes they saw through a political 
narrative, defining an “us” and “them” and the conflict between the two, and desiring 
another way to organise their company. The politica n rrative created in this 
instance gave grounds for workers to recognise commn interests. Whilst they have 
less power than management to diffuse their story, I show next how Italian unions 
fought against the spinoff of the memory division, a d in Chapter 8 how the critique 
of financialisation on business terms became crucial to unions’ 2015-16 campaign, 















Interlude 3:  
Fighting for the memory 
division 
 
In 2007, ST initiated conversations with Intel regarding the creation of a joint venture 
encompassing ST’s Italian flash memory division andIntel’s memory department. 
ST would contribute 4,100 employees and $2.4 billion to the joint venture (ST CSR 
Report, 2007, p.24). The business was made official in March 2008 under the name 
Numonyx, and, according to ST’s then chief finance director, it represented a 
“further step in executing [ST’s] strategy towards a focused and less capital-intensive 
business model” (ST, 2010), i.e. the fabless strategy d scribed above. Numonyx was 
sold to Micron in 2010. Crucially, workers suspected that Micron bought Numonyx 
for no other reason than to “[acquire] the intellectual patents,” which Numonyx had 
developed, and that it “wasn’t interested in people” (Maria). Rosa agreed. “Once 
[Micron] obtained the licences, the pattern, the knowledge, they weren’t interested 
in staff,” she said. Soon after, in 2013, Micron anounced that it would fire over 400 
workers in Milan and Catania (Giornale di Sicilia, 2014), confirming workers’ 
suspicions. For Maria, this was when ST’s “financialised history” began, since 
before, “it was an industrial story.”   
The ST Italian unions waged a successful two-year long campaign for ST to reinstate 
the workers, purposefully ignoring that Micron was in fact the workers’ employer. 
Rather, ST’s and Micron’s unions dismissed the ST-Micron distinction as not based 
on their experience: workers who had shared the same offices, still felt part of the 
same workforce community and acted as one. Alessandro said,  
[Through the union], we tried to keep some personal relationship 
between the memory department and other [divisions in ST], to try to 
act as a single company even if we were two separate companies. […] 
[We held that] Numonyx was nothing more than ST’s memory 
[division]. We were one trade union group split in wo. We kept acting 






Picture: “Micron No to the plans to flee, Yes to the industrial plans. 
No to the desertification of Agrate’s industries” from (Olivetti, 2014) 
Peppe believed that three key things ensured the unions’ victory:   
[First] we were able to understand how a big international company 
[…] worked. [By doing so], we were able to [deconstruc ] what they 
said [when meeting with ministers]. […] The second [thing] was the 
human approach. […] [Micron workers] were former colleagues from 
ST. They were in a different company, but most of us had close 
relationships with [them]. […] This helped us to build a human 
relationship. 
This second factor led ST workers to stand in solidarity with Micron workers, when 
Micron workers organised strikes. Peppe remembered when Micron “colleagues” 
picketed the entrance to the ST site in Catania. Previously some ST workers had 
ignored Micron workers’ issues “because they thought it was Micron's own problem,” 
but that day, they could not cross the picket line: 
They met their former colleagues. They had worked with them, some of 
them were people they would meet in the evenings [socially]. […] [The 
encounter] was very strong for them, they were not able to go inside the 
company, to go to work. [...] In their minds and hearts, [they had] to 
[follow] the strike because they [couldn’t summon the] courage to look 
in the eyes of their former colleagues, considering that [these workers] 
were also [often] the wives and husbands of their colleagues. (Peppe) 
Workers were able to recognise each other as part of the same community and as 
having responsibilities towards one another that superseded work imperatives. In 
Milan, workers organised strikes, as well as a flash mob, wearing hi-vis vests in the 
canteen to demonstrate the high number of workers under threat (Guila). The third 
factor, according to Peppe, was the unions’ use of media. When workers organised 





ST” (Peppe). Alessandro said, “We [the unions] annou ced to mass media before 
[Micron’s announcement] that this [layoff] was going to happen and then it actually 
happened. […] So everybody realised [that ST’s spinning off of Numonyx] was a 
fake plan.” The unions thus kept ST accountable for the Micron workers’ fate, 
claiming that ST had created Numonyx to disguise potential layoff decisions. 
Additionally, the unions decried that Micron had “pillaged” the country’s resources, 
i.e., its IPs, and reported positive returns (Giornale di Sicilia, 2014) and emphasised 
Micron and ST’s territorial and national significance (Salerno, 2014). This way of 
framing the issue was “a very big problem for ST” (Peppe). Following the 
coordinated strikes in Catania and Milan, along with the strong media coverage they 
received, unions were able to meet ST management repres ntatives and Italian 
government representatives in Rome. There, Valentino remembered, public 
representatives challenged ST’s decision, asking “‘What are you doing with this 
public money? […] We will not allow you to do this.’” These pressures led ST to 
agree to a plan to reinstate some of Micron’s Italian workers, and Micron to offer the 
others advantageous severance packages, retraining pla s, and positions in offices 
elsewhere (Fisascat, 2014).  
The trajectory of Numonyx epitomises the financial outlook I analysed above: 
workers are seen as superfluous to value, which is instead understood as the 
possession of IPs, whilst the desire to reduce costs means that the future value 
workers could produce is dismissed in favour of “cutting costs” now. This story saw 
engineers come to understand the threat of a financialised outlook and the need to 
fight for their jobs and saw unions rally around a iscourse of ST’s significance and 
draw on public representatives’ power to save workers from layoffs. It served as a 
warning to what could happen to joint venture employees, a warning which French 
unions took seriously when ST and Ericsson merged th ir digital processes (notes, 
June 2018). However, the fight stayed within Italy’s borders and did not challenge 










Chapter 8:  
“All together for a change of 
strategy”  
  
In 2015, French and Italian unions, later joined by Malaysian and Moroccan unions, 
launched a campaign to confront ST’s decision to lay off 1,600 digital workers. 
Unions made this decision the symbol of the broader financialised vision driving 
ST’s management. As a result of the campaign, threaten d French workers secured 
a generous redundancy plan – workers elsewhere were not as fortunate – and ST’s 
management announced a 40% reduction in dividends along with greater 
investments in ST’s production facilities (ST, 2016), the two latter decisions 
answering, in part, the criticism unions levelled against ST’s financialisation.89 I 
show that unions used the discourse of “finance versus industry” to drive their 
campaign, contrasting the high dividends paid by ST with its lack of capital 
investments despite its receiving large amounts of public funding. Unions put 
forward a vision of ST as a strategic industry and argued that, given the French and 
Italian states’ longstanding power over ST, they should act to protect ST’s industrial 
character from its managers’ financialised ambitions. Unions reinvigorated existing 
political networks with stakes in ST’s survival, activating sources of institutional 
power whilst linking up unions internationally through ReAct to create coalitional 
power. This discussion demonstrates the ways in which, even when faced with 
financialised pressures, workers can fight back and wi , finding common interests 
across professions and sites. I conclude by analysig how workers’ efforts to save 
the company from the contradictions of financialisation speak to Herod’s (2003, 
1997) notion of the “labour fix,” in order to further understand the goals of workers’ 
agency and the consequences of this agency.  
                                                          
89 Although I focus on this campaign, ST’s financialis t on and workers’ fight against it 
predate 2015, which meant that workers had experienced the quotidian and long-term 
consequences of financialisation. As early as the 1980s, French union documents warned of 
the risk of financial interests overshadowing ST (Balas, 2009). In the Interludes, I recount 
workers’ fight against offshoring the production in Rennes and against the layoff of 
Numonyx workers, both of which events were linked to financial pressures. Indeed, McCann 
(2013, p.239) states, “the championing of ‘shareholder value’ as the sole indicator of success 
and sole justification for organizational change appears to be a major driver of offshoring,” 
whilst Baud and Durand (2010) likewise argue that offshoring is a way to  answer the pressure 





1. Fighting to be an industrial company 
 
In May 2015, Mr. Bozotti told investors, “Business a  usual is no longer an option 
[…] the losses [from the digital division] are unacceptable. This issue must be 
addressed and we are considering all the options” (CFE-CGC, 2015a). This 
announcement followed several tumultuous years of restructuring within the digital 
division and the closure of ST-Ericsson.90 French unions understood the implicit 
threat in Mr. Bozotti’s announcement. From then on, they mobilised against the 
closure of the digital division. The Italian unions and EWC gradually joined these 
efforts. In Chapter 7, I showed the diversity of workers’ experience and the 
competition between unions, within and across sites. Here, I show that unionists 
developed a discourse which bridged workers’ division  and brought different 
unions to rally behind the critique of the financialis tion of ST, and the demands for 
an industrial strategy. Unions persuasively argued that they were fighting for the 
good of ST in a way that answered workers’ desire to do meaningful work and that 
plausible alternatives to financialisation existed.  
a. Finance versus industry 
 
Instead of the digital division’s difficulties having come about because of workers’ 
shortcomings as contended by ST, French unions portrayed the digital division’s 
predicament as an outcome of the grip of financial pressures on ST. On their blog, 
the CGT (2016a)  argued, “With others, we demonstrated that the current crisis in 
ST largely goes beyond the issue of the digital division.” French unions’ declarations 
made the closure of the digital division the symbol of ST’s financialisation, a strategy 
which, they held, threatened ST’s future tout court. The unions thus broadened the 
scope of the issue to encompass ST’s excessive dividends and lack of strategy. This 
reflected workers’ critiques but also was a large enough threat that unions decided 
to bypass their divisions. In response to hearing ST’s announcement, the CGT, 
CFDT, CFE-CGC and l’UNSA circulated a petition among workers based on 
                                                          
90 ST-Ericsson was a fabless joint venture set up in 2009 that focussed on mobile phone chip 
design with over 8,000 workers worldwide. By 2012 there were 6,200, of which 1,700 were 
in France (CGT ST-Ericsson, 2012). Between 2012 and 2013, ST fired 1,700 workers and, 
in 2013, when ST-Ericsson was dismantled, the remaining workforce joined either ST or 
Ericsson (CGT ST-Ericsson, 2013). Unions had learned from the Italian workers’ experience 
with the Numonyx joint venture and pushed ST to keep 51% of the shares of the joint venture, 
as ST’s majority control would mean that unions could then leverage the French state’s power 





common demands (CGT, 2015c). The petition targeted th  French government with 
the following requests:  
The abandonment of the short-term financial strategy; the return to a 
development strategy in all the company’s divisions and the 
investments necessary to guarantee the future of all the sites, the 
technological independence [of the company] and sustained 
employment; and the departure […] of the CEO and the nomination 
of a new executive team. (in CFDT, 2015d) 
French unions subsequently presented these demands to the EWC, whose members 
ratified a letter which launched a ferocious critique of Mr. Bozotti’s management, 
Workers are under austerity policies, when Mr. Bozotti benefited from 
a pay rise of 258% in ten years. […] From 1998 to 2004, ST made 
$3.95 billion and distributed $312 million in dividends; from 2005 to 
2014, ST lost $3.6 billion and distributed $2.6 billion in dividends. 
Workers denounce this illegible and short-term ‘strategy,’ which 
brings ST from commercial failures to useless reorganisations. (in 
CGT, 2015d) 
The EWC letter used language which echoed the French petition and went on to ask 
management to “abandon the short-term financial strtegy; prioritise industrial and 
innovation investments; [and distribute] dividends [based on] the profits of the 
company rather than a guarantee [to shareholders]” (in CGT, 2015d). 
Whilst this started as a French issue which the EWC supported, throughout the 
autumn Italian unions mobilised workers, fearing that t e Italian state might sell its 
shares and relinquish oversight over ST (CGT, 2015e) and that ST’s financialised 
strategy would undermine their own production capacity (CGT, 2015j). Samuel, a 
French leader, explained,  
Italians at first didn’t feel concerned [by the redun ancies], it was the 
same in France a few years ago [during the Numonyx struggle]. But 
they saw the impacts, [ST] is delaying the investments in Sicily, 
they’re not buying back a factory, they’ve implemented rotating 
forced holidays at the end of the year. So they see the convergence [of 
interests] here.  
By December, the FIOM, FIM and UILM recognised the reat and proclaimed:  
[ST should] overcome the conservative and mainly financial vision, 
which guides the company […]. Instead of redefining an industrial 
model, the proposed solution is that of yet another declin  in 
production, and the spectre of restructuring, imposed by a pathological 
attention to ‘cost-reductions,’ which, in addition to weighing ever 
more heavily over workers’ wages, entails a constant decline in [ST’s] 
activities. (CGT, 2015k emphasis added) 
Their demands resembled the ones put forward by French unions, with an added 





Italian unions thus overcame their national division  to rally behind the critique of 
ST’s financialisation, both fearing ST’s de-industrialisation and recognising a 
mutual interest in protecting ST’s future as an industry. The unions powerfully 
argued that ST was under the grip of financialisation, and that it would only have a 
future if it retained an industrial capacity, framing the discursive landscape where 
the alternative – ST decreasing its industrial capaity – was associated with a 
tarnished short-term outlook. Daniele explained, “We said that if ST becomes fabless, 
ST will be uncompetitive and Europe will become uncompetitive.” Power is the 
ability to define the field of struggle: by solidifying the correlation between ST 
staying an industry and ST having a future, the unions’ discourse shaped the 
parameters of the discussion and made industrial capacity the defining criterion for 
determining what ST’s future would be.  
Upholding demand for an i dustrial strategy, I claim, helped unions to address both 
the divisions among unions and the divisions among workers across professional 
categories, by stressing their shared need to protect ST. Addressing the issue of the 
international competition between sites, the unions demanded a change of strategy 
but did not specify where investments should happen, only that ST should “guarantee 
the future of all the sites [and] the technological ndependence [of the company]” (in 
CFDT, 2015d). By not locating their demands in specific places, the French and 
Italian unions were able to bypass the competition for investments between fabs. 
Their broad demands also spoke to the interests of he Moroccan union, which 
recognised that their site’s future depended on the upgrading of ST’s industrial 
capacity (see Chapter 6). Besides supporting common interests across unions, the 
critique of financialisation also helped unions to bridge the divide between blue- and 
white-collar workforces. Demanding that ST remain an industry answered operators’ 
need for upgraded fabs that would secure their jobs and engineers’ assessment of 
fabs as crucial to ST’s technological competitiveness. In addition to speaking to each 
constituency’s interests, the unions also articulated their demands in diverse ways – 
rallies, petition, declarations, and official meetings (see below). Given operators’ and 
engineers’ differing organising cultures, this range of tactics also provided a way for 
unions to involve both types of workers. The unions’ emphasis on the digital 
division’s difficulties as a symbol of a wider issue and the dichotomy they created 
between a short-term financial strategy and a long-term industrial one, helped to 
consolidate mutual interests across borders and professi nal occupations and framed 






b. Caring for the business 
 
Not only did the unions emphasise they shared common interests, their messaging, 
as I now show, also built an expanded understanding of who belonged to their “work 
community” and what the purpose of their work was. This messaging fostered a 
common identity, which allowed unions to increase their intra-union associational 
power by explaining why workers should care about other workers and how strongly 
the unions cared about ST’s core work of producing hips.  
Communications put out by the unions during the campaign recognised the 
interdependence between the sites and stressed that all workers were crucial to the 
company’s overall health. For instance, when ST confirmed its decision to close the 
digital division in January 2016, dismissing 1,600 workers throughout the world, of 
which 430 were French (Dumoulin, 2016), the CGT denounced the redundancy plan 
in France and elsewhere, for resulting in a global loss of knowhow: 
The large-scale layoffs, […] in addition to being a social scandal, 
represent a real loss of skills. […] Unions have underscored the huge 
damage to the company caused by the dismantling of teams and the 
suffering imposed on workers in France, India, the United States, 
Singapore… […] The CGT expresses outrage that such a sabotage of 
workers’ labour was allowed. [This is a] scorched earth policy from 
top management. (CGT, 2016c) 
The CGT (2017c) later lamented on its blog, “In Europe, Asia, the U.S and the 
Maghreb … the stepping back [i.e., closure of the digital division] of ST translated 
into thousands of layoffs and in a considerable loss f substance [i.e., skills].” 
Raphael stressed to me that European engineers across ST had created a successful 
collaboration with non-European engineers, deploring the “waste” the closure of the 
Asian divisions represented: “It took 15 years to build a globalisation which worked 
and five minutes to destroy it. We had accepted [the division of labour between sites] 
and developed competences to work with Asian workers.” In addition to contrasting 
the previous long-term vision with the short-term choi es favoured by Mr Bozotti, 
these quotes put forward a semi-managerial perspective: they criticise the decision 
to fire workers in Asia on the basis that it harms ST’s resources. This posture was 
also apparent in other interviewees’ understanding of the plans. Maurice stressed that 
all workers, regardless of their location, contribute to ST’ overall competitiveness: 
The sites which are confronting difficulties, now [that’s] a real issue for us 
[in France], even regarding foreign sites. The weakening of a number of sites 
or even their disappearance doesn’t strengthen activities elsewhere. Those 





Edern added that, for clients, the company was one unit, and thus, that each site 
depended on work done across the production chain: 
There are products from Tours and Catania […] for the same final 
client, so their success [in Catania] is our success. […] If we send 
pieces that aren’t good, or they do… it’s all our ST image. I don’t think 
the client sees a difference between Tours and Catania. They see ST 
products. 
Harvey (2019) suggests that the high profits of semiconductor and software 
companies, in part, result from the transfer of value from low-wage assembly 
workers in the Global South to high-wage workers in the Global North. There is little 
way to prove this assertion, which rests on the fundamental Marxist assumption that 
all workers create value, which is then unequally captured. However, I have shown 
that ST’s competitiveness, especially regarding front-end activities, depends on the 
challenge of achieving economies of scale and that off-shoring R&D activities has 
been an answer to remain competitive. Thus, French a d Italian sites depend on some 
activities being off-shored, which workers recognised above when they spoke of the 
disappearance of sites weakening ST. Further, as Edern suggested, ST’s products 
transit through different sites, and thus, products’ overall costs and quality reflect 
each site’s productivity and developed knowhow. Workers and union 
communications drew on an alternative management sta ce, conveying that they 
cared for ST’s business and this meant caring for all sites, since sites were 
interdependent. Herod (2003b, p.509) argues that “whatever else it may be, 
international solidarity is a process of opening up the landscape and making the 
spatial connections between workers in different par s of the world visible.” The 
quotes presented suggest that union leaders made these connections. They 
recognised the interdependence of sites, and from there, tried to encourage a 
pragmatic internationalism, founded on a common need for a global change of 
strategy. 
The adoption of this alternative managerial stance by unions had another impact: it 
gave legitimacy to their argument that alternative strategies existed. In their 
declarations, the unions drew on workers’ knowledge of the business to highlight 
market opportunities to stop ST’s spiralling decline. For instance, the CFDT (2015e) 
claimed that “new markets are already characterised by 3D printing, robotics […] 
the Internet of Things [etc.]. […] ST needs to suggest innovative solutions to these 
new domains to remain a leader of high tech” and asked that ST implement “a change 





the stated aim of regaining workers' trust, the CFDT (2015g) called on ST to give 
more credence to workers' judgement, whilst the CFE- GC Crolles (2015) declared,  
ST has everything to bounce back: the resources, th human knowhow 
and the product portfolio. All this could enable STto better position 
itself in attractive markets, such as the Internet of Things or the smart 
car. We need to […]  have a long-term vision, which would break the 
silos, created by the current [digital/automotive organistion], 
encourage cooperation between divisions, and orient transversal 
[collaboration] according to potential markets.  
One sees the CFE-CGC and CFDT adopting a corporate vocabulary of “breaking 
silos” or “piloting innovation.” Similarly, the CGT issued business advice to ST 
(CGT, 2015i) speaking of the importance of various key technologies controlled by 
ST, and in a January 2016 letter to the Ministry of the Economy, argued, “Our 
colleagues – marketing and design engineers – believe it would be a significant 
mistake to abandon [the digital] market” (CGT, 2016a). Throughout these 
communications, the unions conveyed that they were pragmatic associates whose 
goal was to protect ST’s business, asserting that they, and their members, understood 
the market constraints and opportunities for ST’s products. To contest the company's 
scenario that portrayed closure as the only solution, hey appropriated a corporate 
vocabulary, and assumed a reasonable white-collar expertise, contending that the 
problem was the management’s failure to seize market opportunities – a fixable 
shortcoming, rather than the company’s lack of competence. Daniele believed that 
the unions’ understanding of the business aspect of ST’s strategy was crucial: 
If we didn’t have a strategic vision of the semiconductor industry, we 
would have never succeeded to defend the production in Catania, 
Milan or even in France. […] If you don’t understand the strategy, you 
don’t have a vision for the future. […] You leave free rein to the 
markets and [this] can be catastrophic for workers. 
These discourses feature the unions reworking ST’s interpellation techniques, to 
present their solutions as equally valid as ST’s. This meant that, when interacting 
with MPs, they were able to suggest that credible alternatives to the current strategy 
existed and to undermine the hegemony of a financialised direction. 
As well as giving legitimacy to their demands, unions’ emphasis that their demands 
would protect the company from its short-sighted management allowed them to 
appeal to workers’ producer pride. Bachet and Compin (2013, p.8) describe Molex 
workers’ fight against the closure of their factory b  the company’s shareholders. 
“For workers,” they write, “the company was a means of working and creating 
wealth (meant as the production of goods and services). For management, the 





similarly suggested that the unions were fighting for ST to remain a chip producer, 
rather than a vehicle to line the pockets of shareholders. In Chapter 7, I showed that 
dissatisfaction with the lack of recognition ran through workers’ critiques of 
financialisation: workers had valuable insights about how to secure ST’s future and 
were frustrated by not being able to share them. Trade union work, based on 
respecting workers’ dignity, needs and knowledge, is premised on the belief that 
workers know how to improve their work, and, more boadly, how to run a company. 
Baptiste for instance claimed that 
to look at questions regarding industrial, investment-r lated or 
technological issues and to intervene on this matter, rather than just 
working conditions etc. […]  [is important]. I feel that one of the roles 
of a union is of course to defend workers on all aspects, but at the same 
time to train people who can become able to manage companies. 
In this instance, the unions’ messaging, in putting forward workers’ expertise and 
acting as a channel for workers to suggest solutions t  redevelop ST, answered to 
workers’ need for recognition and desire to have input into strategic decision-making. 
It presented workers as competent and reasonable producers fighting for a future, 
rather than victims.  
In addition to focussing on ST as an industrial company and putting forward workers’ 
concerns and expertise, the unions’ messaging presented a clear culprit. Unions 
opposed their fight for the future of ST against a enior management team portrayed 
as self-interested. For instance, the CFE-CGC (2015b) alleged that the decision to 
close the digital division was driven by the desire of “certain top executives to cash 
in their bonus.”91  These pronouncements, by personalising the force of 
financialisation, represented it as resulting from choices which are vulnerable to 
change, rather than an ungraspable natural phenomenon. Whilst this targeting added 
a moral element to unions’ fight, there is a nuance to add regarding this tactic’s 
effectiveness. To maintain unity across France and Italy, unionists had to focus on 
criticising ST’s strategy, rather than just Mr. Bozotti. When the CFDT prompted a 
“Bozotti Fuori” or “Bozotti Out” campaign, Italian unionists read this as an attack 
on an Italian managing ST (notes, November 2015). Baptiste remembered that 
French unionists had to explain that their criticism did not target ST’s CEO for being 
Italian but for not providing a strategic direction:  
We always fought against the [France-versus-Italy] vision, saying that 
it isn’t our problem. And we explained to our Italian comrades that the 
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problem isn’t that [Mr. Bozotti] is Italian, he could be Singaporean, 
Australian, whatever, it wouldn’t change the problem. The problem is 
the direction he gave. 
Raphael concurred, noting, “The French government wants a French [CEO to take 
over], which is a totally stupid conversation. We need to get out of these discussions 
and confront the issue of global demands” (notes, January 2018). 92 The French union 
leaders were thus conscious of the potential conflict over this issue and drew on their 
alternative management stance to suggest that the question was not the nationality of 
the CEO but the strategy he pushed for. The Italian unions’ reaction shows that, when 
creating mutual interests, experiences – here past debates around the nationality of 
the CEO (see in Balas, 2009) – matter. Unionists had to ensure that their analysis of 
financialisation was effective by targeting the practices of specific managers, and 
sufficiently general to not prompt nationalist reflexes. 
Here, I showed that the ST unions created a broad narrative which spoke to workers’ 
experiences of financialisation and desire for an industrial vision. This narrative, I 
argue, increased their intra- and inter-union power, favouring the rise of greater 
solidarity amongst different unions and workers, who recognised that they faced a 
common threat and held a shared desire to secure their jobs. Further, the unions’ 
communications, drawing on an alternative management stance, encompassed a 
broad vision of sites’ and workers’ interdependence and thus, common needs. 
Furthermore, they argued that they cared about ST’sbusiness goals, in contrast to a 
self-seeking senior management team, and emphasised the harm done by clinging to 
short-sighted financial targets. Their messaging drew on workers’ expertise, 
tactically providing a way to channel workers’ desir  for recognition and framing 
financialisation as contingent rather than inescapable.   
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2. Creating coalitional power 
 
Above, I argued that the ST unions tried to claim the moral high ground: they 
portrayed senior managers as the self-interested actors. Here, I add that the unions 
created a powerful narrative which provided: a convincing analysis of the issue, 
namely financialisation; its culprits, namely a specific management team; and its 
impacts, not only on one company but also, on local, natiol and European 
industrial development. The broad framing and emphasis on the benefits provided to 
the public by ST stressed the shared interests between unions and public 
representatives in maintaining ST’s industrial character.  By emphasising that their 
demands served the public good and protected national and European industrial 
sovereignty, the unions were able to leverage local MPs, who then pressured French 
and Italian government representatives to change ST’s strategy. Whilst the 
Moroccan and Malaysian unions mobilised in solidarity, the campaign’s choice of 
tactics adds nuance to how this international campaign functioned: indeed, to exert 
power over ST, unions chose to leverage specific state , which limited the 
involvement of less institutionally strong unions. 
a. Leveraging public officials 
 
Following Mr. Bozotti’s announcement in May 2015, all three major French unions 
issued declarations, which deployed similar themes. The unions claimed that ST’s 
development was of French and European significance, called out the high levels of 
dividends distributed by ST, and attempted to hold public representatives 
accountable for ST’s fate. The CFDT (2015a) argued that closing the digital division 
would entail “the loss of European independence in the sector of new technology” 
and criticised ST’s management, stating,  
For the CFDT, microelectronics is an issue of strategic national 
sovereignty in the long run, which concerns tens of th usands of jobs 
and tens of billions of euros. Our representatives call for the French 
shareholder state to reverse [this] strategy [to intr duce] real industrial 
perspectives. 
The CFE-CGC (2015a) emphasised, “In addition to the social impact that a decision 
to ‘solve’ the issue of financial losses [of the digital division] could have, the 
technological independence of France and Europe is under threat.” The CGT (2015f) 
argued, “At a moment when the digital sector is transforming industries and services, 
it would be incomprehensible for the French and Italian state to abandon their control 





noting, “The semiconductor industry is a key sector for the strategic independence 
of Europe. […] Europe cannot abandon this sector to Asian and American actors.” 
All three unions thus underlined the geostrategic interests at play, drawing on ST’s 
role in Europe’s technological independence and industrial development. In 
suggesting that the closure of the digital division would have ripple effects on ST as 
a whole, and by extension, on French and European interests, the unions broadcasted 
that they shared a common interest with public representatives in fighting for ST’s 
industrial future.  
In addition, unions emphasised the potential local consequences of the digital 
division’s closure and wider deindustrialisation. Between May and October 2015, 
the CGT, sometimes with the CFDT, organised assembli s in front of worksites and 
rallies in Grenoble, through which they aimed to increase pressure on local public 
figures and ultimately on the French state. During the May 2015 rally, a speaker from 
the CGT (CGT, 2015l) requested that the préfet93 “transmit their request to the 
government for a clear and public statement following ST’s CEO’s declaration. […] 
Workers’ employment is threatened. So [are] the industrial future and the 
technological autonomy [of ST].” In June, at another rally, CGT activists (CGT, 
2015d)  declared: 
The real decision makers are the French and Italian governments. […] 
Microelectronics is at the heart of today’s world. Will its history 
resemble that of other industrial pullbacks and offshoring which 
destroyed local territories? 
The unions suggested that, unless the French state in ervened, ST, and more broadly, 
the semiconductor industry, would decline, drawing parallels with the history of 
other French industries. This analogy is important, because, since 1980, France has 
lost more than two million industrial jobs (Orange, 2019). However, despite the 
French government announcing plans in 2013 to relaunch France's industrial 
prowess and create new industrial jobs, the plans, according to Ezratty (2017), often 
neglect hardware, i.e., semiconductor technology, despite it being the bedrock of 
other industrial development.94 As the EWC secretary stated, “at a time when one 
increasingly speaks of the digital revolution, IoT etc., one shouldn’t forget the basis 
of this revolution, the chips themselves” (CGT, 2015e). The French unions’ 
messaging emphasised the industrial value of ST, both regarding a specific territory, 
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here l’Isere, and regarding France’s industrial future. The key word here is strategic: 
unions stressed that ST would retain its trategic significance if it remained industrial.  
In October 2015, at another rally, the CGT representatives (in CGT, 2015j) stressed, 
“The public funding given to the company should be given in exchange for a return 
to [industrial] development.” In March 2016, the CGT and CFDT reiterated that 
without ST, Europe “would become dependent on global actors in the U.S. or China” 
and protested that “for several years […] state funding went from the taxpayers’ 
wallet to the bank accounts of ST’s shareholders and senior executives” (CGT, 
2016d). Brookes (2013) explains that how the scope of a conflict is defined is itself 
contested. By targeting local representatives and drawing attention to the large 
subsidies received by ST, the unions shifted the discourse away from a private issue 
of layoffs regarding unions and management, towards it becoming a public matter 
regarding ST’s general strategy, for which public representatives should be held 
accountable because they gave ST subsidies, and because of ST’s territorial 
significance.  
These pressures and the ongoing relationships that union leaders had developed with 
local office holders in l’Isere meant that ST union leaders were able to meet with 
two MPs in l’Isère in June to highlight their concerns regarding ST’s strategy and 
the threat over the digital division (CGT, 2015f), and in July, with representatives 
from the French and Italian governments government (CFDT, 2015f). In September, 
armed with the petition that had gathered more than4,900 signatures, eight French 
union representatives met delegates from the French Ministry of the Economy who 
said that they recognised that keeping ST’s industrial character was an issue of 
sovereignty, and that they, as shareholders, had initiated discussions with 
management regarding strategy (CFDT, 2015d; CGT, 2015h; Lyan, 2015). On the 
other side of the Alps, in October, drawing on their r lationships with political parties, 
Italian unions arranged for the former Italian Presid nt to visit the Catania site and 
join them in a meeting that included Mr. Bozotti (notes, June 2018). Daniele 
remembered, 
[We] created a lot of pressure, writing publications locally and 
nationally. [The President] said the industry was strategic […] I 
remember Bozotti’s face [upon hearing that]. He didn’t like it […] 
Bozotti was pushed to do something, whereas before he believed that, 
to do business, [ST] should have the least production possible. 
As a result of unions tactics, from public rallies to petitions and regular meetings, 
office holders gradually came to support unions’ claim that ST’s strategy threatened 





started speaking to their governments, highlighting heir concerns and asking them 
to draw on their shareholder power to shift ST’s strategy.  In October, Mr. Queyranne, 
the President of the Isere region, sent a letter to Mr. Macron, then minister of the 
economy, expressing his worries that the closure of ST “could lead to the 
disappearance of a strategic industry for the Grenobl  ecosystem” and asking for a 
European-wide strategy for semiconductors, similar to the one for Airbus (Labeur, 
2015). By November, three MPs from l’Isère sent a letter to Mr. Macron outlining 
their concerns, using language which invoked key thmes of the unions’ messaging. 
They asserted: 
[ST] provides the technological foundation, which is indispensable to 
the development of intelligent systems, which constitute the added 
value of a number of industrial products. […] The recent declaration 
by STMicroelectronics’ CEO, which suggests a reduction, or even a 
step back from the digital activities in the Isere sit s, has destabilised 
the balance of an ecosystem. […] As MPs [in l’Isère], we wish to alert 
you to the social and economic impacts that a reduction in the 
activities of a company which represents more than 6000 direct jobs 
and 5 times more indirect jobs […] would not fail to have. 
In their letter, these MPs clearly articulated the reat on l’Isère’s “ecosystem,” 
mentioned the high number of jobs at stake and wenton to express concern about 
- The distribution of dividends to shareholders at an ab ormally high 
level, […] 
- A level of CapEx which is way too low in this [up-market swing] 
period, and far lower than that of comparable companies in this 
capital-intensive sector, […] 
- A lack of vision and strategy in the mid- to long-term regarding 
the governance of the company, which has privileged th  short-
term, letting the annual revenue drop from $10 billion to $7 billion 
over the last ten years, when the global market experienced a 50% 
growth. 
Their text thus reiterates key aspects of the unions’ critiques, denouncing the high 
level of dividends, the low level of CapEx and the s ort-term vision driving ST and 
correlated the digital division’s difficulties with ST’s greater focus on financial 
targets. These similarities demonstrate the convergence that happened between 
unions and MPs regarding both the issue, and what should be done about it.  
In December, one of these MPs, Mrs. Fioraso (2015) intervened at the national 
Assembly, heavily criticising ST’s strategy: 
The company currently suffers from a lack of strategic vision, which 
translates in a very insufficient level of investment. […] I suggest that 
the level of dividends should be reduced, […] in favour of targeted 





resolutely European strategy, because the upkeep of a semiconductor 
sector is an issue of sovereignty and competitiveness for Europe. 
The MPs, like the unions, stressed the strategic importance of ST to European 
industry and, crucially, highlighted the French state’s ability to change ST’s 
direction. Mrs. Fioraso reiterated ST’s geopolitical significance when I interviewed 
her in 2017. She said: 
[The question is] whether we [France/ Europe] want to depend on the 
United States or Asian countries for what constitutes the basis of any 
digital industry, as well as digital services, because as soon as you 
don’t have the [technological] bedrock, you’re done. You’re 
dependent on the agenda of Asian [countries], which will always be a 
step ahead […] notably for military. 
She continued, explaining her disagreement with how ST was managed, and 
demonstrating her sense that she, and the minister, could exert oversight over ST,  
[Starting in 2015], we felt that we didn’t share the same vision of 
development [with ST]. […] There were declarations in 2014 
according to which everything was fine, and then the next day [ST] 
announced a restructuring plan, without layoffs, but still… So I can 
tell you that neither I nor [Mr. Macron] were happy. […] I found [the 
level of dividends] shocking. 
Her argument focussed on the senior management team’s lack of strategy, rather than 
the threat to the digital division specifically, reflecting again the unions’ analysis. 
Furthermore it adopted the unions’ warning that financialisation was not just a threat 
to workers and their jobs but also to the state’s “sovereignty,” namely its control over 
industrial and military development. These interventions illustrate that MPs came to 
agree with the unions’ assessment that the closure of the digital division resulted 
from ST’s financialisation and threatened jobs and industrial development in l’Isère, 
but also, crucially, the nation-state.  Whilst I showed in Prelude 1 that the state then 
agreed to the offshoring of the Rennes fab, one sees a different stance being adopted 
here. In linking ST’s future to such public considerations and showing how 
financialisation challenged core state interests, unions were able to draw upon what 
Tattersall (2009) calls the “sword of justice” and avoid the discourse Rennes workers 
faced of needing to accept “market forces.” By claiming that ST’s industrial demise 
would ripple across territories, industries, and geopolitical relations, unions 
suggested their demands answered wider public interests, adding a moral element to 
their claim that ST not only could but should follow a different strategy. This sense 
of a public good being under threat permeated the intervention of the Isère MPs, who 
came to ask the government to ensure ST’s industrial future. The French government, 





b. Creating coalitional power 
 
Along with creating coalitional power locally and supported by ReAct and me, 
French and Italian unions also broadened their campaign to unions located elsewhere. 
Under the auspices of ReAct, I called union leaders in Malaysia and Morocco to 
inform them of the French and Italian campaign and sk if they agreed with the 
critique of ST’s financialisation. Unionists from Morocco and Malaysia decided to 
support the French and Italian unions’ demands for a change of strategy (notes, 
March 2016). Several conference calls between the CGT, CFDT, UMT, EIEUSR, 
CGIL and CISL followed. All of the unions representd agreed to publish a 
collective text, which put forward three demands that echoed the ones pushed for by 
the French unions.  
This led to the mobilisation spreading beyond France and Italy. In Bouskoura, the 
union organised a rally in April attended by over five hundred workers, and several 
workplace meetings during which workers discussed th  campaign and assessed the 
demands. In Agrate, unions organised information hours and leafletting activities, 
which mobilised two hundred workers, and continued to mobilise their federal 
networks to pressure public representatives (notes, May 2016). French and 
Malaysian workers in Grenoble, Rousset, and Muar responded by taking photos 
showing solidarity, with each event gathering betwen ten and fifty workers (notes, 
April 2016). The Malaysian mobilisation was the result of the union organiser having 
asked semiconductor workers attending a training session to pose in solidarity (notes, 
May 2016). This was not an ST-specific mobilisation, a d I was reminded of this 
lack of engagement during my visit, when few EIEUSR interviewees mentioned the 
picture taking (notes, July 2017). Despite this, based on French, Moroccan and 
Italian unionists’ welcoming responses, I believe that the pictures from Malaysia led 
to workers feeling a sense of solidarity across borders, as this was the first time that 
they saw each others’ actions and saw that their act ons, however small, were 
connected by the same demands (notes, May 2016). 
French activities culminated in May 2016, when the CFE-CGC, CFDT and CGT 
delivered a joint letter to the Ministry of Economy, which reiterated their concerns 
regarding ST’s strategy. Moroccan and Malaysian unions decided not to pressure 
their management and MPs, arguing that they had little leverage over ST’s global 
strategy (notes, April 2016). The demands put forward by the international coalition 
percolated up to higher political levels in France – by May 2016, Mr. Macron 





We have a management [team] that doesn’t answer to our goals, which 
has uncoordinated communication and which, several times, shot its 
own team in the foot. […] I think that we have not yet sufficiently 
lowered the dividend […] it’s a short-term logic to maintain the value 
[of the dividend] which objectively isn’t our priority […] when we 
essentially need to reinvest. (in Dumoulin, 2016) 
Days later, at the company’s AGM, ST announced a 40% reduction in the dividend 
(ST, AGM minutes 2016). The causality here is hard to prove definitively, without 
access to ST board meetings minutes or to company directors. Yet, given ST’s 
strategy over prior years, I believe that this shift, in one degree or another, was a 
response to the pressure applied by the unions and MPs.95 The French state continued 
to exert more visible oversight. A year later, in March 2017, the French president 
visited the Crolles worksite and hinted at negotiations being underway for the 
creation of a European-wide effort to support European semiconductor industries 
(Le Dauphine, 2017). In January 2018, ST announced ew investments in Agrate 
(ST, confcall 2018Q4) and during ST’s 2018 AGM, a new CEO was nominated (ST, 
AGM minutes, 2018). That these changes only came about over a long time reflects, 
I think, the inertia of this large corporation. Nevertheless, I believe the unions were 
able to shift ST’s strategy, and, crucially regarding my interest in international 
solidarity, acted across scales to further a recognised common interest.  
Faced with the threat to the jobs of many workers, unions used assemblies, rallies, 
and their relationships with M.Ps to put forward their demands. The campaign held 
MPs and government representatives accountable for this ostensibly private issue 
and stressed that they had power over ST, given the shareholder status of the French 
state. As Brookes (2013a, p.33) emphasises: 
Success requires not only intra and inter-union coordination but also a 
power strategy that actually compels an employer to alter its behaviour, 
resulting in some benefits for members of the labour alliance. Structural, 
institutional, and coalitional power only achieve this result when their 
exercise directly impacts (or threatens to impact) something on which 
the employer in question depends for fulfilling itspresent or future 
material and strategic interests.  
In this case, the unions effectively participated in making ST’s two main 
shareholders, who both control and, in the case of France, substantively support ST, 
believe that unions’ fears and demands were legitimate. These actors were then able 
to push ST to respond, in part, to these demands. The unions’ ability to use state 
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power over ST highlights that workers’ institutional power can be heightened by the 
political significance of an industry.  
That ST unions were able to participate in shifting ST’s strategy demonstrates why, 
as encouraged by Glassman (2011), it is crucial to understand the geopolitical 
interests as stake within specific GPNs, not only to further the theorisation of GPNs, 
but also to analyse sources of workers’ leverage. In addition, the campaign 
showcases the power which workers may create when ty demonstrate that a 
particular company is of public relevance, and argue that this relevance should entail 
public responsibility, i.e., that the state should ensure the company’s smooth 
development. The dichotomy between public and private matters reflects, 
fundamentally, an exercise of power. At the same tie that neoliberal rhetoric has 
instilled a belief in the public that decreased public intervention in the economy is 
just common sense ((Massey, 2013), ST workers’ fight illustrates how unions may 
increase their power by reconfiguring the notion of public intervention away from a 
neoliberal agenda and towards reinvigorating the twin notions of a public 
responsibility for the economy and a public ability to intervene in the economy. 
Whilst this was a type of global victory, in that a more industrial strategy benefitted 
every site, the matter of unions’ uneven power and local conflicts was apparent 
throughout the campaign.  
At the French level, the relationship between CGT and CFDT remained hard to 
navigate. Whilst they signed and delivered the lettr together in May 2016, two CGT 
leaders reproached ReAct and me for pushing inter-union coordination, because in 
the context of the national mobilisations against the labour reforms in France, when 
the CFDT stood with the government, they felt the cooperation was “red washing.” 
CFDT members could say that they were “doing stuff,” when they were not 
mobilising on the most important issue: the labour reforms, recalling the complex 
scales of politics that overlapped in each decision (notes, May 2016). The CGT 
leaders had faced tough discussions to explain to members why this was a joint 
action, emphasising the action’s international aspect to sidestep local issues. At the 
European level, French unions had more power than Italian ones, notably because 
French MPs were more interested in what happened to ST than Italian ones. 
Alessandro explained: 
If you ask a thousand politicians in Rome, “What is ST?,” they can tell 
you how much is the [ST] stock [value], [but nothing about the 
company]. […] When [French union leader] picks up the phone, on 





To underline this point, Alessandro explained that even during the Numonyx 
struggle, the unions, despite having asked to meet th  minister of industry for three 
years, never met anyone higher than his “fifth secretary.”  
In addition, the campaign favoured some tactics over thers, and this promoted some 
unions’ agency over others. French and Italian unions decided to focus on building 
and leveraging their institutional power, rather than on organising strikes. That job 
cuts targeted engineers and that ST put in place local mechanisms to diffuse workers’ 
anger explain, in part, the French and Italian workers’ and unions' choice to not 
organise strikes. Daniele, from Catania, argued, “It’s not easy to strike for a strategic 
vision, we [talk about financialisation] as a union a d we write [about] it, but we 
know it doesn’t touch people’s hearts.” Financialisation’s consequences – the lack 
of means of production, cost cutting, intensification of work – are gradual and diffuse 
rather than immediate. Unless they lead to direct layoffs, such as in the case of 
Numonyx, Daniele argues, they are hard to grasp. This shows why the discourses 
which unions built to materialise financialisation’s consequences, as well as workers 
correlating financialised practices and their everyday work-related frustrations, were 
important. The decision not to strike may also reflect the unions’ strategy: strikes 
would not have reached the main target of unions' demands, namely the French and 
Italian states. Finally, as engineers were the ones directly under threat, their 
organising culture, based on discussion and a reluctance to strike, might have carried 
the day when the unions' tactics were planned in a context, in France, where ST 
offered them a generous redundancy package, in the hop  of tempering their anger.96  
There were thus multiple reasons why French unions cho e not to organise strikes, 
though this choice limited the ability of other unio s to exert power in this campaign. 
Whilst the UMT mobilised its members through a rally and workplace meetings, 
they did not stop production, which is one of the key ways workers mobilise locally. 
In Malaysia, EIEUSR does not have access to strong institutional and coalitional 
power, whether in the form of laws protecting the right to strike, or with respect to 
                                                          
96  Regarding why Indian and Chinese workers chose not to strike, I was told that 
semiconductor companies in Noida and Bangalore blacklisted militant workers and that the 
local ST management had provided a replacement unit, which helped all dismissed workers 
to find other jobs (notes, April 2016). Both these tactics potentially diffused workers’ anger 
and/or deterred workers from organising. In China, following the layoff’s announcement, 
white-collar workers exceptionally published a picture of themselves, face hidden, behind a 
banner, asking for clarity regarding when their contracts finished and for decent 
compensation. Using ReAct’s networks, I got in touch again with mobilised workers there, 
who drafted a letter, which the EWC sent to management, outlining the Chinese workers’ 
demands. However, following this, the workers stopped all contacts. I was not able to 
determine whether this was because their demands had been met, because they had been fired 





politicians committed to ST’s presence, whilst its as ociational power remains quite 
weak, both in resources and ideology (see Chapter 6). Although it is not clear which 
tactics could have increased EIEUSR members’ involvement, the choice to focus on 
the French and Italian states limited their ability to take part in the campaign. Further, 
whilst I showed that Maltese public representatives are invested in ST’s survival, I 
also showed the relative vulnerability of the site, which potentially restricted unions’ 
desire to enter in conflict with ST’s management. They chose not to mobilise their 
workforce, despite, as part of the EWC, having seen th  campaign develop. Thus, I 
argue, whether deliberate or not, the campaign’s choice not to organise strikes and 
to focus on pressuring public authorities, privileged French and Italian unions’ type 
of power and participated, amongst other constraints a d unions’ own choices, in 
limiting the Moroccan, Maltese and Malaysian unions’ i volvement.  
This section demonstrates that French and Italian unions, with uneven support from 
Moroccan and Malaysian unions, created a powerful discourse, which brought 
together a range of actors behind a common interest and successfully increased 
unions’ local and international coalitional power. This campaign suggests that, in 
some instances, workers can organise to resist the rhetoric of “shareholder value.” 
Whilst Boyer (2005), Fligstein and Shin (2003) and Froud et al. (2014) focus on the 
agency of managers in dealing with pressures from financialisation, the experience 
of ST unions illustrates that workers can also shape a company’s trajectory, even in 
financialised times. Just as scholars have criticised the early globalisation literature 
for theorising about the growing interconnection between places and its 
consequences as natural and all-encompassing, it is important to offer stories that 
chip away at financialisation and show its contingent nature. Whilst ST’s particular 
characteristics raise questions about how replicable this campaign is, it provides one 
example of how unions organised internationally against the threats c used by a 
financialised outlook, underscoring however that each union’s context, source of 
power and ideology also constrained their collective ability to “internationalise” this 
campaign. Unions in Morocco, and to a lesser extent in Malaysia, supported the 
campaign, yet because of the strategy chosen by others, were less able to exert power 
as part of the campaign. 
Whilst workers built an expansive notion of “us” in order to mobilise unions from 
different countries to contest ST’s financialised turn and Moroccan and Malaysian 
unions unevenly mobilised their workforces, the camp ign focussed on reviving the 
responsibility of states to regulate corporations, drawing on public interests at the 





centric strategy presents a challenge to an “interna io alist” narrative: effectively, 
whilst ST unions managed to temporarily avoid the national trap by fighting for 
global demands about ST’s strategy, this campaign achieved unions’ goals through 
coordinated national actions targeting two nation-states, rather than through building 
international leverage against their employer. This situation illustrates labour 
geographers’ argument that the internationalisation of workers’ struggles is not 
always the best source of leverage or tactic. This is also a result of the type of demand 
put forward: workers fought to change their boss and the strategy of the company, 
rather than to negotiate for better working conditions and benefits, thus requiring, on 
a tactical level, the intervention of an actor beyond the management team. By 
successfully arguing that financialisation threatened the territorial and geopolitical 
interests of the French and Italian states, the unions were then able to leverage the 
states’ power, heightened in this instance by their shareholding power, to achieve 
their demands. However, along with these state-centri  tactics, the campaign was 
also sustained by a broad understanding of workers’ interconnectedness, based on 
workers’ understanding of and care for the business. Thi  perspective provided them 
with a common ground to work together in the name of their company’s interest. In 
this tension between the scale of the tactics chosen and the scale of the campaign’s 
outlook lies both possibilities for greater international solidarity – where unions with 
more institutional and coalitional power than others can leverage their power to 
benefit all workers  –  but also temptations for unions to restrict their demands to the 
scale that they experience as most effective. This campaign demonstrates the need 
for unions to explore all their sources of power, to be able to distinguish between the 
scale of a tactic and the scale of the outlook driving it, and recalls that in neoliberal, 
globalising and financialised times, public office holders, at a range of scale, still 






3. Building a “labour spatial fix” 
 
Labour geography aims to centre workers’ experiences, voices and actions central to 
the functioning of capitalism as it actually is (Mitchell, 2011), and, by doing so, to 
contribute to the theorisation of how capitalism functions. Having demonstrated 
workers’ agency in their fight against ST’s financialised strategy and analysed how 
they achieved their demands, I now turn to Herod’s (1997, 2003a) notion of a “labour 
spatial fix,” to look at the goals of labour agency. Whilst Coe and Jordhus Lier 
(2011), define the goals of workers’ agency as to survive, cope with, or resist 
capitalism, they do not explore how workers’ agency participates in the reproduction 
of capitalism and its space, losing some of the power of the term “fix” as used in 
geography. In this section, I further reflect on Herod’s metaphor, to contribute to 
labour geography’s project of theorising workers’ role in the development of 
capitalism. 
At this stage, it is important to assess whether th ST workers’ campaign represent a 
“labour spatial fix.” Herod (1997, p.26) suggested this notion to emphasise workers’ 
agency – “either in collaboration with or in opposition to both capital and other 
groups of workers” — in the production of landscapes, which are “appropriate to 
their own conditions and needs at particular times in particular locations” (2003a, 
p.16). This is a spatial phenomenon, with a metaphor and terminology that drws 
upon Harvey's (1981; 2001; 2005; 2006) spatio-temporal fix theory. Harvey (2006) 
suggested the term “spatial fix” to denote the structurally necessary and ever 
contradictory “fixes” which capital may organize to delay – and never solve – the 
crises of profitability and over-accumulation which beget capitalism. Herod (1997, 
2003a) argued that capital is not the only agent in such “fixes,” and that workers may 
also shape the geography of capitalism, stating, 
Acknowledging that workers may seek to impose within t e landscape 
their own spatial visions which can be quite different from those of 
capital, then, forces us to theorize how workers’ social practices are 
shaped by their spatial contexts and how, in turn, their spatial practices 
play an important role in structuring the evolving social and spatial 
relations of capitalism. (Herod, 2003a, p.117) 
On the other hand, does workers’ influence over one company count as a labour fix? 
Labour geographers have looked at workers’ actions in a range of settings and scales. 
For instance, Herod (2000), Ellem (2003, 2004) and Castree (2000) focus on workers’ 
struggles in specific companies and Herod’s (2003a) argument draws upon wage 





Bergene's (2006), Kelly's (2001) and Selwyn's (2009) studies are either based in a 
region or a sector. Whilst workers’ struggles to shape a city’s development (e.g.: 
Ikeler, 2011; Tufts, 1998) have clear spatial consequences, the spatial consequences 
of workers’ struggles to achieve better working conditions are more diffuse and 
taken for granted rather than explicitly stated. Grounded in a relational conception 
of space, which considers that space is not just the inert stage of people’s actions but 
rather the embodiment of shifting relationships between people, companies, and 
political representatives, I claim that workers’ struggles to challenge how value is 
distributed in a company is also a struggle over space. In the campaign presented 
above, workers fought for investments in specific places and a key part of their 
argument was based on these territorial considerations. Furthermore, if one 
understands financialisation as a regime of capital accumulation which produces 
space in distinctive ways (see Aalberts, 2015; Crotty, 2008; Fine, 2010; Lapavitsas, 
2011), the ST workers’ campaign, which fought for ST to remain industrial, to secure 
jobs and territorial development, rather than just to create profits for shareholders, I 
argue, represents an instance of a labour spatial fix, that is a contestation of how 
value is allocated and to whom. 
Herod’s (1997, 2003a) idea of a labour fix emphasises that, on a spatial level, 
workers’ struggles may both further some workers’ interests and undermine others’ 
needs, something other authors call a “spatial dilemma” (Castree et al., 2004), given 
that people’s lives are deeply spatial and that people need to survive. Whilst Herod 
(2003a) analyses the spatial contradictions of workers’ choices, the ST workers’ 
story also shows the duality of workers’ spatial fix in one place (or here company) 
through time. There were clear spatial dilemmas involved in this “fix”: ST’s 
investments ended up favouring Agrate’s fab where a 12-inch pilot line was 
announced in 2018. French union leaders still welcomed this news. Baptiste saw this 
new pilot line as “really good for [Italians], so there is a readjustment so that on the 
Italian side, they also have advanced fabs.” Yet, French leaders recognised that this 
decision challenged their ability to cooperate and recognise a common purpose. 
Laura wondered if 
Italian unions are going to take a back seat [in campaigning]. You have to 
know that if [investments] happen in Italy, it’s at the expense of France and 
vice versa. So I feel like creating coherence across unions internationally [is 
complicated] given that there is always the temptation o retrench oneself 
behind, ‘We’re ok, so let’s not complain […] because if we lose 





The Agrate site benefited from the investment, won through the campaign whilst the 
future of other 200-mm fabs remained uncertain. Thus, whilst this investment was 
desired by everyone and recognised as globally positive, it favoured a specific 
workforce and potentially undermined the common interest previously built. This 
reinforces the importance of understanding labour’s spatial fix as a lived process, 
which changes the ways in which capital is spent (ad invested) but also produces 
its own contradictions, in terms of who benefits spatially, whose futures are secured 
and how a common purpose across scales can be sustained, or not.  
ST workers’ struggles also stress the dialectical emporal consequences of workers’ 
actions. With increasing capital investment comes increasing automation and this 
modifies the composition of the workforce. Although on a historical scale, the 
increase of “dead labour” (or constant capital) curbs workers’ power (Kirsch and 
Mitchell, 2004), this correlation is less clear in a specific firm: Morgan and Sayer 
(1988) thus argue that the introduction of new technology reflects the pressure of 
competition rather than an aim towards the disempowerment of workers. Edwards 
and Belanger (2008, p.297) similarly argue, “it is important to both [capital and 
labour] that any unit of capital continues to transform itself, for otherwise it will be 
swept away by the forces of competition.” ST workers recognised this challenge. 
They campaigned for investments to secure the productivity of ST and yet growing 
automation also troubled them concerning the future of blue-collar jobs. In the pilot 
300-mm line in Agrate, Luca explained, “You will not have any man [sic] working 
in it, because it will be the new generation [of fabs].” Alessandro worried that 
increasing capital investment – the 300-mm line costs at least €300 million – is not 
linked with increasing employment (notes, February 2019). Guiseppe concurred, 
stating, “what’s crazy is that the machines are 10 times more expensive but need 
fewer and fewer workers.” Likewise, Louis wondered about the future of blue-collar 
workers in Crolles given the few opportunities they ave to upskill (notes, February 
2019). Given the competitive pressures of capitalism, the central role of technology 
in them, and the intertwined aspects of production processes in ST, the victory by 
unions in ST produces contradictions and workers’ remarks illustrate that they were 
aware of these. In effect, the outcome favoured the Agrate site and probably 
strengthened the slow displacement of blue-collar jobs. At the same time, workers 
recognised that they needed investments for the company to survive tout court. My 
discussion demonstrates the importance of attending to the temporal dilemmas 
workers may face, and illustrates the limits of organising in one corporation, when 





I last examine another aspect of Herod’s (2003a) work, namely the role of workers’ 
spatial fix in the broader development of capitalism. Whereas Harvey (2006) 
emphasises that spatial-temporal fixes temporarily solve the crises of capitalism and, 
at the same time, exacerbate the contradictions which future development will need 
to overcome, Herod does not theorise the role of a labour spatial fix in solving, or 
exacerbating, capitalism’s crises. He focusses on age cy in shaping the landscape, 
rather than on that agency as part of a broader process of the uneven and crisis-prone 
development of capitalism. Whilst I recognise that extrapolating beyond a company 
and its workforce stands on shaky grounds, given th issue of theorising abstract 
agency when workers are situated people, and employed b  companies rather than 
by capital, here I argue that ST workers’ experiences reiterate the dangers of the 
contradictions core to Harvey’s fix notion. Furthermore, the ST campaign suggests 
that workers’ actions, in protecting their own interests, may also play a role in 
addressing, temporarily and at their scale, the contradictions produced by a 
financialised, and more broadly capitalist, outlook. 
On a macro-level, Harvey (2006a) understands the growing power of financial value 
as an example of temporal fixing, whereby through debt and its commodification, 
capitalism’s crisis of profitability is solved temporarily, albeit pushed further in the 
future. He explains that the circulation of capital as shares, bonds, debts and financial 
products, relies notably on the exacerbated exploitati n of workers now and the 
promise of their exploitation in the future. However, at the meso-level of a 
corporation, the experiences of ST workers underscore that financialisation threatens 
the paradoxical equilibriums which make up a corporati n, that is, between adequate 
rates of investment in fixed capital versus shareholders’ surplus; between 
centralisation of decision making and autonomy of innovation; between the 
exploitation and recognition of workers’ value; and between short-term profits and 
a company’s long-term future. ST workers suggested that the financialisation path 
chosen by ST would foreclose their ability to produce value in the future by 
destroying their company’s fixed capital. They held that they might not have a future 
employment. Capitalism’s financialised turn relies on workers’ future production of 
value and yet, how financialisation takes shape may undermine workers’ very ability 
to produce value. I found that this tension, which was crucial to workers’ fears, 
encapsulated Harvey’s abstract “fix” notion, highliting how the pressures of 
financialisation, in focussing on short-term value extraction, sow the seeds of the 





Moreover, Offe (1985) reminds us that workers’ economic dependency can lead to 
a paradoxical situation whereby workers are more concerned about the survival of 
the company than company owners themselves. In the fig t above, one sees ST 
workers rising to defend a company against the dangers brought about by its 
financialised management. That workers may play such a role not only illustrates 
workers’ actions as “less than revolutionary and […] bound within the confines of a 
capitalist economic system” (Herod 1997, p.16), butalso when furthering and 
protecting their own interests, as caught in broader contradictions and their “solving”. 
Workers fought to protect ST from its managers, acting as a bulwark to mitigate 
financialisation’s worst impacts, and ensure a bit more certainty for ST’s longer-term 
future. This, I argue, is important for three reasons. First, on a practical level, it 
suggests that workers and unions may hold common interests with unlikely 
collaborators. As financialised capitalism threatens the very sources of growth that 
it depends upon, managers driven by a vision of companies as productive enterprises, 
shareholders who wish for companies to adopt long-term strategies, commentators 
who question whether too great of a financial focus might undermine innovation,97 
states which want to actively drive innovation, citizens, and workers who wish to 
retain jobs, may find mutual interests and, in these mutual interests, workers may 
find sources of power.  
Secondly, on a theoretical level, it simply reminds one of the ongoing reliance of 
capitalism not only on extra-economic processes of value production and extraction, 
as so powerfully demonstrated by feminist literature (Gibson-Graham, 2006; Mies, 
2014), but also on the action of people and here, more specifically, workers, acting 
from within the capitalist system, but driven by alternative visions of what this 
system can entail. Labour’s agency, I suggest, is not just about shaping a landscape 
but about being more deeply caught in the complex and contradictory processes of 
capitalism’s development, and notably, in my analysis, in the process-based nature 
of the ever-evolving “fixes” to its contradictions. 
Thirdly, this point bears emphasising for what it suggests in terms of the politics of 
agency. Bok (2018), in her review of the evolution f the term “fix” through 
geography, claims that the metaphor has a certain inertia and conservatism to it, 
                                                          
97 In 2018, the Financial Times ran a number of stories outlining the dangers of the scale of 
share buybacks, which amounted to $741 billion in 2018, $550 billion in 2017 and $529 
billion in 2016. To offer them, “companies have poured billions […], not into productive 
capacity but into their own shares. The proportion of sales spent on research and development 
by S&P 500 companies has, meanwhile, yet to recover t  p e-2008 levels.” (FT, 2018). They 
implied that too great of a focus on share buybacks, i.e., shareholder value, curtailed 





given that it is concerned with how capitalism survives, rather than how it is 
disassembled. To quote: “[the fix as a metaphor’s] conservative character reinforces 
circular thinking, which explains why accounts of fixes tend to be repetitive and 
unsurprising” (Bok, 2018, p.1102). This comment, directed at three main fix theories, 
(which are, I acknowledge, less concerned with people than with meso- and macro-
scale phenomenon), reproduces a type of condescendence, which Scott (1985) 
decried in Marxist literature thirty years ago. Yes, one could see ST workers’ effort 
in such a light: they want their company to survive to preserve their jobs and ways 
of life. They are not fighting an abstraction or striving for a revolution and they focus 
on other people as the culprits, based on past experi nc s. This “modest” aspect of 
workers’ struggles is core to Scott’s (1985, p.348) study of Sedaka peasants, where 
he claims  
[Resistance begins] close to the ground, rooted firmly in the homely 
but meaningful realities of daily experience. The enemies are not 
impersonal historical forces but real people. That is, hey are seen as 
actors responsible for their own actions and not as bearers of 
abstractions. The values resisters are defending are equally near at 
hand and familiar. Their point of departure is the practices and norms 
that have proven effective in the past and appear to offer some promise 
of reducing or reversing the losses they suffer. The goals of resistance 
are as modest as its values. The poor strive to gain work, land, and 
income; they are not aiming at large historical abstractions.  
Both Scott (1985) and Katz (2006) stress a fundamental idea, namely that agency is 
about a process based in quotidian realities and needs rather thanbased in a 
revolutionary consciousness. When people assert their right to survive, work and live 
with their needs for dignity, respect and recognitio  met, they resist capitalism’s 
extraction of value and exploitation of people now and this may support them to 
organise to change capitalism later. When Bok (2018) suggests that the metaphor of 
the fix is conservative, she misses the people who are behind the deployment of such 
fixes and the potential agency, both now and in the future, such instances represent. 
Attention to workers’ agency demonstrates that the s aping of a company, but also 
the shaping of its crises and potential solutions, are contested and that, sometimes, 
in some places, people may win temporarily. Labour spatial fixes are lived processes, 
fraught with tensions and less-than-revolutionary, nd yet, I believe, crucial to the 
shaping of the world in a more humane way, and should, as such, continue to be 







In this chapter, I analysed unions’ struggle to stop the layoff of 1,600 workers. The 
success of this grassroots campaign supports scholars’ claims that to sustain 
international collaboration, union activists need to draw on shared experiences, 
identify a common threat, organise regular interactions, and encourage active 
struggle (Antentas, 2015; Cumbers, Routledge, et al., 2008; Hennebert, 2010; Kay, 
2005). I showed that the clear narrative crafted by ST unions enabled them to develop 
intra- and inter-union power. French unions made the company’s move a symbol of 
ST’s financialisation, widening the scope of this threat to ST’s entire future. 
Significantly, I argued that the discourse that said “ST is being fi ancialised” was 
effective in helping workers’ politicise their experiences, whilst it brought unions in 
other countries to recognise a common interest in tackling financialisation and 
campaigning for ST to re-embrace an industrial vision. At the same time, involved 
unions proposed a global vision of their company and put forward demands that 
would, in broad strokes, benefit all workers, whether blue- or white-collar and 
wherever they were located, that targeted clear culprits and that drew upon workers’ 
producer pride and knowledge. Jean sums up nicely why this discourse was powerful 
in creating a common interest despite all the differences encompassed in ST, saying  
You know, it’s already so hard to make people move f r something on 
their own site, people who work side-by-side, so you can imagine how 
much harder, it is to move people around the world. There’s that, and 
then, the need to find common interests. It’s hard [looking at] wage 
[claims], since you are confronted with each country’s level of life. 
[…] Where one might be able to create links is on stuff that touches 
upon the global future of the company.  
Whilst he shows how hard it is for unions simply to m ve their workforces, he also 
shows exactly how a global threat can bring them together. By unions materialising 
the risk that ST’s growing financialisation represented, they were able to recognise 
a common interest and to overcome their divisions. 
In addition to persuading other unions to support their demands, French and Italian 
unions emphasised ST’s strategic importance to French, Italian and European 
industrial development and geostrategic interests, thu  suggesting that their demands 
responded to public needs. This allowed them to leverage the interests of local MPs, 
who then pressured their governments to change ST’s overall strategy. ST unions’ 
success demonstrates the power workers may create when they effectively expand 





across several places. This campaign offers ways to grasp how to create greater 
international cooperation against financialisation, even as these attempts remain 
bound by each union’s local context, source of power and ideology, whilst the type 
of action chosen favours some unions’ agency over others. I demonstrate the impact 
of such embeddedness over the longer-term attempt to build the TUN next. 
Rather than an all-encompassing imposition of specific behaviours, I showed that 
ST’s financialised practices were driven by specific people and they were contested, 
illustrating Thompson's (2013, p.476) remark that “there are still ‘different paths or 
trajectories of financialisation,’ in part contingent on political struggles and degrees 
of economic pressure.” Furthermore, I suggested that pressure towards maximising 
shareholder value may be slowed down, not just following abstract contradictions 
which are structurally embedded in capitalism (Harvey, 2006) or natural limits 
(Christophers, 2015), but also because of workers’ r sistance. Workers’ experiences 
of and campaign against financialisation adds nuance to the literature, which mostly 
portrays workers’ interaction with financialisation as consumers, through the 
pressure of debt (e.g., Garcia-Lamarca and Kaika, 2016; Hudson, 2010; Storm, 2018), 
rather than as workers, through their shifting experiences of work. This work-centred 
perspective is important because it provides another way to grasp the everyday 
manifestation of financialisation and stresses that str tegically placed TNC workers 
have power over how financialisation plays out.  
Lastly, this campaign suggests that financialisation may also foster the emergence of 
new processes of class resistance. Kelly (2012) defines class as a position in the 
social division of labour, a process of value extraction, and a performance of a 
specific identity, all of which may enable political solidarities. In Chapter 7, I 
showed that ST’s financialisation prompted a renewed emphasis on the extraction of 
value across professions, reminding all workers of their vulnerable position as 
employees and prompting increased resentment and alienation across the workforce. 
In this chapter, I showed that these experiences, and the clear threat that workers 
faced, led unions to recognise a shared interest across sites and to act in solidarity 
with each other. Their esistance suggests that financialisation may not just be 
heralding new class relationships globally, as suggested by Martin et al. (2010), but 
that it may also further class formation and, potentially, struggle at the company level. 
In a “minor” fashion, i.e., with all the caveats mentioned throughout this chapter, I 
also suggest that financialisation both provides yet more tools to favour capital 
owners at the expense of workers’ rights and recogniti n (pace Fligstein and Shin 
















Chapter 9:  
Solidarity from the ground up 
 
In Chapter 4, I recounted the dilemmas that unions faced as well as the different 
priorities they had to juggle with building the TUN. In the chapters that followed, I 
analysed the factors which conditioned ST unions’ varied agency at a range of scales, 
including the threat of financialisation, the sector’s disparate capital intensity and 
unions’ uneven power and diverse ideological stances. Here, I demonstrate how 
these factors, positions, and stances acted as key obstacles to the TUN members 
achieving their goals, though these realities, however complex and divisive, were 
also the ground upon which international exchanges developed.   
In Section 1, I show that TUN participants embraced the sharing of information and 
stories as a way to demonstrate the TUN’s relevance d confront ST’s whipsawing 
abilities. Whilst unions’ uneven resources, the competition within ST, and their local 
inter-union conflicts amidst ongoing practical difficulties, hampered these 
exchanges, they were crucial to initiate an alternative geography of care necessary 
to international solidarity. In Section 2, I demonstrate that the unions disagreed over 
who had the legitimacy to speak for the TUN, in a context where the question of 
which organisation “controlled” the TUN shaped its possible goals and tactics. The 
source of the disagreement, I argue, came from unions’ diverse ideologies and their 
varied representations of “the international.” Some union leaders saw the TUN as a 
distinct scale led by international actors, others understood their collective decision-
making as a negotiation of positions country by country, whilst others proposed a 
grassroots-based network. How TUN members came to imagine the international 
space, in conjunction with the influence of more conservative unions, prompted the 
TUN to be increasingly driven by Industri’ALL’s representative. This brought the 
TUN to settle on institutional goals and tactics, which failed to speak to workforces’ 
needs, and thereby, was unable to sustain the blows of local realities. I conclude by 
claiming that the ST TUN’s experience shows the pitfall of abstraction that looms 
over the process of pursuing a GFA and that, unless unions accept a me sure of 
vulnerability, international solidarity will tend towards replicating traditional “help” 





1. Materialising “the international” 
 
When I reflected back on this action-research, I found it hard to remember the modest 
gains that the TUN achieved in the face of the obstacles that stood in the way and 
the reality that the TUN’s activities stopped after our years. Yet interviewees valued 
its achievements, as small as they were. Maurice argued, “I’m patient. […] Doing 
all this [international exchange] is useful, the small [achievements] are already loads.” 
Remembering his humility and the critical romanticism I speak about in my 
introduction, I show that data comparison, the stories of faraway colleagues and 
relationships between people made the TUN concrete and relevant to workers’ needs 
and part of their geographies of care. However, I also show how local realities 
overwhelmed union leaders’ time, whilst participants’ positionalities, inter-union 
relationships and corporate strategies kept pulling them apart, reiterating why it is 
crucial to analyse unions’ positionalities within a TNC as well as their stances to 
understand their ability to upscale their power.  
a. Sharing information 
 
Participants presented the sharing of information as the first goal and outcome of 
their network, valuing direct exchanges as a way to counter the imbalanced stream 
of information between their global employer and themselves. Arnault said, “What’s 
clear is that management has no interest in countries getting together on a union level, 
because management uses differences [between countries] to negotiate directly [with 
unions],” linking ST’s control over information to its whipsawing abilities. European 
union leaders criticised the opacity that ST maintained about their plans for all non-
European sites. Although ST provided EWC members with information about its 
strategy and vision for front-end activities, these pr sentations “never gave numbers 
for India or China” (Arnault), whilst Emmanuelle added that “the company refuses 
to give information about back-end activities, saying precisely that these do not 
concern [the EWC], because [the EWC] are Europe-basd.”98 The company thus 
effectively segmented access to information, and this opacity benefited local 
management’s control. For instance, workers observed ST’s reporting numbers that 
diverged from reality, and were only able to ascertain he differences by establishing 
direct contacts with each other. In Rennes, Nathan noted, “We had colleagues who 
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for this back-end site, ST eluded questioning about other back-end sites by providing specific 





went to Singapore. They realised that their numbers were not good at all. All the 
rejects, they piled them in bags which were not repo ted. They hid [the scraps].” This 
possibly allowed Singapore to put in more financially convincing bids than French 
sites for production loads. In Morocco, union leaders similarly believed that other 
sites rigged certain data, for example changing the rec ption date to improve “due 
delivery” indicators (notes, January 2017), whilst n Malta, Liam outlined how 
despite managers claiming that Chinese workers weremo  productive, “[Maltese] 
technicians who go there, checked [and realised] that in China they reported fewer 
workers on the machines and had unregistered workers to help” (notes, June 2016). 
These anecdotes highlight the significance of having access to data from other sites, 
given the prevailing opacity of information, within the ongoing pressure on plants to 
outcompete each other. 
TUN members saw the building of a global view of ST’s activities as a crucial way 
to combat this source of corporate power. As Edern put it, “it’s a war for information, 
to know what happens in various continents, what happens in factories. […] The 
hardest thing is that everything is cordoned off, there is nowhere where one speaks 
of ‘ST world’.” The UMT representative, speaking inAgrate recounted the 
repression that their union faced in 2010 to show hthis asymmetry of information 
favoured ST’s narrative, i.e., that ST maintained good relationships with unions, 
when the reality was otherwise (notes, November 2016). When the TUN met for the 
second time, Alessandro clearly argued that the sharing of information was critical 
in the fight against ST’s divisive tactics, saying “because ST does their job and 
divides us, and we need to work to increase our solidarity.” Liam favourably likened 
the TUN to the EWC, through which the GWU had been able to learn about ST’s 
strategic decisions and used this knowledge to confront their local management’s 
narrative, saying he hoped that the TUN would provide the same level of practical 
and strategic information to all ST unions (notes, September 2017). Union leaders 
thus underlined their interest in sharing information as a way to confront ST’s 
whipsawing strategies. Whilst leaders upheld this goal in the abstract, they faced 
ongoing practical difficulties in achieving it, as ideological differences and, in back-
end sites, fears over sharing information further inhibited their trust in each other.  
The TUN fostered multiple occasions when unionists compared, in minute detail, 
their working conditions, rights and benefits. These xchanges were crucial because 
they helped to ground the international, which otherwise felt far from workers’ 





encourage solidarity between workers in the abstract, zoomed in on the specific 
chemical which had led to a worker dying in Singapore 
I really wonder how it happened, because this is a chemical we use 
every day. We need to know the circumstances around this, which 
meant that there was a death because of [product name]. That can 
bring people together, because we all use it. It’s leverage like that, 
things that are common, that’s how we will hook peol  [onto 
international stuff]. 
Attendees compared conditions across ST during site visits (for instance when a 
UMT representative came to the Agrate site and asked about canteen prices, holiday 
entitlements and safety equipment), TUN meetings, and bilateral calls. At the first 
TUN meeting, union representatives compared the various provisions they had for 
working from home, the right to be offline, paternity leave, on-call duty, how back-
end shifts were organised and how overtime was calculated (notes, September 2016). 
At the third TUN meeting, representatives quizzed each other over variations in 
around safety procedures, break provisions, and bonuses (notes, February 2019). 99 
At the second TUN meeting, members of the network decided to collect information 
from each site about social benefits, gender discrimination, and safety and security 
procedures, to respond to the interest in greater info mation exchange, and to ground 
the demand for the GFA in specific issues (notes, Sptember 2017). 
This exercise to formalise what had been more informal exchanges encountered a 
range of difficulties. There was the expected lack of time, which interviewees 
mentioned apologetically, torn between appreciating these international links and the 
demands of local commitments. Lack of time is, of curse, manufactured: locking 
union leaders into ongoing negotiations related to local issues, whether intentional 
or not, was an effective tactic for making sure union leaders were always putting out 
fires rather than able to engage in the slow work of building international 
relationships. Collecting data was further hindered by language barriers;100 technical 
issues prompted by the constraints of the chosen mediu  of communication (email, 
                                                          
99 Participating in these moments was of course framed by workers’ uneven positionalities, 
whether in terms of ease of access to visas or institutional resources. For instance, Moroccan 
leaders were not able to physically attend the second TUN meeting due to visa issues and 
Malaysian union leaders had to use their personal holidays to attend TUN meetings. 
Moreover, although Industri’ALL covered expenses for the Moroccan and Malaysian 
participants, French, Maltese and Italian delegates had to “beg” their federations or the EWC 
for financial support to be able to attend (interviw Emmanuelle). 
100 Italian was the language spoken at the EWC because French and Maltese representatives 
spoke it relatively well, but, in terms of foreign languages, Moroccan workers preferred 





WhatsApp, phone calls);101 the need for union members who had the detailed 
knowledge necessary to make technical comparisons; 102 uneven access to reliable 
data, as well as the different national systems reflected in each data point. 
Unsurprisingly, local managers also pressured unionists to favour relationships with 
them, rather than with “distant” union leaders. They told Malaysian leaders not to 
speak to French leaders because they were too aggressive (notes, October 2016), and 
encouraged GWU leaders not to speak to other EWC and TUN members (notes, June 
2018). In the EWC, European managers put forward the “personal” argument that 
EWC leaders and management had good relationships, so why not continue to solve 
their issues through internal discussion, rather than involving an external actor, 
Industri’ALL (notes, November 2017). These issues, like ST’s answers to the EWC 
(see Chapter 4), speak of the ongoing pressures from the obvious global player, ST, 
to favour locally focussed perspectives so as to maintain control over the power 
represented by having insight into ST’s global situat on. 
The pressure to favour a localised remit was particularly effective in the case of back-
end union leaders, whose sites are more vulnerable than front-end ones to ST’s 
whipsawing tactics. Liam argued that competition betwe n back-end sites “should 
just be on the table, to make [this reality] clear” nd to acknowledge the difficulties 
it prompted in terms of information sharing (notes, June 2016). Thibault explained 
the temptation to use international exchanges to further site-specific needs at the 
expense of the workers who give this information 
As soon as there is a decrease in loads, one or thether [back-end sites] 
will take the cut. So everyone is interested in getting information from 
the other side of the barrier, but do [they] really want to share the 
information [they] have… 
When I exchanged information from one site with other unions, I sometimes sensed 
unionists’ apprehension. My notes recount my blunder when I mentioned to 
Moroccan representatives that the Muar plant was recruiting and how, “sensing 
unease, I immediately reassure them and kick myself m ntally for sharing this 
information” (notes, February 2019). When we first talked, Liam suspected that 
other union leaders would not be transparent with their data (notes, June 2016). After 
                                                          
101 For instance, to collect data, European representatives suggested using excel spreadsheets, 
which Malaysian representatives (having no computers) could not easily use.  
102 Union leaders who were part of the international discussions did not always know the 
answers to technical questions. For instance, the Malaysian representatives who attended the 
TUN meetings were the union’s organiser and the president. Neither of whom were involved 
in shop floor issues and thereby unable to answer technical questions on machines, technical 
processes or chemicals used (notes, September 2017), whilst the engineers who were part of 





two years, he still perceived that Malaysian and Moroccan union leaders had not 
shared data with his union, and was grateful to have data from Malta processed by 
the Italian representative rather than shared across the network (notes, June 2018). 
He believed that if the Moroccan and Malaysian unionists had access to information 
about Malta – where wages are approximately three times greater than wages in other 
back-end sites, they might use it to argue for the relocation of Maltese production to 
their sites. Sharing information was thus valued, but threatening. The extent of this 
mistrust was uneven: the UMT openly shared data and was less scared of ST’s 
offshoring threats, having won increased benefits for its members in recent years, 
whilst GWU and EIEUSR leaders were more cautious. This unevenness illustrates 
the entanglement between unions’ positionalities, corporate pressures and each 
union’s stance, and its impact upon efforts to increase international collaboration. 
ST’s GPN also conditioned the interest leaders had in speaking to each other. For 
instance, when I asked Arnault what could be done between ST unions, he 
demonstrated a kind of tunnel vision focussed on R&D workers like himself, rather 
than operators. He answered: “If I were to meet people from India today, [we could] 
at least align ourselves on the strategy of the company, saying [the company] is doing 
well but here let’s try to develop it.” When I prompted him about cooperation with 
sites in Malaysia or Morocco, he reacted: “It isn’t evident, […] I would be keener to 
develop union partnerships with Asia [i.e., India] because we work a lot with them.” 
André, another French engineer, explained, “No one knows anyone from Bouskoura, 
[…] it’s a back-end and not everyone knows them. I went there but what works [for 
collaboration] is proximity, or otherwise, it’s politicisation.” Raphael, a French 
technician, indicated that front-end workers had a hard time understanding and being 
interested in what went on in back-end sites because “they’re a world unto 
themselves.” If I show in Chapter 5 that ST’s GPN shaped the scale of the strategies 
chosen by unions, these reactions demonstrate how it also informed workers’ trust 
in and their felt proximity to others.  
As much as these different expectations were about p sitionalities, they also 
reflected union leaders’ varied ideologies. Maurice put it simply: “the hard thing is 
that we don’t necessarily have the same way of doing union work, [and] the same 
[political] orientations.” For instance, Claire, criticised the TUN’s discussions for 
being “too down-to-earth,” as well as filled with blue-collar workers who spoke of 
strikes, rather than “fellow” white-collar workers with whom she felt she could speak 
about ST’s wider corporate strategy. Her reaction revealed her condescendence 





union as helping ST to better conduct its business (see Chapter 6). Similarly, Thibault 
appreciated a transnational effort in ST if it was b ed on “economic issues,” that is, 
able to offer strategic advice to ST to improve its bu iness. However, he doubted that 
other unions “would be able to make proposals.” His su picions were somewhat 
confirmed when, in the third TUN meeting, a Malaysin union leader briskly 
criticised the CGT’s presentation of ST’s business outlook, asking, “Why do they 
show this? This is not for workers. I don’t know, this [information] is for managers” 
(notes, February 2019). The EIEUSR representative’s vi w of a union’s role brought 
him to criticise other unions for overstepping theirs and created frictions, as union 
leaders realised they held different visions of their roles. Disagreements over 
demands also revealed unions’ divergent ideologies and the tensions this produced. 
For instance, at the September 2017 meeting, the EIEUSR representatives did not 
contest ST’s practice of offering workers a bonus for chemical exposure, which 
shocked other union representatives who pushed for a risk-free environment (notes, 
September 2017). At the 2019 TUN meeting, other union leaders were startled when 
EIEUSR representatives did not denounce the lack of reproductive freedom for 
migrant workers: Alessandro wondered, “Doesn’t he se  that [migrant workers] are 
people!” (notes, February 2019). These interactions show that what may appear as 
unacceptable to some union leaders may be normalised by others, and how data is 
never just “objective.” Faced with these clashes, union leaders realised that they did 
not share a common “union” culture, which further encouraged distance and mistrust, 
demonstrating the impact of union’s stances upon international interactions. 
The importance of union leaders’ varied values was also evident in what union 
leaders nicknamed the “French problem.” The TUN agreed that leaders from 
different sites would collect data. To increase efficiency, Italian leaders pushed 
French unions to speak in one voice. However, French union representatives 
defended the need to allow disagreement over data an lysis, both within each union 
and among unions, explaining that local and national conflicts between the French 
unions could not just be dismissed in the name of international solidarity. They felt 
that the TUN members’ insistence on having a single French voice made collecting 
data locally difficult and further distanced local union leaders from the TUN. 
Raphael explained, “It’s already hard to get them to be interested in international 
issues, so if, to be in the TUN, they also have to work with people they hate, it makes 
things really complicated, or even impossible.” In effect, these conflicts halted data 
collection in France. Moreover, they frustrated Italian union leaders, who were able 





who asked French unions to sort out their inter-union conflicts nationally rather than 
bring them to the international space. Meanwhile, UMT and EIEUSR leaders did not 
understand the stakes involved in the French conflicts (notes, September 2017). This 
clash, along with the anecdotes reported above, show t e “nested” character of 
international interactions: leaders’ positionalities, stances and conflicts reverberate 
at the international level, where they hamper the deployment of inter-union power. 
Moreover, this “French problem” touches upon the fact that some union leaders 
imagined the international as a place where national leaders should speak in one 
voice, bypassing country-specific conflicts, whilst others understood the 
international as a space where local leaders could speak, acknowledging the 
disagreements between “country(wo)men.” The two visions show that the 
representation of the international space is contested and that how the international 
is imagined may thwart local initiatives, for instance French unions collecting data.  
Given all of the issues outlined above, the role of collecting data required legitimacy, 
neutrality, time and trusting relationships with each union leader. At first, the TUN 
decided that two union leaders, whom I would support, would be responsible for 
collecting data for each selected topic. These representatives struggled to collect data 
and speak directly with each other, in a period when my health made me unavailable 
(notes, October 2017- February 2018). The lack of results brought Jiro to take charge. 
The surveys he sent also went unanswered and his approach became increasingly 
abstract. My notes after a call to review progress count my growing frustration: 
Jiro seems to only want to tick different boxes and sks no questions 
about the sites. […] It just becomes a list of what s been done – little 
– and then his solution for reining this in – his involvement. He doesn’t 
ask people what they think and just states what he beli ves is good. […] 
I don’t want to overemphasise my role but, by contrast, I ask questions, 
[…] encourage union leaders to speak to each other, […] and lay out 
the ‘strategic’ decisions of to whom a report should be addressed to. […] 
I’m not implying a wilful attempt to undermine the coalition, it’s just a 
totally different approach. He seems to follow blueprints of what to do 
rather than engage with the issues on unionists’ terms. I’m frustrated. I 
see before my eyes what I fought to build decomposing under the 
weight of inertia. (notes, March 2018) 
Whilst my readers may find that this reaction contradicts my aim to contextualise 
rather than judge, I criticised the impact of his approach rather than Jiro himself  
based on what my thesis has hopefully demonstrated, namely that there are no 
blueprints for building international solidarity, ap rt from meticulous attempts to 
understand each union’s positionalities and stances. Thi  understanding, I argue, is 





collaboration; however Jiro’s ignorance of these realiti s meant he was unable to 
work through them, bringing a growing abstraction t international efforts. 
The frictions created by these varied positionalities, ideologies, and representations 
of “the international” space epitomise what Cumbers and Routledge (2010, p.43) call 
“geographical entanglements.” These, they argued, 
continue to infuse union operations, reflecting loca  and national 
interests against broader visions of solidarity. While promoting 
transnational labour rights is an aspiration of most union actors, this is 
inevitably compromised by different subject positions both within the 
spaces of the international labour movement and in relation to broader 
processes of capital accumulation. 
These entanglements highlight the importance of embedding labour: along with 
simple material issues, they significantly hampered union leaders’ ability to share 
data and open conversation at an international level. Less than ideal, they formed the 
actual conditions of international collaboration. I believe that understanding how 
these conditions interlock to produce mistrust, distance between workers and 
potential conflicts is key to overcoming, or at least working with, these limits. I also 
showed the impacts of how the international space was imagined, and the need for 
grounded international exchanges. I return to these issues below. 
b. Caring for distant colleagues 
 
Despite all the difficulties outlined above, in interviews workers also stressed their 
feelings of comradeship coming out of their shared experiences and ongoing 
professional relationships.103 Daoud, a Moroccan engineer, explained, “When I see 
someone from Agrate, they’re a colleague, we’re doing the same job for ST.” 
Massoud, another Moroccan engineer said,  
ST workers are the same family. […] I have contacts wi h people in 
Catania, Grenoble, etc. So for me it’s the same thing. For example, if 
someone works in Catania and we work on the same product and I 
hear that he [sic] is going to be fired because herwe’re creating jobs, 
it’ll hurt. No one can accept that. We have to stand in solidarity. 
Guy, a French engineer, likewise explained “when you have someone on the phone 
every day, even if you have never seen them, they’re colleagues. I have loads of 
colleagues in India, China, Singapore. […] Those were people I had almost daily [on 
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workers. Furthermore, technicians and engineers train operators across sites as product lines 





the phone].” This professional connection brought some workers to mobilise when 
distant colleagues were under threat, or at least, to connect with the human element 
of restructuring. Maurice, a French engineer, remarked, “When there are job cuts at 
another site and people see the consequences, given the friendly relations that they 
have with foreign workers, you can have positive solidarity reactions, for example a 
petition in solidarity.” Arnault in Le Mans remembered a layoff when 
I had colleagues who were fired in India and who were crying during 
our team meetings, they were crying on the phone because they were 
losing their jobs… […] I asked around to understand why they are so 
sad to lose their jobs when the discourse is that [India] is a country in 
an economic boom. They said that they are in a zonea little bit like Le 
Mans, where there are no companies nearby. If they want [another job] 
they have to move four hundred kilometres with their families.   
Arnault’s regular contacts with Indian workers allowed him to relate to his Indian 
colleagues and begin to understand their difficulties. Other workers pictured distant 
colleagues as sharing similar experiences and need for respect. Nour, a Moroccan 
operator emphasised that if someone “has given a lot for ST […] you have to 
recognise the time they spent for this company, these are years of their life they spent 
working here. It’s the human factor… you can’t [just fire them].” Choukri, a 
Moroccan technician, stressed the similarities betwe n workers, noting 
It’s the same. Colleagues in the Philippines, Singapore or elsewhere, 
they’re fighting for their rights, to have a better life, to be well paid for 
their efforts, to have their work recognised. They look for peace, like 
us […] to live their life with dignity. […] We fight for the same goal, 
we don’t want to massacre the company or the employer. We want to 
live in collaboration, like partners rather than slaves. 
In her evaluation of internationalist feelings, Ryland (2010, p.67) argues that rather 
than promoting an “idealistic working-class consciousness or social praxis or 
identity,” it is important to look at how workers connect to each other as social beings. 
In these instances, workers extended their care to dis ant colleagues based on either 
their professional relationship, which bridged the geographical distance between 
them, or on core values such as dignity and respect, which take on a particular 
significance in the mouths of Moroccan workers who had to struggle for their dignity 
to be respected (see Appendix 6). This suggests that, w ilst ST’s GPN encompasses 
numerous and varied contexts, it also enabled workers to connect with faraway 
colleagues. If the impact of workers’ positionalities above emphasises that 
“geography matters,” workers’ reactions also show how this geography can be 





relationships, and political narratives, however fleeting and modest these 
connections are. 
Union leaders recognised the power of this empathy when they stressed the need for 
personal contacts and promoted the sharing of storie  along with data comparison. 
For instance, Guiseppe expressed how hearing about the story of the UMT’s 
struggles against ST’s discrimination had reinforced his commitment to the TUN 
(notes November 2016). In Agrate, after the presentation by the UMT representative 
and me, workers suggested setting up a Facebook page and a YouTube channel and 
using the unions’ notice boards to periodically publish news from other sites, because 
they saw these stories as vital to giving the international a material reality and 
overcoming the distance imposed by ST (notes, November 2016). Likewise, holding 
that “when you meet people, it takes a material dimension, it’s embodied, instead of 
staying just theoretical,” Baptiste tried to organise bilateral site visits to confront 
workers’ temptation to scale back to local issues and to encourage “a discourse which 
gives a more global vision of the world, of the working relationships at the global 
scale.” 104 Laura, after the second TUN gathering, stressed that meeting people was 
crucial for international solidarity to feel less abstract (notes, September 2017). 
When a picture of Chinese workers mobilising against the 2016 restructuring plan 
arrived in the inbox of a French union leader and then circulated through the TUN, 
André argued that “seeing the Chinese workers’ picture with their banner to ask for 
equal treatment, that had a lot of impact. Because for once, [workers] saw people.” 
He argued that since they do not often hear from Chinese ST sites, this picture really 
touched people, illustrating again the importance of seeing other workers to connect 
with their plight and to care about them. 
The desire for direct contact and stories led the TUN, independently of Industri’ALL 
and through my support, to set up a WhatsApp group, with over thirty participants, 
which union leaders still use to share stories, pictures and ask brief questions. I 
believe that this group was key to building concrete r lations between union leaders, 
who had names, stories and voices. In addition, members of the TUN searched for 
ways to improve the exchange of stories, in order for workers to feel part of this 
international network (notes, September 2017). In this sense, the stories began to 
function as an alternative to the data that ST refused to circulate internationally and 
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not answer the CGT about whether they would co-host the invitation, delaying the invitation 
(notes, May 2017). Summer events (Ramadan and holidays) further pushed back the visit, 
until the focus shifted towards preparing the TUN. This failure illustrates the simple 





that unions struggled to collect. They wrote two newsl tters, which they distributed 
to workers, who welcomed them for the stories and images they provided from 
across the sites (notes, September 2017). These attmpts to foster ongoing exchanges 
of stories, pictures and direct contact represent pragmatic ways to heed Ryland’s 
(2010) contention that the social being of workers matters to their international 
solidarity efforts. I believe that these simple tools helped build empathy between 
union leaders and workers and supported them in creating their geography of care. 
These are humble suggestions and they are of course not enough: I show below that 
inspiring goals and accessible tactics are also key. 
This was one area where my research and “resourcing” approach worked together. 
When visiting different leaders, I always brought stories and pictures to share and 
worked to collect more. I recounted in Catania how the unions in Crolles had worked 
with a labour inspector to keep track of union leaders’ career advancements, 
documentation which had pressured ST to stop discriminating against union leaders. 
This information led Catania leaders to contact the CGT for more information (notes 
June 2018). I prodded Guila to explain how in Agrate they had won flexible time for 
white-collar workers to encourage women engineers to stay in ST (notes, September 
2016). I was careful to not create a unidirectional stream from European to Global 
South unions. For instance, the UMT leaders explained how they had equalised 
workers’ annual bonuses across categories and achieved an agreement that all new 
engineer hires would be evenly distributed across gender, two victories which 
impressed French and Italian representatives (notes, September 2017). I emphasise 
this two-way circulation because, although Guillaume noted that, “we [in places with 
long histories of trade unionism] should learn from [unions in the Global South],” 
not all leaders embraced this reciprocity, and some became wary of sharing their 
stories. 
Lucas, a representative from Agrate, thus explained that he no longer wanted to talk 
about their local issues with the TUN, because he felt that other leaders had latched 
onto one safety issue they had faced, when no one had said anything about the deaths 
in Singapore or Morocco (notes, May, 2017). This biased portrayal of history – union 
leaders had strongly reacted to these deaths – reveals a type of pride that said that 
they, in Italy, were “strong” enough to not need others’ help and symbolises a vision 
of solidarity as charity, flowing from more wealthy workers to less advantaged ones. 
This question, whether solidarity was a reciprocal attempt to fight for everyone or 
charity, underlined international interactions. For instance, at the second TUN 





touch workers, to which a CGT representative replied that stories should not just 
dwell on Southern workers’ misery, explaining that in France, workers also faced 
unfair practices, such as when disabled workers were unlawfully dismissed in 
Crolles (notes, September 2017). Yet, another CISL representative dismissed this 
story as inappropriate, holding that French workers were the most privileged of ST 
workers (notes, September 2017). This interaction reveals the complex balance 
required between recognising workers’ uneven rights and benefits, and avoiding a 
charity posture, which echoes an older colonialist posture. As I show in Section 2, 
this conflict also appeared in the pursuit for the GFA: whilst some leaders 
emphasised the GFA to help workers in the Global South, Baptiste saw this 
charitable “well-meaningness” as “poison,” in its emphasis on help, rather than a 
common struggle (notes, May 2017). In addition, the reluctance to share stories 
resonates with Wad’s (2014, p.13) observation that creating global union networks 
“may cause union leaders to feel loss of ‘sovereignty.’” Anderson (2012) claims that 
local stories and struggles are crucial to energise lobal networks. However, the 
reactions above show that enabling the sharing of storie  necessitates that union 
leaders accept a measure of vulnerability and “need” an  agree to the loss of control 
this sharing represents. There lies the tension in building truly reciprocal solidarity: 
the need for unions to desire international solidarity not only in support of others, 
but also for themselves. In Section 2, I also show that how unions negotiated the 
international’s “threat” to unions’ sovereignty favoured moderate unions’ goals.  
Holding these caveats in mind, I still encouraged the sharing of stories so the 
international could be embodied in people and places rather than just disseminated 
via the abstract notion of building power through information. By disseminating 
stories, I also tried to encourage a sense of the possible, gently challenging what was 
seen as “normal” at each site. As Wills (1998) notes, stories of distant workforces 
and their victories can stimulate other workers to act, showing the landscape of 
possible victories and reminding workers that despit  ongoing pressure, they can and 
do win. After seeing pictures of Moroccan workers’ sit-downs, Sophie, for instance, 
remarked that “in times when [we feel that] nothing works, for sure to hear that others 
decided to do something […] which was successful, that’s encouraging.” Some 
unions drew on my visits to talk about international issues, which often got sidelined 
in branch conversations (notes November, 2016; February 2017; June 2018). In 
sharing stories, like Rathzel et al. (2013), I worked to translate the context, history 
and meaning of each story. As I grew more familiar with various sites and union 





exchanges needed to be navigated with care, whether that meant explaining why 
Muslim union leaders would not shake a woman’s hand, the conflicts between 
French leaders, the Maltese representative’s fears or the political difficulties that 
militant organising face in Malaysia. Routledge et al.'s (2006) analysis of 
international networks brings attention to the role of particular so-called 
“imagineers.” They claim that these individuals, with access to material and non-
material resources – mobility, linguistic abilities and knowledge of different cultural 
contexts – become crucial to sustaining an internatio l network (see also Brookes, 
2013; Davies, 2009; Hennebert, 2010). In my research, I ame to adopt such a role. 
That I respected union leaders’ autonomy and focussed on enabling participation 
rather than seeking to direct it, brought many union leaders to trust me. These 
trusting relationships enabled me to bridge some of the suspicion they held of each 
other, whilst my knowledge about each site supported my ability to translate stories 
in accessible language, making the international grspable and set in relationships 
rather than an abstract theoretical goal.  
Dufour-Poirier and Levesque (2013, p.54-55) argue that unions’ “perception of 
transnational trade unionism is grounded in and shaped by local issues and problems.” 
Here, I showed how union leaders in ST were able to give the international a material 
reality and legitimacy by promoting the comparison of information and the sharing 
of site-based stories. This helped international interactions to be embodied in 
relationships and in other workers’ realities, rather than in acronyms on a flyer, 
suggested by a faraway GUF. ST unions’ efforts display, as André argued when 
outlining the importance of politicisation, that workers’ geography of care can also 
be built. Herod (2003, p.127) defines international solidarity as “an explicit attempt 
to bridge space so that the interests on one group of workers can be brought to the 
attention of (and supported by) workers in other parts of the global economy.” I 
showed how, when presented with the social being of their colleagues, workers 
extended their care towards distant others. In these practical efforts, union leaders’ 
socio-spatial positionalities as workers in specific GPNs confronting the competition 
between sites and time pressures related to their work, and union representatives, in 
constant relationships with management, driven by different values and potentially 
in conflict, produced ongoing contradictions, whose negotiation was the basis and 
constraining frame of the TUN’s activities.  Whilst necessarily contradictory, 






2. Building a grassroots internationalism 
 
Whilst the TUN aimed to and did share information and stories, when unions 
requested Industri’ALL’s support to organise the first international meeting of ST 
unions, they also sought to analyse the strategy of the company and to address the 
issue of workers’ freedom of association (letter, March 2016). That the TUN came 
to be increasingly controlled by Industri’ALL and dominated by its goal – the GFA 
– and its tactics, thwarted the TUN from achieving other aims, though this shift was 
contested. Baptiste explained, 
Industri’ALL, it’s a top-down approach, but we built the TUN totally from 
the grassroots level, and some unions favour this [op-down approach]. 
Like Malta, who are really prone to discuss with management […] when I 
think we should organise common petitions, actions etc., and that’s how 
[ST] will listen to us. 
In this section, I argue that union leaders feeling i le itimate at the international scale, 
some union and federal representatives working to undermine a grassroots outlook, 
and TUN members’ emphasising absolute democracy led th  TUN to adopt an 
institutional approach and pursue a toothless GFA. This abstract aim answered none 
of the needs of ST unions and the tactics chosen limited the power unions were able 
to build, leading the international to become irrelevant to workers’ and unions’ needs 
but also distant from their scale and means of power. This outcome demonstrates the 
importance of an international campaign that reflects workers’ needs and the role 
that a TUN’s internal dynamics and its members’ ideologies play in the performance 
of a genuinely reciprocal, empowering, and grassroot  internationalism. 
Writing this analysis presented me with an emotional a d ethical dilemma, because 
I genuinely respect most union leaders and struggled with writing what may appear 
as sharp critiques of trusting participants, who alng with all their shortcomings, 
embodied and pushed for the TUN to exist for three years, whilst also continuously 
fighting for workers’ rights and dignity – in various fashion  – locally. Furthermore, 
I was involved in this experiment and it was hard to dissociate its failure from my 
own shortcomings. Although I continued to support cracks within the process, 
facilitating bilateral phone calls, questions and translation on the WhatsApp group, 
at the end of the day, given that I was not democratically accountable to ST’s 






a. Finding international legitimacy 
 
The TUN was founded upon the efforts of CGT and UMT leaders supported by 
ReAct and then joined by other union leaders. Before representatives met formally 
in September 2016, they had taken part in multiple multinational conference calls; 
acted in a semi-coordinated manner to push for a change of strategy in ST; shared 
regular communication through a WhatsApp group; and questioned ST’s global HR 
about laid off workers in China (see Chapter 4). At the same time, these efforts faced 
pressures from the union federations, whose representatives encouraged leaders to 
contact all unions in ST to convince Industri’ALL to get involved – as more of its 
affiliates were involved – rather than self-organise the first international meeting. 
This prompted the CGT leader to fear that the federations’ involvement would lead 
to an ineffective international meeting, where only federal staff members would 
attend rather than company workers, and that inviting all unions would tamp down 
any action other than reaching out to management and hat such participants might 
relay information back to the company (notes, May 2016). Apprehensive of these 
possible outcomes, he advocated for the TUN to carry on, largely ignoring 
Industri’ALL’s agenda. For a while, the TUN managed to juggle these two 
contradictory logics, though as time went on, the grassroots-based approach was 
superseded by the top-down approach favoured by some unions, federations and 
Industri’ALL, which upheld the signing of the GFA as  “win-win” and discouraged 
attempts to create leverage over ST.  
Key to this shift was the way Jiro increasingly became the spokesperson for the TUN. 
Whilst CGT leaders had welcomed Industri’ALL funding Malaysian and Moroccan 
leaders to attend the first TUN meeting, they grew critical of Jiro’s acting in the name 
of the TUN, a view that, importantly, not all union leaders shared. The CISL and 
CGIL leaders suggested the TUN could push for the GFA through the EWC structure, 
because Jiro had explained that this approach had enabled other GUFs to sign GFAs 
(notes, November 2016). In December 2016, they invited Jiro to attend the EWC 
meeting, where he introduced the unions’ demand for a GFA to the European HR 
representatives. Baptiste condemned this initiative, both for what it represented – a 
non-company-related person speaking for ST unions, in a space where Moroccan 
and Malaysian leaders had no voice – and for the content of Jiro’s speech (see below) 
(notes, December 2016). By contrast, other union leaders welcomed Jiro’s approach 





In March 2017, evaluating how to respond to ST’s refusal to discuss the GFA, CISL, 
GWU and EIEUSR representatives suggested that Jiro ry t  establish an informal 
conversation with ST’s headquarters (notes, March 2017) and the CGIL 
representative agreed, adding the need for intercession by the EWC. The CFE-CGC 
representative, in the meantime, lobbied for other French federations to exclude 
ReAct from the process and for federal representatives to negotiate the GFA, 
deeming that federal representatives were ST’s legitimate interlocutors (notes, 
March 2017).105 CGT leaders convinced their federal representative to oppose this 
plan, suspecting that it was also motivated by federations’ hope to be financed by ST 
(notes, March 2017). They emphasised that Jiro should be a means for their struggle, 
rather than directing it (notes, April 2017). The influence of an institutional vision 
spread. European representatives met with Jiro in May 2017 – non-European leaders 
and I were not involved – and decided again to focus on contacting management. 
Despite my concerns, I respected the leaders’ autonomy and recognised the 
importance of the favourable business conditions in shaping this measured stance,  
The fact that fabs are fully loaded and that a new CEO will soon be 
nominated also prevents ambitious demands from emerging. [This is 
exacerbated by] the paralysis that inter-union division in France 
brings about. And I cannot decide for workers what t ey should do. 
[…] This network follows its own rhythm, fast-paced when reacting 
to the death of the worker in Singapore, and then anchored down by 
local issues, which absorb the time, attention and imagination of union 
representatives (notes, June 2017).  
Control continued to shift away from union leaders. During a conference call 
preparing for the second TUN meeting, Jiro hinted that Baptiste was overstepping 
his role by trying to host it and went on to impose his agenda, challenging the press 
conference organised by Grenoble leaders and decreasing the time allocated for 
issues-based discussion, thus cancelling the possibility of running thematic 
campaigns alongside the GFA one (notes, July 2017). At the meeting, the fight for 
control continued to play out over who would facilitate the day and set the TUN’s 
goals. I sometimes stepped in, whether to ensure that Moroccan leaders could speak, 
or when closing the meeting by asking union leaders for feedback on their experience 
of, and desires for, the TUN, hoping that, if everyone spoke, they would appropriate 
the network as their own, rather than it delegate it to Industri’ALL (notes, September 
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2017). At first, TUN members agreed to organise data collection in a decentralised 
way, which answered to Baptiste’s fear that having o e TUN coordinator would 
make its administration a goal rather than a means (notes, October 2017). However, 
when the data collection exercise failed, Jiro took ver facilitating the network. This 
failure may have strengthened the pull of institutional approaches, which in theory 
promised more certainty. Conference calls became more and more focussed on 
process rather than content, ignoring local issues, th  nomination of a new CEO for 
ST, or the need to build relationships between leaders (notes, March, April 2018). 
Whilst I continued to cultivate more grassroots efforts, I was also on increasingly 
shaky ground, since the “appropriate” actor was now in charge, whereas my 
legitimacy only rested on the relationships I had developed and since most unions 
had approved of this shift. 
These skirmishes, along with the increasing delegation of authority to Jiro, reflect 
the tension at the heart of imagining a grassroots internationalism. When existing 
institutions have the remit over the international scale, how can local leaders 
appropriate an international space of discussion? When ReAct and CGT leaders 
started to talk about increasing collaboration betwe n unions in ST, the CGT leader 
remarked that “coordinating unions’ activities at the international level, well there’s 
a problem. Because there is already an institutional actor whose responsibility it is 
to do that. So we can’t really step on their toes…” (notes, September 2015). Similarly 
the CFDT leader argued that although “workers should really be in control, […] 
institutions want to use institutions as there are, it’s logical. […] Industri’ALL is 
meant for this [international interaction].” These comments and the shift within the 
TUN suggest that a type of “scalar territoriality” is at play, i.e., each scale has its 
legitimate representatives, leading representatives from one scale to feel less 
legitimate at another or to have to struggle for legitimacy. Interestingly, this 
perspective replicates the logic put forward by the company. Whilst ST refused to 
engage with Industri’ALL, the legitimate “international” representative, arguing that 
they already had sufficient discussion channels, the tensions recounted above point 
to a similar logic within labour structures according to which each scale has its 
appropriate bodies and representatives. Attempts to create new channels are thus 
resisted by the company, of course, but also by the some of the unions’ own 
institutional structures. This was a contradiction-filled situation: federations 
politically cannot openly discourage their leaders from getting volved in 
international interactions and some federations also disagreed with the GUF’s 





with international issues – in a situation when they often lacked funds – and needed 
to protect their scale of power to justify their appointments. 106 
Importantly, this was not just about federations: some unions, notably the more 
conservative ones, deferred to Industri’ALL, in part, I argue, because they knew that 
Industri’ALL promoted a non-threatening approach (see below) which suited their 
union culture and ideology. The differences between unions’ approaches became 
particularly problematic because of how the international space was imagined: 
consensus was deemed necessary before anything could be done in the TUN’s name. 
The CISL representative summarised this informal rule as “in the TUN, we have to 
be one. We can only do things that we all agree upon. We can’t do it by majority 
rule” (notes, September 2017). This democratic impulse, whilst crucial to ensuring 
that unions did not use some workers’ issues without them having a voice (for 
instance using Filipino workers’ lack of freedom of association) and to answering 
unions’ fear of a loss of sovereignty, became a way for conservative unions to thwart 
any action from happening. The CFE-CGC thus slowed down other French unions’ 
attempts to distribute flyers denouncing ST management’s refusal to meet with the 
TUN. Similarly, the TUN’s rule that all French unios needed to have a unified 
position effectively reinforced the CFE-CGC’s, and i creasingly the CFDT’s, ability 
to get in the way of data collection and initiatives in France (notes, March 2017).  
This shows how respecting unions’ sovereignty at the international level, in practice, 
can favour moderate unions, which whether for lack of interest, closeness to 
management, or just divergent union cultures, can the make the international follow 
their pace. Thus, whilst the number of unions is potentially key to activating a GUF’s 
interest in supporting a TUN and theoretically more f them should increase their 
collective power, that they hold divergent and potentially conflicting stances, within 
a framing of the international space as ruled by consensus, meant that in practice 
having more unions led the international scale to be governed by the lowest common 
denominator. The structuring of the international space may thus in practice 
discourage more radical approaches, as suggested by Hauf (2017) and illustrating 
how the conception of a scale is always a political endeavour, underlined by 
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questions, but did not trust local workers to be interested (notes, February 2017), whilst 
during my visit to Muar, I realised that the EIEUSR committee had not really shared the 






struggles, including within labour. This demonstrates the necessity to analyse unions’ 
stances, not just because they may promote a self-int rested internationalism (pace 
Herod, 2003a; Johns, 1998), but also because these id ologies interact with how the 
international space is structured. Addressing this issue, I believe, necessitates that 
international efforts respect a union’s autonomy– to guard against local issues being 
exploited by other unions at the international leve – but also to let unions act 
independently of others, within all the scales they belong to. This is of course 
politically complex, since I would feel more wary of the CFE-CGC acting at the 
international level than of the UMT or CGT. However the alternative, i.e., requiring 
consensus in practice, already allowed moderate unions to “control” the international. 
Lastly, I believe that these difficulties were reinforced by a paucity of the 
imagination regarding what grassroots-based internaional efforts can achieve. Local 
union leaders were in unfamiliar territory at the international level and somewhat at 
a loss in terms of what they could do, reinforcing the institutional actor which could 
seemingly offer certainty, this scale being its speciality. A federal ally of the CGT 
leaders explained that it was only after taking part in several Industri’ALL meetings 
that he became able to voice his opinions in internatio al discussions (notes, 
November 2015). Laura said that she had difficulty participating in international 
exchanges because they took place in English, but, she added, “it’s not just about 
language. It’s the issue to dare to do something which we aren’t used to doing.” Just 
as union leaders may benefit from hearing stories about other unions’ local victories, 
I believe that they need more stories of how to imagine and practice “the 
international” in a grassroots-led way. This thesis tried to add one story to the many 
stories that need building. 
My discussion of the fight to control the TUN showed that the building of a 
grassroots effort in ST was hindered by the “scalar territoriality” that still permeates 
unions’ practices and representations. Cumbers and Routledge (2010) suggest that 
the vertical hierarchies through which the GUF they studied operated, constituted 
one key barrier to grassroots internationalism. I demonstrated the continued 
pertinence of this critique, which I extended to national federations, along with the 
difficulties prompted by the influence of more conservative approaches. ST unions 
also struggled to maintain their grassroots efforts when in practice they lacked the 
imagination of what to do together at the international level. My discussion restates 
the need to understand the varied practices and perspectives which thread through a 
TUN, the struggle within “labour” these differences may prompt and crucially, how 





struggles and representations have an impact on promoting a grassroots approach. 
As I next show, the approach chosen mattered not only regarding grassroots leaders’ 
involvement but also in terms of the goals and tactics pursued, and from there, the 
relevance of international efforts to local workforces and unions’ needs. 
b. Tactics and goals, the moving sands of abstraction 
 
In September 2016, Jiro suggested that the unions pursue a GFA. He emphasised 
that it would differ from a corporate Code of Conduct because it would be a 
negotiated agreement that covered suppliers, mentioned all fundamental labour 
conventions, and offered a basis for greater social dialogue between the company 
and existing unions (notes, September 2016). Whilst each of these points is important, 
they are abstract. They show a “recipe” approach to international solidarity through 
standardised and pre-ordained motions. None of these goals spoke to the specific 
experiences of workers in ST, apart from the desire by some unions to have more 
social dialogue with the company. However, achieving a GFA presented a goal that 
was clearly international and a seemingly easy first step to continue the international 
activities initiated in 2016. It also addressed ST unions’ stated aim to tackle the issue 
of workers’ freedom of association, when the other stated aim, to discuss the global 
strategy of ST, stumbled over the fact that not all union leaders agreed on speaking 
about strategy (see Chapter 6 and above). To both support the process and make it 
more relevant to ST workers, some TUN members and Itried to incorporate demands 
in the draft agreement which would materially benefit workers in ST. For instance, 
we suggested articles to limit the maximum weekly working hours to address the 12-
hour shifts in Muar; gender equality; and additional w ys to enforce workers’ 
freedom of association (notes, November 2016).  
However, the effort to “thicken” the GFA with workers’ issues came up against the 
simple fact that national regulations, notably in Europe, were often more protective 
than a GFA, for which there are still few compliance mechanisms, would be (see 
McCallum and Fichter, 2015). That the GFA could not improve European workers’ 
rights encouraged European unions to perceive it as for others, which fundamentally 
undermined its international premise. This posture became visible when the TUN 
agreed that Italian representatives would question HR representatives during the 
CSR presentation planned in Castalletto (notes, October 2016). The CISL 
representative emphasised that questions should not address Italian or French issues 





proposal that relegated the GFA as only for “others,” holding that “‘we’ aren’t doing 
well at all, but no one wants to say that” (notes, October 2016), echoing the issue of 
union pride I mentioned above. He argued, “of course we want rights for those who 
don’t have any, but we need to also speak about strategy, because otherwise, within 
the next five years, we’ll be on the dole!” (notes, October 2016). He thus tried to 
bring focus back to what he saw as an issue that spoke to every site’s interest. Yet 
this proposition was not taken forward, because, as noted above, EIEUSR and GWU 
representatives felt corporate strategy was management’s prerogative, whilst other 
members did not feel back-end unions could comprehend this topic. 
The debate continued to play out as the TUN pushed for the GFA. The CFDT leader 
argued that the TUN’s demands should speak to all workers because, if they, as 
French unions, only defended “faraway” workers, they would lose credibility with 
French workers (notes, May 2017). The CGIL representatives outlined both the need 
for the TUN to “raise rights on the weaker side” and that they should all learn from 
each other, as they had things to fight for in common (notes, April 2017). CISL 
representatives continued to focus on the GFA and the TUN more broadly as a way 
to help non-European workers. Thus, when a UMT representative and I gave a 
presentation in Agrate, a CISL representative described the goal of the TUN as 
helping non-organised workers, such as those in the Philippines, to gain dignity 
(notes, November 2016). Whilst there are blatant inequalities between Global North 
and South workforces, this way of seeing, possibly not understood in such a light by 
those who upheld it, sets victims and saviours. It suggests an implicit and patronising 
power dynamic, especially when articulated with a refusal to speak about one’s own 
issues. After this presentation, I asked the local union committee whether there were 
issues from Agrate which the GFA could attempt to address. The CISL’s leader 
quickly shut down the discussion, illustrating both possible issues of democracy 
within each union, and the difficulty of some unions to open their local remit to other 
unions.107 The CISL leader instead suggested that representatives at each local, 
national and European negotiation bring up the matter of the GFA, asking “for rights 
for the countries with fewer rights” (notes, November 2016).  
Meanwhile, those imagined “in need” “non-European” workers and organisations 
were not particularly enthusiastic about the GFA. The UMT, locally strong enough 
to negotiate without needing an international agreement, supported the GFA in the 
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name of “brothers and sisters,” though who these workers were was unclear. The 
EIEUSR’s ideology and closeness to management, I believe, meant that whilst they 
supported the GFA in the abstract, they feared demanding things which would affect 
their site, whilst the suggestion to cap weekly hours encountered the division 
between workers mentioned in Chapter 6. The Filipino u ion stayed silent, which, I 
understood later, reflected their strategic shift towards organising workers within 
neighbourhoods rather than companies (notes, July 2017). This shows that unions 
may not always see international solidarity as the best source of leverage or may not 
always be willing to leverage their potential power. It also demonstrates the issue of 
irrelevance that overshadows international efforts that implicitly rely upon 
“oppressed” and “faraway” workers asking for help and do not fight for issues which 
speak to all workers.  
Amidst the complex difficulties of how to make the international speak to union 
leaders and navigate the leaders’ different ideologies, Jiro’s posture exacerbated the 
abstraction of the GFA by choosing, as a tactic, to dilute the GFA’s demands to 
make it an easier agreement to sign. Thus, at the Dec mber 2016 EWC meeting, Jiro 
offered to remove articles that might bother management, i.e., all the articles that 
would make a difference to ST workers. Hearing Jirosuggest that the GFA would 
not mention a cap on maximum weekly hours, so as not to discourage the company 
from signing, a CGT leader exclaimed “the GFA will mean nothing and Jiro is a 
catastrophe” (notes, December 2016). He saw this proposal as proving that 
Industri’ALL was pursuing its agenda to achieve a GFA in this sector,108 and 
evidence that Jiro would push for a “toothless agreem nt,” which would be a “pure 
publicity act” and might disappoint Moroccan and Malaysian comrades and stifle 
enthusiasm for the TUN (notes, December 2016). He argued:  
The enthusiasm in Malaysia for the GFA is not a fairy tale. But if, in 
the end, we negotiate that we will meet three times a year in front of 
canapés, it’s not going to work. For sure, ST will not negotiate on 
anything that will improve the working conditions in front- and back-
end sites. […] We need to guarantee at least one or two substantial wins, 
in order to say that we won this, that it’s worth saying in the TUN and 
fighting to achieve progress. 
His comment is about politics, i.e., whether to relat  to management through cosy 
discussion or through negotiation on material changes, but also reflects a tactical 
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consideration about how to make the TUN’s effort worthwhile and legitimate in front 
of workers. It also illustrates my point about European union leaders seeing the GFA 
to be for Southern workers rather than for European ones.  
Jiro and some union leaders continued to focus on asking for a discussion with 
management, hoping that branding the GFA as a win-win situation protecting all 
workers’ rights whilst supporting ST’s CSR claims would facilitated reaching such 
a meeting. Italian flyers written to denounce ST’s refusal to meet Industri’ALL 
deplored that “STMicroelectronics’ management does not understand the value 
added by a long-term relationship with worker representatives.” It described the 
GFA as  
a mutual commitment to achieve harmonious industrial relations 
throughout the company’s operations [that] provides the necessary 
mechanisms to deal with problems before they escalate, improves 
corporate performance, and allows the company to tell customers that 
it complies with the highest social standards. 
In addition to this “win-win” argument, it listed other companies that had signed a 
GFA, I believe, to reassure workers of the “reasonableness” of the demand.  The 
CGT leader disagreed with this tactic, saying, “it’s useless to present the GFA like 
it’s good for ST’s management, it just isn’t!” This insistence is telling at least in 
showing that, in the eyes of the CGT, it should not be. Encouraged by CISL, GWU, 
CFE-CGC and CGIL representatives, Jiro suggested inviting ST representatives to 
the second TUN meeting, an attempt which CGT leaders saw as pointless, since 
“taking part in a discussion means recognising the TUN,” which management clearly 
refused to do (notes, June 2017). Another CGT leader saw this invitation as 
replicating the problem with EWC meetings, where ST could present information 
and boast about its CSR achievements without there b ing any space to challenge 
the veracity of these claims or to negotiate nything (notes, June 2017). In waiting 
for ST’s answer, the campaign lost momentum, whilst Jiro's focus on persuading 
management enacted the international as a series of meetings, conducted by himself 
beyond workers' reach, whilst the diluted GFA he suggested made the international 
ever more abstract. 
By contrast, after a year of politely demanding that ST speak to the TUN, the UMT, 
CGT and the CFDT representatives suggested building leverage through direct 
action, petitions and media pressure. 109 At the second TUN meeting, UMT leaders 
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suggested that a delegation from each site could stage a sit-in in front of management 
offices to increase pressure on global HR. A CGT leader similarly emphasised the 
need for the international to be concrete for workers, through coordinated 
international actions like the ones initiated in Spring 2016 or delivering a petition to 
the French state targeting both ST’s long-term strategy and the need to increase all 
workers’ social benefits (notes, September 2017). Another CGT leader argued, “we 
need to think again about ‘the political,’ that is what to ask for together and how to 
obtain it. […] We could have coordinated actions to call out management as soon 
there is an issue in one site.” Several TUN members ag eed to a coordinated day of 
action lest the TUN run out of fuel. A CISL representative suggested picking one 
theme, such as health and safety or gender inequality, based on a personal story, and 
organising a multi-site event. Discussion channelled this idea towards the publishing 
of a “sustainability report” compiled by union members, which could build evidence 
for the GFA and help convince ST’s management to open talks. This counter-report 
had been a long-standing suggestion by the CFDT repres ntative, who argued, “We 
need to find something to attack [ST]’s image […] that’s how we’ll get them. […] 
You need an accident, a precise issue. I’m not convinced, like the Italians or the CGC, 
about going through the EWC.”  I was wary of this search for a scandal, because it 
reintroduced a narrative of victims and saviours and because of the practical issues 
that would then arise and further delay the TUN, fears which were sadly confirmed. 
The debate on tactics that took place throughout the TUN shows that, as much as 
each union and structure favoured certain tactics, there was room for negotiation: 
GUFs and federations cannot openly stop their affili tes from pursuing their own 
agendas and members of the TUN also appreciated the need for concrete actions to 
embody the TUN. Moreover, it shows the different targets imagined by each union: 
whether local management in the case of a sit-in, global management in the case of 
a coordinated day of action, the French and Italian st tes in the case of a petition or 
shareholders and clients through a media-focussed action. These varying targets 
show that unions also differed in their understanding of power, and pragmatically, 
show the need for more collective analyses of corporate power for unions to be able 
to select the most strategic ways to achieve their demands. 
In this discussion, I showed the key opportunity and danger of unions pursuing a 
GFA. As McCallum and Fichter (2015) argue, a GFA can help structure international 
efforts because it can create an arena for the pursuit of global labour relations, but 
                                                          






also crucially, I argue, because it offers a directon for international efforts. In a 
landscape that presents few avenues for common workapart from reacting to 
scandalous workers’ rights abuse, unions, GUFs and scholars alike are clutching at 
straws for possible international aims and a GFA dangles answers. However, this 
case study shows that, whilst the campaign for a GFA gave a direction to the TUN, 
it also made the international too abstract and emphasised the GFA, and by extension, 
international solidarity, as for “others.” At the same time, advancing the GFA 
through social dialogue tactics further distanced the international effort from workers.  
In a situation when workers already perceive internatio al organising as separate 
from everyday concerns and as a long-term goal which does not answer their short-
term needs (Featherstone, 2012), that Jiro pushed for a toothless GFA made the 
international scale irrelevant as a source of leverag  for the workers who had strong 
local bargaining power, whether thanks to protectiv national laws or built-in 
structural power. Cumbers et al.’s (2008, p.381) claim that GFAs which “are not 
firmly embedded in the particular places of work […] will be relatively superficial 
networks,” and this was demonstrated in the fact that, save from Industri’ALL, no 
union really needed the GFA. Unions fought for the GFA in a “shallow” fashion, 
i.e., to help others rather than themselves and based on ideological, or potentially 
charitable, beliefs rather than common interests. Cumbers et al. (2008, p.381) 
criticise GFAs for potentially imposing “European ad North American corporatist 
practices on unions in the global south.” More than imposing a social dialogue 
vision, I argued that the very process of pursuing a GFA encouraged a charity mind-
set, underpinned by unions’ reluctance to open up their own local issues to 
international scrutiny. Lastly, whilst McCallum and Fichter’s (2015) suggest that 
social dialogue is a strategic way to secure a GFA, in this case, that approach was 
problematic because it built no leverage and offered no way to mobilise workers in 
support, since the locus of agency was Industri’ALL, which, in terms of structural, 
coalitional and institutional power, had the least amount of power.  
Given the struggle that opening an international spce of interaction represents, as 
shown by ST’s numerous tactics to undermine the attemp  to create a global scale of 
discussion, I believe that “the international” needs to be relevant and meaningful to 
workers, otherwise they will not build the power necessary to open and sustain this 
scale of interactions. Whilst global campaigns may be initiated and energised by a 
vibrant local issue, often around a blatant unfair practice (see for instance  Anderson, 
2015; Brookes, 2013a, 2017; Castree, 2000a), finding ways to build long term 





campaign and their GFA effort suggests that, in TNCs which feature no flagrant 
scandal, there is a need to imagine more than bargainin  for rules, but for rights, 








The first difficulty is that there is no binding legal framework for the 
company to come to an agreement [at the international level]. […] The 
second difficulty is to successfully create the feeling of being in the same 
company and of having common interests, and to share this feeling with 
workers. The third difficulty is that, at one point or another, we’ll have to 
organise common actions and they’ll need to be sufficiently powerful to have 
an impact on the company’s policies. (Maurice) 
Maurice’s quote clearly explains how, with no institutional power to draw upon, 
unions need to create intra-union power by building common interests between 
workers in order to leverage inter-union power capable of opening an international 
space denied by the company. Throughout this Chapter, I showed the difficulties that 
piled up as ST unions tried to achieve this. Along with the expected resistance of 
their employer, the pragmatic issues of lack of time, uneven resources and varied 
abilities to speak in the chosen lingua franca, I emphasised the importance of workers’ 
and unions’ socio-spatial positionalities and ideologies. These shaped workers’ 
ability to care for faraway colleagues, their ability to trust other union leaders’ 
motivations and their desire to work together. Whilst important, I also showed how 
union leaders attempted to work around these reactions and to create a greater feeling 
of comradeship and care between ST’s workforces by sharing stories and 
establishing direct contacts between workers, efforts which, I believe, were 
significant in grounding international solidarity and starting to perform a more 
grassroots internationalism.  
Beyond these positionalities and stances, I also stressed the politics inherent in 
building scales and their representations. I showed that, in the TUN, how the 
international was imagined had consequences for how it was performed and crucially 
which organisation was in charge and able to impose its vision. Some leaders 
endorsed a top-down vision that held that the obvious nternational labour actor, the 
GUF, should speak for the TUN. Other leaders pictured the TUN as the apex of a 
pyramid with the local at the base and the internatio l on top, with each scale 
requiring an agreed-upon stance, whilst others helda grassroots approach, where 
each union could initiate international activities without waiting for others’ approval. 
That the first and second vision merged – in a context where the international scale 
“structurally” does not belong to local leaders, who lack confidence in what they can 
do at the international level and where moderate unions favoured institutional 
approaches – led TUN members to delegate coordination to Industri’ALL’s 





uphold consensus at the international scale reinforced conservative unions’ abilities 
to stymie grassroots approaches and more confrontati al tactics, demonstrating 
how scales are not only nested but intermingled. Whilst Anderson (2015) suggests 
that local issues can reverberate and energise a network, I show the flipside of such 
an influence: how the international was imagined as consensus-based became 
intertwined with local situations and unions’ ideologies to work against more 
grassroots internationalism. Given such entangled consequences, I outlined the need 
to imagine the international space in a way that respects local autonomy without 
kerbing militant dreams, though this requires facing serious contradictions in terms 
of democracy between unions and building power across unions more generally.  
Amidst these conditions, I emphasised the importance of unions grounding 
international solidarity in concrete data exchange, stories, relationships, and needs 
in order for workers to be able to care about distant others, see international solidarity 
as relevant to their needs and be able to perform actions with an international outlook. 
This need for grounding was demonstrated by the failure of the TUN once it was 
entrenched in pursuing a GFA. Dufour-Poirier and Levesque (2013, p.52) claim that 
framing transnational unionism to respond to local contexts and needs “emerges as 
a critical prerequisite for sustaining local actors' involvement in the alliance. 
Transnational unionism, without such a frame, may often appear irrelevant and 
inaccessible for workplace trade union leaders.” Indeed, in contrast with the 
campaign against financialisation which answered workers’ fears, created a powerful 
political narrative, and featured a range of tactics (from dialogue to petitions and 
rallies as well as symbolic actions which performed a connection across ST’s 
workforce), or with the direct exchange of stories and information organised by the 
TUN, the choice to pursue a toothless GFA through social dialogue brought on 
increasing abstraction to international efforts. Hyman (2001, p.173) claims that 
“building collective solidarity is in part a question of organizational capacity, but 
just as fundamentally it is part of a battle of ideas.” In advocating for a toothless 
GFA through faraway and institutional procedures, the TUN made internationalism 
a bureaucratic and abstract process, which was unable to excite local workforces and 
unions to fight for its goals, whilst it gave control over the TUN’s timeline to the 
company. Increasingly, the TUN was sustained by personal relationships rather than 
by a vision of what to do together or what it could achieve. This was confirmed by 
the fact that no concrete step has taken place sinc the otherwise comradely third 
TUN meeting. Whilst critical of an institutional approach to international solidarity, 





impacts of workers’ and union leaders’ varied socio-spatial positionalities and 
ideologies and yet, I believe that such grounded-ness is the only way to answer the 
challenge of internationalism as both an ideal of solidarity and a strategy for workers’ 
power. To contribute to the imagination of what such solidarity can mean in practice 
and thus its performance, beyond encouragement, I argue that academics and 
activists alike need to help build stories of grassoots international solidarity. 
Lastly, I showed how TUN members tried to overcome th distances between 
workers through two competing narratives. Some union leaders supported reciprocal 
international exchanges on the basis that to be relevant and supported by workers, 
“the international” should speak to all workers’ interest. Others emphasised the 
TUN’s goals as to help more disadvantaged workers in the Global South rather than 
themselves, a charitable posture which was encouraged by the choice to pursue a 
GFA. I reflected on the need for solidarity to be grounded in reciprocity and shared 
vulnerability to and desire for international solidarity, if it is to be truly radical and 
avoid the pitfalls of charity, whilst acknowledging the difficulty this represents given 
the ongoing competition between sites, but also the uncertainty that opening this 
scale represents for local leaders. Featherstone (2015) speaks of solidarity “without 
guarantee” to highlight how solidarity is a political construction, shaped by different 
relations and connections, which are then open to change, whilst van der Linden 
(2003) argues that internationalism must be achieved time and time again. I hope 

















Chapter 10:  
Conclusion 
 
Throughout the thesis, I engaged with the material realities of work in, and across 
places, in one of the leading industries of the 21st century, to analyse the conditions 
that framed workers’ ability to build power at the international scale and to create a 
geography of care that incorporated workers beyond the national arena. Harvey urges 
that the geography that we write (and make) should be 
A peoples’ geography, not based on pious universalisms, ideals and 
good intents, but a more mundane enterprise that reflects earthly 
interests, and claims, that confronts ideologies and prejudice as they 
really are, that faithfully mirrors the complex weav  of competition, 
struggle, and cooperation within the shifting social and physical 
landscapes of the twentieth [and twenty-first] century. The world must 
be depicted, analyzed, and understood not for what e would like it to 
be but as it really is, the material manifestation of human hopes and 
fears mediated by powerful and conflicting processes of social 
reproduction. (in Mitchell, 2008b, p.102) 
I tried to follow this guideline. I analysed the contradictions, fears and hopes of ST 
workers as I found them in their diverse circumstances while paying attention to the 
ways in which the complex weave of competition and division they faced may 
change. Caught in these site stories and relationships, I struggled to “bind” the story 
and my arguments. Details and contradictions kept pulling at the seams of broad 
claims and, to summarise my core argument, I showed that these realities, stances 
and contradictions framed but also enabled unions’ capacity to act in solidarity with 
one another at the local, national and international sc le and their capacity to renew 





In Chapter 2, I showed the emphasis within labour geography on analysing the 
material conditions of labour agency to assess the possibilities for and co straints on 
progressive politics (Cumbers, 2015; Mitchell, 2011). Coe and Jordhus-Lier (2011) 
suggest that this can be done by “embedding” labour in its temporal and spatial 
dimensions as well as in the GPNs and states they are part of. When attending to 
these questions regarding international labour agency, I used the framework 
developed by Brookes (2013a) to distinguish between unions’ sources of power, 
emphasise the importance of the variegated subject positions from which workers 
act and build intra-union power, and analyse how these varied forms of power and 
culture affected international union collaboration. In Chapter 3, I outline my attempt 
to grasp this international effort through an ethnographic approach, based in 
observation of and participation in the TUN along with site visits and long-term 
relationships with some union leaders and ReAct members. 
My thesis offers three interrelated arguments. I first demonstrated that the ability of 
ST unions to exert structural, institutional and coalitional power was conditioned by 
the world’s uneven development, but also, more specifically, by the spatial and 
temporal dimensions in which workers were embedded. These encompassed the 
particularities of semiconductor production and their r percussions upon national 
territories; the factors which informed how ST’s internal competition organised; sites’ 
contexts; business trends; workers’ socio-spatial positionalities; corporate strategies 
to undermine militant unions; and unions’ varying stances in response to these 
diverse contexts. Second, the thesis showed that attention to workers’ contradictory 
loyalties is important to understand workers’ agency. Workers faced spatial and 
temporal dilemmas, as their need to secure their own site’s survival both pulled them 
apart, and when faced with an existential threat, brought them together. Drawing on 
the example of workers’ fight against ST’s financialis tion, I showed that workers 
may organise to save companies from self-defeating profit-seeking impulses, and in 
so doing, shape their geographies. Attention to these contradictory realities, I 
claimed, is also empirically crucial to workers’ struggles, enabling activists to 
correctly identify and activate sources of leverage nd to understand the landscapes 
within which workers have to manoeuvre. Third, I demonstrated that paying 
attention to specific realities of workers is crucial to the building of international 
labour solidarity, as it is only through being grounded in workers’ concrete needs 
that internationalism will be able to rally them to fight and make international 
solidarity real. In this conclusion, I return to these three interrelated arguments. 





In Chapter 4, I recounted the story of the TUN, introducing the spatialities, 
contradictions and varied stances of each union that made and unmade the TUN over 
time. The following chapters dissected these spatialities and stances, as well as their 
impact on ST unions’ effort to build a grassroots internationalism.  In Chapter 5, I 
showed that the economic and technological factors hat sustain the relentless 
progress of semiconductor production, along with the path dependency feature of 
semiconductor development and the technology’s crucial role in industrial growth 
and military strength, have prompted some states to actively protect their 
semiconductor industry. These territorial and geostrategic interests informed ST’s 
historical development and continue to shape its current location strategies, 
illustrating how firms’ local trajectories are inseparable from global processes and 
how global tendencies shape the various territories which make up a TNC. Beyond 
shaping workers’ landscapes (or states as a patiality), these considerations also 
encouraged front-end unions to adopt nationally focussed strategies to leverage the 
interests of some states as actors, with their own agendas.  
In the context of the competition within ST for investment and production loads, I 
demonstrated that sites, depending on their place in ST’s production network, faced 
diverse pressures mediated by varying significance of labour costs, state support, and 
the need to protect technological secrets. This meant that unions were unevenly 
protected in terms of offshoring and related differently to their states and, in parallel, 
to each other. Since back-end sites’ profitability was more reliant on low labour costs 
than front-end sites’, back-end unions were more wary of sharing data related to 
wages and productivity with one another, whilst front-end unions were more prone 
to develop cooperative relationships with their states to help secure the large capital 
investments required for semiconductor production. These varied conditions, as 
Anner et al. (2009) assert, demonstrate the importance of attending to the sectoral 
specificities that structure the scaled geographies of competition within a TNC in 
order to understand unions’ ability to collaborate internationally. Further, my 
analysis of the campaign by ST unions demonstrated th  continued significance of 
the national scale to workers’ agency. Workers were abl  to leverage the state’s 
interests in this significant sector to achieve their d mands, demonstrating the power 
that is available to workers when they tie their demands to public goals and 
highlighting again the crucial role of the state in the functioning of markets and 
technological development despite the talk of globalisation or financialisation. 
Whilst unions adopted a state-focussed strategy, the  coupled it with a global outlook, 





interconnectedness of ST’s workforce, and by a politica  understanding of solidarity. 
This outlook, as well as the global demands that it put forward, enabled them to 
bypass nationalist reflexes, to some extent and temporarily.  
In Chapter 6, I showed that workers were variously positioned, not just in relation to 
ST’s network of production, but also at the local level, because of their gender, 
immigration status, religion, and job description, all of which shaped their ability to 
build intra-union power. These identities were mediated by broader social contexts 
and discourses; by corporate tactics, which framed th se identities as sources of 
antagonistic interests; and by workers’ own decision  to embrace, or not, these 
identities as divisive. Whilst in some instances these identities reinforced intra-union 
power, in others, notably as a consequence of divisive corporate tactics, they 
undermined workers’ trust in each other and their ability to see a common interest. 
This impact was locally varied: not all unions were qually challenged by workers’ 
diverse positionalities and they responded differently to this challenge. Further, in 
Chapters 6 and 9, I showed that workers’ diverse socio-spatial positionalities were 
also key obstacles to unions ability to develop inter-union power both locally, for 
instance in France, and internationally, within the TUN. Whilst these realities 
presented difficulties for the TUN, ignoring them proved more harmful. 
These variations connect to my third point, namely the importance of attending to 
the stances that unions chose to uphold towards management, becaus  these stances 
were varied, led to more or less ambitious demands to improve working conditions 
and benefits, and divided unions, and by extent their power, locally, nationally and 
internationally. I showed that mistrust between unions was heightened by predictable 
factors such as distance and lack of familiarity, but also by corporate practices which 
targeted individual unionists alternatively with promotions or harassment, to 
estrange them from the workforce and their fellow activists. The various stances 
which unions chose in their conflict (recognised or not) with management 
undermined national and international attempts to build inter-union power. This 
claim illustrates why grounding “labour” in place but also, and crucially, in its 
organisations’ stances, is essential to understanding workers’ ability to organise 
across space (Brookes, 2013a, Birelma, 2018; Bolsmann, 2010). 
The last spatiality I analysed was the international space, embodied in meetings, 
conferences, WhatsApp groups, email threads and concrete actions, that the unions 
created, first as a loose group mobilising against fi ancialisation and second, as a 





realities which encompassed pressing local needs that overwhelmed activists’ time 
and existing tensions between unions, shaped how they interacted with and within 
these international spaces. Furthermore, TUN members disagreed over its guiding 
goals and vision, torn between the institutional approach embodied by Industri’ALL 
and the more locally attuned demands that I, supported by ReAct and some unions, 
tried to promote. The conflict was manifested in the political and interdependent 
questions of who controlled the nascent network, how the network took decisions, 
what it aimed for, and how best to achieve its demands. The answers to these 
questions shaped the outcome of what international solidarity meant as a source of 
leverage and as an ideal. In this instance, because the international was im g ned as 
nested through national spaces which were under the remit of each national union, 
only decisions taken by consensus were deemed to speak for the TUN. This, 
combined with the fact that some unions held moderate approaches, led the 
“democratic” international space to stifle more ambitious demands in favour of 
toothless and uninspiring ones and to halt actions aimed at exerting leverage over 
ST. International collaboration became merely the replica of more conservative 
European approaches to social dialogue, with a patronising hint of “helping” Global 
South unions to achieve the advantages that exist in Europe rather than a struggle 
which mobilised unions on an equal footing, driven by the vision of reciprocal 
solidarity.  
This unsatisfactory outcome, I argued, resulted in part from most unionists’ feelings 
of illegitimacy at the international level, a representation which further favoured the 
status quo. This stresses the need to imagine international labour solidarity as 
embodied in multiple places, relationships and actions, built through trust and time 
rather than belonging to formalised decision-making bodies. In terms of how to make 
decisions at the international level, my work showed the importance of involving all 
unions. However, I also outlined the dangers of having one GUF in charge, and 
stressed that requiring decisions to be taken unanimously in practice favoured more 
conservative approaches. Resolving the tension between building grassroots and 
democratic decision-making international networks without stifling more militant 
approaches, I argue, is crucial to furthering genuinely radical internationalism. 
Finally, I stressed the need to create ways for local unionists to grasp the value of 
international solidarity, notably by having international goals that speak to local 
needs, and representations of international solidarity which straddle care for distant 






These various spatialities (ST’s GPN, unions’ local contexts, workers’ socio-spatial 
positionalities, unions’ stances, and the TUN) were dynamic and interconnected, 
since as much as unions were tied to their local sites, they were able to draw upon 
national laws, emphasise rights provided through international agreements and 
leverage international relationships to destabilise local labour-management regimes 
in their favour. I attempted to thread an attention t  temporalities throughout my 
discussion, showing how workers’ varying temporal st tuses led to a fragmented 
workforce, in which some members were more vulnerabl  than others, and a 
fragmented labour movement, as past conflicts between unions continued to bear on 
present inter-union collaboration. I showed that workers’ various nested and 
intertwined spatialities and temporalities, acted as conditions shaping how unions 
were unevenly able to oppose the company’s plans at the local level and how union 
leaders engaged in and imagined their international activities, and as tools to further 
their interests, whether drawing on memories of a time when the company followed 
an industrial vision to contest its current financialised management, or creating 
professional and emotional connections among workers’ across ST’s GPN. 
- - - 
Throughout my empirical chapters, I illustrated thepertinence of attending to the 
specific and contradictory relational spaces which unions were part of and dissected 
these actors’ potentially contradictory interests and goals. I showed that the French 
and Italian states acted as rent-seeking shareholders, when accepting that ST increase 
its dividends for ten years, and heeded a neolibera vision when they took refuge 
behind the notion of the “free market” to justify the closure of some of ST’s sites. 
Yet, they also switched stances and intervened to curb ST’s financialised strategy 
and to protect the industrial development of some of their territories, following the 
successful mobilisation of a broad section of local actors. Whether ST was run by 
managers seeking personal financial gain or by others who were driven by an 
industrial ambition influenced how the company worked, and crucially, how workers 
related to their labour. The variously politicised relationships that union members 
had with local management as well as their differing u ion’s ideologies undermined 
trust between unionists, and thus their ability to work together at a range of scales. 
Lastly, workers chose, or chose not, to know about and care for workers in different 
roles and sites.  
Showing that “labour,” “capital,” or “the state” when embodied in concrete people 





assessing pragmatically potential sources of coalitional power and leverage that 
unions could draw upon, whether that meant finding shared interests with public 
representatives and corporate clients or finding shared demands which could bridge 
the division between blue- and white-collar workforces and between differently-
placed unions. Cumbers et al. (2008, p.371) claim that “labour is taken too often as 
a given without a deeper conceptualization of […] its international constitution and 
divisions, and its relations to other actors within global capitalism such as ‘the state’ 
and ‘capital.’” Theoretically, attending to the granularity of each actor responded to 
this critique along with Glassman’s (2011) emphasis on the understanding the 
geopolitical aspects of a GPN; Schoenberger’s call (2001) to attend to the 
individualities of each manager; and Wills’ suggestion (2008a) to “mess up” class in 
order to analyse the multiple positionalities and identities which may both 
complicate, sustain or renew class politics. As I argued, recognising workers’ “messy” 
identities and affiliations, which bring workers and their organisations to face 
contradictions, is part and parcel of claiming that workers have g ncy: they may 
choose, determined in part by geographies and histories not of their own making, to 
side with management or to favour their local loyalties, over standing in solidarity 
with their colleagues.  
Contradictions are what makes capitalism both trembl  and land back on its feet, in 
an ever-tightening cycle of destruction and exploitation (Harvey, 2006 [1982]). 
However, I argued that they are also fundamental to the idea of a “labour spatial fix.” 
As shown in Chapter 7, most workers are concerned with the protection of or modest 
improvements in their realities, rather than their overturning and care about their 
work. Workers’ attachment to their work and their demands for recognition and 
respect prompted them to resist the rise of a financialised strategy in ST, which they 
saw threatening the paradoxical equilibriums that held their company together. 
Unions, by attending to workers’ contradictory feelings about work, as both 
alienating and something that they cared about and needed, were able to find a 
common interest to fight against ST’s financialisation and leveraged this caring 
posture to increase the appeal of their demands to whi e-collar workers and to public 
stakeholders.  In mobilising for the state to intervene and protect heir company from 
the threat to ST’s productive capacity, workers were, of course, protecting their jobs, 
most of which depended upon ST maintaining an industrial outlook. Beyond this 
clear self-interest, workers, consciously or not, also played a role in the stabilisation 
and survival of the company. Their fight for ST to change its corporate strategy also 





This campaign shows workers’ ongoing schizoid relations to capitalism (Cumbers et 
al., 2008), in that they are vested in capitalism’s regulation and, potentially, survival 
in the short-term, even if in the longer term they are “victims” of entrenched 
inequality. The contradictory dynamic further illustrates workers’ fundamental role 
in shaping the geography of capitalism. This type of agency was core to Herod’s 
(1997, p.17) labour geography project, where he suggested the need for  
A more deeply political theorization of the contested nature of the 
production of space under capitalism for, ultimately, it is the conflicts 
over whose spatial fix (capitalists’ or workers’) is actually set in the 
landscape that are at the heart of the dynamism of the geography of 
capitalism.  
Here, he explicitly states that the dynamic contradictions which are core to Harvey’s 
(2006) understanding of how capitalism develops and survives by making space, 
albeit in a temporary manner, cannot be understood as capital’s making only. My 
work illustrates how, in practice and at the level of a company, workers and their 
organisations were involved in finding a “fix” to the long-term contradictions 
prompted by heightened short-term value extraction. This case study, I argued, aptly 
illustrated the fragility of financialisation as a new round of capital accumulation, 
given how a focus on maximising shareholder value exac rbates the next crisis by 
threatening both its means of production and its workforce, which, ultimately, is the 
source of its productivity. Yet, my analysis also suggested that financialisation, in its 
heightened drive to extract value could also offer grounds for new class formation 
processes, and that these processes of class resistance  were both crucial to secure 
workers’ jobs in this company, and by extension, to pr tect this company from the 
contradictions its financialised management within a financialising landscape 
engendered, if temporarily. Greater analysis of capitalism‘s “fixes” as contested 
processes between workers and people at large, capital nd the state, as reflecting the 
result of workers’ needs and constrained ability to shape their landscapes, and as 
ever temporary solutions to capitalism’s crisis remains crucial to understanding how 
capitalism endures and how it can be challenged. 
- - - 
Finally, I showed that international labour solidarty was both a means for workers 
to build power, and a related i eology that upholds that workers share common 
interests, with the need to care for one another on that basis. This distinction is crucial 
because it highlights the tension between the fact that “in union there is strength” 





practice, international collaboration is seldom the most relevant way to exert power. 
Within TNCs, workers and unions seemed as much pulled apart by their realities and 
experiences as brought together. Baptiste, well-aware th t international solidarity did 
not strengthen French unions, still pushed for it, claiming that “the goal is to create 
solidarity even without concrete progress, especially n these times of nationalist 
withdrawal” (notes, May 2017). This is where my politics intersects with my 
academic identity: like Baptiste, I believe in the importance of sustaining the ideal 
without any guarantee that it will work or brings about greater power in the short-
term. Tsing (2004, p.8) argues that “universals are eff ctive within particular 
historical conjunctures that give them content and force.” Likewise, to give the 
abstract ideal of labour solidarity shape, one should engage with it as a concrete, 
“messy” and constantly changing political endeavour and narrative, grounded in 
workers’ needs. In union, there is strength, but there is also strength in grounded 
approaches that do not rely on an ideal notion of unity before it is enacted and start 
with small steps.  
Significantly, whilst I emphasised the importance of w rkers’ given and reproduced 
differences, I also tried to avoid another type of essentialism, according to which 
these intrinsic differences preclude them from collective organising. Wright’s 
argument (2006, p.100) that making the leap between “lived experiences of struggle 
[unfolding] in highly particular ways and the recognition, at some level of abstraction, 
that common issues bind these experiences in some important ways” continues to 
challenge activists and scholars alike as they fight or social justice. I strived for my 
analysis of workers’ uneven agency to also attend to the question of creating 
commonality. Gibson-Graham (2006, p.xxv) criticise tudies which characterise 
limits to workers’ agency as fundamental and definitive, rather than as “things to be 
struggled with.” They speak of one of the groups they studied, which, whilst 
expecting “to confront obstacles, difficulties, threats of annihilation, and co-optation,” 
treated “these as everyday political challenges rathe  han as limits to politics” 
(p.xxv). This description speaks to my hesitancy to reify the limits to workers’ and 
unions’ ability to create commonality locally and internationally. Whilst these limits 
proved to be crucial stumbling blocks to the TUN and showcase the importance of 
workers’ varied socio-spatial positionalities, unions were also able to create political 
narratives which enabled them to recognise common interests and bridge their 
differences, as well as to connect with the social being of distant colleagues.  
Indeed, in Chapter 7 and 8, I showed how workers and unions politicised their 





workers’ producer pride, and articulating the conflict of interest between themselves 
as organised workers concerned for their future andtheir financially-driven 
management. This framing was effective in that French unions, with varying support 
from other unions, were able to leverage coalitional power to moderately shift ST’s 
financialised strategy, but also to find common interests, temporarily, with other ST 
unions. The campaign against ST’s financialisation, based on workers’ experiences, 
fears and concrete needs and putting forward a common interest structured by a 
political narrative, fostered international collaboration more effectively than the 
campaign for a GFA, which remained abstract. The differences between the two 
campaigns illustrate why a grounded approach to international labour solidarity is 
needed, in order to both analyse material differences and resulting divisions between 
workers and how these conflicting loyalties may change and enable narratives that 
sustain unions finding common interests and strugglin  together. Following growing 
frustration with Industri’ALL’s approach, I considered that 
The power of capital is the power to abstract places and people, in 
numbers and terms such as 'financial outputs’ and ‘inputs.’ Labour isn’t 
able to do that. It is formidably and irrevocably attached to people, 
names, individual stories, conflicts and power struggles. Does the 
international require abstraction? How can it take shape, body or weight 
in order to have consequences? There is a fundamentl divergence 
between the act of the abstraction that a capitalist c view of people as 
numbers embodies and workers’ relationship to themselve  and each 
other. (notes, July 2017) 
Trade unionism has always been about more than class, su tained as it is by local 
relationships, cultures, values, and a sense of community. For internationalism to 
take shape, I believe that workers need to create a similarly rich relational 
environment on an international scale. As I argued in Chapter 9, researchers can play 
a role in this endeavour, by helping to share and translate this wealth of worlds and 
experiences between different unions. Further, by sharing stories, establishing direct 
connections between workers and unions leaders and attempting to build common 
demands, union leaders in ST were also able, in a modest fashion to build a more 
grounded international solidarity. Ryland (2010, p.6) claims 
It is too simplistic to claim that workers automatic lly identify with 
internationalism and other workers according to an idealist working 
class consciousness or social praxis or identity. This is not to disregard 
the possibility of an international solidarity motivated by a universal 
class consciousness but rather, to look towards one that is constructed 





Whilst this is something of a straw(wo)man argument, since I do not believe that 
Marx, Engels or any militant trade unionists ever just wanted abstract solidarity, I 
repeat this point of “grounding” or “embodying” the international because when an 
abstract relation to international solidarity animated workers, for instance French 
workers believing they should speak to Moroccan ones because they obviously (!) 
shared common interests, or when union representatives went through the motions 
of attempting social dialogue at the international scale, nothing concrete took root 
and solidarity faded into thin air. When French andMoroccan unionists called each 
other in October 2014, they did not know what to say to one another. When reading 
this account, I wrote, “There is almost a need to create the vocabulary to imagine a 
transnational struggle, beyond the somewhat hollow principles - a vocabulary that I 
need to create for myself as well” (October, 2015). This vocabulary should 
encompass workers’ daily experiences, needs, dreams, fears, and also provide 
examples and stories of what they can do together, at a range of scales. 
Without a concrete imagination of what one could do together that spoke directly to 
what workers experienced, I saw workers and unionists fall back into the ease of 
institutional habits and toothless demands of fighting for rules, which responded to 
no ones’ needs. By contrast, when they spoke about machines, safety equipment, 
layering processes or corporate strategy, their inte es s and producers’ pride lit up – 
albeit in an uneven fashion. The realities and feelings, notably the notion of 
producer’s pride, I believe, are characteristic of many workplaces and can provide 
grounds for workers to see their singular experiences as shared, unfair and 
susceptible to change. These connections need to be devised according to the 
particularities of each site, rather than taken for granted and this is where a pragmatic 
approach to research may be helpful. Lastly, I argued that solidarity depends on 
workers and trade unions being ready to take a step in o the unknown, cognizant of 
what they could do together, and willing to show a measure of vulnerability. 
Vulnerability is both about providing the impetus for workers to take action, i.e., 
stating a need that others can answer, and about ens ring a measure of reciprocity in 
efforts which can stray into “help” rather than solidarity. International labour 
solidarity may not exist now; it may still be mostly an abstract dream. The point is 
to make it real by looking at workers’ diverse experiences, and working with the 
contradiction they entail and the possibilities they offer.  





In September 2017, I attended one of the last protests in Grenoble against the wave 
of labour reforms. I wrote, “the day gnaws at me, w are so few and it feels like 
there’s a world which is bowing out.” The union paraphernalia, the dated discourses, 
the tiredness, the sparse numbers and my own exhaustion left me parched for hope. 
And yet, as I write the final words of my thesis, new waves of strikes and protests 
reverberate throughout France whilst UCU geography members are building their 
usual fire for the third wave of university strikes. This action-research offered no 
certainty. I remain unsure about the postulate heldby hopeful scholars and GUFs – 
whose role is structurally to hold this belief – that TNCs may offer “alternative 
cartographies” (Wills, 2002) which can enable greater feelings of solidarity between 
distant workers. Whilst TNCs remain key nodes of power, I am all too painfully 
aware of the myriad difficulties that activating this spatiality, which does connect 
diverse workforces in both interdependent and competitive ways, encounters. I tried 
to hold my doubts at bay, along with recognising that e analysis of failed attempts 
might be illuminating (Evans, 2010; Hennebert (2010) and that there is a latent 
capacity for people to resist, that no cold materialist nalysis or personal disillusion 
can foreclose. Wallerstein (2005, p.50) encourages us “to hold on to our visions even 
if we won’t reach them in our lifetimes. If we put our work in perspective, we are 
part of a longer struggle. The point of an ideal may NOT be to reach it, but to let it 
guide our journeys.” There were no blueprint – and I would be suspicious of any, 
and as Stoeckler (1999) suggested, I gave it a try.  
Throughout this work, I was humbled by activists’ generosity, and by their ability to 
continue to try, fail, and hope still. Faced with the insane reach of and massive stakes 
involved in globalised capitalism, union struggles need to stay humble and take one 
step at a time, learning from their mistakes and small successes. I tried to learn, and 
I hope my readers have as well. If I sometimes despair(ed) at the results of this work, 
I cling to the need for this analysis, by remembering that things did change, albeit 
temporarily and that, as the latest strikes suggest, building a sense of collective 
agency and continuing to uphold hope needs to be continuously performed and 
embraced. It is hard work, comes under threat, crumbles, changes and starts again 
and not anew. The world we need is not at hand, it has to be made. Remaining open 
to hope is remaining vulnerable to disappointment, bu  this vulnerability is key to 
change. To quote Younge (2020), “The propensity to despair is strong, but should 
not be indulged. Sing yourself up. Imagine a world in which you might thrive, for 













Appendix 1: Interviewees summary 
 
Name Site Job Union 
Andre Grenoble Engineer CGT 
Baptiste Grenoble Engineer CGT 
David Rousset Operator CGT 
Edern Tours Engineer CGT 
Etienne Tours Engineer CGT 
Jean Grenoble Technician CGT 
Jo Rousset Operator CGT 
Julie Grenoble Engineer CGT 
Laura Grenoble Engineer CGT 
Louis Crolles Operator CGT 
Madeleine Grenoble Engineer CGT 
Martin Grenoble Engineer CGT 
Maurice Grenoble Engineer CGT 
Otto Crolles Ope/Tech CGT 
Raphael Grenoble Technician CGT 
Rene Rousset Operator CGT 
Richard Crolles Operator CGT 
Sophie Grenoble Operator CGT 
Thomas Crolles Tech CGT 
Alban Crolles Engineer CFDT 
Arnault Le Mans Engineer CFDT 
Baltazar Rousset Engineer CFDT 
Emmanuelle Rousset Engineer CFDT 
Gauthier Crolles Engineer CFDT 
Guillaume Grenoble Engineer CFDT 
Jules Crolles Technician CFDT 
Nathan Rennes Technician CFDT 
Samuel Rousset Technician CFDT 
Timothe Crolles Engineer CFDT 
Donald Tours Engineer UNSA 
Claire Rousset Engineer CFE-CGC 
Edern Tours Tech/Inge CFE-CGC 
Pierre grenoble Engineer CFE-CGC 
Thibault Le Mans Engineer CFE-CGC 
Leo Federation CGT 
Aaron Malta, former union rep federal GWU 
Christopher Malta, current union rep federal GWU 
Liam current union representatives Technician GWU 
Alessandro Agra Operator CGIL 
Angelo Agrate Operator CISL 





Carla Catania Operator CGIL 
Claudio Catania Operator CGIL 
Daniele Catania Engineer GCGIL 
Giuseppe Castalletto Engineer CGIL 
Guila Agrate Engineer CISL 
Lucas Agrate Operator CISL 
Rosa Catania Engineer CGIL 
Afiq Muar Operator EIEUSR 
Ashraf Muar Supervisor EIEUSR 
Diyana Muar Operator EIEUSR 
Imran Malaysia Organiser EIEUSR 
Manish Muar Operator EIEUSR 
Najah Muar Operator EIEUSR 
Nayla Muar Operator EIEUSR 
Syami Muar Technician EIEUSR 
Aya Bouskoura Operator UMT 
Azzeddine Bouskoura Engineer UMT 
Belaid Bouskoura Operator UMT 
Bilal Bouskoura Operator UMT 
Carlos Bouskoura Engineer UMT 
Choukri Bouskoura Technician UMT 
Daoud Bouskoura Engineer UMT 
Farid Bouskoura Operator UMT 
Ghazi Bouskoura Operator UMT 
Hosni Bouskoura Supervisor UMT 
Larbi Bouskoura HR UMT 
Massoud Bouskoura Operator UMT 
Mahmoud Bouskoura Maintenance UMT 
Mehdi Bouskoura Supervisor UMT 
Maryam Bouskoura Supervisor UMT 
Nour Bouskoura Operator UMT 
Christopher Federal representative UWEEI 
Damien Former chief economist ST 
Charles Industry expert 
Mrs Fioraso French MP Isere 
Akmal HR manager Muar 
Harith HR manager Muar 
Emile Former mayor Isere region 







Appendix 2: Consent form (English version) 
 
 
Emma Saunders,  





I,  ………………………….. 
in signing this consent form, accept to participate in the research conducted by 
Mrs. Emma Saunders. 
I understand that the research aims to analyse the possibilities and limits to 
international labour solidarity in one TNC. 
I am aware and agree that : 
1. My interview will be recorded, transcribe and coded in order to inform the 
research mentioned above 
2. I can ask to access my interview transcript in order to read over and amend 
its transcription 
3. Excerpts from my interview with Emma Saunders may be used in 
academic publications and in public presentations 
4. I am free to retract my consent at any time during this research. In this 
case, my participation will cease immediately and ay information from 
my interview will not be used 
 
Regarding confidentiality, I choose to (tick appropriate box) 
 
I agree for my real name to be used in the research 
 
I would like for the researcher to use a pseudonym 
 
 
Signed : ……………………………………………………………… 
Signed by the researcher : ………………………………………. 









• What are the issues, demands and interests of workers at the moment in the 
site ? How have they changed ? 
• What are the ongoing negotiations or priority issues that the union is 
negotiating at the local level ? (at the national leve  if relevant) 
• Has the atmosphere  changed at the worksite ? How so ? How come ? 
What are workers’ fears at the moment ? 
• During the various restructuring exercises that you lived through, what 
happened ? Did workers mobilise ? How so ? Were you able to stop these 
restructurings ? 
 
Personal union trajectory: 
• Why did you join ? And why this union ? What is your vision of your 
role ?  Of your union’s role ? 
• What have been union victories on your site ? In other sites ?  
• How did you achieve them ? 
• What are organising/ unionising stories which inspire you ? 
 
Union work : 
• How do you unionise people ? 
• How to exert leverage ? What are your tactics to influe ce management ? 
How effective are they ? 
• How do people get in touch with the union ? 
• How do you communicate with them ? 
 
International work : 
• What do you think of the inititiave of the TUN? 
• Who do you think should be involved in this effort? 
• What are the needs for international solidarity ?  
• What are the obstacles you see ? 
• What would it be interesting to know from the other sites ? 
• What would you be able to share with them ? 







Appendix 4: Number of ST workers in R&D, fabs 
and back-end plants 
 
 
Site Country Number of workers 
Pure R&D 
Grenoble France 1,400 
Le Mans France 250 
Sofia Antipolis France 300 
Castalletto Italy 1,000 
Noida India 1,500  (ST website) 110 
TOTAL  4,450 
R&D connected to industrialisation 
Tours France 1,500* 
Rennes France 100* 
Crolles1-2 France 5,000* 
Rousset France 2,670* 
Agrate Italy 4,500* 
Catania Italy 3,949* (ST, sustainability, 2018, p.6) 
Ang Mo Kio Singapore 4,581* (ST, sustainability, 2015, p.5) 
TOTAL  3,000** 
* This is the total number of workers: many of these workers are not R&D 
workers. When possible, I quote the source of data. Otherwis, e timations stem 
from union data; in many instances there was no breakdown for each site 
regarding R&D workers, thus the two asterisks. 
** This is the total of R&D workers specifically in these sites 
 




                                                          
110 Most of Bangalore’s 600 workers were fired during the restructuring that took place in 





Front-end production facilities 
Site Country Number of workers Size of wafer 
Tours France 1,500 125-mm, 150-mm 
Rennes France 100 150-mm ( 
Crolles1 France 1,000 200-mm  




2017, p.11) 200-mm  
Agrate Italy 4,500 200-mm, 300-mm pilot line 
Catania Italy 3,949 150-mm, 200-mm 
Ang Mo Kio Singapore 
4,581 (ST 
sustainability report, 
2015, p.5) 150-mm, 200-mm  
TOTAL  19,300*  
* I subtracted from the total number of workers the workers already mentioned as 
R&D workers 
 
Figure 2: Front-end fabs in ST. 
 
Back-end production sites 
Site Country Number of workers* 
Bouskoura Morocco 3,450 (interviews) 
Kirkop Malta 1,600 
Muar Malaysia 
3,900 (ST website) though plans towards 
becoming 4,400 
Shenzhen China 4,800 (ST sustainability report, 2017, p.9) 
Calamba The Philippines 1,600 (ST website) 
Toa Payoh Singapore 1,400? 
Rennes France 100 
TOTAL  16,840 
 





Appendix 5: Subsidies received by ST between 1994 
and 2017 
 











   ?  ? Italy France  Europe France 
1994 19.3 (2) 40.4 (2)         80.1 (1) (2) 
1995 11.8 (2) 64.5 (2)         89.6 (1) (2) 
1996 4.6 (2) 93.3 (2)         63.8 (1) (2) 
1997 6.2 (2) 30.2 (2)         55.3 (1) (2) 
1998   
182.4 
(2) 
        63.5 (1) (2) 
1999   53.4 (2)         60.4 (1) (2) 
2000   95.2 (2)         42.1 (1) (2) 
2001   77 (2) 
 526  
(2) 
      58 (1) (2) 
2002   55 (2)     
 Crolles2 
(6) 
76 (1) (2) 
2003   62 (2)     76 (1) (2) 
2004   46 (2)     84 (1) (2) 
2005   38 (2)     76 (1) (2) 
2006   15 (2)       54 (1) 
2007   9 (2) 78 (2) 49 (1)   97 (1) 
2008   4 (2)   161 (1)   
Nano12 
83 (1) 
2009   4 (2)   146 (1)   201 (1) 
2010       146 (1)   106 (1) 
2011       159 (1)   128 (1) 




2013       146 (1)   57 (1) 
2014       146 (1)   231 (1) 




2016   15    ? 
ESCEL 



















 800 ? 






   42  1,030  78 1,218  33.5  2,186.7 
Total  France: 3,404.7 + 800 (?) 
Total Italy: 78 
Total other: 1,072 (unknown origin) + 33.5 (Europe) 
Total ALL:  4,588.2 (+ 800?) 
I cross-checked all of ST’s annual reports from 1996 to 2017 with an industry expert report 
(SECAFI report, 2016). Given the changes of reporting standards, i.e., in how different 
funding streams are reported as “items,” these are tentative numbers. Further, from 2004 
onwards, ST financial reports no longer specifically record governmental funding. Rather, 
they speak of 'other income,' which includes: “funds received through government 
agencies for research and development programs; costs incurred for new start−up and 
phase−out activities not involving saleable production; foreign currency gains and losses; 
gains on sales of tangible assets and non−current assets; and the costs of certain activities 
relating to IP” (ST, Annual Report 2007, p.67). Thus, there is little indication of the 
provenance of funds and how they are linked with government-backed plans. I crossed-
checked figures between ST’s Annual Accounts and the SECAFI report and I believe the 
estimations I provide are roughly accurate. I included the cancelled subsidy in Catania 
because it shows the high level of support considered by the Italian state, though I cannot 
explain why it was cancelled. 
(1) Secafi Report 2016 
(2) ST Annual Report (1996, 1998, 200, 2003, 2006, 2 07, 2008, 2010, 2014, 2017) 
(3) ECSEL reporting available online. European funds followed one another under 
different acronyms (MEDEA, ESRPIT, RACE, Horizon2020, IPCUI, ECSEL), and are 
mainly funded by member states, rather than by the EU. 
(4) Number comes from Industry announcements (Usine Digitale, 2014) and from ST’s 
own reporting. 
(5) Numbers from PIA 2015, 2016 and 2017 report. Some fficial documents report that 
the Nano 2017 program received 600 million euros frm the French state, in addition to 
38 million from local councils, and 11 million from Europe (Conseil General Isere, extrait 
de deliberations 11/12/2014, p.7; 24/07/2015, p.2) however I was not able to cross-
reference these greater amounts which is why they are not included. 
(6) Reverdy (2014, p. 18) 





Appendix 6: Story of the unionising efforts in 
Bouskoura and Muar 
 
In Bouskoura, in 2010, after workers lived through the closure of the Ain Seba site 
and activists being laid off after two attempts to unionise the workforce, forty 
workers stood for election as branch officers. When the company fired all of them, 
according to Mehdi, “We had a plan.” The entire fab walked out. Operators chanted 
and protested through the night until the management took back in all of the fired 
workers the next day (notes, January 2016). The union persists to this day. Nour 
recalled, 
We had to protest, we organised strikes, we had tough moments to 
create the union here. […] In the warehouse department, two members 
were suspended [because of union activity]. […] We organised a strike 
[in solidarity]. 
Workers supported unionisation because “when [ST] closed the site in Ain Seba, 
they massacred [sic] workers’ rights” (Farid), but also because “the [existing] shop 
floor delegate system did not feel transparent” (Mahmoud). Interviewees emphasised 
changes that have since taken place, 
[Before] it was like a dictatorship […] as soon as you said something 
[your supervisor could shout,] ‘Go see your manager!’ […] You could 
arrive at 5am, beep your badge and be unable to enter [because you 
had been fired]. (Mahmoud)  
Now, we have the right to say no. […] We have to right to express our 
opinion, react and say what is important! […] Befor, the company 
didn’t respect the worker. The worker, like in the army, just had to 
execute orders. (Nour) 
Before there was no dignity for the worker, the HR did whatever they 
wanted and now [with the union], there is dignity. (Massoud) 
UMT won rights for subcontracted workers; an equalisation of the annual bonus, 
which was particularly beneficial for operators; brought gender parity in engineering 
roles (notes, February 2019); and improved “transport, the restaurant, health benefits, 
the insurance, well lots of things!”(Aya). Afterwards, as suggested by the quotes, 
workers felt respected and able to voice their concerns and needs. Since, 85% of 
Bouskoura’s workforce has joined the UMT and union leaders continue to mobilise 
the workforce on everyday issues through flyers, speeches during mealtime, and, 
when needed, sit-ins. Workers’ quotes are important in highlighting that the UMT’s 
win was not just about material changes, but also about workers feeling respected at 





In Muar, following the implementation of new legislation in 2010, activists 
registered a regional electronics union: EIEUSR. When the organiser filed for union 
certification in ST, the company rushed to the Industrial Relation office to declare a 
company union (notes, July 2017).111 The nascent union had to contest the legality 
of ST‘s move and then convince workers to vote in favour of EIEUSR. Unable to 
access the work site, activists leafletted workers in buses and used WhatsApp groups 
to exchange information (notes, July 2017). They urged workers to go to the voting 
place in groups, to protect themselves from pressur from managers (notes, July 
2017). Workers voted in favour of EIEUSR effectively ousting the company union. 
Since then, over 1,300 workers have joined EIEUSR. The union has won a 7% pay 
rise and greater parental-leave benefits, ensured that the 12-hour compressed week 
had an overtime pay provision and extended the two-month annual bonus to 
contractual workers (notes, July 2017). Since the election, the work site committee 
has not leafletted workers, nor organised petitions, r walkouts, has been granted an 
office in the factory and relies exclusively on tri-annual CBA negotiations to 
improve workers’ rights (notes, July 2017).   
ST Malaysian and Moroccan workers were thus able to create local independent 
unions, despite facing strong corporate hostility, and achieved significant 
improvements through their organising. Both organising successes were supported 
by unions from elsewhere: workers in Bouskoura receiv d support from the French 
unions, which pressured their HR112 to prevent further layoffs, whilst in Muar, the 
ability for electronics workers to form unions resulted notably from a 30-year 
campaign, supported by American trade unions and the ILO (Wad, 2012). Workers’ 
organising is thus testament to workers’ ongoing ability to fight for their rights, and 







                                                          
111 Since only one union can exist in each worksite, management may create an in-house 
union under their control, to prevent the rise of an independent union. 
112 Moroccan workers, in a weird legacy of colonialism, remained managed by the French 
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